Accountability issues of the resolution trust corporation

Abstract

No other governmental organization ever created can rival the complex patterns of accountability created to manage the bailout of the savings and loan industry. This complexity has, in turn, led to criticism that the bailout structure is too unwieldy to be managerially effective or politically accountable. While the structure does indeed immensely complicate these problems, it is an inevitable product of the political realities that shaped the bailout strategy. The real issues in maintaining accountability to the public for the bailout are: reporting clearly on how the money is being used; improving Congress's ability to track the complex management of the bailout; and using government officials, not contractors, to supervise the government's goals. Indeed, the biggest potential problem of accountability in the savings and loan rescue is not the convoluted political structure at the top but the heavy reliance on private contractors at the bottom.     

Reinventing the Governance of Public Finances in Remote Indigenous Australia

The economies of remote Indigenous settlements are dominated by public finances. The current system of governing public finance is highly saturated, fragmented and centralised, and this has a corrosive effect on local governance capability. The political accountability of leaders to their constituents is weakened in favour of an administrative accountability ‘upwards’ to higher authorities. New Public Management reforms have promoted administrative deconcentration, over political devolution, and this has been accompanied by an influx of public servants, Non‐Government Organisations (NGOs) and private contractors, and a decline in Indigenous organisations and local government. The end result in many settlements is a marked disengagement of Indigenous people in their own governance. There is evidence of considerable political capabilities existing within local government electorates. Decentralised financing arrangements can be used to catalyse these capabilities and then address deficits in administrative and technical performance.     

Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law

Many critics have suggested that worldwide efforts to reinvent government could also weaken democratic control over public institutions, but few have considered how attempts to implement the "new paradigm" in public management might affect a widely used instrument for promoting accountability: freedom of information law (FOI). FOI laws give citizens and nongovernmental organizations the right of access to government information. However, recent Canadian experience shows that reinvention can weaken FOI laws in three ways. First, attempts to reduce "nonessential" spending may cause delays in handling FOI requests and weaken mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Second, governmental functions may be transferred to private contractors and not-for-profit organizations that are not required to comply with FOI laws. Third, governments' attempts to sell information and increase FOI fees may create new economic barriers to openness. Thus, restructuring provides an opportunity for political executives, public servants, and some well-organized business interests to weaken oversight mechanisms and increase their own autonomy within the policy process.     

Beliefs About Corporate America and the Structure of Opinions Toward Privatization

This research analyzes the individual-level factors associated with public support for the private provision of public goods and services. Given that privatization requires the transfer of authority from public to private entities, we argue that beliefs about private companies are an important and overlooked source of heterogeneity in explaining public policy preferences toward privatization. We test this expectation using survey data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We find that support for privatization is associated with positive beliefs about the motivation of private companies and with favorable views about corporate accountability relative to the accountability of government. Opposition to privatization is associated with beliefs about corporate influence in politics. Preferences for limited government are also associated with support for privatization. These results highlight the potential for beliefs about private companies to serve as a group heuristic in political reasoning and the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices on complex public policy issues.     

Governance in Central Government: Reconciling Accountability and Capability

Governance structures in central government departments are poorly articulated. Departmental boards were imported from the private sector; in central government their remit and accountability are obscure, as is their role in relation to Permanent Secretaries and Ministers—whose leadership roles are also muddled. This brings costs for Ministers, departments and the public. Improvements have proved elusive, in part because an underlying confusion has been neglected—about how bodies subject to the almost unlimited democratic accountability of Ministers are to be governed. The confusion can be cleared up, principles of governance formulated, and concrete improvements proposed. These include: better articulation of Permanent Secretaries' presumptive leadership role; strengthened lines of external accountability; and more coherent provisions for the role and accountabilities of boards, and their relationship with Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and the centre of government. Such changes should improve accountability, leadership, capability and delivery.     

