Models of Performance-Measurement Use in Local Governments: Understanding Budgeting, Communication, and Lasting Effects

While attention has been paid to a few cities and counties exhibiting effective performance measurement systems, most U.S. local governments have been active in the development and use of performance measurement for several decades. This research examines the effects of performance-measurement information on budgetary decision making, communication, and other operations of U.S. local governments. Data are drawn from a national survey of city and county administrators and budgeters that included nearly 300 governments. Findings indicate the use of performance measurement by local departments is pervasive, although survey respondents are less enthusiastic about measurement effectiveness. Study results show subtle distinctions between city and county officials in their use of performance measurement for budgetary purposes and processes. Research findings indicate the consistent, active integration of measures throughout the budget process is important in determining real budget and communication effects in local governments.     

Implementing PBB: Conflicting Views of Success

A modern budget reform, performance‐based budgeting (PBB) emphasizes the measurement of government performance by agencies and public servants. In this article we define PBB as requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provide meaningful information about program outcomes. Performance‐based budgeting requirements are now pervasive in the states. Of forty‐seven states with PBB requirements, thirty‐one have legislated the process to be conducted, while sixteen have initiated the reform through budget guidelines or instructions.¹What remains unknown, yet of vital interest to state administrators, their staff, legislators, and citizens, regards implementation status of PBB systems. How many states are utilizing a PBB process as prescribed by law or administrative directive? And if PBB has been implemented, has it been successful regarding improvement of agency effectiveness and decision making about spending? Perhaps most importantly, has PBB influenced appropriation decisions?. This research is based on responses to a mail survey of executive and legislative budgeters regarding the PBB system established in their state. Results discussed in this article consider budgeters’ response about PBB implementation status and effectiveness as conducted. We find that there are differing perceptions across the branches of government regarding both the extent of PBB implementation as well as its success. Results show that states with better‐known PBB systems have not necessarily realized greater success in terms of effectiveness from this budget reform than states with less popularly known systems, at least as perceived by the budgeters included in this article.     

The usefulness of key performance indicators to public accountability authorities in East Asia

Has the mandated reporting of key performance indicators (KPIs) by public agencies to public accountability or reporting authorities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore helped these authorities in their task to hold the agencies to account? This article argues that the sheer existence of KPIs in public agencies' annual reports and budget papers does not automatically lead to their effective use by the authorities for making decisions about the agencies' performance achievements. The utilization of KPIs for making decisions by the participating authorities in these countries could be best described as careful and cautious because of their perceptions that the KPIs have failed to meet their performance information needs. Since the implementation of a performance measurement and reporting system has been linked to both instrumental and symbolic benefits, perhaps the main value of the current systems lies less with their ability to bring about instrumental benefits to reporting authorities and other stakeholders. Instead, their primary strength may be skewed towards their capacity to accrue symbolic benefits for the government. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Congressional Use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool

This paper seeks to advance knowledge about congressional use of the program assessment rating tool (PART) in the 109th Congress. The research suggest that both congressional chambers use PART on a limited basis; affirms that congressional committees are exposed to PART scores through congressional budget justification score inclusion and in federal agency testimony; and that use was primarily driven by non‐congressional actors.     

Making Government Accountable: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program

This article describes the evolution of a performance measurement system in a government job training program. In this program, a federal agency establishes performance measures and standards for substate agencies. The performance measurement system's evolution is at least partly explained as a process of trial and error characterized by a feedback loop: The federal agency establishes performance measures, the local managers learn how to game them, the federal agency learns about gaming and reformulates the performance measures, possibly leading to new gaming, and so on. The dynamics suggest that implementing a performance measurement system in government is not a one-time challenge but benefits from careful monitoring and perhaps frequent revision.     

Using Performance Measures for Federal Budgeting: Proposals and Prospects

The political system, the popular press, and the public have recently been concerned about measuring government performance. This concern for measuring performance should imply a concern for measuring it correctly. With this in mind, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently conducted an analysis of the use of performance measures in the budget process. The study attempts to review the issues raised by performance budgeting in the context of past and current efforts to link performance measures and budgeting. This article focuses on two portions of that study: The status of the current federal performance measurement efforts and specific observations designed to inject a note of caution into the current debate about performance measurement and budgeting.     

