Corruption and the Mexican political system: Continuity and change

Thanks to the nature of its political system, Mexico has had a long history of political corruption. Yet recent changes in the patterns of corruption and broader political changes have seemingly altered the equation. Anger over rampant corruption under President Carlos Salinas contributed to the stunning electoral defeat of the PRI in July 1997, while the outcome, the PRI's loss of majority control of the Chamber of Deputies, will add to the structural pressures that have mounted in recent years against institutionalised corruption. This article explores these trends. It sets out the historical and theoretical foundations of corruption in Mexico, examines changes in the incidence and patterns of corruption, and discusses the impact of recent political changes on this aspect of the system. Though cautiously optimistic regarding the impact of Mexico's political breakthrough on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, the essay concludes on a cautious note, highlighting the difficulties other Latin American countries have encountered in strengthening the rule of law and reining in corruption.     

Authoritarian legality and informal practices: Judges, lawyers and the state in Russia and China

To participate in the global economy authoritarian states are pressed to offer international business a legal order that protects the interests of investors, customers, and sellers, but the creation of a modern legal order threatens to undermine the leaders’ control of public life. An increasingly common way to resolve this dilemma, I argue, is developing formal legal institutions that appear to meet world standards, while using informal practices to maintain control over the administration of justice when needed. In this paper I show how the governments of post-Soviet Russia (with its hybrid or competitive authoritarian regime) and the fully authoritarian People’s Republic of China as well, have used this approach in their relations with judges and defense lawyers in their respective countries. The analysis underscores the utility of investigating informal practices along with the reform of formal legal institutions, especially in the context of transition.     

Postsocialist patronage: Expressions of resistance and loyalty

Research on patronage in postsocialist Russia focuses on structural and exchange aspects, but neglects deeper cultural forces that contribute to its reproduction. This study adopts a “bottom-up” approach to understanding the culture of patronage by analyzing the claims of ordinary citizens in “letters to the editor” from a postsocialist Russian locality. The common conventions authors use to legitimize claims share many characteristic features with patronage. Rather than judge authorities based on policy or ability to represent citizen interests, authors evaluate the moral and ethical worth of individuals, making their claims highly personalized. Evidence from these analyses suggests clients help sustain patronage by publicly expressing claims in a language infused with particularlism. Andrew D. Buck is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Reading, England. His interests include social network analysis and postsocialist transitions. He has written on aspects of the privatization process, as well as on the relationship between elite networks and democracy in postsocialist Russia. Research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the international Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). Grateful thanks to Vladimir Levitchev for research assistance. Special thanks to Antonina Bambina for her insightful suggestions and criticisms throughtout different stages of the research. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments I received from Roberto Franzosi, Jeff Hass, Jorge Rodriguez, and David Stark on a previous draft.     

The science of administration,the founders,and theories of political association

Drawing on the work of Michael Oakeshott, this paper seeks to examine the theory of political association underlying Luther Gulick and L. Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration and to contrast this theory with that underlying the Constitution. It is argued that the authors of the Papers clearly viewed the state as a form of purposive association whereas the Founders of the Constitution in large part saw the state as a form of civil association. This explains the difficulties that reformers such as Gulick faced in realizing their vision of administration within our constitutional framework.

Luther Gulick and L. Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration (1) represent one of the most important attempts at a synthesis of doctrines in the field of public administration prior to World War II. While the Papers exhibit a variety of approaches and views, they are best known for those authors who, like Gulick and Urwick themselves, took a more classical approach to administration. Such an approach rests on a belief in the virtues of hierarchy and centralization of authority and power in the chief executive; a belief in efficiency as the central value of administration; a belief that there must exist certain principles for good administration applicable to all organizations, regardless of institutional setting; and a belief that such principles are susceptible to empirical scientific discovery and verification. These doctrines, expounded so forcefully in the Papers, formed the basis for the administrative reform movement of the time including the President's Committee on Administrative Management, of which Gulick himself was a member. Indeed, the Papers continue to strongly influence modern efforts at administrative reform.(2)

The purpose of this article is to examine the particular vision of political association which seems to underlie the Papers, and to compare it with the vision of political association which guided the Founders of the Constitution. In doing so, the article will draw upon the political thinking of the late Michael Oakeshott, a British political theorist and philosopher. I shall argue that there is a tension between the vision of political association held by the authors of the Papers and that held by the Founders, and that this tension explains the failure of administrative reformers to reshape the administrative state along the lines of classical public administration doctrines.     

Urbanization,personal income,and physical quality of life: The case of Kenya

This paper addresses a variety of methodological, theoretical, and historical problems associated with previous research on urbanization and development in Kenya. The first part of the paper discusses several general theories of Third World urbanization and development. Next, these perspectives are examined within the context of recent historical circumstances in Kenya. The final part of the paper presents an entirely new quantitative study of urbanization and development in Kenya. It improves on earlier research by using (1) data fromall urban regions of the country, (2) a statistical model that testschange over time, and (3) several new variables. Overall, the analysis shows that both the causes and effects of urbanization are more complex than what was indicated in previous studies. The quantitative findings can be explained by reference to various theoretical and historical concerns discussed in the paper.     

Corruption,Centralization and Competition: Evidence from Russian Public Procurement

ABSTRACT

This paper estimates the impact of corruption on the incentives of procurers to maintain honest competition in tenders. Customers, who procure for themselves, and Agencies, who procure for the customers in their region are considered. Basing on a large dataset of open auctions conducted by Russian regional-level authorities in 2011, the analysis shows that in highly corrupt regions, Agencies fail to arrange competitive tenders and most of auctions have one bidder. Customers attract more bidders for large contracts, but rebates are usually low. Therefore, procurement centralization may reduce the corruption of Customers, but cannot solve the problem of low competition.