“异姓不王”的传统国宪规范及其悖论与破解

传统政治哲学中“赐姓命氏”的实质就是授予治理权,“异姓”被视为“异德”,不得分享治理权.以西周初年宗法分封为标志,传统政治实践逐步确立了“异姓不王”的国宪规范,其精神实质是“家国一体”、“家国同构”的“家天下”理念,终极目的在于维护最高治理权独家垄断的治理秩序.不同朝代的治理者以不同方式对“异姓不王”加以重申和宣示,但基于特定政治局势也或多或少地有所突破,封异姓为王,从而形成了“异姓不王”的政治悖论.古代政治家和法律人运用政治法律智慧,通过一系列行为、制度和手段对这一悖论进行了破解,使华夏文化政治共同体在治理集团内部权力分肥这一重大问题上得以“安身立命”.“异姓不王”的政治悖论及其破解表明,传统国宪的实际运行会出现表达与实践相背离的悖论现象,但是这种悖论本身也构成了传统国宪的一部分。     

A missed opportunity

Conclusion By focusing on the narrow question of the proper contractual interpretation of the extradition treaty, the Court missed the crux of theAlvarez-Machain case. The weakness in the decision, therefore, is not that the Court adopted the wrong contractual interpretation but rather that it failed frankly to address the real issue. Determining the appropriate role of the Court in formulating an international order in the post-cold war era is a difficult and complex problem. It raises delicate questions of foreign policy, separation of powers, and institutional competence. There are no easy answers. But the problem is not one that will—or should—go away. The issue must be debated in the courts, as well as in the political and academic arenas. By failing to confront this issue openly, the Supreme Court lost a valuable opportunity to start the debate and to begin to define the Court's role in forging the new world order.The authors would like to thank Detlev Vagts, Bemis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, for his insightful comments on an earlier draft.     

Field Work: Masters' Theses and Theses in Progress—1987–1988

Abstract

Arts administration as an academic discipline is relatively new, and there are substantial differences from program to program. For these reasons, the executive editors of The Journal of Arts Management and Law thought it would be valuable to provide an overview of the kinds of subject areas being explored by students enrolled in graduate programs around the country. We mailed two separate requests for theses being completed or in progress in 1987–1988; we hope to update the list every two years. Of the twenty-eight programs that we contacted, eighteen replied. Some programs do not require a thesis; others incorporate internship experiences into a final document. We did ask for recommendations of related theses in other departments on each campus, but such information was rarely forthcoming. We hope that this addition to the journal will give our readers, our colleagues, and future students and practitioners a better sense of a major educational element of the field.     

黑格尔的历史法学思想

对于黑格尔法哲学这样一个异常庞杂的体系,学界一般认为其大体属于理性主义范畴.然而,正如黑格尔自己所言,欲准确把握其法哲学,就必须将其放在黑格尔逻辑学的背景中进行;在这个前提下,从辨证逻辑角度讲,当我们认识到黑格尔法哲学中的理性主义成分时实际上就意味着其中也必定含有经验主义的成分.欲全面而深入地研究黑格尔法权哲学,就必须对相关的经验主义成分予以充分地关注.     

