The "common sense" of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption: a policy analysis.

Although rarely discussed prior to the 1985 Utah Supreme Court ruling against Intermountain Health Care Inc., the question of whether to grant tax exemptions to nonprofit hospitals is currently being debated by federal, state, and local legislators, and by the courts. Changes to current policy seem likely. This policy analysis: (1) presents the historical and legal background; (2) examines the economic, political, and organizational implications of current tax-exemption policy; and (3) offers three alternatives to this current policy. The analysis indicates that the current policy provides little incentive for nonprofit hospitals to make contributions of charity care. Of the alternatives, eliminating the exemption is not politically feasible at this time; regulating hospital operations and outputs portends an implementation nightmare; and tying tax subsidy levels to output levels of charity care--perhaps the strongest and most efficient incentive--would require an unlikely political consensus on what constitute valid and reliable measures of charity care. If there is a movement toward subsidies, then linking subsidy amounts to levels of charity care will depend on whether policy analysts can design satisfactory empirical measures. With the advent of universal health coverage, the demand for charity care will decrease. The problem for tax-exempt hospitals will then become justifying the exemption by demonstrating the extent to which they generate community benefits at no or reduced cost to society.     

Brief lives: economic life and political life in the history of economic thought

This paper considers the relationship between economic life and political life as it has been articulated in four contexts in the history of economics: the ancient, the mercantilist, the classical and the neoclassical. It examines the changing ways in which these aspects of behaviour have been seen to be related, and how that relationship has taken on different forms in different epochs of economic thought. The analysis seeks to reveal some of the remaining questions that arise in the question of the relationship between economic man and political man.     

Causal inference and American political development: common challenges and opportunities

Public Choice - The causal inference (CI) movement has forced political scientists to think far more seriously about what can be learned from a particular research design and to be more attentive...     

思想政治教学与青年人生格局的生成

人生格局是一个人的内化修养,一旦自然生成将会受益终生。要重视高中思想政治教学在青年学生人生格局生成中的基础性作用,引导青年学生以人生大格局的坚定性支撑起人生理想的崇高性、人生信念的坚定性、人生奋斗的持续性、职业规划的长远性。为达到此目的,就要务求思想政治教学的实效,教学素材选择方面实现从试题化到生活化,教学理念方面实现从"单打独斗"到"协同作战",思想政治课教师成长方面做到终身学习。     

The political value of languages

A theory of linguistic justice needs to take into account the three distinct values of language as a medium for communication, as a source of individual identity and as an instrument for political self-government. Doing so would undermine Van Parijs’ claim that political borders and peoples should be downgraded to a purely instrumental role for purposes of social justice. But it would widen the scope of egalitarian global justice by including a universal right of individuals to membership self-governing polities and it could provide more solid theoretical foundations for his defence of coercive territorial language regimes.     

The political economy of dissonance

Cognitive dissonance is defined as the psychological discomfort or annoyance that may exist when an individual's choice is not consistent with his values and beliefs. Dissonance may cause an individual to reconsider his values and beliefs, enter new choices with different parameters, respond to the constraints imposed, or change his individual preference function. This paper extends Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance to the work of public choice theorists and seeks to explain the incentives of the iron triangle to foment and quell dissonance. Examples are provided for specific environmental and health and safety risks. Akerlof and Dickens (1983) used cognitive dissonance to justify public sector intervention as necessary to correct what they perceived as a market failure in the choice of safety equipment by workers in hazardeus industries. Unlike Akerlof and Dickens (1983), we argue that the concept of cognitive dissonance is applicable to the analysis of public sector decisions giving rise to government failure as well as private decisions involving possible market failure. This paper views the public sector as a market-like arrangement in which dissonance may be produced and exchanged like any other commodity. Cognitive dissonance provides a useful framework for examining individual choice and also expands our understanding of the unseen elements of rent-seeking.     

The political economy of targeting

One of the most widely used method of targeting is to reduce welfare benefits as income rises. Although the need for such targeting is clear enough, it also entails two important difficulties. Firstly, the prospect for the recipients of losing part of their benefits if they were to earn more can be a deterrent to work harder. Secondly, by reducing the number of recipients, targeting reduces the political support for taxation and redistribution. The purpose of this paper is to study the voting equilibrium of the degree of targeting and the level of taxation in an economy where labour supply is variable. The analysis reveals that targeting may be fatal for redistribution even though it rejects strictly less than the richest half of the population, and that it is not possible for a coalition of the extremes to form and reject the middle income group from the welfare system. Moreover, because targeting affects labour supply, we find that Pareto improvements are possible when targeting is either “too low” or “too high”. We also find that voting simultaneously over taxation and targeting is favourable to the poor in the sense that they can converge to their most-preferred policy by successively forming a majority coalition with the rich to increase targeting and with the middle to increase taxation.     

The political legislation cycle

The economic theory of legislation holds that laws, even when they do not involve financial resources, redistribute property rights. Politicians supply legislation to groups with the highest political return. By the same logic, politicians should supply legislation when doing so has the highest political return. The dynamics of the supply of legislation should follow the pattern suggested by the political business cycle theory. We develop a model of government’s and voters’ behavior where a legislation cycle is the strategy to hold the government (coalition) together. Under certain assumptions, the model predicts that the approbation of laws should be concentrated at the end of the legislature and be positively related to the fragmentation of the government coalition. We test these restrictions on data about the supply of legislation by the Italian Parliament during legislatures from I to XIII (1948 to 2001). The empirical analysis provides strong support to the theory: a legislation cycle occurs when the conditioning phenomena that the model indicates are satisfied.     

The political consequences of thatcherism

While the economic changes effected by the British Conservative government in the 1980s are transparent, there is considerable debate as to whether there was a political dimension to the Thatcher Revolution. This paper argues that the Conservatives were successful in undertaking social structural reforms that effectively moved the political center of gravity in Britain to the right and toward the government's preferred market-oriented policy agenda. The government's strategy—manifest in the sale of council houses to tenants and of shares in privatized corporations to individuals, and its attack on organized labor—was narrowly targeted on the swing electorate among wealthier members of the lower socioeconomic strata. The Labour party has acknowledged the successes of the Conservatives' structural reforms, and has moved its policy platform, in Downsian fashion, to the right in order to regain electoral competitiveness.     

The political economy of fertility

This paper studies the political economy of fertility. Specifically, I argue that fertility may be a strategic choice for ethnic groups engaged in redistributive conflict. I first present a simple conflict model where high fertility is optimal for each ethnic group if and only if the economy’s ethnic diversity is high, institutions are weak, or both. I then test the model in a cross-national dataset. Consistent with the theory, I find that economies where the product of ethnic diversity and a measure of institutional weakness is high have increased fertility rates. I conclude that fertility may depend on political factors.     

The mobilization of political discontent

Although political discontent has risen substantially among Americans since the mid-sixties, there is considerable disagreement about the implications of this trend for individual political behavior and system performance. This paper develops a conceptual and theoretical framework within which this question can be examined. Two dimensions of political discontent, low diffuse support and external inefficacy, are hypothesized as motivations for political action when certain other conditions are met. In addition, because each of these orientations should be associated with different styles of political behavior, the mobilizing potential of political discontent may be greater than previous studies have indicated.