Policy signals and strategic voting for minor parties: Evidence from Germany

How does executive power-sharing in multiparty democracies influence voter decision-making? The current scholarship has identified two strategies that voters use to target coalitions and that involve voting for a minor party: Coalition insurance voting and compensatory voting. Yet these strategies are not differentiated conceptually, and empirically, are observationally equivalent. By foregrounding the role of policy signals in strategic voting for minor parties, the present study disentangles these strategies at the theoretical and empirical levels. It also proposes a new, hybrid, strategy. To do so, it uses data on the 2013 and 2017 German federal elections from campaign-period surveys, polls and an original dataset of the candidates’ tweets about policy issues. The results show evidence of policy-driven voters using a hybrid strategy in 2013 and a compensatory strategy in 2017. There is no evidence of coalition insurance voting in these elections.     

Gender equality in Germany: Comparing policy change across domains

Focusing on the past 25 years in three central arenas of political, social, and civil rights, this article engages in the current debate over policy change and the direction of German politics by analysing the issue of gender equality. Combining T.H. Marshall's concept of citizenship and Hall's analysis of policy change, I obtain a two-level framework that differentiates between policy changes and categorises reform in Germany in three different domains. The case studies are: quotas in political representation (political citizenship), women and reconciliation policy (social citizenship), and anti-discrimination policies (civil citizenship). Comparing policy change across domains demonstrates that change in these three arenas has occurred to different degrees and for different reasons; electoral competition has fostered policy change in representation, while the male-breadwinner model has slowed down reform for reconciliation of family and employment. A conservative affirmative action regime stands in opposition to individual anti-discrimination and limits potential change. This comparison across domains defines the dependent variable ‘policy change’ in a more nuanced way, helping to pinpoint and differentiate specific areas of reform.     

Factionalism in West European parties: A framework for analysis

This article provides a framework through which strains and conflicts in West European parties may be studied, and the circumstances of individual parties compared. The first section sets out a model of the dimensions of conflict, the second looks at some of the ‘static’ factors which determine the location of parties on these dimensions, and the third considers what dynamic implications there are for the model in recent changes in European party systems.     

Soft money and hard choices: Why political parties might legislate against soft money donations

In contrast to the bulk of the campaign finance literature that highlights political action committee (PAC) contributions and single donations, this paper emphasizes soft money and the rationale for dual contributions. Employing a formal model of unregulated contributions and political access, we show that donors will rationally choose to contribute to both political parties. While the parties accept these dual contributions, they lead to an imbalance between the benefits of contributions and the costs of providing access. This race to acquire unlimited soft money leads to a situation where the parties agree to campaign finance reform legislation.     

Politicians and protection: Tariffs and elections in Australia

An index of manufacturing industry tariff protection is calculated for each Australian federal electoral division and used to test for the presence of voting factors in the electoral incidence of tariff protection. There is a strong positive relationship between the level of tariffs and the Labor vote in an electorate, though this is more likely to be evidence for the effect of levels of manufacturing activity than for systematic electoral manipulation of tariffs. Smaller samples of electorates do suggest that governments shift the largest tariff increases into electorates which they won at the previous election.     

Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”     

Crisis of political parties and representative democracies: rethinking parties in associational,experimentalist governance

The contrast between the normative functions of political parties in representative democracies and their empirical working is stark and rapidly increasing. This article starts from a sober, realist account of the empirical state of affairs and from structural problems of democracy and participations – in terms of limits of time, information, qualification and relevant expertise – that have to be acknowledged by any realist–utopian proposal of alternatives beyond the exclusive alternative of ‘thin, realist democracy’ or emphatic ‘strong, participatory, direct, or mass democracy’. We can do better. My search for institutional alternatives looks not for the replacement of political parties but for their relief. Many, not all, of their normative tasks can be shared with other functional networks, associations and organizations. In exploring such a new division of political labour I draw on older debates and designs of associative democracy and on recent discussions to democratize expertise and to expertise democracy in order to address urgent societal problems of high-risk decisions under conditions of extreme complexity, contingency, unpredictability and uncertainty and deep contestedness of our knowledge, problems that turn out to be unmanagable by party politics and representative democracy.     

Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction

Published in a past issue of this journal, Hug (Public Choice 82:159–180, 1995) studies political competition among three vote-maximizing parties when voters cannot know exactly which policies the parties will adopt when elected. Contrary to what is claimed in Proposition 3, in the generic case the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In this case, only a local Nash equilibrium (LNE) may exist, but due to an incorrect second order condition, the conditions in Proposition 3 do not characterize this LNE either.     

Prominent Role Models: High‐Profile Female Politicians and the Emergence of Women as Candidates for Public Office

Can prominent female politicians inspire other women to enter politics? A woman occupying a high‐profile office directly impacts women's substantive representation through her policy actions. Here, we consider whether these female leaders also facilitate a mobilization effect by motivating other women to run for office. We posit that prominent women in politics serve as role models for other women interested in political careers, causing an increase in female candidates. We test this theory with data from the American states, which exhibit considerable variation in the sex of state legislative candidates and the high‐profile offices of governor and U.S. senator. Using a weighting method and data spanning 1978–2012, we demonstrate that high‐profile women exert substantively large positive effects on female candidates. We conclude that women in major offices are crucial for women's representation. Beyond their direct policy impact, they amplify women's political voice by motivating more women to enter politics.     

How parties compete for votes: A test of saliency theory

Saliency theory is among the most influential accounts of party competition, not least in providing the theoretical framework for the Comparative Manifesto Project – one of the most widely used data collections in comparative politics. Despite its prominence, not all empirical implications of the saliency theory of party competition have yet been systematically tested. This article addresses five predictions of saliency theory, the central claim of which is that parties compete by selective issue emphasis rather than by direct confrontation. Since a fair test of the theory's assumptions needs to rely on data that measures party issue saliency and party positions independently, this article draws on new manifesto data from the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES). Analysing all manifestos issued for the 2002, 2006 and 2008 general elections, it shows that saliency theory correctly identifies some features of party competition. For instance, parties disproportionally emphasise issues they ‘own’. Yet, the core assumption of saliency theory that parties compete via selective issue emphasis rather than direct confrontation over the same issues fails to materialise in the majority of cases.     

Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German elections

While scholars have generally acknowledged that coalition governments are less accountable to voters than single party majorities, surprisingly little differentiation is made among different types of coalition governments. In this paper, we examine voter support for two very different types of coalition governments: those with a single large party and a junior partner and grand coalitions—governing coalitions between two large but ideologically dissimilar parties. We argue that grand coalitions differ from the more typical senior–junior partners in terms of the ability of individual parties to respond to their constituencies. We test this argument using survey data from four German Election Studies (GES), before and after each of the two German grand coalitions (1965, 1969, 2005, and 2009), which provide a unique opportunity to compare voter support for grand coalitions to those of the more typical senior–junior party model. We find evidence that voters responded to grand coalitions by moving away from their traditional voting patterns, and increasing their support for parties outside of the grand coalition, although this effect varies by the number of alternative parties.     

Support for radical parties in Western Europe: Structural conflicts and political dynamics

Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from 2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.     

Failed expectations: Quality of government and support for populist parties in Europe

This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on support for populist parties: How do perceptions of the local quality of government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument highlights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their area is used to estimate both individual‐ and regional‐level models of the link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. The empirical results show a strong and robust association between within‐country variation in QoG and support for populist parties.