A Dangerous Axis: The ‘Bulgarian Müftü’, the Turkish Opposition and the Ankara Government, 1928–36

In June 1967, when the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel following the outbreak of the Six Day War, it came as a surprise to many that Romania refused to do the same. This paper investigates previously unpublished documents in order to retrace the decision-making process in Bucharest and offer a rational answer to the question: why did Romania choose to ignore Moscow's decision? Was it a demonstration of support for Israel as it appeared at the time and, if so, what were the reasons behind it? Archival insight demonstrates that Romania's decision to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel can best be understood in the general framework of its relations with Moscow. Striving to gain autonomy in the Communist bloc and fight off Soviet domination, Romanian decision-makers preferred to engage in their own analysis of the events in the Middle East before assuming one decision or another. Their conclusions led them to believe that Moscow's policy had been adventurous and to break relations with Israel would have implied confirmation and reinforcement of Moscow's role in the Middle East.     

RETHINKING ASIAN MOBILITIES

ABSTRACT

Vietnam's economic reforms have generated much praise for the country's rapid “opening” of its markets, as if the Vietnamese nation had previously existed in a state of isolation, closed to broader global influences and exchanges. Such discourses overlook the importance of transnational circulations of people, goods, technologies, and expertise during the socialist era that were vital to Vietnam's postwar national reconstruction and continue to play a role in post-socialist economic transformation today. This article traces the socialist pathways of labor migration between Vietnam and the former Soviet Bloc (specifically, East Germany) in the 1980s, mobilities that are generally absent in studies of contemporary export labor industries. Based on multi-sited ethnographic and archival research, the author follows Vietnamese workers first to the East German factories where they labored as “contract workers,” and then through their subsequent return and reintegration into Vietnamese society after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These mobilities bespeak of an alternative history and formation of diasporic communities that are little acknowledged or addressed in literature on labor migrations, and yet are important to understanding emerging forms of stratification today in Vietnam. Moreover, an analysis of early non-capitalist experiences with overseas labor regimes in the 1980s provides insights into contemporary Vietnamese governance practices that promote—rather uncritically, similar to other “emerging countries” —export labor as a nation-building strategy to reduce endemic poverty and develop a late socialist country.     

Religious change in Estonia and the Baltic states during the Soviet period in comparative perspective

Abstract

The article presents a comparative-historical treatment of the change in the religious life of Estonia from 1940 to 1991, when Estonia was part of the Soviet Union. The article is based largely on documents of the archive of the Estonian commissioner of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults of the Soviet Union, documents which were not available to researchers before the collapse of the USSR. Religious change in Estonia has been compared to what happened in the neighbouring Baltic countries. The archival data shows an extraordinary decline of institutionalised religion in Estonia during the Soviet period (especially in the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches). Compared to the other republics of the Soviet Union (especially Catholic Lithuania), this fall was particularly drastic in “Lutheran” Estonia and Latvia. Also, some comparisons are made between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the rest of Europe, in order to test the author's hypothesis that by the end of the Soviet occupation, Estonian society was among the most highly secularised ones in Europe (or possibly the most secularised).     

“We All Make Mistakes”: the Communist Party of Australia and Khrushchev's Secret Speech, 1956

This article examines the impact of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). Specifically it focuses on the reverberations of Khrushchev's “secret speech” within the CPA leadership for the first six months of 1956. It argues that, in contrast to the received wisdom, the response of the leadership was characterised by confusion rather than consistency, division rather than unanimity. This had implications for CPA members as they struggled to come to terms with the line of the leadership and the authenticity or otherwise of the New York Times version of Khrushchev's speech. The words of [Khrushchev's] speech were like bullets, and each found its place in the hearts of the veteran Communists. Tears streamed down the faces of men and women who had spent forty or more years, their whole adult lives, in the movement […]. 1     

‘The Russians are Coming,the Russians are Coming’: American Management of the Crisis Associated with Ending the October 1973 War

This article follows the last 72 hours of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War; that is, the three days from the collapse of the first ceasefire, on 23 October, until 25 October, when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, which ended the war, was adopted. The goal is to present and analyse the interests of the United States and how it managed its policy vis-à-vis Israel and Egypt during the ceasefire imbroglio. However, the article devotes special attention to the serious crisis with the Soviet Union that played out during those fateful hours. It stemmed from the note sent by the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, to US President Richard M. Nixon on 24 October. From the contents of the message, senior American decision-makers concluded that the Soviets were planning the unilateral deployment of an armed force to the Middle East. In response to this threat, these officials decided to raise the state of alert of the American armed forces to Level 3. The main conclusion of the research, however, is that no real Soviet threat existed. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was interested in preserving détente and in continuing to cooperate with the United States in order to put an end to the violence in the Middle East.     

