亚太发展中地区外资的新格局

本文的亚太发展中地区包括了亚洲新兴工业化经济群体(韩国、台湾、香港、新加坡)、东盟四国(泰国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、菲律宾)和中国等九个国家与地区。全文就2000—2003年期间亚太发展中地区外国直接投资的发展趋势进行论述与分析。     

金融危机后亚太发展中地区外资的发展趋势

80年代中期开始，外国资本大量涌入亚太发展中国家或地区。1997年亚洲金融危机爆发后，各国或地区的外资普遍大幅度衰减。随着近期经济的复苏，在今后2至3年期间内，亚太发展中国家（地区）的外国直接投资将呈现出新的发展特点与趋势。     

亚太发展中地区经济的两次衰退与复苏

在短短的五年期间(1997年7月—2002年初)里,亚太发展中地区的经济经历了两次的衰退和两次的复苏。本文论述与分析这两次经济衰退与复苏的国际经济背景,并比较分析这两次经济衰退与经济复苏的不同特点。     

日本对华直接投资的态势

日本对华直接投资走过了１８年的历程，期间经历了４个阶段，掀起了３个高潮，总体投资规模呈逐渐扩大的趋势。近年来，日本对华直接投资在投资方式、投资方向和地域选择方面又有新的变化，表现出新的特点，同时也存在某些顾虑。系统地分析日本对华直接投资的态势，研究我国应采取的对策，对于加强中日两国经济合作，促进东北亚地区经济开发以及实施我国企业国际化经营战略等方面，具有重要的意义     

日本对华直接投资的新发展及其原因分析

新世纪初,特别是2003年以来,日本对华直接投资结束了停滞和下降的局面,进入了新的发展阶段。在日本对外直接投资连年衰退和中日关系恶化的情况下,日本对华直接投资之所以进入新的发展阶段,这乃是由中国经济开始新一轮高速增长、中国工业化进入以重化工业为主的新阶段等因素所决定的。这意味着中日关系出现的“政冷”只能在一定程度上影响“经热”,并不能从根本上改变“经热”的局面。     

日本对外直接投资的新发展与海外经营的新动向

从2005年开始,日本对外直接投资迅速增加,2006年终于超过了1990年的投资规模。在日本对外直接投资迅速增加的同时,其投资对象和投资内容都发生了新的变化,出现了新的特点。由此,日本企业的海外经营规模进一步扩大,今后将继续扩大投资。     

日本对外直接投资现状及其发展趋势

90年代以来,由于泡沫经济崩溃及长期经济停滞,日本对外直接投资在大幅度下降之后一直处于曲折回升的状态。当前日本对外直接投资的主要特点是：投资再次集中于发达国家;制造业投资大幅度增加;跨国购并成为投资的主要内容和基本方式;经由第三国的投资增加等。从整体看,今后日本对外直接投资有进一步重新扩大的趋势。促进日本对外直接投资重新扩大的有利因素主要是：日本经济有走向复苏的希望：日本仍有资本输出的能力：经济结构的继续调整等。     

日本企业在华直接投资及存在问题分析

日本企业对华直接投资发展极快 ,前景看好 ,但由于中日双方经济、文化背景不同 ,难免存在矛盾和纠纷 ,这就要求我们要不断完善法律 ,建立公平竞争的投资环境 ,同时 ,也要求日本企业处理好文化的主体化与客体化的关系。     

汇率及其波动与日本对华直接投资

日本是我国重要的贸易伙伴和外商直接投资来源国。影响日本企业对我国直接投资的因素可能有多种,本文拟从汇率因素切入,并以日本对华直接投资的事实数据和特征为背景,研究日元与人民币双边真实汇率对日本对华直接投资的影响。首先通过GARCH模型对双边真实汇率的波动进行测算,然后以此变量和真实汇率变量为基础,通过脉冲响应函数和方差分解技术,研究真实汇率水平及其波动对流入我国的日本FDI带来的影响。模型结果显示,双边真实汇率及其波动均对FDI产生了显著影响,而且该影响同理论预期相吻合,说明真实汇率是影响日本对华直接投资的重要因素,现阶段保持人民币汇率的相对稳定性有利于日本对华直接投资的增长。     

