Seeing around Corners: Crafting the New Department of Homeland Security1

The development of the nation's homeland security agenda, including building the behemoth new Department of Homeland Security, will for decades to come provide a rich laboratory for scholars, public managers, consultants, and other observers and analysts. In this article, we begin to describe some of the history, key players and institutions, major policy instruments, and organizational challenges in the rapidly evolving arena of homeland security. This article carries with it two primary purposes: (1) to identify some of the key documents and federal-level initiatives since September 11, and (2) to suggest several areas that beg for additional attention from those who care about effective public policy and administration, whether the particular bent be toward scholarship or practice.     

Private regulation and global economic change: The drivers of sustainable agriculture in Brazil

What determines the uptake of private sustainability regulation in developing countries? Existing studies point to the local context as the key explanatory factor. In particular, they identify local program characteristics, industry structures, and the regulatory environment as variables influencing program uptake at the point of production. However, examining two very similar certification programs in Brazil's soy and sugarcane industries, this article finds that local conditions fail to account for the observed patterns. A “local explanation” would have predicted similar levels of industry uptake in the two sectors. Conversely, it is found that Brazil's soy producers first backed but then opposed private sustainability regulation, whereas in the sugarcane sector the dynamic was exactly the opposite. Through an in‐depth analysis and cross‐case comparison this article reveals how changing transnational conditions were decisive in shaping these outcomes. Specifically, shifting end markets exposed the two sectors to different economic and regulatory pressures.     

Regulatory reform and governance: A survey of selected developing and transition economies

Regulation is now considered an integral instrument in developing policy toolkit to support market‐led, pro‐poor growth in developing and transition economies. Institutional environment in general and regulatory governance in particular have increasingly been viewed as a factor of competitiveness. In search for better governance, regulatory reform is critical. This article assesses regulatory reform in selected developing and transition economies by reporting the results of a survey on the application of regulatory governance policies, tools and institutions. It is found that in these countries regulatory reform has not shifted in approaches and objectives to taking a systematic view of regulatory governance and the means of promoting and enhancing it. It is suggested that, in order to improve regulatory governance, focus should be put on each of the three elements: regulatory policies, tools and institutions, and that centralised and concerted efforts are needed to integrate the elements. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Concurrent Analysis of Three Institutions that Transform Health Technology‐Based Ventures: Economic Policy,Capital Investment,and Market Approval

Drawing on institutional theory, this article articulates qualitative insights from a program of research on Canadian health technology‐based ventures to examine the rules that characterize economic policy, capital investment, and regulatory approval as well as the way these institutions enable and constrain the development of ventures at an early stage. Our findings clarify how economic policy integrates these ventures into the entrepreneurial domain, how capital investment configures them for economic value extraction, and how regulatory approval fully releases their market value. These findings help to revisit current policy modernization initiatives by calling attention to the convergence among the three institutions. Rather than operating solely as a source of constraints, these institutions provide a highly integrated market‐oriented space for health technology‐based entrepreneurial activities to unfold.     

Governance reforms and public acceptance of regulatory decisions: Cross-national evidence from linked survey experiments on pesticides authorization in the European Union

Do governance reforms affect public acceptance of regulatory decisions, and if so, how? We tackled this critical but under-studied question through a pair of linked survey experiments on public attitudes toward the reform of European Union (EU) pesticides regulation among a representative sample of the adult population in six EU member states. We tested the expectation that citizens are more likely to accept a regulatory decision that runs counter to their prior policy preferences if it is taken under a procedure they support. We first conducted a conjoint experiment to study whether the specific design of decision-making procedures impacts public support for EU pesticide regulation. In a second linked experiment, we asked respondents whether farmers should be allowed to use glyphosate, the best known and most controversial pesticide. We then asked respondents if they would accept an authorization decision on glyphosate contrary to their prior expressed preference if it were taken under a decision-making procedure they supported. The results demonstrate that a regulatory decision-making procedure respondents support increases their willingness to accept a hypothetical authorization decision contrary to their prior expressed preference. Contrary to the findings of previous research, our study thus provides strong evidence that governance reforms supported by citizens can enhance acceptance of controversial regulatory decisions, even on politicized issues such as pesticides authorization.     

