Sexual Desire and the Importance of Marriage in Kant's Philosophy of Law

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage within his philosophy of law.     

Permissive Laws and the Dynamism of Kantian Justice

If Kant’s theory of justice is known for one thing, it is for offering a vision of a perfectly just society that is utterly disconnected from the imperfect societies that we occupy. The purity of Kant’s account has attracted criticism from those who claim that if a theory of justice is to be practical, it must offer more than a vision of a perfectly just society. It must also explain how existing societies mired in injustice are to be brought into ever-closer conformity with the ideal that justice prescribes. In this essay, I will argue that this is exactly what Kant’s mature legal and political theory offers. To discern this feature of Kant’s theory, a neglected component must be integrated into his broader framework. This component is what Kant refers to in Toward Perpetual Peace as a permissive law of public right.     

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.     

Kant and Habermas on International Law

The purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas' reformulation of Kant's philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas' proposed multi‐level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant's proposal—a league of states. I argue that Habermas' critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant's league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi‐level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas.     

Ownership,Use, and Exclusivity: The Kantian Approach

Ownership combines the owner's right to exclude others from the owned object and the owner's liberty to use that object. This article addresses the relationship between using and excluding, by presenting Grotius's and Kant's classic accounts of ownership. Grotius's approach treats use and exclusivity as separate notions, with the latter evolving out of the former. For Kant, in contrast, use and exclusivity are integrated aspects of ownership as a right within a regime of equal reciprocal freedom. This article offers a Kantian critique of Grotius's account of the original right to use, and then presents Kant's notion of usability as the basis for his integration of use and exclusivity.     

Theorising Children's Rights in Youth Justice: The Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights

This paper develops a theoretical approach to children's rights in youth justice, located within a wider rights‐based theory of criminal justice which emphasises the centrality of citizens' autonomy. Understanding what is special about children's rights in the youth justice system requires an understanding of how children's autonomy differs from that of adults. One difference is that within the legal system children are not considered to be fully autonomous rights‐holders, because childhood is a time for gathering and developing the assets necessary for full autonomy. These assets should be protected by a category of ‘foundational’ rights. It is argued that an essential component of a rights‐based penal system for children is that it should not irreparably or permanently harm the child's foundational rights. The concept of foundational rights can then underpin and strengthen international children's rights standards, including those relating to the minimum age of criminal responsibility, differential sentencing for children and adults and a rights‐based system of resettlement provision.     

从村民自治领域的权利救济看统一公法学知识生产的必要性——从村民自治领域的两个典型案例切入

村民自治是中国本土政治法律实践的重要成果,但该领域大量的权利救济却很难进入国家正式的司法程序之中。“有权利无救济”的根源在于部门公法学知识生产的分散性,这导致对村民自治权的法律性质的判断以及村民自治内外权利救济缺乏有效的理论和制度供给。“统一公法学”提供了一种整体化的知识生产模式,针对村民自治领域的权利救济需求发展出“社会公权力”理论和“统一公法诉讼”理论。这种整体化的知识生产明显优越于原来的分散化的知识生产,对于最大化提供公法领域权利救济机制,并表达中国自身公法文明具有积极的理论和制度意义。     

Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions*

Abstract
Popular sovereignty and human rights are the modern pillars of legal legitimacy and political power. Liberal and republican thought, however, tend to interpret the two notions from different perspectives: either as moral principles, emphasizing the self-legislation and autonomy of individuals, or as ethical values, stressing the self-realization of the political community. Adhering to his theory of communicative action, the author brings the two principles together in a non-competitive relation. Here the connection between popular sovereignty and human rights is given by the procedures of a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation. Theoretically, the institutionalization of this process through law leads to a normative model of contemporary democracy, which is based on the substance of human rights as a formal condition for deliberative politics.**     

How Kant's View of Perfect and Imperfect Duties Resolves an Alleged Moral Dilemma for Judges*

Abstract. I clarify Kant's classification of duties and criticize the apocryphal tradition that, according to Kant, perfect duties trump imperfect duties. I then use Kant's view to argue that judges who believe that an action is immoral and should be illegal need not set aside their beliefs in order to comply with binding precedents that permit the action. The same view of morality that causes some people to oppose certain actions, including abortion, requires lower–court judges to comply with binding precedents. Therefore, someone's opposition to legal abortion, by itself, does not justify opposing that person's nomination to a lower court.     

Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

The Moral Foundation of Law and the Ethos of Liberal Democracies

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl‐Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory.     

Reflective Judgement and Prudential Rationality: A Contribution to an Inclusive Practical Application of Law

Hannah Arendt has developed a theory of the importance of judgment of taste for political manners, founded on the Kantian aesthetic theory. Nowadays this theory is considered a current theoretical reference for establishing a political way to reconcile the demands of the radicalization of deliberative democracy with the need for political inclusion (Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib). Albena Azmanova in her The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment proposes an inclusive political rhetoric. The political theory founded on judgment is based on Kant’s philosophy; it was developed by Arendt and has greatly influenced the current debate, as an alternative theory in which the moral basis of law can be more sensitive to human contexts; a universalist theory more adequate for dealing with the tragic dimension of human life. The theory of political judgment uses the concepts of reflective judgment and ‘enlarged thought’ as its main concepts. As a starting point, a theory like this considers the singular judgments of justice that each person makes. The background, therefore, is not a rational foundation of principles, but the capacity of rational beings to make judgments. This post-metaphysical theory of law, based on a theory of judgment, is a critique of legal positivism, but presents itself as an alternative to the idealistic theory of law. But this theoretical project has received some criticism related to the adequacy of Arendt’s rereading of Kantian philosophy and her attempt to approximate Kant’s reflective judgment to the Aristotelian concept of phronêsis. Some critics, such as Bryan Garsten, believe that Kant’s rhetoric of public reason diminished and displaced the prudential faculty of judgment that Arendt is to be interested in reviving. Arendt’s attempt to find a theory of judgment in Kant’s aesthetic theory is not successful, in Garsten’s view. Our purpose is to show that a critical theory of judicial judgment is not only possible, but necessary; Arendt’s theory of judgment offers an important contribution to a critical theory of judicial judgment, particularly one devoted to the construction of a legal theory that prioritizes a politics of social inclusion. This theory proposes a critical approach to the project of the procedural conception of democracy, since it can mask social exclusion. An adequate understanding of judicial argumentation cannot forget that it happens in a rhetorical context: it is not only important what a discourse says, but how it says it. The radicalization of deliberative democracy supposes a revision of the ways judicial deliberation is thought: not by reference to universal or at least general principles, but taking into consideration what is ‘critically relevant’, with a view to remedying social injustice (following Azmanova).

