The economic model of voter participation: A further test

The central hypothesis of the economic model of voter participation was put to an empirical test. It was found that the coefficient of population size, which represents the subjective probability of affecting election results, is negative and significant in municipal local elections, but insignificant in national Knesset elections. Therefore, this variable is unable to represent subjective probability in the latter case.It was suggested that the economic model is more relevant to local elections than to Knesset elections. The empirical results revealed that the regression coefficients of municipal elections that took place separately from Knesset elections fit the expected outcome of the economic model whereas when municipal elections were held simultaneously with the Knesset election this did not hold true.     

A new barrier to participation: Heterogeneous application of voter identification policies

In democratic societies there is a tension between maximizing ballot access and minimizing voter fraud. Since the 2000 presidential election, this tension has been central to discussions about election reform at the national, state, and local level. We examine this tension by focusing on the implementation of voter identification laws in one state that has experienced significant issues in recent elections, and that is currently implementing election reform: New Mexico. We hypothesize that Hispanic voters are more likely to show some form of identification than other types of voters. Using a voter data set from New Mexico's First Congressional District in the 2006 election, we find that Hispanic, male and Election Day voters are more likely to show some form of identification than non-Hispanic, female and early voters. In addition, using an overlapping study of Bernalillo County 2006 poll workers, which almost entirely overlaps with the First Congressional District, we find no evidence that differences in poll worker partisanship or ethnicity produce differences in voter identification procedures. Our findings suggest that broad voter identification laws, which may be applied unequally, may be perceived as discriminatory.     

The local roots of the participation gap: Inequality and voter turnout

It is generally accepted that the rich are more likely to participate in politics than the poor. It is also generally accepted that the probability than an individual will participate in elections is influenced by the gap between the rich and the poor. There is little agreement, however, about whether inequality across time and space increases or decreases participation. In this paper we examine the impact of inequality across space. We suggest that the impact of inequality depends crucially on whether it is defined in terms of variations between geographical units (‘segregation’) or within geographical units (‘heterogeneity’). Evidence to support this argument is drawn from multi-level British data. Heterogeneity has a mildly positive effect on participation but this effect seems to be outweighed by the negative impact of segregation. The effect of segregation, moreover, is most pronounced among the poorer sections of the population, indicating that geographical isolation among the poor ('ghettoization') leads to lower turnout among these groups.     

The median voter hypothesis: Evidence from general purpose local governments

The median voter hypothesis (MVH) represents a much-used as well as much-criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists. To evaluate the MVH, this paper applies the Cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments. The Cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the MVH and all tested models, thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical MVH analyses. The test results reveal that the MVH is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments, but not specific services. Further, the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical MVH performance.     

The median voter model across levels of government

The median voter model provides a method of aggregating individual voter's demands to obtain community demand. Although higher level governments are often assumed to be less responsive to voters than lower level governments, it remains an open question whether or not the median voter model, which has been found to apply to the lowest tier of the federalist system, extends to higher level governments. We use the Cox specification test to find that the ad hoc model dominates the median model for counties and states. The county results are sensitive to the time periods, budgetary structure, and degree of urbanization.     

Getting things straight: The effects of ballot design and electoral structure on voter participation

This paper considers the implications of the straight-party voting option (STVO) on participation in judicial elections. Voters using straight-party options (by definition) do not vote for candidates in nonpartisan elections. Consequently, ballot roll-off in these elections is more likely to occur when people are given the chance to vote the party ticket and complete the voting process quickly. This is the case because nonpartisan judicial elections are considerably less salient than statewide and federal partisan elections. This article separates out the effects of the institutional structure of the election on political participation with the effects of ballot design. We find that in nonpartisan elections, the straight-party option decreases voter participation since voters who utilize the straight-ticket option may erroneously believe that they have voted for these nonpartisan offices, or simply ignore them. However, in nonpartisan elections without straight-ticket voting, participation is increased compared to nonpartisan elections with straight-ticket voting. Additionally, both forms of nonpartisan elections have less participation than partisan elections, all of which have the straight-ticket option. Thus, voter participation is affected not only by the type of election, but the type of voting rules in the election.     

The median voter model in public choice theory

The changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world. Early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter. This claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector. In the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory, but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether. The model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is. These latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model, appropriately applied.Pointing out that the model might not be valid under some circumstances in no way implies that the model is never valid. In fact, this paper has reviewed strong arguments, both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that the median voter model is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public sector for many issues. One paper will not change the opinions of public choice theorists on the median voter model. But the argument given here is that there is a large amount of theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the median voter model as a good foundation for the development of the theory of public sector demand. Once the overly ambitious claims that have been made for the model are set aside, the median voter model is in a good position to provide a base for the development of a theory of political structure that is analogous to the theory of market structure in economics.     

Price-earnings changes during US presidential election cycles: voter uncertainty and other determinants

Using electronic-markets data, this paper investigates partial determinants of change in Graham’s price-earnings ratios (P/E) during US presidential election cycles. We document evidence over six elections, that as the probable winner of the election becomes clearer, markets surprisingly respond with decreases in P/E ratios. We consider that our results are consistent with rational markets reacting to presidential campaigns focused on influencing biased, sociotropic voters. These results should be of great interest to researchers concerned with market reaction to election cycles, public policy, and the overall role of election uncertainty in financial markets.     

Economic determinants of presidential elections: The fair model

Ray Fair has constructed a model explaining the incumbent share of the two-party presidential popular vote for the elections of 1916-1984. The economic measures of the growth rate of real per capita GNP and the absolute value of the rate of inflation are singled out as important. In addition, a time trend favoring Democrats and whether an incumbent is seeking reelection are included.I argue that the Fair model is misspecified. Including the rate of growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages significantly improves the fit of the model, eliminates the trend as significant, reduces the income parameter, and strengthens the inflation parameter. In addition, the model remains stable when including the 1908 and 1912 elections, and up-dating to include the 1988 election strengthens the results.The explanatory power of the model is impressive with only one missed election outcome (1976) between 1908 and 1988, and this miss is easily explained by the impact of Watergate on the Republican candidate, President Ford.     

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.     

The abiding voter: The lengthy horizon of retrospective evaluations

Although the theory of retrospective voting receives wide support in the literature on voting behaviour, less agreement exists on voters’ time horizon when assessing the government's performance – that is, whether voters are myopic. Previous studies on voter myopia tend to focus on aggregate-level measures of the economy, or use an experimental approach. Using panel data, this article offers the first investigation into voter myopia that uses individual-level evaluations of government performance in a representative survey at several points during the electoral cycle. The study focuses on The Netherlands, but it also provide tests of the generalisability and robustness of the findings, and a replication in the American context. The results indicate that voter satisfaction early in the government's term adds to explaining incumbent voting. Thus, rather than the myopic voter, evidence is found of the abiding voter – steady at her or his post, evaluating government performance over a long length of time.