The European Parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals

Abstract The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.     

Is Co-decision Good for the Environment? An Analysis of the European Parliament's Green Credentials

The European Parliament (EP) has long been regarded as a positive force for environmental change in the EU, but there has been little detailed empirical scrutiny to determine whether its reputation as a green champion is deserved. Nor has there been any evaluation of the environmental impact of the increase in EP powers under co-decision. These oversights are rectified by an evaluation of the EP's amendments to environmental legislation using typologies that rank them in terms of their level of ecological commitment and importance. EP amendments proposed under three procedures of decision making are compared in order to determine whether recent increases in the EP's powers under the co-decision procedure have affected its ability and willingness to adopt 'green' amendments. It is clear that the EP has consistently tried to strengthen environmental legislation but there is some ambiguity as to whether co-decision has been good for the environment.     

Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation

With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given to the administrative and delegatory consequences of changes in the EU's legislative procedures. This article examines how legislative institutions' preferences for limits to the implementing discretion of the Commission and the member states have changed with the shift from the cooperation procedure to the codecision procedure. I find that the European Parliament (EP) responded to the codecision procedure by increasing the share of its amendments that expand the implementing discretion of member states. Furthermore, the Council significantly changed its attitude toward EP amendments restricting Commission discretion.     

The Impact of the Scottish Parliament in Amending Executive Legislation

This paper provides the first systematic attempt to investigate the legislative impact of the Scottish Parliament on Executive legislation, by analysing the fate of all amendments to Executive bills from the Parliament's first session (1999–2003). Initial findings on the success of bill amendments show that the balance of power inclines strongly in favour of ministers. However, when we account for the type of amendment and initial authorship we find evidence that the Parliament (both coalition and opposition MSPs) actually makes more of an impact, particularly in terms of the level of success of substantive amendments to Executive bills. Our findings have implications for much of the current literature that is sceptical of the existence of power sharing between the Executive and the Parliament and within the Parliament.     

动物的法律地位研究

近年来不少人士提出应当以立法形式赋予动物法律主体地位或权利主体资格。本文论述了动物法律地位的现状,通过对理性的定义,法律主体扩张的内在限制,动物本身的特点,对国外典型立法和风俗、判例的不同理解进行分析,得出法律主体的扩张不能及于动物的结论。进而认为应当将动物作为特殊的物进行保护。     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

Bremse oder Gaspedal? Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Wirkung der direkten Demokratie auf den Steuerstaat

This article analyzes the relationship between the different forms of direct democratic participation and the size of the tax state in the Swiss cantons for the period from 1983 to 2000. The analysis distinguishes between the different effects of the financial referendum and the initiative. Theoretical arguments suppose that the financial referendum curb the tax state, whereas the initiative is expected to contribute to its growth. Pooled time series analyses show that legal conditions of direct democratic participation in general and especially the legislation on financial referenda are much more important than the frequency of plebiscites for the explanation of the different sizes of the tax states in the cantons. As an additional result of the analyses, the impact of direct democracy on the tax state turns out to be much larger in the 1990s compared to the decade before.     

Desperation votes and private interests: an analysis of Confederate trade legislation

The Confederate Congress passed draconian trade legislation in February 1864 to regulate the blockade running business in contrast to their free trade agenda. This legislation created higher prices and deadweight costs except in areas under Union control. We examine the series of votes and proposed amendments relating to the passage of this legislation and find that representatives were more likely to vote for trade regulations if their districts would be largely unaffected by the legislation, such as those districts under Union occupation. This private interest explanation provides a heretofore unexplored historical example of public choice theory under extreme conditions.     

More Than IndyRef2? The Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020

Demands for a second Scottish independence referendum have persisted since 2014. The Scottish government introduced the Referendums (Scotland) Bill at Holyrood in May 2019 to enable referendums within the competence of the Scottish parliament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government presented this as a framework enabling a range of referendums. Opponents saw this as legislating for a second independence referendum. The act will form a large part of the legal framework and rules for any second independence referendum. Importantly, the legislation provides innovation in electoral law more generally. This article discusses the background to the bill, its initial contents, and debates around and amendments to the bill. It discusses its electoral law innovations, before considering its limitations and place as constitutional debates play out over a second independence referendum.     

