“Neither angels,nor demons,but humans”: anti-essentialism and its ideological moments among the Russian Zionist intelligentsia

This article shows that anti-essentialism was a pivotal ideological feature of Russian Zionism – the idiom of Zionism that lay behind Russian Zionist periodicals such as Rassvet in Late Imperial Russia. For Russian Zionists, the Jewish nation was the social field that existed as a social fact. While Russian Zionists' concept of the Jewish nation was inevitably influenced by their political context, nonetheless, it was primarily a result of the convergence of the following two ideological movements. First, there emerged a sense that a socioeconomic foundation was crucial in forming a nation. The transformation of Jewish socioeconomic positions in Eastern Europe and Russia was the background of this consciousness. The second is the ideological claim that any collective entity or social field should be respected regardless of its merit and utility vis-à-vis others. More specifically, for Russian Zionists, the Jewish raison d'être was the simple existence of their own social field; they believed that no further definition was required. The emergence of this viewpoint can be understood as a reaction to the Zionists' perception of Jewish history where Jews pursued the recognition and validation of their place among non-Jews by virtue of their merit or utility vis-à-vis non-Jews.     

Russia's post-crisis growth: its sources and prospects for continuation

This article provides an in-depth analysis of Russia's post-crisis growth, with a view to understanding the prospects for its continuation. It examines in detail the chief drivers of growth, as well as the main developments and policies that have been underlying it. A key finding is that the role of the oil sector, and particularly privately owned oil companies, has been vastly more important in driving economic growth from 2001 to 2004 than thus far recognised. The oil sector's contribution to growth has hitherto been severely underestimated because official data do not account for transfer pricing and thus fail to fully reflect the importance of the hydrocarbon sector in the Russian economy. In the light of this finding, this article also assesses the economic impact of the ‘Yukos affair’. Looking forward, it is reasoned that—given its economic structure—Russia is bound to remain a heavily resource-dependent economy for some time to come. The article further argues that, given good macroeconomic management and the avoidance of gross policy errors, Russia could realistically hope to sustain high growth rates over the medium term. However, given current tendencies for greater state involvement in key sectors of the economy, such an outcome is not by any means guaranteed.     

The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.     

Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection

BARGAINING OVER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER between the federal government in Moscow and the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation is now widely considered as critical to the success of Russia's democratic and free market reforms, if not to Russia's enduring viability as a state.1 The key challenge to Moscow, and to Russia as a whole, is how to harmonise different levels of political control so that economic growth could be accelerated and social tensions eased in the regions. This challenge is aggravated by the absence of reliable institutions (understood as enforceable rules of the game) regulating centre-periphery relations and the ideological and organisational disarray at the centre itself. In the regions along Russia's post-Soviet borders in particular, this problem is further complicated by a tension between geopolitical insecurity and powerful incentives for trade and economic development coming from outside Russia's borders. Relations between Moscow and the outlying regions thus become a truly 'intermestic' issue, affecting both Russia's internal post-Soviet institution building and the mode of Russia's integration into the global economy. The politics that shape relations between the Russian regions and Moscow are therefore part and parcel of Russia's evolving relations with the outside world, and the policies of regional elites are part and parcel of an increasingly complex fabric of Russia's foreign relations.     

Russia as a great power: Status inconsistency and the two Chechen wars

The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which suggests that Russia is a ‘status overachiever’ in that it has an international status that is greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian perceptions of the country's status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs. While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia's level of status recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.     

Divergence and dispersion in the Russian economy

While post-war economic development In market economies was characterised by geographical concentration of economic activity, this was not the case in the Soviet Union. Soviet economic development resulted in a highly dispersed economic landscape with mono-industrial towns scattered around the country. One plausible reason for this was low perceived transport costs as seen by Soviet planners. Another reason was that political and not only economic motives governed industrial location (Maurseth, 2001a). In addition to the sheer size of the country, these factors made the Soviet Union one of the most transport-intensive economies in the world. The post-Soviet Russian economic geography faces Russia with important challenges. Production, population and employment patterns are likely to change dramatically. There are at least four reasons for this hypothesis. The first is structural change in the Russian economy. Production patterns in Russia were highly distorted. In the future industrial production, and in particular heavy industry, will represent a smaller share of total production while consumer industry and services will probably experience relatively higher growth rates. The second reason to expect a changing economic geography is that transport costs are likely to increase. While the Soviet Union implicitly subsidised transport heavily, Russia now faces important challenges due to increasing transport prices. The third reason for expecting change is population changes. Recently, migration from the climatically least hospitable areas has been growing. In the future, these trends are likely to continue. Fourth, and partly as a consequence of the above-mentioned factors, market access will probably become more important for location of Russian industry. The Russian economic landscape is therefore likely to become more concentrated in the years to come.     

