Sources of tolerance towards corrupted politicians in Greece: the role of trade offs and individual benefits

Reelection of corrupted politicians points to a problem of democratic accountability. Voters do have the chance to ‘throw the rascals out’, but they do not take it. Employing a survey experiment, we test two popular explanations of why Greek voters fail to effectively sanction corrupt politicians. One is related to the distorting effects of psychological attachment to parties and the second to tradeoffs that seem to come into play when voters weigh the prevalence of corruption against other tangible benefits that they receive from governments and parties, such as lower taxes or clientelistic exchanges. Our findings suggest that collective benefits, such as cutting taxes, outweigh the costs of tolerating political corruption. On the contrary, exclusive provision of goods to specific voters, such as in the case of clientelistic exchanges, seems to be negatively related to support for a corrupt politician and therefore should rather not be regarded as a source of tolerance to corruption, at least not in present time Greece.     

“It’s the politics, stupid!”. The politicization of anti-corruption in Italy

This article aims to analyze the relationship between judicial activism against political corruption and electoral accountability. The judiciary plays a pivotal role in enforcing anti-corruption legislation, and, in many countries, courts have moved closer and closer towards that kind of working. In the article, we analyze the conditions under which a judicial prosecution of corrupt practices can also lead to electoral punishment of political misconducts by voters, or to a failure of accountability mechanisms. The latter outcome is more likely to occur if judicial activism is politicized. The ‘politicization’ of anti-corruption initiatives is here defined as an increase in the polarization of opinions, interests, or values about judicial investigations and the extent to which this polarization is strategically advanced towards the political debate by parties, political leaders, and media. By crystallizing a new dimension of political conflict, political actors can negatively affect electoral accountability, diminishing the risk of electoral punishment. We study this phenomenon by analyzing the case of Italy, a country which has experienced high levels of politicization of anti-corruption. However, whether and to what extent anti-corruption policies can be politicized is a question open for many other countries that can take a similar path.     

Corruption,Party Leaders,and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

Research indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to Italy’s legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption—but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office—and reducing corruption—and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.     

Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry

This article challenges the widespread view that democraticaccountability is unattainable in global politics because ofthe impracticality of establishing global elections. Instead,it argues that global democratic accountability can potentiallybe achieved by instituting non-electoral mechanisms that performequivalent accountability functions through more workable institutionalmeans. This argument is defended at a theoretical level, andfurther illustrated by analysing an empirical case study ofthe institutions through which labour standards in the globalgarment industry are determined. The article first explainswhy electoral mechanisms are no longer a viable means for achievingdemocratic accountability in political contexts such as theglobal garment industry, that are characterized by the decentralizeddispersion of public decision-making power among a range oforganizationally disparate state and non-state actors. It thenidentifies the key democratic function of electoral accountabilityas that of ensuring a reasonable degree of public control overpublic decision-making, and argues that this normative functioncan, in principle, be legitimately performed through non-electoralas well as electoral mechanisms. Finally, it elaborates thekey institutional features of a legitimate framework of non-electoralaccountability – public transparency and public disempowerment– and illustrates how these functions could potentiallybe achieved in practice, with reference to the example of theglobal garment industry.     

Towards ‘Accountable Independence’? Parliamentary Controls of the European Central Bank and the Rise of a New Democratic Model

The independence of the European Central Bank is legally defined in very clear and strict terms. Although most scholars in economics describe this status as a crucial condition of the Bank's efficiency, it is frequently criticised by politicians and political scientists as a contradiction to democratic theory. This paper will examine the emerging practice of parliamentary control of the ECB, from its installation until September 1999, in order to understand which kind of ‘accountability’ is elaborated in this unprecedented relationship between ‘politicians’ and lsquo;technocrats’. It will first show that MEPs have rejected all forms of parliamentary control based on a logic of constraint. It will then describe the numerous institutional links created between the Bank and the EU political organs to favour their cooperation. Finally it will analyse the recent initiatives taken by MEPs to influence central bankers and to convince them to submit their decisions to public debates. The hypothesis developed from these empirical analyses is that a new kind of ‘accountability’ is emerging in the EU. From a horizontal point of view (inter‐institutional controls), it is based on influence rather than traditional parliamentary constraint. From a vertical point of view (accountability to citizens), it focuses on responsiveness rather than on classic responsibility.     

