对孟德斯鸠分权理论几个问题的辨析

从文本的意义上说,人们对孟德斯鸠分权学说的认识仍存有一些根本性的分歧。对这些分歧进行学理的正本清源的梳理与辨析,犹为必要:(1)孟德斯鸠分权学说的真实本意是通过权力的分立与制衡使公民的政治自由免受国家权力的侵害而得到法律的庇护。权力滥用的被制止只是分权制度达致的结果,而非其诉求的意旨。(2)孟德斯鸠对人的本性和道德能力的悲观与否定,构成分权学说的理论逻辑前提。(3)分权学说是为封建贵族的利益张目,不是为新兴资产阶级呐喊,即分权的本意是等级分权。当资产阶级夺取政权后,分权的实质就演变为国家机关内部的职能分工,文本问题就切换为应用问题。(4)分权政制其实是一种混合政体,它不是权力的绝对分立,分立中的权力其实是一种交叉混合的权力。(5)分权制度对公民自由的保护不一定要以降低行政效率为代价,它还有增强政府工作能力的“积极性”作用。(6)分权学说是否具有普适价值是一个十分复杂的问题。任何一种设计良好的政治制度,在性质上并无好坏之分,只有适合不适合之别。分权体制在中国确实存在一个适合与否的问题。但是,分权体制所折射出的一些基本原则应该具有普适的意义和价值。     

刍论三权分立的理论、实践与理论重构——从静态“权力”到动态政治行动

三权分立理论在18世纪形成之后,几乎没有什么变化,而三权分立制度则经历了巨大的变迁,因此两者不能简单等同。事实上,制度的变迁引起了学者们对三权分立理论的猛烈批评。尽管如此,在21世纪,三权分立理论仍然具有相当的生命力,是政治理论的重要成分。三权分立理论之重构需要抛弃其静态"权力"概念,并抛弃最小程度的政治参与、目标极为有限、小政府等过时前提,而重构为与特定价值承诺相结合的分析性的动态理论。     

孟德斯鸠的分权学说及其现代意义

孟德斯鸠分权学说得以产生的条件,是西方政治思想中的分权思想、分权理论的发展,在一定意义上,孟德斯鸠的分权理论是在这些思想和理论的基础上进行逻辑发展、理论研究以及结合实际政治现象而得出的成果。孟德斯鸠的分权理论较洛克的分权理论有了长足的发展。其对分权理论的完善和发展的贡献,最为根本的在于明确提出了“三权”相互制衡的思想,使“三权”得以成为一个系统。孟德斯鸠将司法权独立出来,真正形成分权制衡的理论,其中包含了更高的政治理性。结合我国司法的实践,科学地认识孟德斯鸠分权学说的现代意义,是有必要的。     

试论美国“三权分立”模式的本质及局限

美国以1787年宪法确立的三权分立制度丢掉了革命时期追求公民权利和自由的宗旨,公开以排斥和防范民众的民主权利为出发点,成为对付民众权利的工具。西方的政治学家也历来不敢恭维美国的三权分立模式是资产阶级民权或民主政体的典范。孙中山筹划共和国体制的时候批判西方的三权分立制度,主张以五权宪法取而代之,证明三权分立制度在中国从来就行不通。近年现实中鼓吹三权分立制度的所谓宪政思潮,意在颠覆和瓦解社会主义政治制度,其政治思想水平已经倒退到18世纪以前去了。对西方三权分立政体这一重要问题的看法和态度,实际上是检验是否划清资产阶级民主与社会主义民主界限的大是大非问题。     

咸丰帝的三权分立

1861年,年仅30岁的咸丰帝被迫放弃无限的金钱、美女走进生命的黄昏。临终前,他做了三件大事：一是立皇长子载淳为皇太子;二是命御前大臣载垣、端华、景寿、大学士肃顺和军机大臣穆荫、匡源、杜翰、焦祜瀛八人为赞襄政务大臣（顾命大臣）;     

亦论“三权分立”在中国走不通

介绍中国的国体政体、美国的三权分立制度,陈述了目前中国的社会法制现象以及人们对三权分立的认识。正面阐述了三权分立在目前中国行不通。客观分析了三权分立在目前中国走不通的三大原因。阐述了我国的国家制度,强调要进一步健全和完善我国的国体政体。     

法国大革命前期的三权分立

权力分立并通过权力制衡达到政治自由是法国思想家孟德斯鸠明确提出的资产阶级国家制度的基本原则,但卢梭极度轻蔑赋予国家各组成部分独立权力以相互制约的均衡理论.这种观念上的冲突,在法国大革命时期的前两部宪法中表现得十分鲜明.从实际情况看,法国大革命时期的权力分立有自己的特色:议会至高无上并发展为相当程度的专制,行政权过于弱化而无法与立法权抗衡,司法权根本没有独立地位.因此可以说,法国人基本上没有按照孟德斯鸠的思路去制约权力.     