Presidents,Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior

This article investigates the consequences of fast-track legislation in the European Union. Previous research has explained why fast-track legislation occurs and evaluated its democratic repercussions. This study focuses on the European Parliament (EP)’s intra-organisational response. It first describes how the early adoption of EU legislation has informalised legislative decision-making, transformed inter-organisational relations, and induced power shifts. It then discusses the political response, showing that actors seek to redress power shifts, that reform attempts centre on the control of negotiation authority and information flows, and that reform is highly contested. The research suggests that the chance of successful redress is low in Parliament as a decentralised organisation unless two conditions are met: (i) the extent of fast-track legislation reaches a critical level, and (ii) the organisation goes through a period of wider reform; the former increases the visibility of disempowerment and reputational loss, the latter allows package deals and/or the strategic use of norms. Based on qualitative document analysis and semi-structured elite interviews an analysis is made of how Parliament’s rules of co-legislation have been contested, negotiated and reformed from the formal introduction of fast-track legislation in 1999 to the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Negotiating in the Context of Codecision Procedures in 2009. The analysis also shows that Parliament may have a price to pay for its successful fight for empowerment, namely a challenge to its institutional legitimacy and discontent of its of rank-and-file members. More generally, understanding the conditions for intra-organisational reform can inform the study of other democratic bodies which undergo a similar restriction and seclusion of de facto decision-making.     

Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation. Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament’s inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and give more insight into the EP’s account-holding role.     

The political economy of centralization and the European Community

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz' law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters' attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression. Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin (Jacques Delors, Debates of the European Parliament, 6 July, 1988, No. 2-367/140).     

The “Europeanization” of the Basel process: Financial harmonization between globalization and parliamentarization

Public policy initiatives aimed at the prevention of future financial crises originate with global harmonization in the form of executive standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This article explores the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the process of adapting the standards in European Union legislation passed in 2013 as the Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive IV. Unlike accounts casting the EP as increasingly dependent upon outside sources in order to meet its enhanced legislative role, we find it increasingly dexterous in developing and using in‐house policy ideas, expertise, and not least a common sense of institutional purpose. Notable EP successes in final legislation include (but are not restricted to) a headline cap on bankers' bonuses in the face of entrenched business and national interests. The argument is developed by drawing upon a broad range of interviews together with other primary and secondary sources, tracing the contribution of the EP from the early stages of agenda‐setting through to the development of an “esprit de corps” among the committee lead team which survived intact throughout the “black box” of trilogue negotiations. Besides illuminating the notoriously opaque trilogue process, the analysis also contributes to contemporary debates about whether the EP's increased legislative powers are resulting in a shift away from its traditional allegiances with diffuse interests toward a greater engagement with producer sources in order to fulfill requirements for policy expertise.     

‘Somewhat more disruptive than we had in mind’1: The Boundary Commission for England's 2011 Proposed Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies

In February 2011 the UK Parliament passed an Act that both reduced the number of MPs to be elected to the House of Commons and significantly altered the rules for the definition of Parliamentary constituencies. After six redistributions in which organic criteria—MPs representing places with a community of interest—dominated the redrawing of constituency boundaries, the new rules gave precedence to an arithmetic criterion: all constituencies must have electorates within 5 per cent of the national quota (average). Seven months later the Boundary Commission published its initial proposals for a new set of 502 constituencies implementing these new rules. This paper evaluates the amount of change to the country's electoral map that this involves, identifies the main features of the new constituency configurations, and assesses their likely impact on UK political life.     

Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks

e-mail: jhfowler{at}ucdavis.edu Using large-scale network analysis I map the cosponsorship networksof all 280,000 pieces of legislation proposed in the U.S. Houseand Senate from 1973 to 2004. In these networks, a directionallink can be drawn from each cosponsor of a piece of legislationto its sponsor. I use a number of statistics to describe thesenetworks such as the quantity of legislation sponsored and cosponsoredby each legislator, the number of legislators cosponsoring eachpiece of legislation, the total number of legislators who havecosponsored bills written by a given legislator, and networkmeasures of closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality.I then introduce a new measure I call "connectedness" whichuses information about the frequency of cosponsorship and thenumber of cosponsors on each bill to make inferences about thesocial distance between legislators. Connectedness predictswhich members will pass more amendments on the floor, a measurethat is commonly used as a proxy for legislative influence.It also predicts roll call vote choice even after controllingfor ideology and partisanship.     

