Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics

A rather unique feature of global climate negotiations is that most governments allow representatives of civil society organisations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant such access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, this article argues for a ‘contagion’ effect that explains this phenomenon besides domestic determinants. In particular, states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if other governments do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organisations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the article also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in 2011.     

The impact of governance on education inequality: Evidence from Bangladesh

Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in increasing education access in the last 20 years. However, substantial inequalities in educational attainment remain even though equity in education is a central government objective. The article argues that weaknesses in education sector governance are crucial to understanding these persistent inequalities. At the level of the budget, anti‐poor biases in allocation decisions are shown to be the result of the budget's role in political management and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms. The spearhead of government attempts to address education inequality at the primary level has been the conditional cash transfer programme for poor children. The article shows that the programme has failed to target the poor and suggests that this has been due to the weaknesses and contradictions in the governance of the programme. Strengthening the links between policy and implementation through improvements in the governance of the sector are crucial if inequality is to be addressed and national education goals achieved. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From norms to programs: The United Nations Global Compact and global governance

Norms shape policy when they get translated into concrete programs. What if a widely shared norm gets translated into a weak program? How might this influence the program's legitimacy? We examine these issues in the context of the United Nations Global Compact, a voluntary program that embodies the widely shared norm of corporate responsibility. While both international intergovernmental organization (IGO) and international non‐governmental organization (INGO) networks support this norm, they differ on the adequacy of the Compact's program design. We explore how this tension affects the diffusion of the Compact across countries, which vary in their levels of embeddedness in IGO and INGO networks. Our findings suggest that embeddedness in IGO networks encourages adoption, while embeddedness in INGO networks discourages it. Our analysis provides important lessons for sponsors of voluntary governance mechanisms. Widespread support for a norm does not automatically ensure support for a program that claims to embody it.     

Accountability infrastructures: Pragmatic compliance inside organizations

We trace the pragmatic turn in regulatory governance from the level of the state and civil society to the coalface of the regulated organization. Since the 1980s, an array of new regulatory models has emerged. These models, while distinct, are unified in two related tendencies. First, they support the devolution of responsibility for standard setting, program design, and enforcement to the regulated organization. This delegation of governance to the organization itself has catalyzed the creation of accountability infrastructures within organizations, a network of offices, roles, programs, and procedures dedicated to aligning the organization's operations with external standards, codes of conduct, ethical and normative expectations, and regulations. Second, the diverse regulatory models depend, often implicitly, on organizational accountability infrastructures that incorporate the tenets of pragmatist philosophy: inquiry through narration, adaptation to context, and problem-solving through experimentation. Reviewing the empirical literature on organizational compliance, we find ample evidence of inquiry through narration at the organizational coalface. However, we find limited evidence of narrating plurality in the organization and narrating experimentation as problem-solving, as these activities create tensions with internal and external parties who expect singular, stable representations of governance. These tensions reveal an important incongruity between pragmatic governance across organizations and pragmatic governance within organizations. We contribute to the regulatory governance literature by documenting this important shift in the locus of governance to the organizational coalface and by charting a new research agenda. We argue that examinations of regulatory governance should be retraced in three ways. First, attention should shift to the organizational coalface, recognizing and analyzing accountability infrastructures as the central contemporary mechanism of governance. Second, the long-standing focus in regulatory studies on why parties comply should shift to understanding how regulated parties manage themselves to achieve compliance. Third, analyses of compliance should examine the tensions in narrating adaptation and experimentation, and the implications of such tensions for the achievement of prosocial outcomes.     

Risk and the limits of governance: Exploring varied patterns of risk‐based governance across Europe

Risk‐based approaches to governance are widely promoted as universally applicable foundations for improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance across policy domains. Premised on the idea that governance cannot eliminate all adverse outcomes, these approaches provide a method for establishing priorities and allocating scarce resources, and, in so doing, rationalise the limits of what governance interventions can, and should, achieve. Yet cursory observation suggests that risk‐based approaches have spread unevenly across countries. Based on a comparison of the UK, France, and Germany, this article explores the ways in which, and why, such approaches have “colonised” governance regimes in the UK, but have had much more limited application in France and Germany. We argue that the institutionally patterned adoption of risk‐based governance across these three countries is related to how entrenched governance norms and accountability structures within their national polities handle both the identification and acceptance of adverse governance outcomes.     