     

A Cosmopolitan Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach

Analyzing different works and in particular Habermas' reflection on Kant, the author reconstructs, first, his approach to international law and his political and legal cosmopolitanism. Second, he presents some critical observations on Habermas' cosmopolitanism in the context of his more general discursive theory of law and state. In this perspective, he discusses the problems of peace and of the role of the United Nations, the strategy of protection of human rights, and the question of world citizenship. He argues that Habermas' cosmopolitanism is a radicalization of Kantian tradition based on a centralization of international power and a cosmopolitan law. Finally, he develops realist arguments in favour of a non-globalistic conception of international law. 1 Abstract by Giorgio Bongiovanni.
     

Hegel and Hobbes on Institutions and Collective Actions

Abstract. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is usually, and rightly, considered the foremost representative of the organistic conception of society. It is only natural to think that his view has nothing in common with the kind of individualistic outlook that dominates our legal and political thinking, and that I myself have tried to defend. I try to show why certain insights of Hegel are potentially important even for individualistic legal and political theories. First, I explicate some of the problems he struggled with, and compare his views with those of Thomas Hobbes. Next, I try to link his views to the modern theories of institutions and of collective action. The antidemocratic ideology expressed in the main works of Hobbes and Hegel is clearly outmoded. Nevertheless, in their criticism of popular sovereignty, they posed some important questions. First, how do collectives like the People exist? Second, what do we mean by saying that collectives perform actions? It seems that, in order to perform an action, an entity ought to possess will. But what does it mean that a collective has a will?     

Guilt Beyond Guilt: From Political Theory to Metaphysics with Herbert Morris

As it is presently conceptualised and applied in criminal law, moral guilt is bound by a narrow, legalistic framework that is rooted in a liberal political philosophy. In this paper, drawing on the work of Herbert Morris, I seek to open up and deepen the concept of moral guilt. I do this through the development of a four‐fold typology of guilt that charts Morris's journey from political theory to metaphysics that includes the following forms: moral‐legal guilt; moral‐psychological guilt; quantum guilt; and metaphysical guilt. In deepening our understanding of moral guilt, the typology compels us to consider alternative conceptions of guilt that would take into account a person who feels guilt not only towards others, but also towards themselves and the world. I argue that Morris's journey has important implications for how we think about the critical relationship between theory and law as well as restorative justice.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis: A Case Study

Legal philosophers divide over whether it is possible to analyze legal concepts without engaging in normative argument. The influential analysis of legal rights advanced by Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus some years ago serves as a useful case study to consider this issue because even some legal philosophers who are generally skeptical of the neutrality claims of conceptual analysts have concluded that Coleman and Kraus's analysis manages to maintain such neutrality. But that analysis does depend in subtle but important ways on normative claims. Their argument assumes not only a positivist concept of law, but also that it counts in favor of an analysis of legal rights that it increases the number of options available to legal decisionmakers. Thus, whether Coleman and Kraus's analysis is right in the end depends on whether those normative assumptions are justified. If even their analysis, which makes the thinnest of conceptual claims, depends on normative premises, that fact serves as strong evidence of the difficulty of analyzing legal concepts while remaining agnostic on moral and political questions.     

“Let us content ourselves with praising the work while drawing a veil over its principles”: Eighteenth-century reactions to Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments

Cesare Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments, first published in 1764, has often been read as a purely utilitarian work. Beccaria, while certainly not ignoring considerations of utility, was far more interested in considerations of justice than many critics have believed, and he was at least as much a retributivist as a utilitarian.

The misperception of Beccaria grew out of the political controversies surrounding the book during the years following its publication. Beccaria's critics often grasped the rights-oriented and justice-centered aspects of his thought, but they attacked them in the name of tradition or religion. Those who defended Beccaria's retributivist side were few and generally not influential. By far the greatest number of his supporters—Milanese reformers, French philosophes, and Austrian civil servants—stressed the utilitarian side of his book to suit their own purposes. The upshot was that, by the end of the eighteenth century, Beccaria was wrongly perceived as a sort of Benthamite avant la lettre, both by Bentham himself and by the retributivists Kant and Hegel. This misunderstanding of Beccaria has persisted in many quarters, creating a false impression of the criminal justice system advocated by the Lombard reformer.     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist.On the Question of What Ought to Be Preserved of His Philosophy

Abstract. Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German‐speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo‐Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative‐holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, belongs more to a fundamentally different, critical camp of philosophy. Although Radbruch has incorporated Kantian Elements into his theory, he is rather a member of the affirmative‐holistic camp. In the end the question will be raised as to what ought to be preserved of his philosophy.