Contracting Out and Accountability

Governments are increasingly moving to contract out the provision of public services which have previously been delivered by public service departments. Contracting out typically implies provision by private sector contractors. However, it may also include in-house provision by public service departments or other public agencies where the right to provide is won through competitive tendering and is governed by contract. At the Commonwealth level, the trend has been given added impetus by the Coalition government elected in 1996 (Reith J 996; National Commission of Audit 1996).
The main rationale for contracting out is to improve efficiency in service provision by harnessing the virtues of competition, in particular the superior productivity engendered among competitive providers (Industry Commission (IC) 1996, B3.4; Appendix E). At the same time, there is a legitimate expectation that providers of public services paid for by public funds will be publicly accountable (IC 1996, BI). However, contracting out has the potential to reduce the extent of public accountability by transferring the provision of public services to members of the private sector who are generally not subject to the same accountability requirements as public officials. Indeed, reduction in such accountability requirements may be one of the reasons for the greater efficiency of the private sector.     

Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia

Decentralization is argued to create incentives for local and regional politicians to be more responsive and accountable to their constituents, but few studies have directly tested this claim. We use survey data from Colombia to examine individual‐level evaluations of the degree to which decentralization prompts citizens to view department government as more accountable. We estimate the effect of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, controlling for participation, political knowledge, confidence in government, education, and income on perceptions of accountability. Our results indicate that administrative and fiscal decentralization improve perceptions of accountability, while political decentralization does not.     

Performance, Accountability, and the Debate over Rules

Does compliance with rules ensure better program performance and accountability? Since the 1980s, many scholars have answered no to this question, arguing that as managers attempt to comply with a growing thicket of rules, they often lose sight of the performance of their agencies and programs. Even the defenders of a rules‐based approach have tended to view it as a necessary, though inconvenient, means of ensuring that democratic values and public rights are protected in the functioning of government. But does compliance with rules inevitably result in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of public projects? This essay presents a case study of a public works project and three additional case summaries to demonstrate a theoretical proposition that compliance with rules for contracting and competitive selection of contractors can be an essential element of both a project’s success and its accountability.     

Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics

This article tests a wide range of government activities against requirements for public accountability. The article explores the incentives for ethical behaviour by public officials; the need for more outcome focused performance indicators, tensions between parliamentary and managerial accountability; the standards of accountability applied to public providers of services can be applied to private providers; the utility of spelling out service requirements in advance; the impacts on accountability of the convergence of the public and private sectors; the need, where responsibility for programs is collaborative, for a clear governance framework, tensions between representative and participative democracy, and trends towards more participative and collaborative leadership.     

Impact of compulsory competitive tendering on the structure and performance of local government systems in the State of Victoria*

Around the world, the public sector is introducing private sector management practices. Abandoning the binary model of public and private sectors the State Government of Victoria introduced the compulsory competitive tendering system under which local government bodies are required to tender out their services to private sector service providers. The aim was to encourage local government bodies to operate in contestable situations so that they can increase efficiency, decrease operating costs, develop clear programme goals and objectives, become responsive to client goals, and improve the quality of goods and services. The article describes how the practice of the compulsory competitive tendering system has introduced major changes to organizational cultures, attitudes of employees, power and authority structures, sytems of decision making, delegation of financial and managerial authority, and the nature of control and accountability. In addition, the article explains the degree of competitiveness and efficiency that local government bodies have achieved and describes how the corporatized structure has helped to achieve the financial objectives. The article also discusses how the role of the elected councils is diminishing under this new management structure and argues that in the absence of a genuine monitoring system and accountability mechanism the local government bodies find it difficult to assert their role as quality service deliverers. This has forced the councils to comply with the requirements of the competition laws which have reduced direct accountability of government to the public. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rediscovering Implementation: Public Sector Contracting and Human Services

There is vast literature on how to implement public policies, with endless case studies emphasising a few key lessons. The drive to contracting in the public sector raises familiar threats to coherent program implementation, and adds those of control and incentives. Contracting fragments program responsibility among multiple contractors, and separates policy agencies from service delivery contractors. It raises questions about political control and accountability, and the prospect of gaps between intention and outcome. This paper 'rediscovers implementation' by reviewing the practical difficulties of constructing public-private relationships which can deliver quality human services. After considering broad arguments about the efficacy of contracting, the paper turns to the provision of human services by examining the contracting out of welfare services and the Job Network. Our argument is modest: that public sector contracting fails if the challenges of implementation are not addressed explicitly, since service delivery through the private sector can falter for exactly the same reasons as traditional public bureaucracies.     