Can markets be expected to prevent themselves from self‐destruction?

Even if competitive markets have shown themselves to be the most efficient organizational form for creating economic efficiency, the question of how they can avoid destructive influence from agents with opportunistic motives remains unresolved. Different institutional approaches have argued that to be efficient, markets need to be embedded in a set of formal and informal institutions. Because such institutions will in the long run make all market agents better off, they are labeled efficient institutions. Contrary to what is argued in neoclassical economics, it is unlikely that such institutions will be created endogenously by market agents because the institutions are to be understood as genuine public goods. Moreover, if such institutions have been established, we should expect market agents to face a collective action problem when sustaining them, leading to the destruction of the institutions. The conclusion is that if left to themselves, markets should be understood as inherently self‐destructive.     

Global democracy in a society of peoples

This paper explores the political structures suitable for the realization of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples (1999). In particular, it explores whether Rawls’ principles and fundamental foundations recommend establishing global institutions and, if so, whether, and in what sense, these institutions should be democratic. It is often suggested, either implicitly or explicitly, that The Law of Peoples would operate through the bilateral and multilateral interactions of, ideally conceived, nation-states. This paper argues, on the contrary, that it would advise a series of democratic global institutions. The case is developed with respect to the idea of a global institution with the remit of regulating international trade and applied, in the contemporary context, to the World Trade Organization (WTO).     

Dysfunctional institutions? Toward a New Agenda in Governance Studies

There is a wide‐spread perception among academics and commentators that institutional dysfunction has become increasingly common in important social, political, and economics arenas. Opinion polls show a decline in trust and confidence in major actors and institutions, including inter‐governmental organizations, governments, firms, NGOs, and religious organizations. For some, the core of the problem is that the hitherto well‐functioning states have become less effective in aggregating and acting upon citizens' preferences. Many policy initiatives of the 1990s – deregulation, privatization, new public management, private regulation, regional integration, civil society, and so on – seemed to have failed to meet expectations. This symposium seeks to identify important theoretical and empirical questions about institutional failure, such as why do institutions fail, why are they not self‐correcting, what might be a clear evaluative yardstick and analytic approach by which to measure performance, and to what extent contemporary theories of institutional evolution and design are useful in examining institutional restructuring and institutional renewal? Symposium essays by leading social science scholars offer important insights to inform future work on institutional performance and outline an agenda for institutional renewal and change.     

Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.‐Based Agreement

Several scholars have suggested that the United States can be compelled to reengage in the Kyoto process by linking cooperation on climate change to cooperation on trade or technology research and development. We argue that such issue linkage would likely fail and suggest that a more promising road to U.S. cooperation is to develop an alternative climate agreement based on federal U.S. climate policy. However, the question then becomes whether the Kyoto countries might be prepared to abandon the Kyoto process in favor of such a U.S.‐based agreement. We argue that if a U.S.‐based agreement were to be built on President Bush's current climate policy, the Kyoto countries (especially the European Union) would likely be reluctant to go along. However, if a U.S.‐based agreement were to be built on the many Kyoto‐like initiatives now emerging at state and local levels, the Kyoto countries might well be more favorably inclined.     

ANALYZING SELF‐ORGANIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES: ARE THERE INSIGHTS FOR DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS?

