Pluralism and Liberalism

Meta-ethical pluralism, as developed in the work of writers like Isaiah Berlin, is the idea that ethical values cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy or system but are irreducibly multiple. It has often been argued that simply to recognize this fact is to have a reason to favour liberal institutions. On the contrary, the plurality of values in itself gives us no reason to support liberalism, indeed no reason to prefer any particular political arrangement to any other. If pluralism is true, the liberal's best defence may lie in appealing, in the manner of writers like Walzer and Rorty, to the de facro limitations on moral commitments imposed by the existing political culture.     

Liberalism,neo-liberalism and governmentality: introduction

This paper concerns the emergence of a specifically 'economic' way of governing poverty at the start of this century, an event which is to be accounted for, though by no means exhaustively, by the discovery of 'unemployment'. The latter will make it possible to relate the nineteenth-century 'problem of the unemployed' to an object domain that is primarily economic, rather than cultural or moral. A new object of regulation will emerge from this economic problematization of the 'social question': the labour market. The paper pays particular attention to the national labour exchange system, the political technology that will visibilize the labour market in new ways. Together with unemployment insurance, it will suggest new ways of governing poverty and a new course for social policy.     

Foucault and Liberalism: Rationality,Revolution, Resistance

Abstract

In 1978 and 1979, the concept of governmentality was introduced by Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France. Foucault finds the genealogical origin of this concept in the Christian figure of the shepherd. From this starting-point, he then embarks on a eulogy of liberalism, in stark contrast to the Marxist critique of political economy. These two grand narratives of modern liberalism differ markedly in their political and philosophical presuppositions. The latter, rooted in the tradition of natural law, is directed towards revolution. The former, rooted in the tradition of English radicalism, is directed towards resistance. Beyond their different reconstructions of liberalism, however, the article concludes by showing how these two narratives, can in fact be combined in a politically fruitful way.     

Neutrality,autonomy, and power

This paper critically examines Alan Patten’s theory of neutrality of treatment. It argues that the theory assumes an inadequate conception of personal autonomy, which undermines its plausibility. However, I suggest that the theory can resolve the problem by developing and reinterpreting its conception of autonomy and introducing an additional strategy for addressing the power imbalances that result from the market-based interactions between individuals and their conceptions of the good.     

Modernity,Pluralism, and Catholicism

Over the past century and a quarter, the Catholic Church has passed through four phases in its response to modernity: rejection; the search for a modus vivendi; accommodation; and a critique of modernity from within. The net result of this development has been the recovery of the Church’s understanding of itself as an evangelical or missionary enterprise.     

Contractarianism, Liberal Neutrality, and Epistemology

This paper examines three arguments that attempt to justify liberal neutrality. Firstly the type of neutrality between conceptions of the good that is sought by the arguments is explained. Then the contractarian procedure that is one of the premises of each of the arguments is presented. The remaining sections then examine the arguments, which are Thomas Nagel's appeal to epistemic restraint, Brian Barry's appeal to the uncertainty thesis, and John Rawls's appeal to the burdens of judgement. The arguments attempt to show how the contractarian procedure results in liberal neutrality. They do so by trying to show how no conception of the good can be acceptable to everyone due to the epistemological status of conceptions of the good. It is concluded that none of the arguments succeeds.     

Liberalism, Unintended Orders and Evolutionism

There is something gravely amiss about a liberalism based upon evolutionism, as F. A. Hayek bases his endorsement of the free, open, or 'Great Society'. Such a society—one based upon individual liberty, autonomy, and free-market institutions—is not guaranteed by the evolutionary process, as Hayek's own indictment of twentieth-century totalitarianism in The Road to Serfdom amply demonstrated.
In the first section of this paper, I explore some of the pitfalls for a liberalism grounded on evolutionary foundations: a relucance to tamper with existing institutions which borders on traditionalism; a tension between individualism and holism, the latter born of an evolutionist's concern for the survival of the group; and a relativism derived from evolutionism which seems ill-suited to a liberalism which values freedom.
The last two sections of the paper examine some striking connections between Hayek's liberalism and that of William Graham Sumner and Herbert Spencer. While there are important differences between Hayek's and Sumner's positions, on the one hand, and Spencer's, on the other, all three suffer from a common problem: their liberalism sits uneasily upon evolutionary foundations.     

Reinventing Pluralism: Consensus,Hegemony, and the Politics of Affirmation

As inequalities in the United States have intensified in recent decades, Washington, DC’s advocacy system has thrived. Why has this proliferation of interest groups failed to deliver more substantive equality? The dominant response to this question typically cites the advocacy realm’s “upper-class accent,” portraying interest group representation as imbalanced and unresponsive to a broad range of voices. Yet this prevailing account—which I term “post- pluralist”—does not sufficiently explore the inegalitarian ways that neoliberalism shapes contemporary political advocacy. To this end, this article builds upon post-pluralist and post-Marxist insights to outline the advocacy system’s “politics of affirmation.” Using recent antigay legislation to explore this concept, I argue that today’s political advocacy circumscribes, rather than enlivens, prevailing standards of democratic participation by mobilizing hegemonic, neoliberal expressions of democratic citizenship. The article concludes by outlining how groups might pursue a transformative politics in order to destabilize neoliberalism’s hegemony.     

Strong Poets and Utopia: Rorty's Liberalism, Dewey and Democracy

Richard Rorty is one of the most controversial philosophers today. He argues, among other things, that philosophy should be replaced by literary writing and that it has nothing to say to politics. Yet his own more recent writing has been more and more about political issues. This article focuses upon the inconsistency of his politics with the philosophical influence which he has consistently identified as the strongest on his writings; that of John Dewey. At the root of this incompatibility lies the failure of his theoretical project to carry over his synthesis between Deweyan pragmatism and Nietzschean poststructuralism into the realm of politics.     

Pluralism,corporatism and perception of corruption

When people know who is influencing the elected politicians and they may ‘put the rascals out’ in case they feel that the incumbents are corrupt, ceteris paribus, their perception of the level of corruption should not be affected by lobbying. If on the other hand people are not sure which or how many actors are influencing public policy and they are not able to hold the government truly accountable as interest group influence is constant with different governments, people will be more likely to perceive the government as corrupted. The former system is a characteristic of corporatism and the latter of pluralism. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that interest groups with resources such as business groups or firms in pluralist systems are more influential than groups with few resources. Thus, people may perceive pluralist policy‐making system as more corrupt than corporatist policy‐making system where fewer visible actors have more or less equal weight in the policy‐making process. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.