人权理事会普遍定期审议机制视野下的中国人权外交

普遍定期审议是联合国人权理事会的一项重要职权。作为联合国安理会常任理事国中首个任满6年的人权理事会成员。一方面,中国积极参与对各国人权状况的审议,发挥建设性作用,恰当运用赞扬、关切、声援与呼吁、询问、澄清、关切和建议等手段,积极开展人权交流、合作、对话与斗争;另一方面,中国也以认真、开放和坦诚地态度接受人权理事会对中国人权状况的审议。在人权理事会普遍定期审议这一人权外交的重要舞台上,中国取得了一定的成绩,积累了一定的经验。我国应在坚持人权外交的基本立场,总结自身实践经验,借鉴他国的有益经验,不断增强我国参加国际人权合作、对话的斗争的能力。     

普遍人权理论的宗教难题

20世纪60年代末,伊斯兰复兴运动的兴起促进了伊斯兰人权观的出现,这种从伊斯兰教义出发看待一切人权规范的人权观在伊斯兰世界至今仍具有顽强的生命力。伊斯兰人权观与人权的亚洲价值观在强调人权的特殊性以及非政治化方面存在很大的相似性,但前者的宗教性决定了其比后者更加根深蒂固。无论是以国际人权宪章为基础还是以道德普遍性为基础的普遍人权理论都存在理论上的弱点,很难对与国际人权宪章存在诸多矛盾冲突的伊斯兰人权观有足够的说服力,伊斯兰世界多元变化的事实也不足以消除伊斯兰人权观与普遍人权观存在的观念冲突。在一个多元化的世界,西方普遍人权话语中将人权宗教化或者原教旨主义化的倾向具有使人权观念被绝对化和异化的危险,由此很容易成为与其他信仰的冲突之源。只有坚持一种具有反思性的温和普遍人权观才能实现其与伊斯兰人权观等其他价值观的和平共处与有效对话。     

对人权的普遍性与人权文化之解析

人权的普遍性要求人权应当是世界性的。人权文化是世界范围内对人权普遍认同、普遍尊重和普遍保障的文化,是人类文化发展的更高形态。人权文化的形成既有可能,也是必要的,但现存的“人权的霸权主义”和“人道的霸道主义”则是建立人权文化所必须首先清除的最大障碍。     

论人权的主体

本文指出只有认清人权的主体,明确人权的主体为个人,才能体现出人权的享有者即人的特殊性,也即人的本性。人权基于人的本性而产生,认清这一点的价值在于指导人们基于人类的本性而去追求共同的幸福。只有让人们清楚地认识到人权的来源是他们自身的本性,才能更有效地唤起人们的权利意识,才能使人权为人们争取自己应得的权利提供最直接最强有力的依据。这一价值远比引入所谓的"集体人权"的概念所产生的价值要大的多。     

试论各国议会参与联合国人权普遍定期审议

各国议会是否应当参与以及如何参与联合国人权理事会普遍定期审议机制正在成为一个新话题.从议会在人权保护和促进方面固有的独特优势、人权条约机构的实践以及有关普遍定期审议的国际法文件来看,各国议会应当、而且可以参与这一机制.从实践来看,许多国家的议会已经在国家报告的准备、互动对话、审议建议的执行等各个阶段参与这一机制.我国的全国人大在国家报告的准备、互动对话和审议建议的执行等各个阶段已经参与这一机制,不过仍需要进一步提升参与的空间.     

人权基本概念的演变与人权发展历程

人权是我们这个时代的共同话语,同时也是一个深刻、敏感并极富争议性的论题,其中人权概念就是一个必须认真对待的基本问题。现代人权概念是一个历时性与共时性相互作用的产物。在人类的人权发展史上,曾先后出现过人权的几个基本概念,厘清这些概念将有助于我们理解人权概念本身的演变及其内涵与外延的丰富与发展过程。它们从某个角度记载了人权事业发展的曲折艰难历程和人类在人权事业上不断进步的足迹。     

人权三论

人权到底属于什么性质的权利,应当在人权的自然属性与社会属性上分别之,在自然属性上它是事实权利,在社会性上它才是道德权利。作为人权概念基础的问题是政府对待其公民的道德态度问题,把政府对待人权的方式表达为人权对政府义务上的束缚与限制,人类对人权的渴求和理想转化为政府具体的道德义务行动,这有利于推动人权的现实化和可操作性。从人权的自然性与社会性上来评价,人权对主体的人的价值主要体现在:权利信仰价值与促进民主宪政的成长价值。     

论人权及我国人权保障

随着生活水平的不断提高,国际社会对人权的关注程度也在日益上升.本文从人权的发展及国际人权保障谈起,进而将眼光凝聚在我国,试着论述我国在人权保障的上取得的进展,以及不足;并试对部分国外舆论对我国人权保障的无端指责进行驳斥.     