Justifying law: An explanation of the deep structure of American law

Conclusion Charles Darwin argued that human beings are what happen whenphysical laws act upon a planet with the characteristics that earthhad five billion years ago. Similarly, I have argued that theprimacy of individual will is what eventually happens when asociety allocates and limits coercion based upon rights. From timeto time particular visions of the good or the right dominate publicbehavior, but they are eventually enframed by rights — the authoritative claim of each person to respect.I have argued that the propositional structure of American law—the laws themselves — can be seen to be a logically consistentsystem of propositions stemming from the axiom that the will ofeach person is worthy of respect. This is an explanatory, not anormative, proposition. The axiom was not put there by anyoneand the law derived from it, any more than the human brian wasput there and the theory of relativity derived from it. The axiomcame to be embodied in k because of a fact — the single universalcharacteristic of human beings that is relevant to the question ofarranging coercion is individual will — and a process — the right ofeach person to demand a justification for coercion used upon him.Since will is universal to human beings, this would suggest thatany rights-based legal system would evince a general structuresimilar to our own. Particularities of national culture, naturalresources, population density, and so on would produce a verydifferent liberty frontier from the one facing this country andhence, different laws. But the general structure of law — the relationship between principle and policy decision, the role of thebasic rights, and so on — should be similar. This similarity shouldprovide a common basis for cooperation between states, transcending particularities of economic structure, political structure and ideology. We have seen that a very broad range ofeconomic and political institutions may be justified. The essential difference between states lies not in the different ways that theyarrange institutions but in the different ways that they justifythem. Those that justify them to people as persons are similar.Those that justify them by conformity to a design are different.The theory set out here is not a design. It is an explanation. Onevirtue of explanations is that they draw forth other explanations.More importantly, they offer perspective — they tell us what weare up to. As the social relations which law must rationalizebecome ever more complex, perspective becomes ever more necessary. The simple laws have already been written. The connectionbetween the doctrine of consideration and the first principle isobvious. The connection between the hard look doctrine ofreviewing administrative agencies and the second principle isnowhere near so obvious (though it is a lovely example of thejudicial process enframing the realm of uncertainty). The morecomplex and artificial the institution, the poorer the guidance ofintuition and the more necessary are conscious guides to decision.Justification comes easy to printers. Most of them don't knowwhy a page of print that has straight margines left and right isjustified. They don't need to know, for the idea has immediateintuitive appeal; it is easy to accept and to remember, and, onceremembered, it is an effective guide to behavior. It is easy to seethat this line of print is not justified and to do somethingabout it. It is not so easy to tell whether the hard look doctrine orthe enforcement of a surrogate motherhood contract sits fairly on itspage. Justification of law requires an understanding of thecriterion against which it is being done. There is an intuitive core— a sense — to any act of judgment, but that core can be illuminated and developed by an understanding of the framework withinwhich it operates.     

论宪法基本权利条款在私法上的效力

传统的观念认为:宪法对权利的保障通常只是约束国家和国家机关,对私人领域的效力是间接的,不具有直接的法律效力,宪法的基本权利规范具有原则性,且无制裁性规定,不能在私法上直接适用。但“理论是灰色的,而生活之树常青”,本文立足于对国外相关理论的分析,对我国社会现实、法律观念及宪法规范的梳理,探讨我国确认基本权利私法效力的必要性、合宪性。     

宪法学的应有品质:以人为本、面向民众、扎根生活

82年宪法实施以来,我国宪法学研究取得了长足的进步,但也存在自身的不足,面临发展的困境。而造成困境的深刻缘由在于问题意识不强、与部门法学对话的意识和能力不强、本土意识不强、直接切入社会热点问题尤其是公民权利问题并加以解决的意识和能力不强等几个方面。要走出现实困境,必须以人为本、面向民众、关注民生、扎根生活,这是中国宪法学的应有品质,也是中国宪法学研究工作者的应有品质。     

Freedom, Property and Equality in the Theory of `Fundamental Rights'. A Commentary on an Essay by Luigi Ferrajoli

The essay that Luigi Ferrajoli published inTeoria politica is a partial, althoughvery important, preview of an importanttheoretical work on which he has been labouringfor several years. Ferrajoli is knownto be aiming at achieving a rigorousformalisation of the theory of subjectiverights, an undertaking to which he first turnedhis hand at the beginning of the seventies,with the book Teoria assiomatizzata deldiritto, in which he laid the foundations forhis subsequent work, including his extensivetreatise of the theory of criminal law,Diritto e ragione.So it is quite natural that this new essaycontains a quantity of references to conceptualcategories that come together in a veritableWeltanschauung, as it used to be called at onetime, in addition to an epistemology and ageneral theory of law.In order to discuss all his theses in thisessay as seriously as they deserve, we reallyshould go back to that set of philosophicalpremises to which they refer – and whichFerrajoli tends to nurture in a sort oftheoretical latency – and try to focus on anddiscuss them. As this is not the place for such amassive task – for which I may not even havethe necessary competence – I shall restrictmyself to touching on just a few points thatconcern me more closely. I apologise for thisselective and thus not very systematicapproach, made necessary to some extent also bythe large numbers of theoretical and politicalquestions that Ferrajoli's essay tackles,raises or merely touches on. Nevertheless, myselection will be aided by the criticalsignificance that Ferrajoli dedicates to someof my opinions. In short, I shall not try to doany more than to respond indirectly to hiscriticisms. And I shall do so with the greatestof respect, as Ferrajoli well knows, for histheoretical work and for the profoundmotivations that inspire him.     

