作为宪政实践机制的合宪性审查

合宪性审查作为一种宪政实践机制,蕴涵了宪法的“高级法”观念、自然正义、宪法保障、分权与权力理性、宪政民主、人权保障等思想基础,集中展示它的宪政性与现代意义。为此,应当认真对待宪政生活中的合宪性,当前我国的关键问题不在于应否创制,而在于如何创制合宪性审查机制。     

Constitutional Judicial Review in the Russian Federation

The institution of constitutional judicial review has acquired a new legal foundation for its application: the Constitution of the Russian Federation (RF), adopted on 12 December 1993; the federal constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 21 June 1994; and other acts. However, the opportunities for full implementation of this new legislation on constitutional judicial review in the Russian Federation are constrained by problems from the past: first of all, by the problem of depoliticization, which has assumed exaggerated proportions as a result of the lack of practical success that marked the first stage of the Constitutional Court's operation in Russia. The resolution of this problem has become a condition for the viability of specialized constitutional judicial review in the RF. The difficulty of understanding and mastering this problem is further aggravated by the ambiguous nature of the institution of constitutional judicial review, not only in the Russian model but also in the classical model of its organization. For it is indisputable that constitutional judicial review is a component of the mechanism of judicial authority, regardless of where it is situated in the constitutional structure of power. However, constitutional judicial review cannot be wholly equated with traditional judicial functions since it is at the same time also a political activity undertaken through a jurisdictional form.     

Constitutional pluralism: Chronicle of a death foretold?

What remains of the idea of constitutional pluralism in the wake of the Euro‐crisis? According to the new anti‐pluralists, the recent OMT saga signals its demise, calling to an end the tense stalemate between the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court on the question of ultimate authority. With the ECJ's checkmate, OMT represents a new stage in the constitutionalisation of the European Union, towards a fully monist order. Since constitutional pluralism was an inherently unstable and undesirable compromise, that is both inevitable and to be welcomed. It is argued here that this is misguided in attending to the formal at the expense of the material dimension of constitutional development. The material perspective reveals a deeply dysfunctional constitutional dynamic, of which the judicial battle in OMT is merely a surface reflection. This dynamic now reaches a critical conjuncture, encapsulated in the debate over ‘Grexit’, and the material conflict between solidarity and austerity. Constitutional pluralism, in conclusion, may be an idea worth defending, but as a normative plea for the co‐existence of a horizontal plurality of constitutional orders. This requires radical constitutional re‐imagination of the European project.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

A European Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated

Abstract:  Especially since the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, the idea of a European constitutional patriotism has become subject to ever more intense criticism. This article argues that many of the criticisms of the idea of a European constitutional patriotism have been based on philosophical misunderstandings (both of the notion of constitutional patriotism as such, and of the role it could play in Europe) or rely on implausible empirical claims. Accordingly, the normative idea of constitutional patriotism is first clarified; second, the article discusses some of the most common normative and empirical traps when trying to 'transfer' constitutional patriotism from a domestic nation-state context to the supranational level, as well as the tendency to overburden constitutional patriotism with expectations of solidarity and deliberative democracy; third, an EU-specific post-sovereign, pluralist version of constitutional patriotism is defended against critics who see even such a vision as insufficiently sensitive to value pluralism and cultural diversity.     

何谓合宪性解释：性质、正当性、限制及运用

法律的合宪性解释是指法律有两种甚或多种解释可能时,择取其中与宪法不相抵触的解释。合宪性解释是一种法律解释方法,更是一项法律解释要求。此种解释方法对于维护国家法秩序的统一与稳定不可或缺,其正当性源于权力分立原则下的司法自制理念。合完性解释有其运用上的限制,对于字义本身违宪之法律适用合宪性解释是对此种解释方法的滥用与误用。在美国、德国等实行宪法审查的国家,合宪性解释方法在其司法实践中得到了广泛运用。具有实效性的宪法审查制度在我国尚未真正建立,合宪性解释方法在我国的司法裁判中有无适用空间值得商榷。     

法国宪法委员会功能新论

提起法国宪法委员会,人们都会很自然地将其功能与宪法监督划上等号。但事实上它却是一个有着宪法监督功能,以平衡政府与议会关系为主要职责的特殊政治机构。从宪法委员会官方网站提供的历年裁决来看,其功能可分为两级。通过第五共和国权力机关运作流程,对其功能进行动态分析,发现宪法委员会的主要功能不是宪法监督,而是平衡政府和议会之间的权力。     

Text Matters: Some Reflections on the Forging of a New Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Africa

The South African Constitution establishes a constitutional democracy with a strong form of constitutional review. The Constitutional Court is required to declare invalid any legislation or conduct of the President which is inconsistent with the Constitution. The author, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, argues that the text of the Constitution has been an important determinant of the Court's jurisprudence, both in relation to the Court's jurisprudence concerning the institutional structures established by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights jurisprudence.     