Performance Measurement in State Budgeting: Advancement and Backsliding from 1990 to 1995

Performance measurement has been one of the dominant themes of budget reform in the 1990s and has been prevalent in the mainstream of budgeting since the 1950s. Given the attention that performance measurement has had nationally, states might be expected to have made major strides in this arena in recent years. The article considers the current status of performance measurement practices, and identifies both advancement and backsliding made by states between 1990 and 1995. The discussion is based on data obtained from surveys of state budget offices in those two years. Indexes of performance measurement were constructed, and these became the bases of regression analyses using independent variables pertaining to state characteristics. Generally, these analyses were unsuccessful in explaining the variations among the states. The findings underscore the diversity among the states in their budgetary practices and the fact that budget reform, in the sense of increased use of performance measurement, is not necessarily achieved in a straight line of progression. The article considers possible explanations for the changes.     

Federal Agency Budget Officers: Who Needs Them?

This article examines the role of federal agency budget officers and their responsibilities from the author's own perspective and experience. The article suggests that it is inadequate to standardize the role of an agency budget oficer other than that used by the agency head to determine if he or she is satisfied with the budget processes in the agency.     

Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems

We use the principal‐agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawing primarily on examples from performance measurement systems in public education and social welfare programs. We also describe a dynamic framework for performance measurement systems that takes into account strategic behavior of individuals over time, learning about production functions and individual responses, accountability pressures, and the use of information about the relationship of measured performance to value added. Implications are discussed and recommendations derived for improving public sector performance measurement systems. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Disparate Measures: Public Managers and Performance-Measurement Strategies

Over the past two decades, many studies have investigated the scope and significance of performance measurement in public organizations. Nonetheless, there is more to learn about the challenges facing public managers who want to measure organizational outputs and use the feedback to improve performance. Specifically, managers are often faced with redundant measures of the same output, each of which may be preferred by a different political principal or stakeholder. Furthermore, a manager's choice of measures can have serious consequences for both the estimation of agency problems and the success of programmatic solutions. We test these assertions in an analysis of educational organizations in Texas. We find that managers' assessments of organizational performance and decisions regarding solutions depend on the choice of performance measures.     

An Examination of the Impact of Budget Reform on Arizona and Oklahoma Appropriations

Government reform shifts from using the budget as a control mechanism to focusing on how the budget can leverage planning and management tools that emphasize results. This research investigates reform at the state level. First, has the emphasis in the appropriations format changed from a control to more of a planning or performance orientation? Second, what factors explain any change in the level of control exercised through the appropriations process? Through multiple regression analysis, this research finds that Arizona, a reform state, is more likely to have reduced appropriations format control than Oklahoma, a nonreform state. Also, an elected agency head, the number of changes in the head of the agency, the level of reliance on the general fund, and the format received in a prior year are predictors of change.     

Do Legislatures Matter in Budgetary Reform?

A recurring problem in the implementation of budgetary reforms at the state level is whether and how to engage legislatures in the effort. This paper posits that legislatures are critical for effective implementation and that different legislative institutional arrangements may have differential effects on both legislative and agency implementation. Drawing on a multistate survey, the analysis shows that higher levels of legislative responsibility for budgeting as well as legislative engagement in oversight of performance information are significantly associated with increased use of performance measures in making budgetary decisions both at the legislative and agency levels.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.     

Mediated Agency,Blame Avoidance and Institutional Responsibility: Government Communication in a Personalised Media Landscape

This article explores how personalisation, blame avoidance and institutional constraints collide in contemporary government communication practices. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in a Norwegian ministry, it analyses how a central government agency manages the media during critical news campaigns featuring individuals suffering from inadequate public health services. To provide a comprehensive analysis of the particular limits and aims of government communication, the article combines perspectives from public agency studies with media research on personalisation. It finds that the need to be visible and demonstrate agency in the media drive personalisation strategies towards a strong focus on government leaders, while simplifying the representation of complex government organisation and processes. At the same time, institutional constraints and the formal delegation of responsibility limit the communication repertoire available for public agencies when critical human interest stories dominate in the media. This results in a standard type of unconvincing media performance, where incumbents appear to evade direct personal responsibility. The case study provides new knowledge on dilemmas, negotiations and strategies behind government communication, illuminating how competing interests play out in a rapidly changing media landscape.     

