Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes

Recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size. Thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult. It combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament. A general indifferenceresult applies. An exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures. At the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled. If the formateur is strong, a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures.     

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self‐determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.     

Movement Outcomes and Movement Decline: The Vietnam War and the Antiwar Movement

Conventional accounts underestimate the duration and impact of the movement against the Vietnam War. Data from the New York Times Index show more arrests in antiwar protests in 1972 than in the years usually considered the height of the movement; demonstrations continued until a week before the end of the war. The persistence of the movement strengthens claims it succeeded. While those who minimize movement influence assume it had to be popular to succeed, it had a direct impact on policy makers uncertain about future trends in public opinion and electoral behavior. The movement changed the discourse about, and the conduct of, the war, restraining escalation and accelerating troop withdrawals. Comparing Nixon's goals and those of the movement with the Paris Peace Accords shows the success of the movement. The movement also helped lower the voting age, reform the presidential nominating system, and change attitudes towards military action.     

Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation

Study after study has found that regime type has little or no effect on states’ decisions to pursue nuclear weapons. We argue, however, that conventional approaches comparing the behavior of democracies to that of nondemocracies have resulted in incorrect inferences. We disaggregate types of nondemocracies and argue that leaders of highly centralized, “personalistic” dictatorships are particularly likely to view nuclear weapons as an attractive solution to their concerns about regime security and face fewer constraints in pursuing nuclear weapons than leaders of other types of regimes. Combining our more nuanced classification of regime type with a more theoretically appropriate empirical approach, we find that personalist regimes are substantially more likely to pursue nuclear weapons than other regime types. This finding is robust to different codings of proliferation dates and a range of modeling approaches and specifications and has significant implications for both theory and policy.     

The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining, and Policy Consistency

Political science can offer few theoretical generalizations about the exercise of presidential power. From one perspective, this is no disadvantage: there are few presidents, and presidential leadership so intrinsically involves the interplay of ideas and persuasive deliberation that success depends on personal traits and the fit of the president's ideas with the times. Striving for inductive generalizations in such a case would mistake rote scientific method for the pursuit of knowledge. Others argue, however, that the dearth of theoretical generalizations is a temporary weakness, remediable by shifting to a deductive approach. Deductive theorizing can claim insights in other areas once typified by historiographic methods, notably in studies of Congress, and formal models of legislation have been extended to generate hypotheses about transactions between president and Congress. I suggest that neither side of the dilemma offers a satisfactory and complete approach to the puzzle of presidential leadership; it then goes on to specify how the contributions from each side fit together. Rational choice models, based on bargaining as the mode of influence and the repeated game as the image of process, show how institutional structures can produce stable decisions where majority rule tends toward endless cycling. But the cost is that the resulting decisions are typically ad hoc and disjointed. Achieving consistent and coherent policy requires more subtle coordination of individual expectations than legislative organizations can manage, and it is this limitation of bargaining that establishes the potential for presidential leadership. Presidents can attempt to capitalize on this opportunity either by intervening as an additional (but situationally advantaged) bargainer, or by employing persuasion, the explicit appeal to collective goals rather than particularistic trades. I develop the distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.     

Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks

Although empirical research has generally demonstrated that democracies experience more terrorism than autocracies, research suggests that this depends upon complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy‐autocracy divide. This study examines these differences, linking institutions to strategies of coercion and co‐optation. Using zero‐inflated negative binomial regression estimations on Geddes’ (2003) autocratic regime‐type data for 161 countries between 1970 and 2006, we find that single‐party authoritarian regimes consistently experience less domestic and international terrorism relative to military autocracies and democracies. This finding is robust to a large number of specifications, underscoring the explanatory power of regime type for predicting terrorism. Our explanation for these findings is that party‐based autocracies have a wider range of coercion and co‐option strategies that they can employ to address grievance and dissent than do other, more strategically restricted, regimes.     