法国宪法实践中对国际条约的合宪性审查

设立宪法委员会实施合宪性审查是法国1958年宪法的一大突破,其中对于国际条约的合宪性进行审查更是宪法委员会实践中的亮点之一。在欧洲一体化进程加快的形势下,作为国内的合宪性审查机构,如何实施对于国际法文件,特别是欧盟法律文件的合宪性审查是宪法委员会面临的重大难题,宪法委员会在这个方面既表现出了一定的创造性,更表现出了相当大的自我约束,这在一定程度上发展了法国的宪法制度,但也反映出其对于宪法难题的回避。     

不抵触宪法原则的适用范围:规范差异与制度逻辑

不抵触宪法原则是我国宪法上国家法制统一原则的一项重要内容。该原则对于贯彻宪法精神和原则,维护国家法制统一以及确定合宪性审查的对象范围,具有重要作用和指导意义。根据宪法第5条第3款、第67条第7项第8项、第100条第1款第2款的规定,不抵触宪法原则的适用范围包括法律、国务院制定的行政法规、决定和命令以及省、自治区、直辖市、设区的市人大及其常委会制定的地方性法规和决议。而根据《立法法》第72条第1款第2款、第87条、第97条第2项、第99条第1款第2款、第100条第1款第3款的规定,不抵触宪法原则的适用范围"被扩大"了,还包括自治条例、单行条例和规章。从合宪性审查的制度逻辑出发,宪法之所以将部分行政法规和地方性法规纳入不抵触宪法原则的适用范围,是因为它们存在着直接依据宪法制定的情形。而《立法法》将不抵触宪法原则的适用范围扩展到所有的法律规范,遵循的是一种宽泛意义上的制度逻辑,其所谓的"不抵触",不应当被解释为不抵触宪法原则适用范围的"扩大"。     

论美国联邦最高法院宪法解释的创造性

美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释具有创造性,其主要表现在司法审查权、三重审查标准、选择性吸收理论、推翻先例和创造新的公民权利等五个方面。原旨主义和非原旨主义都会达至具有创造性的宪法解释,原旨主义具有天然的民主合法性,有时美国联邦最高法院会以原旨主义来掩饰它们具有创造性的宪法解释。宪法解释的创造性是一把双刃剑,有积极性的一面也有消极性的一面。美国联邦最高法院的宪法解释曾经也将永远具有创造性,只有如此它才能为宪法提供与时俱进的新意义。     

The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism

Constitutional discourse has perhaps never been more popular, nor more comprehensively challenged than it is today. The development of new constitutional settlements and languages at state and post-state level has to be balanced against the deepening of a formidable range of sceptical attitudes. These include the claim that constitutionalism remains too state-centered, overstates its capacity to shape political community, exhibits an inherent normative bias against social developments associated with the politics of difference, provides a language easily susceptible to ideological manipulation and, that, consequent upon these challenges, it increasingly represents a fractured and debased conceptual currency. A rehabilitated language of constitutionalism would meet these challenges through a version of constitutional pluralism. Constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian world there exists a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured in a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical pattern, and seeks to develop a number of empirical indices and normative criteria which allow us to understand this emerging configuration and assess the legitimacy of its development.     

合宪性推定的正当性

合宪性推定是宪法审查中一种重要方法。其最初起源于美国，尔后逐渐被德国、日本、澳大利亚等法治国所采用。国内目前对于合宪性推定方法的认识尚有不足，在一定程度上影响了宪法审查制度的有效运作。对于合宪性推定方法的借鉴，不在于简单移植，重点在于从一般原理的角度来探求其所存在的正当性基础。从人权价值、规范体系、经济理性等多角度对合宪性推定的正当性进行论证，可发现合宪性推定是一种原理性的宪法方法，根基于宪法的最高性、法官的经济理性、人权的目的性、国家权力的手段性等。合宪性推定的正当性论证，在折射出目前宪法方法的贫瘠的同时，也有助于摆脱宪法文本浪漫主义的方法论困境，进而体现出宪法方法兼具政治与法律的特性。     

以宪法概念思维:规范是如何发现的?