The Russian virtual economy turning real: Institutional change in the Arkhangel'sk forest sector

The article reports on an attempt to assess recent developments of the Russian ‘virtual economy’, a system that, some have argued, represents an alternative form of economic interaction to the modern market economy. In the virtual economy enterprises are engaged in informal non-market transactions with other enterprises and the public sector in accordance with rules that are alien to a market economy. Structural and behavioural changes that have taken place in the Russian economy after 1998 are studied with the help of official data and two surveys (from 1998 and 2005) of 15 forest sector enterprises in Arkhangel'sk Oblast’, a region in Russia's north-west with a largely forest-based economy. The outcome of the assessment indicates that the virtual economy is contracting in the Arkhangel'sk forest sector as well as in Russia at large, and that it will eventually disappear altogether, even if it is likely to exert a profound influence on the behaviour of Russian enterprises for some time yet.     

Russia's missing link? Social capital,entrepreneurialism, and economic performance in post-communist Russia

This paper argues that there is a spurious correlation between social capital and economic development in the regions of post-communist Russia. This argument rejects Robert Putnam's collectivist hypothesis that social capital is the ubiquitous cause of economic growth. Rather, the data presented in this paper indicates that individualistic behavior in the form of entrepreneurialism, has been the prerequisite for growth in post-communist Russia. While social capital may slow or accelerate economic growth, it will not cause it. Without entrepreneurialism, social capital cannot be harnessed for economic development. In essence, social capital does not create wealth, entrepreneurs do.     

Hybrid Historical Memories in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine

Abstract

This article attempts to measure the multilayered, diverse historical memories of contemporary Ukrainians, drawing on a cluster analysis of nationwide survey data collected after the Euromaidan. A significant minority of Ukrainian citizens still gravitate toward Soviet–Russian narratives. These are not merely copies of those embraced in Russia, however; they include ambivalent ‘hybrid’ feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union while supporting Ukraine's independence. This article argues that historical memories of Ukrainians in the southern and eastern regions are amorphous and heterogeneous, and that the architects of the Novorossiya project failed to distinguish Soviet nostalgia from Ukrainophobia and separatist grievances.     

Asymmetric bilateral bargaining in the new Russian Federation: A path-dependence explanation

In this essay we identify economic and political factors that led both the federal centre and the regions in Russia first to open the process of federal bargaining and then to pursue it in the form of signing bilateral treaties, unique for each region. Many Russian politicians and most scholars of Russian politics view asymmetric bilateral bargaining as a dangerous institutional choice contributing to federal instability and potentially threatening the disintegration of Russia. We offer an alternative view. While the treaty-signing practices are actively maintained by Russian political elites, we argue that the genesis of asymmetric bilateral bargaining in Russia had a strong `path dependence' component. In particular, it was precipitated by the developments of the last period in evolution of the Soviet federalism.     

Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia

The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the development of Russia's civil society has been the focus of academic study since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In light of this literature, this article aims to assess the impact of the movement that has most often been seen as very promising for Russia's future civil society development—the environmental movement—by utilising research undertaken in Samara Oblast’ of the Russian Federation. While the results do reveal some positive contributions to civil society development in Russia, they also exhibit many similarities with other studies in the extant literature, illustrating the relative weakness of Russia's social movements in the area of civil society development.     

Rethinking the Economic Relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia

According to their governments, economic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia—the two largest post-Soviet countries—have been exceptionally solid and robust. However, statistical data demonstrate that Russian investments in Kazakhstan's economy have been weak, and that Kazakhstan has only recently increased investment in the Russian economy. This raises the question of whether relations between the two countries have been more uneven than has been claimed officially. The article also explores the influence of off-shore investments via third countries and other aspects of the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and the involvement of each country in the other's economy.     