Transparency of Risk and Reward in U.K. Public–Private Partnerships

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) are an increasingly common mechanism for the renewal of public sector infrastructure, although in the United Kingdom, these have been criticized as representing poor value for money. An inherent assumption of much of this criticism is that a corollary of detriment for the public sector is benefit for the private sector. This paper highlights the difficulty of objectively verifying the many criticisms and assumptions regarding risk and reward associated with PPPs. Public and private sector disclosure policies and systems are analyzed and we conclude that neither sector practices openness and transparency. This results in a democratic accountability deficit in the public sector and a lack of meaningful data being made available to stakeholders in private companies.     

The Market Turn in EU Governance—The Emergence of Public–Private Collaboration

The question asked here is how the horizontal relationship between public and private actors, with the overall aim of delivering public service, is squared with the requirement of democratic accountability according to the traditional model of command and control. Empirical analysis of the European satellite navigation program (Galileo), the European Investment Bank and health, and the European Financial market (the Lamfalussy model) shows that efficiency is at the forefront of the collaborations. Democratic accountability is assumed to take place because there is a formal chain of delegation. However, the private actors are not part of that chain and their accountability is never addressed. The market turn in European Union governance has opened up for private authority and emphasis of output legitimacy. It has not opened up for democratic reforms according to the very authority system of governance. We are dealing with a governance turn and yet it is still government.     

Local Government and Governance in Norway: Stretched Accountability in Network Politics

This article is concerned with the democratic quality of network governance in a local context; in particular, the interplay between traditional local government and the emerging network structures. What forms of interplay can be observed between traditional local government and emerging network structures? Of particular interest in this respect is the role of local councillors. As elected representatives, councillors embody the special commitment of authorities towards the public. However, involvement in networks implies a danger of capture, and if network decisions are not open to public scrutiny, democratic control is difficult to achieve even if local councillors are represented. This article therefore discusses networks and accountability: In what ways and to what degree are networks held accountable? Empirically, it explores three local policy networks, all involving the city of Kristiansand. One group of networks – neighbourhood networks – is internally initiated and maintained by the municipality of Kristiansand. Another network is an intermunicipal collaboration involving Kristiansand and five surrounding municipalities. The third network is an example of a public‐private partnership that includes the municipality of Kristiansand, as well as several other actors. The case studies show that the actual presence of local government representatives in networks is not enough to ensure accountability. Lines of popular accountability are stretched, either because the networks are deemed irrelevant by the city councillors, or because networks develop decision‐making styles that shield them from external political control, or because local councillors deliberately deprive themselves of influence over important policy fields.     

Effects of the IMF and World Bank on public expenditure accountability in Jamaica

This article analyses the positive and negative effects of IMF stabilization programmes and World Bank structural adjustment programmes on the accountability of public expenditure management in Jamaica in the period 1980–1992. Particular attention is given to the negative accountability effects of IMF budget deficit reduction targets imposed on a Government uncommitted to meeting such targets. Many of the arguments presented in this article relate to expenditure accountability problems more generally and it cannot be proved that IMF conditionality was the sole cause of these problems. It is argued, however, that IMF conditionality contributed. This argument is based on a large number of semi-structured interviews conducted in 1993 with Jamaican bureaucrats, politicians, donors, academics and private sector representatives, many of whom were involved in Jamaica's budget formulation process, and on analysis of the existing literature and data. The conclusion reached is that donor-guided reform programmes have complex and often conflicting impacts on the accountability of the Government's budgetary practices. A major question that arises is the relative importance that donors such as the IMF place on budget conditionality as against accountability. The conclusion based on the Jamaican experience is that the IMF placed greater emphasis on the former. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