In spite of the great enthusiasm and arguments supporting decentralization in Africa, its performance has frequently fallen well below expectations. However, a number of self‐initiated, local governance efforts have been quite successful. The article finds that all governance initiatives face a number of collective action problems that they must overcome to succeed. These include issues of collective choice, free riding, principal–agency, and constitutional design. The article explores two cases of locally initiated self‐governance initiatives where smaller population size, the ability to focus on only a few services, and the ability flexibly to redesign their institutions were important in their success in overcoming these governance challenges. In one case, challenge by and negotiation with formal governance institutions furthered their success. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Technology Trap and the Role of Political and Cultural Variables: A Critical Analysis of the E‐Government Policies

More than a decade after the first introduction of the e‐government policies, early enthusiasms on its immediate benefits on the quality of democracy have undergone critical review. E‐government implementation worldwide has proved that technology alone does not necessarily provide more access and more participation. Massive technological intervention is not enough for reinventing government online. Hence, other variables should be taken into consideration. Factors concerning political culture, cognitive frames and mentality, administrative traditions, as well as the country‐specific peculiarities play a relevant role in determining if and how e‐gov initiatives can succeed or fail. In this article, it will be argued that any opportunity and push for change and actual influence on administrations, governments, and societies, prompted by the new technologies, should endure important variables of political, social, and cultural nature. The political and socio‐cultural variables then overcome the technological one and we can state that politics (still) determines (e‐)policy.     

Complementing and correcting representative institutions: When and how to use mini-publics

In democratic theory and practice, it has become a popular view that designed deliberative mini-publics can effectively counteract failures of representative democratic institutions. But when should mini-publics be deployed, and how should they be designed? This article develops a framework for thinking about these questions. It argues that when representative democratic institutions ensure the empowerment of inclusions, enable the formation of collective agendas and wills, and are capable of translating those agendas into binding decisions, mini-publics should be used sparingly and as complementary initiatives; the less representative institutions are able to serve these functions, the more mini-publics should gain independence and standing to correct these problems. The article shows how this can be operationalised in light of two key institutional design issues – coupling and authority – and discusses some empirical examples that foreground the empirical leverage offered by the suggested framework.     

Towards a Study of Human Rights Practitioners

The expansion of human rights provisions has produced an increasing number of human rights practitioners and delineated human rights as a field of its own. Questions of who is practicing human rights and how they practice it have become important. This paper considers the question of human rights practice and the agency of practitioners, arguing that practice should not be conceived as the application of philosophy, but instead approached from a sociological point of view. Whatever the structuring effect of political institutions, human rights is being defined more expansively by practitioners. The weakness of international institutions and the interpretive scope of human rights discourse produce significant opportunity for practitioners to interpret the meaning of human rights. Our exploratory interviews of a small sample of practitioners reveal widely varying histories, in which they interpret their own work as “human rights” practice in differing ways. Practitioners who in the past thought of themselves differently, now identify as human rights activists. They are also becoming more professional, but concerned about professionalization. Their self-interpretations reflect these concerns and also respond to the necessities of career events. Through the conscious and unconscious aspects of their practice, practitioners exercise considerable agency in adapting human rights discourse to their own concerns while also being critical of it.     

Looking for strengths in response to AIDS: individual,group and public authority roles in strategy

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a challenge not only to medical understanding but also to understanding about how society works or can be made to work. New treatment regimes have to be matched with new social organisation. Caring and coping present society‐wide challenges and to the need to reinvent key social institutions in order to respond effectively. Existing studies demonstrate the vulnerability of modern, large‐scale state institutions to loss of knowledge, skill and competence in the face of high attrition rates in their pay role staff. Equally, family and kinship as well as other civil society institutions or ‘traditional’ social structures may be so disrupted by the loss of carers and providers that they cease to generate adequate levels of well‐being and security. The role of key individuals in providing public leadership is recognised but the significance of personal networks in communicating effective messages and mores is more difficult to pin down. Associations and mass movements have emerged that play a vital role in changing social attitudes and behaviour, and social institutions are adapting to the challenge. It appears that diverse social responses are essential, but, I argue, public policy thinking has a ‘centralist’, hierarchical, bias that discourages' sensible thinking about plural, diverse, strategies. This article seeks to develop a way of thinking about strategy, around the idea of institutional competence, to take account of, and be responsive to, diverse social forms and initiatives. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutional Capacity and Choice in Australia's Integrity Systems