Coordination and control in Russia’s foreign policy: travails of Putin’s curators in the near abroad

Abstract

This article seeks to challenge the conception of the Russian state as being centred on Vladimir Putin by looking at the actors implementing Russia’s foreign policy in its near abroad. In particular, it explores the activities of curators (kuratory), a term applied in Russia to describe officials tasked with making things work often bypassing, and sometimes competing with, formal institutions. Following the state transformation framework, the argument put forward in the article is that curation (kuratorstvo), as a practice of coordination and control in Russia’s system of governance, can be seen as a manifestation of fragmentation and internationalisation of Russia’s foreign policy making. The empirical basis for this article is a case study of Russia’s policy towards Abkhazia, which Russia officially recognised as a sovereign state in 2008. This article addresses the involvement of curators in their attempts to exert political influence as an expression of fragmentation as well as emerging institutionalised curation in development assistance as a part of internationalisation.     

Russian Challenge to the EU’s Normative Power: Change and Continuity

The article examines how Russian criticism of the normative power Europe (NPE) has evolved. Initially Russia insisted that NPE arguments covered realpolitik. However, two new approaches have recently emerged in Russian reporting on human rights in the EU. One is the demonstration that the EU does not qualify as a normative power. Another is the development of an alternative interpretation of human rights. Russia has, therefore, mastered all NPE critiques. This has occurred as the result of a change in how Russia views international relations. Moscow’s ultimate goal has, however, remained unchanged; it is to reaffirm its equality with key global players.     

Online Campaigning in Russia: Evidence from the 2011 State Duma Election

Despite the continuing growth of internet use in Russia, there remains little systematic analysis of online election campaigning. This article presents an in-depth, multi-method analysis of party and candidate online activity during the 2011 State Duma election campaign—arguably Russia's first ‘internet election’—to ascertain the extent to which new social media is changing politics in Russia. The main findings indicate that the internet did indeed help to level the competitive playing field during the election campaign period, but despite the growing number of internet users, the overall level of online engagement remained weak.     

Putin's Power Revisited: How Identity Positions and Great Power Interaction Condition Strategic Cooperation on Syria

Abstract

This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.     

Russian feminist perspectives on Pussy Riot

While Pussy Riot's “Punk Prayer” and its aftermath constituted something of a turning point for Russia politically – as well as personally for the women imprisoned afterwards – it was neither the first nor last of Pussy Riot's endeavors. Among other things, their series of songs, published as video clips on the web, endorsed mass protest against the Putin regime, criticized state-sponsored homophobia, and praised feminism as a possible curative for Russia's many ills. In setting forth their ideas, however, Pussy Riot's lyricists made use of traditional masculine and feminine gender norms as well as homophobia, wielding these against their opponents in the regime and thereby reinforcing them in ways that other self-identified Russian feminists found problematic at best.

In this article, I review Pussy Riot's collection of songs in chronological order, highlighting the areas where gender norms and apparent misogyny, sexism, and homophobia appear. I weave my explications of the content of Pussy Riot's productions in with the responses of Russian feminist activists to Pussy Riot's lyrics and actions. Taking into account the views of some non-feminist Russian commentators in addition to self-identified feminist activists, I discuss a range of evaluations of the content of Pussy Riot's compositions, as well as differing appraisals of the means that Pussy Riot employed to achieve what they viewed as feminist ends: undermining or even unseating the Putin regime.     

Putin's militocracy? An alternative interpretation of Siloviki in contemporary Russian politics

This article challenges the perception of the rising numbers of siloviki in Russian politics as a conscious strategy and expression of a more authoritarian policy direction pursued by President Putin. Contextualising the phenomenon within the framework of the system of elite recruitment in contemporary Russia, and engaging in a micro-level study of individual siloviki, the article argues that the role of these figures is more modest than often asserted and the possibility of a coordinated ‘siloviki project’ is unlikely.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

‘The Foreign Within’: State–Civil Society Relations in Russia

Abstract

The development of Russian civil society is linked to authoritarian government, fear of ‘colour revolutions’ and the ‘sovereign democracy’ that legitimises state control of civil society. This article acknowledges the narrowing room for manoeuvre of contemporary Russian civil society and discusses NGOs’ practices in the context of government pressures, the politicisation of transnational connections and the increasing geopolitical tension surrounding Russia. It describes the localisation and depoliticisation of Russian NGOs as well as their disruptive practices, and explains how narrowing civil society identities inform the self-governing of NGOs. Finally, it argues that seeing Russian civil society in simple dichotomies further narrows these identities.