Reparative development: re-conceptualising reparations in transitional justice processes

Reparations are increasingly seen as potential avenues to address the socioeconomic structural injustices that have affected victims during conflict or authoritarian rule. Scholars, however, have identified serious limitations in these policies, emanating from faulty design, political reluctance, financial limitations and uneven implementation. This article proposes a reconceptualisation of reparation policies by embedding them in a framework of reparative development. A theory of reparative development is outlined by discussing how principles emanating from key rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights can be articulated to provide a conceptual link between transitional justice and development. This article argues that restitution should consider not only past damages but also lost life opportunities. Reparations should be both individual- and community-based, taking into account the supplemental policy actions required to make them both effective and sensitive to existing human insecurities. Finally, they need to involve local and grassroots organisations in their implementation.     

Dealing with the Intractable: A Possible Negotiating Position for the New British Ambassador to Berlin,Summer 1933

Foreign Office diplomats recognised the danger to British security posed by Adolph Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship of Germany in January 1933 but differed on how to meet this challenge. This article reproduces the hitherto unpublished draft instructions prepared by Owen O’Malley, a ranking official at the Foreign Office, for the newly appointed ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, on taking up his posting in autumn 1933. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary, who took a sceptical but not entirely hostile view of O’Malley’s proposals, minutes O’Malley’s suggestion of a clear warning to Hitler, accompanied by the opening of negotiations with Nazi Germany recognising its enhanced position and the justice of some of its claims. Vansittart did not forward the draft memorandum to the foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, and there is, as far as I know, no copy of this in the public archives. Included is additional information on the clashes between the two men on how dictators should be treated as well as biographical information on the careers of the three men involved in this debate.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

French Policy in the Rhineland

From the Treaty of Versailles through to the Dawes Plan, France tried, at various times, to pursue an active policy in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, hoping eventually to create an autonomous political body in the Rhineland detached from Berlin. The methods and objectives were not always the same under Millerand, Briand, and Poincaré, the latter in particular envisaging this as a prelude to the total disintegration of Weimar Germany. The final halting of this Rhineland policy, as part of the outcome of the Ruhr invasion, marked clearly the limits of French power in the post-war era, though it is not certain if all of France's rulers grasped this.     

Are international organizations like the Bank for International Settlements unable to die?

International Organizations seem to be immortal or at least long-lived. In this paper several factors which may be responsible for this fact are put forward and then analyzed by studying the empirical case of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which has now survived for seventy-eight years all threats to its existence. This is the more surprising since it was heavily attacked by the government of the most powerful country of the world, the USA for some years. This country demanded the dissolution of the BIS at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 as a precondition for allowing nations to join the planned International Monetary Fund. Before this the Bank was also able to master the crisis resulting from the demise of the gold (exchange) standard and the end of the German reparation payments agreed on in the Dawes and Young Plans, both consequences of the Great Depression. The Bank even survived the events of the Second World War threatening it, and reacted creatively to the crisis posed by the founding of the European Monetary Union. It is shown that all suspected factors favoring the survival of international organizations were present in the case of the BIS.     

Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936-39

This article examines the charge that, especially during the period when Sir Robert Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Office was anti-German in its orientation. It also analyzes the role played by three successive ambassadors, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Nevile Henderson in influencing the Foreign Office perception of Germany, and examines the Foreign Office's attitude to the anti-Nazi Germany opposition. Finally, the article looks at the evidence for continuity between the Vansittart period, and that which followed under Sir Alexander Cadogan, before concluding that the latter was more inclined to accept the appeasement of Germany.     

DISARMAMENT AND BIG BUSINESS: THE CASE OF KRUPP, 1918-1925

Well before 1914, the Krupp Steel Foundry in Essen had gained a world-wide reputation as a major producer of heavy weaponry. The disarmament procedures set in train initially by the armistice and thereafter by the Versailles Treaty would, therefore, impact massively on one of Europe's few large-scale steel producers, whether in terms of output or with regard to its influence in German politics. This article analyses such developments during the early 1920s, with special reference to the activities of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMCC), including their impact on production and on the workforce at the Krupp factories in Essen. It also investigates efforts by Krupp's management (and also German politicians) to evade military restrictions and also to maintain expertise in the production of heavy weaponry.     

Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936-39

This article examines the charge that, especially during the period when Sir Robert Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Office was anti-German in its orientation. It also analyzes the role played by three successive ambassadors, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Nevile Henderson in influencing the Foreign Office perception of Germany, and examines the Foreign Office's attitude to the anti-Nazi Germany opposition. Finally, the article looks at the evidence for continuity between the Vansittart period, and that which followed under Sir Alexander Cadogan, before concluding that the latter was more inclined to accept the appeasement of Germany.     

DISARMAMENT AND BIG BUSINESS: THE CASE OF KRUPP, 1918–1925

Well before 1914, the Krupp Steel Foundry in Essen had gained a world-wide reputation as a major producer of heavy weaponry. The disarmament procedures set in train initially by the armistice and thereafter by the Versailles Treaty would, therefore, impact massively on one of Europe's few large-scale steel producers, whether in terms of output or with regard to its influence in German politics. This article analyses such developments during the early 1920s, with special reference to the activities of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMCC), including their impact on production and on the workforce at the Krupp factories in Essen. It also investigates efforts by Krupp's management (and also German politicians) to evade military restrictions and also to maintain expertise in the production of heavy weaponry.     

