The liberian civil war: new war/old war?

The Liberian civil war has been portrayed as a primary example of ‘new wars’, drawing attention both to the economic motives and the global character of the conflict. However, to focus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict. This article suggests that there is little ‘new’ about the Liberian war. Rather, it can best be understood as a violent expression of the tendencies, organisation and attitudes towards identity, society and class that have underpinned Liberia since its formation in the 19th century. The ‘new war’ literature helps us to understand one important dimension of the Liberian conflict. However, too much emphasis on this dimension may also lead scholars and policy-makers to neglect the ideational aspect of conflict. These are of immense importance to a full understanding of civil war and its dynamics.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Prosecuting war criminals: the case for decentralisation

Michelle Sieff is a Senior Research Associate on African Affairs at the Eurasia Group, a consulting company in New York City. Leslie Vinjamuri is a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science, and an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.¹     

Natural disaster in Japan: implications for world financial markets

This contribution focuses on the consequences of the natural disaster in Japan for the world financial markets as seen around half a year after the nuclear accident happened. It, thus, focuses on expectations about what would happen in macroeconomics terms later on. For this purpose, it examines how deep the slump in growth was, to what extent Japanese suppliers are integrated into international production chains, and how much the world economy would, thus, be affected. Moreover, it assesses what the economic implications of a forced withdrawal from nuclear energy as a reaction to the disaster would have been. Finally, it elaborates on the consequences of the natural disaster in Japan for the world financial markets and for the development of national debt.     

Forecasting crime and narcobusiness: Iraq after the war

While it is still too early to analyse the consequences of the war in Iraq, the chaos and crime that immediately followed the end of the war has led to an analysis of the post‐war strategy. What we have specifically to explore is how certain assumptions and ‘blind spots’ have prevented us from formulating a useful strategy for dealing with illicit activity in the aftermath of conflicts. As a result, we are constantly surprised by upsurges in crime and drug production and trafficking, and thus are being forced to react to situations that we are not prepared for, nor fully understand. This need not be the case as we have the experience of the last two decades to draw upon, provided we analyse it in a more sophisticated manner.     

Diplomatic intercepts in peace and war: Chanak 1922

Recent Public Record Office releases of British Foreign Office documents include diciphered diplomatic messages from several European capitals intercepted from 1919 onwards by a department of the Foreign Office called the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS). These intercepts were called ‘bjs’ ‐ ‘blue jackets’, from the blue folders in which they were regularly delivered to a very few top government officials. This paper is based on bjs mainly from French, Italian, American and Turkish capitals and embassies during the autumn of 1922 when a genocidal war was being fought along the Black Sea southern coast between Greece and Kemalist Turkish forces under the future President, Ismet Inonu. What became known as ‘the Chanak Affair’ led the Powers perilously close to renewing hostilities terminated at the Armistice of 1919. Despite the attention given by Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill to the implications of the bjs as to Turkish, French and Italian intentions, peace was established on the ground before the end of the year by Inonu and the British C‐in‐C, General Harington.     

Diplomatic intercepts in peace and war: Chanak 1922

Recent Public Record Office releases of British Foreign Office documents include diciphered diplomatic messages from several European capitals intercepted from 1919 onwards by a department of the Foreign Office called the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS). These intercepts were called 'bjs' - 'blue jackets', from the blue folders in which they were regularly delivered to a very few top government officials. This paper is based on bjs mainly from French, Italian, American and Turkish capitals and embassies during the autumn of 1922 when a genocidal war was being fought along the Black Sea southern coast between Greece and Kemalist Turkish forces under the future President, Ismet Inonu. What became known as 'the Chanak Affair' led the Powers perilously close to renewing hostilities terminated at the Armistice of 1919. Despite the attention given by Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill to the implications of the bjs as to Turkish, French and Italian intentions, peace was established on the ground before the end of the year by Inonu and the British C-in-C, General Harington.     

The war in Afghanistan: its background and future prospects

If the West loses in Afghanistan and its region, the most important reason will be that we are pursuing several different goals simultaneously, most of which are in contradiction to the others. Western governments need to choose between these goals, and co-ordinate a strategy in pursuit of the most desirable and achievable ones. The creation of a democratic Afghanistan needs to be recognised as a hopeless fantasy. Instead, the West should imitate the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and concentrate on creating an effective military force that can survive Western withdrawal and continue to fight the Taleban. In the meantime, something to be avoided at all costs is the further destabilisation of Pakistan, since Pakistan in the end constitutes a far greater potential threat to the region, the West and the world than does Afghanistan.