宪法泛政治化的逻辑归谬与历史反思

马伯里诉麦迪逊案创立的“政治问题不审查”之宪法惯例及与美国宪法传统相契合的政治观,将对宪法正当性的逻辑判断转读为对于主体的道德依赖,其生成的逻辑结构未免带有强迫性,导致宪法的泛政治化。近代旧中国立宪的逻辑怪圈亦然:宪法“移植”使得“应然宪法”性状无法获得“实然宪法”有效地证明,则悖论产生;“自上而下”的立宪路径和权力本位,使得宪法缺少正当性基础;明显的“工具性”特征,造成“政治”与“宪法”的“目标冲突”,形成“体”和“用”的二律背反。事实就是:宪法的泛政治化是一个世界现象,防止宪法泛政治化,宪法司法化具有价值上的合理性,但以司法化为导向的中国宪政目标之实现尚需经历一个长期的准备阶段,要防止两种极端倾向:悲观主义和冒进主义。     

Two Steps Forward,One Step Back: One Step (Support) LTD v Morris‐Garner and Another

One Step is an important decision that deals with the circumstances in which a claimant may recover damages in contract on the so‐called Wrotham Park basis, valued as the amount that would hypothetically have been negotiated between willing parties to release the defendant from his obligation. This note argues that, although the Supreme Court was right not to award damages on this basis in this case, the test laid down by their Lordships for when such damages are available is unclear and will be difficult to apply.     

营业自由权隐性入显性的路径设计——从法律对经济回应的视角

营业自由权是民事主体实现财富增值和提高个体生活质量的一种应然性源权利,是民事主体财产自由权在营业领域的展开和扩张,是民事主体不可剥夺的权利。然而,我国法律仅关注了民事主体营业活动和营业成果的保护,对产生和获取实然财产结果的源权利与基础性权利——＂营业自由权＂则没有予以应有的重视,致使营业自由权在具体法律制度中处于隐性且极易受到侵害的地位。如何将营业自由权由隐性入显性,这就需要一个良好的制度路径设计。     

Moral theories of torts: Their scope and limits: Part I

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis — for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous arguments by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the use of principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victims claims to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.     

On the Viability of the Concept of Staatswissenschaften

Staatswissenschaften is said to mean that there are certain specific fields of scholarly inquiry and higher education that relate primarily to the state, which is defined widely as structured human living-together. It is outlined why this is a concept viable for the future, particularly—but not only—in and for Europe.     

宪法解释:一种拯救中国宪法权威性的方法--读范进学教授著《宪法解释的理论建构》

依法治国的前提是依宪治国。在当下中国,依法治国方略虽然被写进了宪法,但宪法却没有得到很好的适用,宪法仍然缺乏必要的权威性。《宪法解释的理论建构》一书充分论证了“释宪演进模式”较之“立宪演进模式”在提高宪法权威方面的优越性,并从界定宪法解释的概念入手,对宪法解释的场合、主体、目标和原则做了令人信服的论证。尽管《宪法解释的理论建构》没有解决宪法解释的方法等技术层面上的问题,但该书对宪法解释主体的界定和对解释原则的论证已经为宪法解释的技术性研究扫清了理论障碍。     

Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir Edward Coke's Reports

Our understanding of Sir Edward Coke's Reports turn upon an appreciation of his methodology as a reporter; the strengths and limitations of the Reports as a source of legal and political commentary have implications for our reading of the early Stuart constitution. This article locates Coke's Reports within the broader habits of record-keeping and observation employed by common lawyers in the early seventeenth century. It argues that a conflation of personal observation and professional opinion, promoted through the educational techniques of English law, provided Coke with a unique opportunity to place his own views at the heart of the profession.     

