Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation

Pecorino (1998) models tariff lobbying in a repeated game and finds that cooperation can be maintained in a large group, even though tariff lobbying provides a rival public good to interest group members. We add small fixed costs of participation to this model and find that cooperation must break down in large groups. By contrast, if a fully rival public good directly enters the utility function, then cooperation is possible in large groups, even with small participation costs. Thus, we find only partial support for Olson’s (1965) proposition that collective action must break down in large groups.     

Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics

Abstract. This article offers a critical investigation of one indicator of support for democracy frequently used by comparativists. Departing from a theoretical multidimensional model of political support, and drawing on large-scale public opinion surveys, we argue that the survey item 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice. At the same time, we show that this item is far from a perfect indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime, since it is highly sensitive to different institutional contexts. By demonstrating empirically some of the problems involved when trying to asses the levels of support for democracy in post-communist Europe, we argue for a more cautious approach when analysing problems of legitimacy in processes of democratic consolidation. We also advocate the need for multiple indicators when analysing political support.     

A note on the political economy of immigration

In this note it is shown that the different attitudes towards immigration can be explained in terms of economic interest, although the public immigration debate is dominated by moral and political arguments. On the one hand, immigration supporters are mainly found among those who may expect economic gains from immigration – skilled workers and especially members of certain professions. On the other hand, unskilled workers who stand to lose economically because they can be easily substitued for by immigrants are for the most part opposed to immigration.     

Policy sciences teaching in context: A note on Germany

This is an attempt to relate the specific opportunities for policy sciences teaching to the broader context of a changing policymaking system. In West Germany, policy-sciences teaching could not develop as long as legal education remained the predominant type of pre-entry training for the career civil service, and as long as constitutional and administrative law seemed to supply decision premises fully adequate for the types of policy problems that were regarded as critical. This pattern was functional as long as the basic conservatism of post-war policies did obscure the problem of policy choice and the need for policy analysis. It became dysfunctional, however, when the fiscal crisis of 1966/67 dramatized the need for a rationalization of budgetary choices, and when the urgency of new problems and new political demands exposed the insufficiency of conservative policies.These emerging demands on policymakers at all levels of government have led to an increasing awareness of the need for better policy-analysis and planning, and for the recruitment of personnel trained in policy sciences. While retraining programs will meet some of this demand, the growing number of planning staffs has created an opportunity for new policy-oriented programs of pre-entry training for civil service functions. The article concludes with the outline of one such program.     

Political sources of growth: A critical note on measurement

This note critically reviews the research on the link between political systems and economic growth. Empirical attempts to capture this patent relationship have been met with mixed success. We conclude that the political variables used in these studies, i.e., democracy and political instability, do not adequately reflect the ‘investors problem’. We suggest that a political variable that encompasses all kinds of potential discretionary state interventions would be more effective in explaining cross-country differences in economic growth.     

Was Knut Wicksell a conservative or a radical? A note on an early monograph by Knut Wicksell

The article reviews a small monograph by K. Wicksell entitled Our taxes. Who pays them and who should pay them? It sheds some light on why Wicksell, a radical of his time, was so conservative as an economist. This paradox comes because Wicksell, as an economist, is often brought in line with the unanimity principle. Correctly seen, Wicksell pleaded for general franchise and proportional representation under the unanimity constraint. This was a radical proposal in his time because it contributed to shift the burden of taxation from the poor to the rich by implementing the benefit principle.