The European Parliament and the Commission Crisis: A New Assertiveness?

This article examines two claims made about the "Commission crisis" of 1999: first, that the accountability of the Commission to the European Parliament (EP) was significantly increased; and, second, that the model of parliamentary government in the European Union (EU) was advanced by events in 1999. In analyzing the crisis and its consequences, this article focuses upon the powers of dismissal and appointment, and what these powers reveal about the capacity of the EP both to hold the Commission responsible for its collective and individual actions and to influence its policy agenda. If a parliamentary model is to develop in the EU, the negative parliamentary powers of censure and dismissal have to be balanced by the positive powers of appointment and enhanced executive responsiveness. On both counts—dismissal and appointment—the 1999 "Commission crisis" did not point to the clear and unambiguous dawning of a "genuine European parliamentary democracy."     

Eurosceptics in trilogue settings: interest formation and contestation in the European Parliament

Trilogues have been studied as sites of secluded inter-institutional decision making that gather the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission. Trilogues, however, are not exempt from formal and informal party-political dynamics that affect intra- and inter-institutional contestation. The increase in Eurosceptics in the 2014 EP elections offers an opportunity to investigate their efforts to shape the position and behaviour of the EP negotiating team in trilogues. Therefore, this article investigates to what extent Eurosceptic party groups participate in trilogue negotiations and how mainstream groups deal with their presence. The analysis shows that the opportunities to participate in trilogues and shape the EP’s position are higher for those perceived as soft Eurosceptic MEPs, while mainstream groups apply a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to those perceived as being part of hard Eurosceptic groups – which reduces the chances of MEPs from those groups being willing to participate in parliamentary work.     

A Not So Technocratic Executive? Everyday Interaction between the European Parliament and the Commission

The European Commission, although generally portrayed as a technocratic, non-majoritarian institution, or as an agent of EU member governments, has become increasingly linked to the European Parliament (EP) through a range of semi-parliamentary measures intended to increase the executive’s legitimacy and accountability. In this article we argue that in addition to several highly visible and often treaty-based control instruments, an almost symbiotic, less visible, routine relationship can be observed between the two institutions. Based on an online survey of EP staff, as well as on minutes from EP committee meetings, this article examines the daily interaction taking place between the Commission and the EP, particularly at the level of officials. Although mutual interdependence in the legislative process may trigger daily interaction, the theoretical argument proposed is that the latter is facilitated and reinforced under two particular conditions: (i) if the two institutions share similar organisational patterns, and (ii) if they share similar behavioural patterns. Three such patterns are emphasised: sectoral, ideological and supranational.     

Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union

Delegation in the European Union (EU) involves a series of principal‐agent problems, and the various chains of delegation involve voters, parties, parliaments, governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament. While the literature has focused on how government parties attempt to monitor EU affairs through committees in national parliaments and through Council committees at the EU level, much less is known about the strategies opposition parties use to reduce informational deficits regarding European issues. This article argues that the European Parliament (EP) offers opposition parties an arena to pursue executive oversight through the use of written parliamentary questions. Using a novel dataset on parliamentary questions in the EP, this article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) ask questions of specific Commissioners. It transpires that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to ask questions of Commissioners. Questions provide these parties with inexpensive access to executive scrutiny. This finding has implications for the study of parliamentary delegation and party politics inside federal legislatures such as the EP.     

The implications of differences between employer and worker employment/earnings reports for policy evaluation

Differences in administrative (UI) and survey (S) records on employment and earnings have substantial implications for assessing the impact of a variety of public interventions, such as welfare‐to‐work and employment training programs, and especially the state‐oriented welfare reform legislation of 1996. We use data from the 1998 and 1999 waves of the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE) Resident Parent Surveys to explore individual differences between survey and UI employment and earnings reports for a Wisconsin sample of current and former welfare recipients. After exploring the potential causes of misreports from both sources, we document the degree of discrepancy between survey and UI earnings and employment measures and assess the difference between the two earnings measures in estimates of simple human capital (earnings) functions. Last, we evaluate the correspondence of the two measures with “hardship” indicators of economic well‐being.