以宪法概念思维 ,以发现问题和解决纠纷为取向 ,既是进行宪法学理论研究 ,也是实施宪法、解决宪法问题的客观需要。宪法概念就是宪法规范。宪法思维就是法官在宪法规范与宪法事实之间的规范涵摄过程 ,其目的是在宪法纠纷和疑难案件中确立价值 ,发现规范 ,在个案中实现正义 ,因而宪法思维也是一个新规范的证立过程。以宪法概念思维 ,可以增进法律人对各种宪法规范属性的认识 ,提高对宪法规范的诠释和理解能力 ,并在此基础上发展宪法 ,进而通往沟通与理解之路。     

The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation

Abstract The European model of the constitutional review of legislation, characterized by the concentration of the constitutional review power in a single constitutional court, had its origin in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that this Constitution established at the same time a parliamentary system of government in a fairly radical form. As the author explains, this “invention” of a constitutional court is attributable to two factors. One factor is the federal aspect. The Court was conceived by the framers of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 as an umpire between federal legislation and the legislation of the states or Länder. In this respect it was meant as a substitute for the principle of the priority of federal law over state or Land law. This is manifest in the initial draft of the Constitution, where actions on questions of the constitutionality of legislation could only be brought by the Federal government (against the legislation of one or another of the states or Länder) and by the State or Land governments (against federal legislation). Right from the beginning, however, the Court could examine a parliamentary act ex officio when it had to apply such an act in another proceeding. It was this power of the Court that triggered the development of constitutional review. Its exercise gradually transformed the Court into a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, in particular, the fundamental rights of citizens. The author traces this development in the context of the concept of state and law that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This concept included specific restrictions on constitutional review. On the basis of a different understanding of the functions of a constitution, the Court gave up these restrictions and followed the examples of the European Court of Human Rights, the German Constitutional Court and—indirectly—the American Supreme Court.     

美国宪法诉讼制度的权力制衡功能

宪法诉讼作为违宪审查的一种主要形式,以权力分立制衡原则为政治理论基础,其直接功能就是实现政府权力的制约与平衡.美国的宪法诉讼制度实现了权力制衡的宪政理念,并通过法院尤其是联邦最高法院在宪法诉讼过程中采取司法能动主义或司法节制的立场实现了权力的动态制衡,使宪法诉讼成为权力制衡的一种有效和有力的手段.     

论宪法的自由理念

宪法的自由理念有其肯定和否定双重形态,这两种不同的形态产生出宪法与宪政具体理念, 即肯定性自由理念建构起宪法的人民主权理念, 否定性自由理念建构起宪法的权利保障和权力制约理念, 自由的双重形态建构起公共政治领域和私人领域的界分。一部实质宪法应当从实质到规范都能体现其自由理念, 即对基本自由权利和其他剩余权利的保障以及对国家权力的限制。     

The influence of the rulings of the Constitutional Court on the development of health law in Lithuania

This article highlights some recent developments in the constitutional doctrine of the right to health care in Lithuania, and more in particular the impact of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania on the development of health law. The right to health care, enshrined in the Constitution, is both an obligation of the state and an individual right. The Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine of the right to health care, as well a doctrine of certain other constitutional social rights, which is based on the understanding of the close interrelation between the different constitutional rights, the principle of indivisibility and equal importance of these rights, and the presumption of justiciability of social rights. The analysis is based on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Two cases on the disputes of the legal regulation concerning the pharmaceutical activities are presented in more detail.     

宪政是宪法逻辑运动的状态

现有宪政理论在概念上引出无穷因果链和循环论证 ,在起源上以道德判断代替逻辑论证 ,很少自觉从因果律上来考察宪政的内涵与意义。宪法的确定性和宪法的功能作为判定宪政内涵的逻辑要件是不可缺少的 ,它们直接指向宪政的目标。这些目标就是组织国家政权、保障公民权利、维护国家和社会的基本制度、保持法制的统一性。     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.