Toward “hardened” accountability? Analyzing the European Union's hybrid transnational governance in timber and biofuel supply chains

The voluntary/mandatory divide is a constant feature of scholarly debates on corporate accountability for sustainability in global supply chains. A widely held assumption is that the addition of state authority to private transnational governance in global supply chains will “harden” accountability and, thus, promote more sustainable production. The state's ability to set legally binding requirements is expected to coerce companies into complying. The hybridization of private and state authority is seen to strengthen good practice in private authority. This empirical study questions these assumptions based on an analysis of two hybrid governance arrangements for sustainability in global supply chains: the EU's Timber Regulation (EUTR) and Renewable Energy Directive (RED). The results demonstrate that both EUTR and EU-RED yield sector wide efforts of compliance and to this extent can be seen as enhancing accountability in the sense of answerability. At the same time, we find that the policies in both cases are not more demanding, nor enforced strictly, the latter putting into question their potential to coerce companies. Further, a “hardening” of accountability is at least obscured as both EUTR and EU-RED have stripped private authority they employ in their hybrid transnational governance from the need to establish legitimacy with a broader audience. This makes legal compliance and cost-effectiveness the core factor for companies’ efforts to demonstrate compliance. Our findings hence question whether the EUTR and EU-RED have led to “hardened” accountability compared to private transnational governance, and ask for an empirical, more nuanced understanding of what there is to gain or lose from hybridizing private and state authority in transnational governance.     

Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical and contemporary,national and European perspectives

Recently there has been a general move towards greater central bank independence in Europe. Countries such as Belgium, Britain, France and Spain have all increased the autonomy of their respective central banks. In this context, some people have argued that the prospects for democratic, representative government have been weakened. In these countries, democratically elected governments can no longer control the process of monetary policy making. By constructing an index of central banks’ independence, this article shows that the recent moves towards central bank independence in Britain and France have not challenged the basic foundations of indirect political accountability. However, it also shows that the proposed institutional architecture of the European Central Bank is a departure from the norms of political accountability and that, in this case, there is a distinct ‘democratic deficit’ which needs to be addressed.     

Monitoring across Sectors: Examining the Effect of Nonprofit and For‐Profit Contractor Ownership on Performance Monitoring in State and Local Contracts

What is the effect of contractors' nonprofit and for‐profit ownership on the scope and nature of performance measurement used by government agencies? Quantitative and qualitative data were generated through semistructured interviews administered to a sample of state and local public agencies and private contractors across five jurisdictions. The findings of this study suggest that monitoring officers working with nonprofit rather than for‐profit contractors are more likely to rely on qualitative performance data and examine equitable access to services, contractors' reputation, and compliance with industry rules and regulations. Although organizational ownership may not be well understood by practitioners, performance appears to be conceptualized differently across sectors. The author calls for a better understanding of the impact of the identified differences in performance measurement on the effectiveness of contract monitoring.     

The Privatisation of Prisoner Transfer Services in Western Australia. What Can we Learn from the Ward Case?

In 2008, Aboriginal elder Mr Ward died of heat stroke while being transported in the back of a prison van operated by private security company GSL (now G4S). This article will address the role accountability mechanisms can play in improving correctional and custodial services and whether existing oversight frameworks can provide a proper supervision and quality control of private security operators. It will focus on the key reports issued by Western Australia's Inspector of Custodial Services, the independent office to oversee the prisoner transfer system. Another central source of information will be an examination of the report and recommendations handed down by the Western Australian Coroner Alastair Hope in June 2009. The Hope Report details the numerous failings of the system which led to the Ward tragedy. Both GSL and the Western Australian state government had breached a duty of care to Mr Ward. Further, it remains highly problematical having a range of oversight bodies if elected government is able to simply ignore the subsequent advice. Parliament must therefore remain a central part of the system of political accountability.