Dependence and opposition. Problems in Soviet Estonian historiography in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Abstract

Soviet rule was established in Estonia by late autumn 1944. By that time only two historians with a PhD degree from the University of Tartu remained in the country, one of whom was Professor Hans Kruus. Until World War II, neither of the two had published any work that interpreted history from the viewpoint of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology. Thus, as far as Estonia was concerned, this type of ideologically based reinterpretation of the past did not exist, and had to be organized from scratch. The main aim of this article is to examine Estonian historians' dependence on the official Soviet interpretation of history after 1945 and during the early 1950s. How were they guided and controlled through the Stalin era, i.e. until 1953? What happened in this respect between Stalin's death and the XX CPSU Congress at the beginning of 1956? And how did the results of that Congress influence later writing of history? The article also examines the possibilities for opposition among professional historians to the official Party interpretation of history. In what context did this opposition arise, how did it manifest itself, and in what ways might it possibly have influenced Soviet Estonian society?     

Finding His Kronstadt: Howard Fast, 1956 and American Communism

The scholarship on the impact on communists of Khrushchev's “secret speech” to the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 is limited. Generally it is located within broader studies of organisational upheavals and ideological debates at the leadership level of communist parties. Rarely has there been analysis of the reverberations at the individual level. Consistent with James R. Barrett's pioneering approach, this paper seeks to incorporate the personal into the political, and inject a subjective dimension into the familiar top‐down narrative of American communism. It will do this by focusing on the motivations, reactions and consequences of the defection of one Party member, the writer Howard Fast. It will thereby illuminate the story of personal anguish experienced by thousands in the wake of Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin.     

Commonwealth Economics in Perspective: Lessons from the East Asian Model

Different approaches to capitalism in the former Soviet Union are discussed in light of recent reassessments of the East Asian economic experience. A reinterpretation of theories of late-development and of economic learning is proposed to explain the focus of economists on post-Soviet/East Asian commonalities in the areas of state-led development policies and group-oriented management techniques. The paper draws on the author's extensive interviews conducted at academic institutes in Moscow and in the Russian Far East studying the Pacific Rim economies, as well as official sources and literature, Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: P20, P52.     

Turkish transformation and the Soviet Union: navigating through the Soviet historiography on Kemalism

Being founded in the wake of the First World War, both Turkey and the Soviet Union followed revolutionary modernizing pathways. At the outset, one could trace many similar patterns in their radical modernization paradigms; however, their development models as well as political and social orders were radically distinct, which became more obvious with the passage of time. The paper discusses the external interpretations of Kemalism by observing the Soviet perspectives on the inception and evolution of Kemalism. Paying more attention to diplomatic, geopolitical and economic complexities of the Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized the Soviet Union perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. In reality, since the early 1920s, different state institutions, intellectual schools of thought and research in the Soviet Union closely observed the domestic transformations in Turkey by providing valuable insights on the perspective and the implications of the Kemalist transformation. The article also looks at the question of how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives can enrich the historiography and our understanding of Kemalism.     

Endorsing Annexation? The Whitlam Government's De Jure Recognition of the Soviet Baltic States

In August 1974, the Australian Labor Party Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced it had recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union de jure. Historical writing around this diplomatic recognition is scarce and sheds little light on why the policy was enacted. Using previously unavailable archival evidence, as well as other sources including testimony from Government and public service workers, this article demonstrates that the recognition was induced primarily by Whitlam, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Sir James Plimsoll, Australia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actors were motivated by varying considerations. These included an adherence to realist foreign policy principles, concerns regarding Australian–Soviet bi-lateral relations, convictions around the legitimacy of Baltic self-determination, and ethnic prejudice against Australians of Baltic descent.     

Iran and Regional Convergence in Eurasia

Regional convergence in Eurasia has been evolving since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States was Russia's initial attempt to forge a comprehensive regional integration. However, Russia gradually shifted its focus to economics, and this produced the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This organization has concluded numerous cooperation agreements, even with countries outside the borders of Eurasia, raising questions about regional convergence. In addition, with the expansion of China's influence in Central Asia, there has been a shift in the role and scope of the EEU. Iran has concluded a preferential trade agreement with the EEU, including non-tariff measures and a list of commodities for which barriers have been reduced or cut to zero. The main question of this study is how Iran's presence in this organization will influence Eurasian convergence. We examine the opportunities for, and obstacles to, convergence through an analysis of the forces that can bind an institution like the EEU: cultural and ideological affinities; the hegemony of the most powerful actors; and the potential for solving common problems.     

Poland and Hungary, 1956: A Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings

Why did the Soviet Union intervene in Hungary in 1956 but not in Poland? This article reviews the “historical thesis”, “personality thesis”, and “neutrality thesis”. It concludes that, while the new archival sources do not radically alter these three older theses, they do yield some insights. Wladyslaw Gomulka was perhaps less successful in deterring the Soviet leaders during the latter’s 19 October visit to Poland and less secure politically in his own country than originally thought. In addition, Imre Nagy may not have been as progressive, given his initial opposition to the very decisions for which he has gone down in history as having made.     