This article examines recent debate over core or ‘independent’ integrity institutions in the Victorian and Commonwealth governments to highlight some of the need, and potential, for more careful deliberation over options for building the capacity of integrity systems ‐ the second of the analytical themes used in Australia's national assessment. The first part compares resourcing of major integrity institutions by Australian governments over the past 15 years. Staffing and finances are seen as a useful basic measure of capacity, helping lift attention away from the assumption that creation of new bodies necessarily increases capacity. The data also show that some jurisdictions—including Victoria—may yet have some way to go if they wish to match other governments. The second part of the analysis identifies eight further issues for consideration in deliberations on institutional design. Our conclusion is that by working through such issues more systematically, it may be possible to identify new or different institutional options for configuring integrity resources. This could help avoid inappropriate choices—whether unnecessary new bodies, overloads on existing ones or the import of frameworks that do not necessarily ‘fit’ local conditions—of particular relevance to current proposals for a new Commonwealth anti‐corruption agency.     

Explaining Australian Economic Success: Good Policy or Good Luck?

Australia and some European countries experienced economic “miracles” in the 1990s that reversed prior poor export, employment, and fiscal performance. The miracles might provide transferable lessons about economic governance if it were true that economic governance institutions are malleable, and that actors deliberately changed those institutions in ways that contributed to the miracles. This paper analyzes Australian policy responses to see whether remediation should be attributed to pluck (intentional, strategic remediation of dysfunctional institutions to make them conform with the external environment), luck (environmental change that makes formerly dysfunctional institutions suddenly functional), or just being stuck (endogenous or path‐dependent change that brings institutions into conformity with the environment). These distinctions help establish whether actors can consciously engineer institutional change that is “off‐path.” While pluck appears to explain more than either stuck or luck in the Australian case, the analysis suggests that both off‐path behavior and policy transfer are probably rare.     

Who would vote NOTA? Explaining a ‘none of the above’ choice in eight countries

In this study, we investigate who would vote ‘none of the above’ (NOTA) if this were available on the ballot paper using original data from eight European countries. In particular, we examine whether NOTA would be used by abstainers and voters to protest within the electoral process. We also test whether socioeconomic factors and specific and diffuse support for democracy and its institutions correlate with a NOTA vote. We find that having NOTA on the ballot would reduce invalid balloting more than abstention and much more than protest party voting. Our results also suggest that NOTA is related to socioeconomic status, political interest, political knowledge and distrust in political institutions and authorities, but not to broadly undemocratic attitudes. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the increasingly large amounts of abstention and invalid voting, as well as the growing distrust of political institutions, in democratic countries. They also hold lessons for electoral reformers.     

New corporate agendas

Globalisation is changing the public affairs agenda for businesses operating in a more interdependent world. As the roles and responsibilities of government are being redefined, and the boundaries between business and government become less clear cut, today's business leaders are facing a daunting array of challenges. In the new age of corporate social responsibility, the needs of shareholders, consumers, employees, national as well as international regulators, watchdogs, NGOs and activist groups have to be satisfied. The number of variables that could affect the bottom line appears to be growing at an exponential rate; and losing the trust of stakeholders can be fatal. Business leaders should step up to the challenges that these developments are creating. They should be unapologetic about countering anti‐globalisation activists by demonstrating the real value that business can bring to the developing as well as the developed world. They should help to promote the virtues of greater transparency and accountability to their stakeholders. They should be actively engaged in fashioning new regulatory architecture that is pro‐competitive, one that makes trade possible. Business leaders should support efforts to develop better quality regulation of the increasing number of trans‐national issues that call for co‐ordinated, international responses. Ignoring or down‐playing these challenges carries a price: it plays into the hands of cyber cohorts and single issue groups, that are accountable to none but themselves, and leads to weaker public policy outcomes. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.