Making Hay ... or Clutching at Ontological Straws? Notes on Realism, 'As-If-Realism' and Actualism

Stuart McAnulla provides an eloquent defence of a particular variant of critical realism, suggesting that it provides a more appropriate set of ontological foundations for the kind of critical political analysis I espouse than the ontological actualism he attributes to me. In this rejoinder, whilst welcoming McAnulla's important intervention in the debate, I defend myself against his charge of actualism (if the attribution of an ontology to an author can be regarded as a charge), whilst indicating how the 'as-if-realism' that perhaps better reflects my ontological assumptions is perfectly compatible with critical political analysis. In so doing I caution against ontological evangelism, the notion that only 'real' entities can be causal, and the appeal to structures (like patriarchy) as causes. I conclude by reflecting on the complex and seldom discussed relationship between experience and ontology.     

Agency, Structure and Causality in Political Science: A Comment on Sibeon

Researchers in political science are devoting increasing attention to the ontological commitments of their theories – that is, to what those theories presuppose about the nature of the political world. This article focuses on a recent contribution to this 'ontological turn' in political science ( Sibeon, 1999 ). Tensions are identified in Sibeon's account of the causal interplay between agency and social structure. It is argued that these tensions can be resolved by reflecting explicitly on ontological issues, in particular the causal efficacy of social structure, using a particular approach to the philosophy of the social sciences known as critical realism. The value of such reflection for the explanatory power of political analysis is highlighted.     

Agency, Structure, and Social Chance as Cross-Disciplinary Concepts

It is appropriate that social scientists should develop explicit conceptualisations of agency, structure and social chance, these being three major dimensions of social and political life. The agency–structure debate, which refers to theoretical and ontological issues that tend not to be explicitly discussed by political scientists, is an important interdisciplinary starting point for conceptual and empirical work involving collaboration between political scientists and sociologists. Following a theoretical review of agency, structure and chance, it is argued that empirical research concerned with the study of politics and policy – indeed, social scientific research on any topic – should employ an ontology and methodology that focuses on the dynamics of interaction between agency, structure and social chance.     

King Canute and the 'Problem' of Structure and Agency: On Times, Tides and Heresthetics

The story of King Canute (Cnut) is well known. Indeed, in perhaps its most familiar form it exists as an oral historical tradition passed from generation to generation. In this almost legendary account, King Canute is depicted as an arrogant ruler, so confident as to his own omnipotence that he takes on the forces of nature, pitting his own powers against those of the rising tide – his wet robes paying testament to his powerlessness in the face of potent material forces and to the triumph of (natural) structures over (human) agency. Or so it might seem. In this article I suggest that even in this, the simplest depiction of the story of Canute, the relationship between structure and agency is more complex and involved than it appears. This complexity is only accentuated if we turn from the legend to the historical evidence. Moreover, by reflecting on Canute's practical negotiation of the 'problem' of structure and agency we can not only gain an interesting political analytical purchase on a seemingly familiar tale, but we can also generate a series of valuable and more general insights into our understanding of the structure–agency relationship. In particular, the (various) stories of King Canute and the waves alert us to the need: (1) to maintain a clear distinction between the empirical and the ontological; (2) to resist the temptation to attempt an empirical adjudication of ontological issues (or, indeed, an ontological adjudication of empirical issues); (3) to differentiate clearly between the capacities of agents with respect to material/physical structures on the one hand, and social/political structures on the other; (4) to acknowledge the significance of unintended consequences; (5) to attend to the 'performative' dimensions of agency; and (6) to recognise the dangers inherent in an overly instrumental view of actors' motivations and intentions.     

Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences

David E. Lewis Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 e-mail: delewis{at}princeton.edu e-mail: clinton{at}princeton.edu (corresponding author) The study of bureaucracies and their relationship to politicalactors is central to understanding the policy process in theUnited States. Studying this aspect of American politics isdifficult because theories of agency behavior, effectiveness,and control often require measures of administrative agencies'policy preferences, and appropriate measures are hard to findfor a broad spectrum of agencies. We propose a method for measuringagency preferences based upon an expert survey of agency preferencesfor 82 executive agencies in existence between 1988 and 2005.We use a multirater item response model to provide a principledstructure for combining subjective ratings based on scholarlyand journalistic expertise with objective data on agency characteristics.We compare the resulting agency preference estimates and standarderrors to existing alternative measures, discussing both theadvantages and limitations of the method. Authors' note: We thank Tom Hammond, George Krause, and JoshuaTucker for helpful comments. We are grateful to Simon Jackmanand Shawn Treier for generously providing their code and oursurvey respondents for their time and expertise.     

Rethinking Agency: A Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment and Agentic Capacities

Agency has been central to modern conceptions of politics but it is a complicated and contested idea that seems to have fallen into both theoretical and historical crisis. I explore the underlying ideas that have grounded it, as well as some recent historical and theoretical challenges. I respond by advocating an ontological agnosticism regarding who or what exercises agency and suggest a spectrum of agentic capacities instead. Commending a phenomenological approach, I then suggest that agentic capacities emerge and interact across this spectrum. At one pole I envisage pre- personal, corporeal processes and at the other, a transpersonal, intersubjective interworld that requires a novel social ontology. I locate individual or collective agents in the middle of the spectrum where they emerge as contingent singularities. My aim here is to retain agency as a necessary ingredient of politics while eliminating the Cartesian presuppositions that have, for example, rendered the agency-structure debate irresolvable and supported a subjectivist account of agents that is no longer tenable. I show how all three dimensions of the spectrum have political significance and discuss examples to illustrate this.     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.     

Politics, Robinson Crusoe, Harold Laski and Plato: A Response to Burns

In a recent article, Tony Burns (2000) challenged the traditional view that politics is necessarily restricted to relations between human beings. However, what such a challenge does not take into account is that the values of non-human nature cannot be conveyed from their source to the humans that represent them. Indeed, such values are estimated by nature's human representatives. The ideas of Harold Laski and Plato can be invoked to support the argument that Robinson Crusoe's relation to nature is not a political one.     

Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics

Developments in public affairs that stress governance— not simply government—hold possibilities for reframing democracy. Governance intimates a paradigm shift in the meaning of democracy and civic agency—that is, who is to address public problems and promote the general welfare? The shift involves a move from citizens as simply voters, volunteers, and consumers to citizens as problem solvers and cocreators of public goods; from public leaders, such as public affairs professionals and politicians, as providers of services and solutions to partners, educators, and organizers of citizen action; and from democracy as elections to democratic society. Such a shift has the potential to address public problems that cannot be solved without governments, but that governments alone cannot solve, and to cultivate an appreciation for the commonwealth. Effecting this shift requires politicizing governance in nonpartisan, democratizing ways and deepening the civic, horizontal, pluralist, and productive dimensions of politics.     

'Talking to Fishers': A Response to Kesteven

Geoffrey Kesteven's 'Talking to Fishers' appeared in the March 1996 issue of AJPA 55(1). Here, Nick Rayns takes issue with Dr Kesteven's observations on the South East Fishery Workshop, held at Bateman's Bay in September 1994. Dr Kesteven's rejoinder follows this response.     

On Formal Theory and Statistical Methods: A Response to Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn

e-mail: sign{at}mail.rochester.edu The recent article by Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn (2007) (CYZ)attempts to relate the strategic random utility models in Signorino(1999, 2002, 2003) and in Signorino and Yilmaz (2003) to existinggame theory practice and to existing statistical techniques.It contributes to this literature by reminding us that comparativestatics analysis can be applied to the equilibria of these models.There are a number of claims in CYZ, however, that require clarification.In particular, the article's primary claim is that comparativestatics analysis, in combination with one of three proposedstatistical estimators, provides a simpler alternative to methodspreviously advocated. This claim (or combination of claims)is incorrect. When one examines the procedure CYZ recommends,it is no simpler for substantive researchers than anything previouslyrecommended. Moreover, none of the proposed estimators are new:they are exactly the same methods introduced in Signorino (1999,2003), in Signorino and Yilmaz (2003), in Signorino, Walker,and Bas (2002), and in Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2007).