The Expected Impact of State Immigration Legislation on Labor Market Outcomes

In response to the dramatic rise in the number of unauthorized immigrants to the United States, every state has passed some form of immigration legislation. These laws appear to be predicated on a belief that unauthorized immigrants impose greater costs than benefits to state and local communities, including the labor market. The purpose of this paper is to examine some evidence on what workers should expect if the immigration legislation is successful in eliminating undocumented workers from states' labor markets. © 2012 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Regime Type,and Labor Protest in Developing Countries

We explore the relationship between FDI, regime type, and strikes in low‐ and middle‐income countries. We argue that FDI produces social tensions and opportunities for protest that can result in higher levels of industrial conflict. However, the effect of FDI is moderated by regime type. While democracies tend to have higher levels of protest overall, they are better able than authoritarian regimes to cope with the strains arising from FDI. We cite two reasons. First, political competition forces regimes to incorporate workers, which shifts conflict from industrial relations to the political arena. Second, democracies provide workers with freedom of association rights, which facilitate institutionalized grievance resolution. We test the argument using a new dataset of labor protest in low‐ and middle‐income countries for the period 1980–2005.     

The Impact of Ballot Type on Voter Errors

Studies of ballots have traditionally focused on roll‐off, candidate order, and partisan advantage. This study is among the first to assess the impact of ballots on individual‐level voter errors. We develop new hypotheses by bringing together theoretical insights from usability research and political science about the effects of ballots with and without a straight‐party voting option. By comparing voters’ intentions to the votes they cast, we are able to create two measures of voter errors: votes unintentionally cast for the wrong candidate and unintentional undervotes. Voters generally make fewer errors of both types when using a standard office‐bloc ballot than when using an office‐bloc ballot with a straight‐party option, with the number of wrong‐candidate errors substantially exceeding the number of unintentional undervotes. Voters’ background characteristics have a significant impact on their ability to vote without error. Our results offer a new perspective for evaluating the use of the straight‐party option.     

Globalisation,Legitimacy, and Pacification: The Emergence of a Global Welfare Regime

The globalisation-induced rollback of social expenditures, and the concomitant increase in inequality and unemployment in developed as well as developing countries, are leading to a crisis of legitimacy for the national capitalist state and the capitalist system as whole. It is argued that the global capitalist class will attempt to offset this crisis of legitimacy through the development of a "global welfare regime" to perform the functions that the nation-state is increasingly unable to fulfil, namely, those of pacifying populations through the handing out of material and symbolic rewards. This article will formulate a working definition of legitimacy, show that this legitimacy is being threatened by globalisation, and then present empirical support for this hypothesis of a crisis of legitimacy. Finally, it will analyse in detail the policies of the international governmental organisations that are predicted to constitute a global welfare regime, showing that they are moving to shore up the faltering stability of unregulated global capitalism.     

1756—1763年英法七年战争对美利坚民族形成的影响

1756年因为对殖民地的争夺,英法之间引发了七年战争。1763年,战争以英国对法国的胜利而告终。但是这场战争却在一定程度上导致了英国对北美殖民地政策的改变。这些包括土地,驻军和征税等问题的“新殖民政策”和与之相关的一系列事件,激起了殖民地人民对母国英格兰的不满与愤怒,促进了美利坚民族的整体意识和独立意识,加快了美利坚民族的形成过程。     

Business Value in Public-Private Partnerships: The Positive Impact of Trust and Task-Relevant Competencies on Business Outcomes in PPPs

ABSTRACT

Governments and businesses enter public-private partnerships (PPPs) to achieve better outcomes, but successful partnerships are not easily accomplished. Because businesses’ expectations about PPP outcomes affect how and whether they participate as partners, managing PPPs effectively requires knowing not just what governments lose or gain, but also the value businesses receive. This article demonstrates how structural, collaborative, and participant factors associated with both public and private partners affect business value in PPPs. Based on a mixed-methods approach, this study tests four hypotheses on how PPPs influence value creation for businesses. The findings show that PPP experience, trust, and size have significant effects on business value. However, they only increase certain types of value, depending on the presence and performance of other factors. Moreover, the results show that businesses gain more intangible values, such as network development and knowledge, than revenue.     

Showing Restraint,Signaling Resolve: Coalitions,Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining

How do coalition partners affect the dynamics of crisis bargaining? I analyze a model in which a potential coalition leader faces a trade‐off between signaling resolve to a target and retaining a partner's support by limiting the costs of war. The strength of the target conditions the partner's effect. When the target is strong, the need to ensure military cooperation reduces the probability of war by discouraging bluffing, though resolute types can signal resolve by foregoing coalitional support. When the target is weaker, a resolute coalition leader moderates threats to preserve military cooperation, foregoing the chance to signal resolve and increasing the chances of war, even as the partner successfully moderates the leader's bargaining posture. Thus, coalitions may face higher probabilities of war against weaker targets than stronger ones, coalitions are more likely against weak than strong targets, and partners can increase or decrease the probability of war.