Governance in Central Government: Reconciling Accountability and Capability

Governance structures in central government departments are poorly articulated. Departmental boards were imported from the private sector; in central government their remit and accountability are obscure, as is their role in relation to Permanent Secretaries and Ministers—whose leadership roles are also muddled. This brings costs for Ministers, departments and the public. Improvements have proved elusive, in part because an underlying confusion has been neglected—about how bodies subject to the almost unlimited democratic accountability of Ministers are to be governed. The confusion can be cleared up, principles of governance formulated, and concrete improvements proposed. These include: better articulation of Permanent Secretaries' presumptive leadership role; strengthened lines of external accountability; and more coherent provisions for the role and accountabilities of boards, and their relationship with Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and the centre of government. Such changes should improve accountability, leadership, capability and delivery.     

G20 institutional transition and global tax governance

The G20 is in transition from a short-term crisis institution to long-term steering institution, adopting a new ‘G20 + established international organization’ governance approach. In this approach, the main role of the G20 is to set the agenda and build political consensus for global economic governance. The established international organization provides the technical support and facilitates proposal implementation, while the precondition for the G20 institutional transition is that the emerging economies need to participate on an equal footing with the advanced economies. The case of global tax governance is among the few success stories of the G20's institutional transition. Within the ‘G20 + OECD’ governance architecture, the G20 builds the political consensus that the profits should be taxed where they are performed, while the OECD proposes the technical Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan. In this way, the G20's political leadership and the OECD's technical advantage complement each other, making a giant leap in global tax governance.     

Power transitions and global trade governance: The impact of a rising China on the export credit regime

The existing liberal international economic order was constructed during the era of American hegemony and has been heavily shaped by US power. How is the rise of China affecting global economic governance? This article analyzes the case of export credit, which has long been considered a highly effective international regulatory regime and an important component of global trade governance. I show that the rise of China is profoundly altering the landscape of export credit and undermining its governance arrangements. State-backed export credit is a key tool of China's development strategy, yet I argue that an explosion in China's use of export credit is eroding the efficacy of existing international rules intended to prevent a competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit. The case of export credit highlights a fundamental tension between liberal institutions of global governance and the development objectives of emerging powers.     

Transparency in transnational governance: The determinants of information disclosure of voluntary sustainability programs

The rise of “new” transnational governance has intensified debates about a lack of accountability in global politics. Reviewing the mechanisms through which transparency can foster accountability beyond the state, this article explores the determinants of information disclosure in the field of transnational sustainability governance. Examining the institutional design of 113 voluntary sustainability programs, we find a positive correlation between the involvement of public actors and information disclosure. In contrast, the role of civil society is more ambiguous. There is no statistical support for arguments linking non‐governmental organization participation to increased transparency. At the same time, our analysis reveals a robust correlation between civil society‐led metagovernance and information disclosure. Moreover, we find that crowding has a negative effect on transparency, whereas normative peer pressures have no influence. At a broader level, the analysis reveals a lack of “deep transparency” among transnational sustainability governors. This limits the scope for transparency‐induced accountability in this policy domain.     

Coming to grips with corporate governance in local government

Local government, the tier of government closest to the people, provides services and infrastructure which impact daily on the well‐being of local communities. Despite the Australian state‐based regulatory framework, governance dysfunction regularly results in dismissal of councils. This paper seeks to gain an insight into what is understood by corporate governance at the local government level, an area not addressed in previous research. The methodology was a case study of one local municipality in Tasmania using explanatory sequential mixed methods. Findings revealed a narrow compliance‐based understanding, with effective accountability strategies not included in that understanding. Diverse information sources, such as previous employment experience and industry‐based training, led to embedded beliefs about the meaning of corporate governance which were not necessarily shared by all. This study has implications for state governments seeking to find long‐term solutions for dysfunctional councils, and to bring about positive change.     

Technocracy,the market and the governance of England's National Health Service

England's National Health Service, the fifth largest employer in the world, has become heavily influenced by expert authority and the market economy, which has had implications for accountability and the receptiveness of health decisions to stakeholder needs. One response has been the introduction of a range of regulatory provisions designed to facilitate effective governance and stakeholder engagement. These provisions are scrutinized using three conceptual devices: core accountability, social reporting and social learning. These devices have significant implications, as they enable technical experts to form closed communities, communicate among themselves mainly about economic and financial matters, and make decisions that aid the market without meaningful recourse to citizens. While technical experts are necessary to help manage complex areas, current arrangements reinforce an existing gap between economic and democratic values through hardened technocratic approaches to health care governance.     

When private governance impedes multilateralism: The case of international pesticide governance

Private standards play an increasingly important governance role, yet their effects on state-led policymaking remain understudied. We examine how the operation of private agricultural standards influences multilateral pesticide governance with a particular focus on the listing of substances under the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, a treaty-based information-sharing mechanism that allows countries to refuse hazardous chemical imports. We find that private agricultural standard-setting bodies use the Rotterdam Convention's pesticide list to develop their own lists of banned substances. This alters the Rotterdam Convention's intended role, impeding efforts to add substances to the treaty, as attempts by private actors to impose stricter governance than state actors can undermine the potential for international state-based governance to become more stringent. We characterize this as a “confounding interaction” whereby institutional linkages between actions by public and private actors with broadly aligned goals results in unexpected negative consequences for governance.     