J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 2

The second part of this article shows that John Maynard Keynes worked closely with the German Finance and Foreign ministries as a supposed neutral expert in October 1922. He supported passive resistance to the French in the Ruhr without regard to its effects on the currency, secretly collaborated in writing the German reparations note of June 1923, and then praised his own work in a weekly that he controlled. Keynes opposed the 1929 Young Plan that re-scheduled the German debt and declined to accept modern thinking on overcoming the transfer problem.     

The construction of NATO's medium term defence plan and the diplomacy of conventional strategy, 1949-50

This article examines NATO's first strategic project, the Medium Term Defence Plan (MTDP) of 1950, and the plan that led to the 1952 Lisbon Force Goals, a landmark in the evolution of NATO's strategic thinking because the failure to reach the Lisbon goals allegedly drove NATO into its subsequent dependence on nuclear weapons from which it has never been weaned. The article disputes this interpretation by showing that the MTDP was conditioned by the desire of the United States to maintain its autonomy over the use of atomic weapons, and its freedom from the constraints of the new alliance. The MTDP was a paradox: a conventional strategy designed to mask the rules governing the balance of decision-making power within NATO which maintained American peripheralism against the integrative pressures of the alliance. Lisbon was actually part of a deepening nuclear commitment on the part of the United States, sustained by the willingness of the Europeans to endorse the rearmament plan in exchange for promises of further economic assistance.     

Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961–1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961–62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.     

Two-Level Negotiations and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Failure of the Johnson Plan for the Palestinian Refugees, 1961-1962

The Kennedy administration sought to resolve the Palestine refugee problem in 1961-62 with a plan for compensation, resettlement, or repatriation under the formal auspices of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission and negotiated by UN special envoy Dr. Joseph Johnson. The negotiations failed and the plan was canceled by the administration in December 1962. The article utilizes a multi-level conceptual model which examines the links between interstate negotiation, domestic politics and boundary-crossing interactions between foreign states and non-state domestic actors and their impact on foreign policy. It analyzes the multi-level negotiations that were conducted between representatives of the governments of Israel and the United States regarding the Johnson proposals, discussions held between Israel representatives and American Jewish leaders and prominent Jewish individuals, and between American government representatives and these same Jewish leaders and individuals. The study analyzes the factors that contributed to the failure of the plan and illustrates the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in foreign policy decision making.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

The United Nations Plan to Establish an Armed Jewish Force to Implement the Partition Plan (United Nations Resolution 181)

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two independent states, Jewish and Arab, with Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under international control. The General Assembly then established the United Nations Palestine Commission to implement partition. Amongst other things, the Commission was to establish “armed militias” under UN supervision to help realise the plan. The analysis examines various aspects of the sequence of events related to this idea, from its conception in the General Assembly to its death in February 1948. It demonstrates that under the militia clause, the United Nations intended to rely on the Jews’ main military organisation – the Haganah – to establish the Jewish state and shows how and why this plan went awry despite the converging interests of the Jews and the United Nations.     

越南岛屿经济发展趋势及特点

2010年4月,越南政府批准了《至2020年越南岛屿经济发展总体规划》,明确了越南岛屿经济的发展目标、发展方向、保障措施和各部门责任,是越南岛屿经济发展的重要指导性文件和落实《至2020年越南海洋战略》的重要措施,越南将岛屿经济发展与国防建设密切结合,不断完善岛屿基础设施,在注重环境保护的同时,重点发展旅游业和渔业.     

Comments (2) on ‘cultural differences in the behavior of terrorists’

This article reviews the development of security policy in Northern Ireland since the outbreak of the current ‘troubles’ in 1969. Following an examination of the three principal categories of actor directly involved on the state side ‐ politicians, civil servants and security agency personnel ‐ the problems accompanying the fust phase of security policy, from 1969 to the mid‐1970s, are discussed. Particular attention is paid to intelligence aspects of the situation. The second part of the paper is devoted to security policy as it has developed since the government's policy review of 1975–76. The re‐emergence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as the primary security agency is described, together with what is called the ‘Hermonization’ of the force in the 1980s. The development of the police under Sir John Hermon (Chief Constable 1980–89) has reflected three main trends in security policy: Ulsterization, professionalization, and the de‐politicization of the force. The article ends with a consideration of the problems of the co‐ordination and accountability of the security forces, and notes that any purely security strategy in the province is doomed to failure.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919–26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the ‘oppressed nationalities’ of Austria‐Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

What really happened at Paris?

Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. £27.50.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from The Foreign Office Confidential Print (General Editors K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt). Part II. From the First to the Second World War. Series I. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (ed.) M. Dockrill, Vols. 1-7. University Publications of America, 1989. $1050 (14 vols).

Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. £40.

F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946, Leicester: Leicester University Press, paperback edition, 1988, £12.95.

Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peace-making, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. Translated from the German by Rita and Robert Kimber, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985. $40.

Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, New York: Norton, 1986 £24.75.