日本对华直接投资的不合理因素分析

20世纪 80年代以来 ,日本对华直接投资呈现出发展起伏、速度缓慢、产业结构技术构成偏低、地区分布集中、规模中小型化等特点。究其原因 ,一是日本对华投资动机的主流是利用低廉而丰富的劳动力 ;二是中国引资政策的调整及其导向 ,使日本对华直接投资发展不平衡 ;三是日本在进行投资决策时过于谨慎 ,不积极 ,且结构不合理。     

东盟国家外资投资的发展特点与趋势

本文选择了泰国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、菲律宾等四个东盟国家,分析它们在进口替代工业化、面向出口工业化、面向出口工业化与第二代进口替代工业化并行发展、金融危机后的两次经济衰退与两次复苏等阶段外资发展特点的变化,并分析导致这些变化的国内与国际经济背景。     

东盟国家外资投资的发展趋势

本文论述泰国、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、菲律宾在各个经济发展阶段的外资投资发展趋势、特点的变化,并分析导致这些变化的国内、国际经济背景。     

21世纪后泰国的外资投资发展趋势

本文论述与分析泰国外资投资在进入21世纪后(2001-2004年期间)的增长变化趋势、投资来源结构与投资产业分布结构的变化趋势及其经济背景,并概述在这段期间泰国外资投资政策的演变。     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

Economic Policy,Political Constraints,and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries

As foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly important in the world economy, a large body of literature has emerged regarding the determinants of FDI flows. Some scholars argue that democracy attracts FDI through the mechanism of political constraints, which reduce the risk of negative policy changes. However, the value of policy stability should be conditional on the attractiveness of contemporary FDI-relevant policies. I therefore propose a theoretically more comprehensive argument: political constraints are attractive to investors when the host country policy environment is FDI-friendly, because these political constraints reduce the probability of negative policy changes in the future. When the policy environment is hostile to FDI, on the other hand, political constraints will have little positive effect, and, to the extent they indicate that FDI-relevant policies are unlikely to improve, may even deter FDI. This argument helps explain why the positive relationship between democracy and FDI seems to emerge after a global shift toward FDI-friendly polices. I find robust empirical support for the argument in tests covering more than 100 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, indicating significant effects using a variety of policy and political constraint measures.     

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

While political scientists find that democracy reduces political risk, little scholarship analyzes how authoritarian regimes attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This article argues that while authoritarian countries are generally risky, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both “above” and “below.” Signing international investment treaties are critical for authoritarian countries to signal a commitment to FDI-friendly policies. However, only authoritarian signatories that allow some degree of public deliberation in their policymaking are then constrained from deviating from the policies of the international investment treaties. Panel statistical regressions and a case analysis support the hypothesis.     

Unionization and Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment

Although inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has many benefits for a country as a whole, like trade, it is a source of competition for producers in the host country, with concomitant effects on labor markets. The entrance of foreign multinationals increases demand for skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor, and also increases the elasticity of demand for labor because multinationals are able to shift production across borders. This raises the question of whether or not labor has an impact on policy toward inward FDI. I suggest that organized labor is a key determinant of the influence of labor on inward FDI restrictions. Not only do unions mitigate the collective action problem facing labor, but unionized workers, regardless of skill level, have incentives to support restrictions on inward FDI because rising elasticity of demand restricts bargaining power. I expect that higher levels of unionization will lead to greater restrictions on inward FDI. I find support for this hypothesis in an analysis of U.S. industry-level formal restrictions on inward FDI between 1981 and 2000. Industry skill intensity, a proxy for the distributional consequences of FDI for labor, does not explain variation in barriers to inward FDI, suggesting that the confluence of interests and influence is necessary for labor to influence policy.     

创造国际直接投资新环境开拓中俄经贸合作新局面

中俄两国经贸关系走上了正常发展的轨道,相互投资成为深化两国经济关系的重要内容。国际直接投资是突破贸易壁垒、进入一国市场的重要手段,也是稳定中俄经济关系的根本基础。中俄相互投资存在经济转轨尚未完全实现、法律法规不健全、缺乏有效的筹资渠道、沟通渠道不畅等制度性和基础性障碍。为促进中俄两国相互投资健康、快速发展,应在签定双边投资协定、建立中俄商业协会、开辟投资融资途径、相互建立工业园区以及举办投资洽谈会等方面构建相互投资的宏观环境。