The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians' Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007

How do electoral opportunities affect politicians' career strategies? Do politicians behave strategically in response to the opportunities provided by the electoral calendar? We argue that in a legislature that combines nonstatic ambition with a staggered electoral calendar, different kinds of politicians will have dissimilar preferences towards running in concurrent or midterm elections. More specifically, politicians with no previous executive experience should strategically run in midterm legislative elections in order to increase their visibility among voters, while more experienced politicians should opt for concurrent elections. We support these claims with data from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 2007.     

Talk like a man,walk like a woman: an advanced political communication framework for female politicians

One of the most significant developments of the past decade in the political arena has been the integration of women into senior political positions. Previously, there was a common assumption that female politicians wishing to succeed had to adopt the male communication model, both verbally and non-verbally. This study aims to examine the communication patterns of women in the political sphere. Twenty-four speeches by 12 female politicians in senior political positions from five democratic Western countries were analysed. All speeches were delivered in the respective countries’ legislatures, between 2009 and 2012. This study presents a theoretical framework that maps gender accountability structures of verbal and non-verbal communication patterns. The findings delineate an advanced communication model that indicates that female politicians’ communication consists of a combination of feminine non-verbal communication patterns and masculine verbal communicative expressions. The study expands the theoretical and analytical research on female politicians and develops a gender-communication approach to political communication.     

Fiscal transparency puzzle and electoral institutions: applying a 3Ds approach for tracking the action cycle in Egypt

This article aims at contributing to the discussion on the fiscal transparency puzzle. The authors challenge the idea that fiscal disclosure can directly increase fiscal accountability. Using an original data set at the level of individual members of parliament (MPs) in the Egyptian parliament, constructed from content analysis of budgetary discussions during the period 2000–10, it is shown that political incentives determined by a majoritarian electoral system curbed the willingness to check government fiscal behaviour, even among opposition MPs. This is because MPs still favoured pork-barrel behaviour to boost their re-election chances. Moreover, fiscal data disclosed could not be communicated to voters and the opposition showed a relatively higher avoidance against fiscal disclosure. The authors conclude that the electoral system is a dominant factor in shaping the final effect of transparency given its influence on the structure of political incentives.     

Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption

One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.     

Candidates,Campaigns, or Partisan Conditions? Reevaluating Strategic‐Politicians Theory

According to strategic‐politicians theory, political elites help ensure electoral responsiveness even when the mass public is deficient. Testing this theory requires measuring the effects of candidate experience and campaign spending, but one must confront endogeneity problems, because the theory requires potential candidates and campaign contributors to be responsive to district partisan conditions and national partisan tides. By applying an instrumental‐variable method to control for selection bias, we found that challenger experience only matters indirectly, through its effect on campaign expenditures, but partisan context matters both directly and indirectly. We theorize that challenger experience is best understood as an informational shortcut: it signals incumbent vulnerability to potential campaign contributors.     

Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011

Corrupt politicians have to a surprisingly great extent been found to go unpunished by the electorate. These findings are, however, drawn from case studies on a limited number of countries. This study, on the contrary, is based on a unique dataset from 215 parliamentary election campaigns in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, from which the electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals are analyzed. Information about the extent to which corruption allegations and scandals have occurred is gathered from election reports in several political science journals, and the electoral effects are measured in terms of the electoral performances—the difference in the share of votes between two elections—of all parties in government, as well as the main incumbent party, and the extent to which the governments survive the election. The control variables are GDP growth and unemployment rate the year preceding the election, the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties, and the level of corruption. The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis; however, not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors, only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes—in line with previous research—that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent.     

困境与重构：对我国政府问责制的再思考

建构政府问责制是基于民主授权关系和社会基准价值所形成的对政府及其官员行为的制度规范和道德规范的必然要求,是当代中国政治文明建设中的创新举措。本文从政治哲学、公共行政学、政治经济学和社会资本等诸多层面分析了政府问责制的内在逻辑及其合理性。但由于制度供给不足、实践层次较低、监督弱化及公共行政文化带有滞后性等因素的存在,使我国的政府问责制在现实中面临许多困境。对此,我们应着力完善政府问责制的立法,强化监督机制,引入政府绩效评估,建设新型行政文化,从而建构起科学合理的政府问责制,实现其应有的价值和功能。     

Selection and Incentives in the Electoral Security‐Constituency Communication Relationship

The relative importance of selection and incentives is essential for understanding how elections structure politicians’ behavior. I investigate the relative magnitudes of these two effects in the context of US House members’ constituency communication. Consistent with previous research, I find that there is a negative cross‐sectional relationship between electoral security and the intensity of constituency communication. The negative relationship holds in a panel‐data setting where only within‐legislator variation in electoral security is used to identify the effect of electoral security on legislator behavior. Due to the likely presence of myopic voters, the impact of electoral security increases as the election approaches. Point estimates suggest that the total effect is almost entirely driven by incentives, and I am able to reject the hypothesis that the incentive effect is zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.     

Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards

Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe's 'democratic deficit' is democratically justified.
The expression 'democratic deficit,' however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the 'regulatory model' of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.     

Crime control in the 2000 presidential election: A symbolic issue

Presidential candidates regularly use crime issues to help win electoral support. Contrary to conventional wisdom, crime control also became an issue in the 2000 presidential campaign. Despite decreasing crime rates, the debate was driven by public opinion. Because the crime debate was fueled by perception rather than reality, it is argued that the symbolic nature of the debate became important in providing reassurance to the American public. This finding points to the importance of symbolic rhetoric by presidential candidates in appealing to voters and increasing public support.     

Transferability of parliamentary experience: The Russian example

The article looks at the development of parliamentary institutions and procedures in Russia and the extent to which Russian politicians have been interested in learning from ‘mature’ democracies.

There are few examples of parliamentary practices being transplanted without significant adaptation. The debate in Russia on the role of parliament indicates that the idea of imitating foreign models has to compete with the powerful notion of rediscovering a national democratic tradition and both are used rhetorically to support particular interests. Parliamentary rules and practices are organically linked with party organisation, with the balance of parties at any given time, with electoral law, and with the relationship of the executive to the legislative branch. Changes in political habits take time.

International contacts are valuable because they lend confidence and authority to those who are working to build on democratic habits, but it is more important that parliamentarians and officials should find solutions which are internally consistent, which work with the grain of their own slowly evolving political culture and which reflect the most positive of their own traditions, than that they should assemble best practice from around the world.     

How do I vote the scoundrels out? Why voters might not punish corrupt politicians at the polls

While we frequently hope electoral democracy can serve as an important constraint on corruption, there are good reasons to think that such might not be the case. This paper analyzes two closely-related questions: should we expect voters to punish corrupt politicians or parties at the polls, and should we expect such influences to check corruption generally? While there have been clear-cut cases in which such punishments have been massive and decisive, they are much the exception. Indeed, a variety of factors having to do with corruption as a concept and as a political issue, the nature of competitive electoral politics, and more recent economic and political trends reshaping important aspects of liberal democracy, all point toward a pessimistic assessment. Ideas for changing that state of affairs are few, because the difficulties reside less at the level of fixable “problems” and more with the inherent workings of liberal political and economic systems. Efforts to improve the quality of news coverage and civic education, however, and any prospects for strengthening and deepening civil society, may hold out some hope for the longer term.     

Gresham's law in politics: Why are politicians not the most remarkable men for probity and punctuality?

Economists have always criticized politicians' behaviour. Adam Smith called politicians “crafty and insidious"; and, more recently Brennan and Buchanan have applied Gresham's law to politics, arguing that the man for whom the expected profit is highest will be the highest bidder for political power. However in their model there is not an argument to explain why these people are elected to public offices. This paper presents a supply model and a demand model explaining why politicians behave as “wicked" men, and are elected by the citizens. Firstly, we develop a model of repetitive and reputation games that shows why probity is not important for many politicians. The second model employs asymmetric information theory to explain why voters elect “wicked" people even if probity is a highly estimated value for them. The paper ends with some suggestions of legal reforms for reducing this asymmetry of information. classification D72. D82     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

PARTISAN POLITICS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND IMPRISONMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATES OVER TIME*

The now well‐documented explosion in prison populations over the last 30 years has spurred significant attention in the literature. Early research focused primarily on economic explanations. More recently it has focused on political explanations of prison growth. Here we extend research on political explanations of imprisonment by drawing on the literature on state politics and public policy. We argue that the effect of partisan politics on punishment is conditional on how much electoral competition legislators face. We test this hypothesis using annual state level data on imprisonment from 1978 to 1996. Our findings show that the effect of Republican state legislative strength on prison admissions depends on time and the level of competition in state legislative elections. We argue that these findings suggest the need for a more nuanced understanding of the link between partisan U.S. politics and imprisonment.