Japanese civil society in global governance: the case of 2015 UN World Conference on disaster risk reduction

In 2015, the Hyogo Framework for Action on disaster risk reduction (DRR) expired, necessitating the introduction of a new international agreement. This article investigates the activities and achievements of the Japan civil society organization coalition for the 2015 UN World Conference on DRR (JCC2015) from the point of view of its involvement in the shaping of the new Sendai Framework for DRR. Although JCC2015 contributed to agenda setting and policy development processes and managed to secure recognition for its position on nuclear risk at a regional level, its participation did not translate into impact on the Sendai Framework to the extent it wished to achieve. The article’s findings testify to the on-going and active inclusion of non-governmental stakeholders in the UN-led global policy-making processes concerning reducing disaster risk, but they also illustrate difficulties that actors who aim to introduce new elements into the agenda need to tackle.     

The transfer of governance from the nation state to a corporate global economy

The purpose of this document is to analyze the emerging phenomenon of the transfer from state governance to global economic corporate governance. After determining the economic globalization processes driven by a corporate global economy, which affects the formation of globalized business-intergovernmental networks, we discuss their outcome and impact. Finally we outline the main challenges facing governance driven by a corporate global economy.     

China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.     

Can non‐state global governance be legitimate? An analytical framework

In the absence of effective national and intergovernmental regulation to ameliorate global environmental and social problems, “private” alternatives have proliferated, including self‐regulation, corporate social responsibility, and public–private partnerships. Of the alternatives, “non‐state market driven” (NSMD) governance systems deserve greater attention because they offer the strongest regulation and potential to socially embed global markets. NSMD systems encourage compliance by recognizing and tracking, along the market’s supply chain, responsibly produced goods and services. They aim to establish “political legitimacy” whereby firms, social actors, and stakeholders are united into a community that accepts “shared rule as appropriate and justified.” Drawing inductively on evidence from a range of NSMD systems, and deductively on theories of institutions and learning, we develop an analytical framework and a preliminary set of causal propositions to explicate whether and how political legitimacy might be achieved. The framework corrects the existing literature’s inattention to the conditioning effects of global social structure, and its tendency to treat actor evaluations of NSMD systems as static and strategic. It identifies a three‐phase process through which NSMD systems might gain political legitimacy. It posits that a “logic of consequences” alone cannot explain actor evaluations: the explanation requires greater reference to a “logic of appropriateness” as systems progress through the phases. The framework aims to guide future empirical work to assess the potential of NSMD systems to socially embed global markets.     

The limits and variety of risk‐based governance: The case of flood management in Germany and England

Risk‐based governance is argued by many to hold the promise of a more rational and efficient state, by making explicit the limitations of state interventions and focusing finite resources on those targets where probable damage is greatest. This paper challenges the assumption that risk‐based governance has the potential for universal and uniform application, by comparing contemporary flood management in Germany and England. On first inspection, flooding appears to be a paradigmatic case of risk colonizing European policy discourses, with the traditional notion of flood defense giving way to flood risk management in the context of climate change, increasingly frequent flood disasters, political and cost pressures on flood protection, and publicly available European‐wide flood assessments. Drawing on in‐depth empirical research, this paper shows how the role, and even the definition, of “risk” is institutionally shaped, and how the respective institutional environments of German and English flood management practices impede and promote risk colonization. In particular, the use and conceptualizations of risk in governance are variously promoted, filtered, or constrained by the administrative procedures, structures, and political expectations embedded within flood management and wider polities of each country. The findings of this research are important for the design and implementation of supranational policies and regulations that endorse risk‐based approaches, such as the recent EU Flood Directive, as well as scholarly debate as to how to legitimately define the limits of governance in the face of uncertainty and accountability pressures.     

The Nordic governments' responses to the Covid-19 pandemic: A comparative study of variation in governance arrangements and regulatory instruments

Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Nordic states—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—exhibit similarities and differences. This article investigates the extent to which crisis policymaking diverges from normal policymaking within the Nordic countries and whether variations between the countries are associated with the role of expertise and the level of politicization. Government responses are analyzed in terms of governance arrangements and regulatory instruments. Findings demonstrate some deviation from normal policymaking within and considerable variation between the Nordic countries, as Denmark, Finland, and to some extent Norway exhibit similar patterns with hierarchical command and control governance arrangements, while Iceland, in some instances, resembles the case of Sweden, which has made use of network-based governance. The article shows that the higher the influence of experts, the more likely it is that the governance arrangement will be network-based.