全球化下的普遍人权批判:基于欧洲的视角——评Global Law:A Triple Challenge

直面经济全球化,马蒂基于欧洲的视角,一方面反对美国式的独白式普遍主义的霸权性的解决方案,另一方面也反对四分五裂的消解普遍主义人权的努力,而给出了一种欧洲式的共同体下的世界法.这种世界法预设了一种普遍人权,这种普遍人权既有其自身难以克服的预设与论述之间的内在紧张,更为重要的是其预设本身就缺乏一种正当的对人之为人的生活样态的关注的理据.因之,在全球化下,对普遍人权的基础与正当性需要作出一种新的检讨.     

试析联合国人权理事会与涉朝人权问题——兼及朝鲜人权问题对周边国家的影响

朝鲜人权问题一直受到联合国的关注。2004年联合国人权委员会首次将朝鲜列入了国别人权审议名单;2006年联合国人权理事会取代了人权委员会,建立了普遍定期审查机制,并于2010年对朝鲜进行普遍定期审议;蒙丹篷特别报告员多次提交关于朝鲜的人权报告,引起了国际社会的关注和朝鲜的抗议。而朝鲜自身的人权问题也对其周边国家产生着重大影响。     

试论中国农民的人权发展

国家农民向社会农民的转变,使农民人权观由群体权利观发展为个体权利观;农民人权的两大实质性内容--平等与自由发生了很大变化,由过去的只关注平等、漠视自由转变为既关注平等、又珍视自由,农民的财产权也有实质性的发展;农民人权保障体制也逐步健全.     

论人权的司法最终救济性

人权,一般意义上理解为“人作为人’应当享有的权利,其最根本的价值就在于通过现代法治社会制度上的设计,使人权这种价值得到最彻底地实现。其中,司法在国家职能中县有保障人权实现的最终救济功能。…….     

论植物人的法律人格及权利行使和保护

Although human vegetables lose their capacities of will and do not have the intrinsic attribute of civil subjects, they still have legal personalities and the status of civil subjects. The law has not provided for defects of their legal personalities, and thus civil law shall include human vegetables as objects of guardianship. The system of adult guardianship shall be constructed to supplement and correct the legal personalities of human vegetables. When human vegetables enter into a permanent vegetative state or state of brain death, law may declare the termination of legal personalities of the human vegetable. Due to the unique life state and capacity of act of human vegetables, the exercise of their civil rights faces a series of legal difficulties and challenges, mainly involving important issues such as the right of treatment for life rescue, marital right and reproductive right. The civil law shall ensure that the civil right of human vegetables can be fully enjoyed and effectively protected. Zhang Li, associate professor in civil and business law at Fujian Normal University, and also an invited researcher on civil law, international economic law and international private law, co-operated with Law School of Renmin University of China. Till now, she’s already released 23 theses in law journals and a monograph of the Survey of International Private Law. In addition, she was a member in doing studies (2006) on the legislation of Chinese tort law and presides over the researching (2007) of the legal personality and rights of disabled persons.     

On rights and responsibilities

Rights are commonly linked to responsibilities. One commonly hears remarks about the rights and responsibilities of teachers, parents, students, etc. This linking together of the two is the topic of this paper. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section I distinguish three accounts of the relation between rights and esponsibilities any of which we could have in mind when linking the two together, and I single out the third account for further study. Unlike the other two, it seems to offer fresh material for the theory of rights. In the second section I develop this material. I explicate the general relation between rights and responsibilities as this third account represents it, and I specify the grounds for attributing such a relation to them. My aim here is to elucidate a conception of rights that certain legal and political rights can be taken to exemplify and that has been ignored or obscured in recent work in the theory of rights. In the last two sections I turn my attention to human rights. I argue in Section III that Locke's theory of natural rights can be interpreted as upholding the conception of rights elucidated in the preceding section, and I consider and criticize in Section IV an account of the relation between certain human rights and responsibilities that comes from Joel Feinberg's distinction between mandatory and discretionary rights. The arguments of these two sections are meant to strengthen the case for making room in the theory of rights for the conception elucidated in Section II.     

On deriving rights to goods from rights to freedom

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a person's inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the freedom that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do.