Contests of citizenship: A comment

The language of citizenship is one of authority, legitimation and contest. Citizenship rights were brought about in some parts of Europe through struggle and revolution, and even then excluded the masses and women. But the ‘law‐state’ and constitutions they established were the necessary conditions for subsequent struggles by these sectors for inclusion and ultimately for cultural and social citizenship. The advocacy of human rights is frequently denounced as ‘Western’ imposition of an individualism alien to other cultures, but these culturalist defences act as a cover for communitarian and state authoritarianism. The establishment of legal rights does not contradict social bonds, but can ensure reciprocity of obligations and protection from communal authority. This is specially pertinent for women. Social bonds are not peculiar to the ‘East’ or ‘South’, but are universal, including the mythical ‘West’, and legal rights for the individual are a necessary condition for achieving justice in social relations.     

More on measuring budget-related rent-seeking: A comment

We wish to thank the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, Jerusalem, for supporting our work on this topic.     

Pre-electoral commitments and government formation

Recent studies show that pre-electoral commitments and the ideological distance between parties influence government formation. But do pre-electoral pacts or rejections of party combinations really have an independent impact on the outcome of the government formation game? Which policy areas matter when parties agree to build a coalition? This paper addresses these questions by applying a dataset that includes information on preferred/rejected coalition partners and the policy-area specific programmatic heterogeneity of all potential coalitions. The results show that pre-electoral commitments have a significant impact on government formation after controlling for endogeneity problems. There is also evidence that not only diversity in economic issues determines the partisan composition of governments.     

Capitalist profit calculation and inflation accounting: A comment

Abstract

Mises’ ‘calculation argument’ against socialism argues that monetary calculation is indispensable as a commensurable unit for evaluating factors of production. This is not due to his conception of rationality being purely ‘algorithmic,’ for it accommodates non-monetary, incommensurable values. Commensurability is needed, rather, as an aid in the face of economic complexity. The socialist Neurath's response to Mises is unsatisfactory in rejecting the need to explore possible non-market techniques for achieving a certain degree of commensurability. Yet Neurath's contribution is valuable in emphasizing the need for a balanced, comparative approach to the question of market versus non-market that puts the commensurability question in context. These central issues raised by adversaries in the early socialist calculation debate have continued relevance for the contemporary discussion.     

The utility maximizing government economic adviser: A comment

The author, drawing on his experience as a Chief Economic Adviser (Deputy Secretary) in the UK Government (1973–76) and occasional adviser in the 1980s, denies that his previous economic analyses of advice-giving support the thesis that government economic advisers become the slaves of politicians in power.     

Multi-party competition with exit: A comment on Duverger's Law

Contrary to Duverger's Law, there exist multi-party systems in conjunction with simple majority single-ballot systems. At least three exceptions exist to this law. Rae (1971) and Riker (1976; 1982) offer explanations for two of the most prominent exceptions, i.e. Canada and India. I also discuss another exception, Great Britain. In this paper, I use a simple one-dimensional spatial model to show that a multi-party system can be supported under a simple majority single-ballot system. This explanation depends on the way political parties exit the system. If parties decide sequentially whether or not to exit, a multi-party system can not be maintained. If political parties make this decision simultaneously, a multi-party system may be able to sustain itself.I am grateful to Evelyn Fink, Ken Shepsle, and Gordon Tullock for their very helpful comments. I would especially like to thank John Kautsky who introduced me to Duverger's Law.