论古典自然法学派

古典自然法学派对西方法学具有重大的影响,具有一定的研究意义。古典自然法学派的产生具有深刻的时代背景和深厚的理论背景。众多法学家共同构建了庞大的理论体系,为资产阶级革命提供了理论武器,而其存在的难以克服的理论缺陷导致了其衰落。     

对西方近代社会契约论思想的再思考

在西方近代社会契约论发展过程中,是格老秀斯完成了由古代契约论向近代契约论的最终转型,霍布斯、斯宾诺莎、洛克通过其社会契约论主张共同开创了西方的自由主义传统,而卢梭的社会契约论则出现了明显的激进主义的转向,20世纪后期的契约论复兴则远离了其过去的超验色彩,更具工具性特点。     

对"三权分立"学说的两点再认识

认为“三权分立”就是将国家主权划分为三个相对独立、互相制衡的部分与洛克和孟德斯鸠最初的观点相悖，因为他们都主张国家主权中“立法权”才是最高权力，这和“议行合一”具有共性；同时，对“三权分立”内涵的理解不能只局限于政治领域，应扩大其外延范围，甚至可以将其理解为一种规律，以适应现实的需要与发展。     

The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting

This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision‐making process to show signs of an SOP effect.     

The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy

A major focus of judicial politics research has been the extent to which ideological divergence between the Court and Congress can explain variation in Supreme Court decision making. However, conflicting theoretical and empirical findings have given rise to a significant discrepancy in the scholarship. Building on evidence from interviews with Supreme Court justices and former law clerks, I develop a formal model of judicial-congressional relations that incorporates judicial preferences for institutional legitimacy and the role of public opinion in congressional hostility towards the Supreme Court. An original dataset identifying all Court-curbing legislation proposed between 1877 and 2006 is then used to assess the influence of congressional hostility on the Court's use of judicial review. The evidence indicates that public discontent with the Court, as mediated through congressional hostility, creates an incentive for the Court to exercise self-restraint. When Congress is hostile, the Court uses judicial review to invalidate Acts of Congress less frequently than when Congress is not hostile towards the Court.     

Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System

This article investigates causes of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants to enforce statutes. It specifies the statutory mechanism, grounded in economic incentives, that Congress uses to do so, and presents a theoretical framework for understanding how certain characteristics of separation of powers structures, particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy, drive legislative production of this mechanism. Using new and original historical data, the article presents the first empirical model of the legislative choice to mobilize private litigants, covering the years 1887 to 2004. The findings provide robust support for the proposition that interbranch conflict between Congress and the president is a powerful cause of congressional enactment of incentives to mobilize private litigants. Higher risk of electoral losses by the majority party, Democratic control of Congress, and demand by issue‐oriented interest groups are also significant predictors of congressional enactment of such incentives.     

Inter-Institutional Dynamics: Assessments of the Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers Context

Using data collected from a survey experiment, we examine whether information about the nature of the interactions between the Supreme Court and Congress influences respondents’ assessments of the Court. We find that political sophistication is key to understanding how individuals incorporate the separation of powers context into their evaluations of the Court. Political sophisticates give the Court its highest assessments when told that the Court and Congress are often in disagreement, and that Congress is most responsible for this disagreement. Assessments of the Court are significantly lower, however, when sophisticates believe that high levels of disagreement between the Court and Congress are due to the Court’s actions and when these respondents believe that the Court and Congress agree a high proportion of the time. These results suggest that for political sophisticates, the Court’s institutional standing is related to the balance it strikes between deference to Congress and judicial independence.     

From Majoritarian Democracy to Vertical Separation of Powers: Sweden and the European Union

The key problem in constitutional politics in the established democracies may be said to pertain to finding the right balance between majoritarian democracy, constitutionalism and effective decision making. From that perspective this essay examines the Swedish polity before and after the accession to the European Union in 1995. From 1917 onwards majoritarian democracy and parliamentarism were the praxis of the Swedish polity. But this mode of goverment was not written into the 1809 Instrument of Government, which was characterised by the separation of powers between the king and the parliament. It was first in the new Instrument of Government, adopted in 1973–74, that the praxis of majoritarian democracy and parliamentarism was codified. But in the 1990s a new form of dualism was introduced into the Swedish polity as a result of the country's accession to the European Union. On the one hand, there is an Instrument of Government characterised by the principle of majoritarian democratic rule. On the other, accession to the EU involves a vertical separation of powers on a major scale. Two conflicting fundamental elements, majoritarian democracy and vertical separation of powers, are currently incorporated in the Swedish polity.     

密尔的代议制思想及对我国民主发展的启示

密尔,英国著名的经济学家、哲学家、自由主义法学家,《代议制政府》作为其最为出名的著作之一,全面地讲述了它的代议制思想,是民主政治的一大进步,对人类社会的发展做出了重要贡献。代议制只是作为比较合理的国家政治制度,并不是完美的,其自身有着难以避免的缺陷。代议思想作为西方政治发展的重要思想,不仅推动了西方政治民主化的发展,对我国民主政治的发展也有重要的启示。     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.