Reinventing Reforms: How to Improve Program Management Using Performance Measures. Really

This paper looks at the design and use of incentivized performance measures to motivate managerial efficiency and promote greater program effectiveness. It starts off by looking at recent reforms like the Government Performance and Results Act to understand why they were largely unsuccessful in altering the decision‐making process of government agencies. One problem was that performance measures have been both numerous and complicated, thereby making their role in management and oversight difficult. Equally important, no external incentives were attached to program accomplishments. The paper then examines what elements would be needed to build a management system that encourages both more efficient and more effective agency behavior. The goal of performance budgeting is to develop performance measures that display the progress of a program toward its stated objectives. Assessments based on these measures may then call for rewards or punishments. As such, it also may encourage program managers toward improved performance. The paper examines the pitfalls and complexities dealt with by Congress and Office of Management and Budget in the process. For example, a performance system must distinguish between funding program needs, as warranted by sectoral indicators, and management concerns. It must also unambiguously tie incentives to performance measures to motivate agencies, while building in commitment devices for the principals. Incentivized performance measures may not be appropriate in all conditions, but may be helpful for motivating managers and improving program performance in particular circumstances.     

绩效管理改革的效果:来自美国联邦政府的证据

从1993年的《政府绩效与结果法案》(GPRA)以及布什政府的项目评估定级工具(PART)已经建立了一种新的政府管理惯例,两者的目的均在于促进美国联邦政府绩效管理实务的发展。但从绩效信息的使用方面来看,两者所做出的努力都极其有限,即一旦考虑其它因素,机构雇员不论是否参与PART评审,是否参与GPRA的实施进程,他们几乎都没有影响到绩效信息的使用。本文采用顺序Probit回归模型,通过对美国联邦审计总署基于1996、2000、2003和2007年的数据进行调研,最终得出依赖于难以观测的官僚行为来实现的政府改革是具有局限性的以及在政府绩效改善的过程中绩效信息使用的重要性。对数据的深层分析还揭示了一系列影响绩效信息使用的组织因素,这包括领导对结果的承诺、监管者引导学习惯例、工作动机的性质、将测量与行动链接起来的能力、管理的自由裁量权以及利益相关者之间的政治冲突。     

Evaluating the Evaluation Strategy as an Instrument for Budgetary Control

This article reports recent research undertaken on the contribution of program evaluation to that part of the budget process for which the Australian public service has carriage. It examines the degree of success which the Labor government's evaluation strategy attained in serving budget agency information purposes. The research is not conclusive, only indicative. Based on two sets of evidence — interviews with officers in the Department of Finance¹ and an analysis of survey results on the use of evaluation in the budget — it contends the evaluation strategy has had only a marginal impact on central budgetary processes. By documenting changes in the approaches of budget officials the article reports the impact of program evaluation on the core function of Finance — the provision of policy advice relating to the expenditure priorities of government.     

Playing the Wrong PART: The Program Assessment Rating Tool and the Functions of the President's Budget

The extensive literature about the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) has not emphasized an issue that appears quite clearly in interviews with senior Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and congressional staff. Budget analysis can pursue efficiency in two ways. One, the object of traditional analysis, involves assessing programs to understand the ratio of inputs to outputs within an agency, and thus the effects of more or less funding. Another approach, termed “budgeting for results,” measures program performance so as to allocate funding among programs in a way that increases total welfare. The second approach is much more difficult because it necessitates comparison of measures of unlike phenomena, requires expertise that often does not exist, and is more easily contested as invoking values rather than facts. Both congressional and OMB sources report concerns that PART weakened budget analysis by diverting resources from traditional analysis. If one goal of reformers is for the OMB to provide analysis that will influence Congress, the focus should be on strengthening the capacity to do traditional budget analysis.     

The Professional Researcher as Change Agent in the Government–Performance Movement

Although academic and professional publications give the impression that performance measurement is a growing government practice, in actuality the use of this technology is not as deep or as widespread as it may appear. Even when performance measures are used, governments rarely integrate them into planning, budget, personnel, and other management processes. Most professional researchers located primarily in academic institutions, but also in research and government organizations, approach performance measurement as though governmental officials, elected or otherwise, are already sold on its usefulness. Instead, they need to function as "change agents," using a variety of strategies to gain acceptance and understanding of the strengths and limitations of performance measurement. This article draws on the authors' experiences with the Community Benchmarks Program of the Maxwell School in Onondaga County and a review of the current literature. It suggests guidelines for professional researchers who want to increase the use of performance measures by governments at all levels.