论我国宪法劳动权的理论建构

目前,法学界对于劳动权的研究大多是从劳动法的角度展开的,从宪法角度所进行的劳动权研究大多也是在用我国劳动法第3条的内容解读我国宪法第42条劳动权的含义,陷入了"以劳动法解释宪法"的方法论误区。笔者认为,对于宪法劳动权的理论建构,应当立基于"以宪法解释宪法"的原则上,从宪法文本以及宪法变迁中探求宪法劳动权的内涵。自1954年宪法以来的几部宪法文本中,我国宪法劳动权的规范表述形式并没有明显的改变,但是,改革开放以来的宪法变迁,主要是所有制结构改革和社会主义市场经济体制的确立,却赋予宪法劳动权和劳动的概念以全新的含义,并使职业自由成为我国宪法劳动权存在和运行的主要形态。     

III ‐ International agreements

Constitutions guarantee certain rights and freedoms. The formulation of these rights and freedoms are predicated on society. Prior to colonisation, Maori (the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa/New Zealand) had effective legal, social and political structures, premised on Tikanga Maori (Maori custom), which determined their ‘constitution’. Upon colonisation the existing ‘constitution’, determined by Tikanga Maori, was not recognised and, arguably, colonisation contributed to the break down of the Maori social fabric. Critics advocate that the disproportionate social statistics, indicating that Maori are over represented in the criminal justice system, are a manifestation of colonisation. The National-led government is engaging in a review of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. In light of New Zealand’s recent endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it is timely to consider whether the implementation of, and return to, Tikanga Maori is a constitutional right.     

Compassion can be cruel: Durkheim on sympathy and punishment

Emile Durkheim's perspective on punishment has been examined in considerable detail, but criminologists still neglect one dimension of his perspective: his account of the causal relationship between “sentiments of human sympathy” and the intensity of criminal punishment. Unlike conventional accounts, which propose a negative relationship between these variables, Durkheim argued that there are conditions under which the relationship is positive. According to Durkheim, increments in feelings of compassion for humans in general can heighten public outrage to acts of “human criminality” and, for this reason, can intensify the punitive response to such crimes. In this article, Durkheim's account of this relationship is abstracted from his theory of penal evolution and is revised to improve its plausibility and temper its problematic implications. It is concluded that his account represents another irony of his work which warrants attention, and which may further our understanding of the persistence of both imprisonment and punitive attitudes.     

Roe v. Wade is constitutionally unprincipled and logically incoherent: a brief in support of judicial restraint

This "amicus curiae" brief was submitted by the Center for Judicial Studies and 56 members of Congress. They were concerned that "Roe" expands powers that belong to Congress and the states into the realm of federal government. Part I of the brief dealt with Missouri's claim that the laws that were at issue in "Webster" were permitted under "Roe" and shouldn't have been made invalid by lower courts. Most of the brief was in Part II. The thrust of it was that "Roe" was not based on any principle and is incoherent internally; "Roe" said that a privacy right existed under the US constitution. However, "Roe" didn't define this right of personal privacy. "Roe" cited a "line of decisions" to prove this point. However, none of the cases that "Roe" cited pretended to be based on the "right to privacy." They dealt with other issues. "Botsford" was said to be the beginning of the constitutional privacy right. It dealt with a "common law rule of evidence," not a right that was in the constitution. Therefore, it did not define the privacy right. "The process by which "Roe" moved from privacy to abortion was unfounded by judicial fiat." "Roe" said that it was protected by "the compelling interest standard," but did not give a reason why this was so. In "Roe," the woman';s interest in getting an abortion was analyzed in medical terms. But when talking about the State's interest in protecting potential human life, medical considerations were not controlling. Part III of the brief asked that "Roe" be overturned because it said that "a privacy right to abortion" was "devoid of any linkage to the text or history of the constitution." "Roe" should be abandoned because its "inadequacies" are "basic".