‘Responsibility for Europe’: the EU policy of the German Social Democrats since unification

The following article analyses the European Union (EU) policy of the German Social Democrats (SPD) since German unity. Starting from the cross-party European consensus in the early 1990s SPD policy has altered significantly in response to major changes in the ‘policy context’ such as the party's rise from opposition to government, German unification and increasing European integration. Policy change in the SPD has been defined by two dynamics: greater ‘pragmatism’ among a new generation of party leaders that has allowed a ‘freer’ interpretation of German interests; and a gradual prioritisation of EU policy in the party elite that has seen it integrated into a multi-level programme for political governance. The article examines how these changes manifested themselves in SPD policy, focusing on European Economic and Monetary Union and the debate on ‘the future of Europe’.     

Equal partners? The Information Research Department,SAVAK and the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda in Iran, 1956–68

This article examines how the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (I.R.D.) worked with SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence service, between 1956 and 1968. It explores how a mutual fear of the Soviet Union compelled both departments to work together to produce and disseminate anti-communist propaganda. As well as the publication of books, prominent Iranian journalists would be given stories that praised the Shah’s regime and discredited the Soviet Union. SAVAK figures were also invited to Britain by the I.R.D. to attend training sessions on producing propaganda. The ties between both agencies, however, meant SAVAK was able to persuade the I.R.D. to assist in the conception of anti-Arab Nationalist propaganda, something that contravened wider British foreign policy. Moreover, such an agency-led approach was rendered short-lived. By 1968, many of the SAVAK figures friendly to the I.R.D. were promoted and replaced by individuals less keen on working with the British.     

Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.     

Do the Kurds have ‘no friends but the mountains’? Turkey's Secret War against Communists,Soviets and the Kurds

A Kurdish proverb says that the Kurds have ‘no friends but the mountains’. This was not what the Turkish authorities believed. Using new and previously unexploited archives both in English and Turkish, this article offers a new interpretation of Turkey's perception of the Kurds. By analyzing Kurdish activities and their alignment with Communist movements and Soviet activities, it shows how Turkey's threat perception was shaped by international contexts, especially through the Cold War. In addition, the Kurdish nationalist movement in the Middle East played a pivotal role in regional intelligence cooperation between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. This article argues that Soviet and Communist activities had an important role in shaping Turkey's threat perception of the Kurdish minority in the country. Turkey's perception of subversive threats involved an intertwining of Communists, Soviets and Kurds. This affected the Kurdish bid for independence for most of the twentieth century.     

Evolving structure of collective bargaining in Turkey (1990–2005)

ABSTRACT

Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union and Britain invested significant efforts in rehabilitating their relations with the Arab countries, notably Egypt. While both supported the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab-occupied territories, the two countries differed over the nature of the settlement. Still, at the UN Security Council, the Soviet Union supported the British draft resolution for solving the Middle East conflict. Cold War interests and competition over influence in the Middle East, however, led the Soviets to launch a public campaign against British policy in the Middle East and prevented the two countries from joining efforts to bring about a breakthrough in the Arab–Israeli conflict.     

The Baltic Question in West German Politics, 1949–90

While previous research by international lawyers has emphasized Bonn's value-neutral legalistic approach to the Baltic question from 1949 to 1990, this article–based on documents from the German Foreign Ministry archives–shows that the West Germans saw the Baltic issue as a political problem that interfered with their highest national aim: German unification. It addresses the following questions: first, why Bonn never made an official announcement of, and never publicly gave a justification for, its stance on the Baltic question; and second, why Bonn granted Baltic refugees the same rights that it offered other Heimat-less foreigners, whereas the remnants of Baltic diplomatic services or self-proclaimed exile governments found no official recognition in Germany. Finally, it comments on the role of the so-called German Balts in West German politics, and in Bonn's Baltic policies specifically.     

The Power of Ideas: How Bundesbank Ideas Have Influenced the Reconstruction of the National Bank of Poland

This article is concerned with the qualitative rise of German influence in an enlarged European Union (EU). The point of departure is the assumption that eastward enlargement facilitates the further expansion and manifestation of German power in Europe via the institutionalisation of parts of the Modell Deutschland in the candidate countries prior to their accession. This article examines the power tools that have facilitated the transfer of Bundesbank ideas into the institutional structure of Poland's national central bank, Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP). The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours is not only determined by the former's physical capacities but, in reflection of post-war Germany's foreign policy strategy, relies on the persuasiveness of Germany's ideational lead.     

German policy towards the European union: The effects of historical memory

Reflection on the past and its implications shaped German policy towards the European Union during the early 1990s. Helmut Kohl's post‐reunification foreign policy rhetoric reveals two prominent historical themes: that European integration is a ‘question of war and peace’, and that German unity and European unity represent ‘two sides of the same coin’. In the post‐Cold War context, both themes served to orient and legitimate his European policy. They informed Kohl's strong support for the realisation of the Maastricht Treaty. And they were central to his efforts to maintain domestic political support for deeper integration.