The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.     

An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

This article examines one of the most serious flaws of the Statuteof the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’): whileit provides that Lebanese domestic law is the sole source ofcrimes over which the STL will have jurisdiction, it at thesame time applies to these domestic crimes uniquely internationalforms of criminal responsibility, namely joint criminal enterpriseand command responsibility. By doing so, the Statute is in violationof the nullum crime sine lege principle, since it would allowfor the conviction of persons who could not be held responsibleunder Lebanese law. The purpose of this article is to highlightsome ways out of this problem.     

The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) represents a sui generisinternational tribunal on various levels. It is the first timea treaty-based Tribunal has been established through a resolutionof the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII. A furtherunique feature is its sole dependence on domestic substantivecrimes. The attempt to include crimes against humanity in theStatute did not succeed, despite the fact that the elementsof a crime against humanity seem to be discernable in the conductthat falls within the jurisdiction of the STL. References tointernational and regional terrorism instruments, such as theArab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, were alsoabandoned. The Tribunal will rely on Lebanese criminal provisionsregarding terrorism, illicit associations, crimes and offencesagainst life and personal integrity. Lebanese law provides anold but concrete definition of terrorism. This raises the questionof whether the Lebanese definition, with its strengths and weaknesses,could assist in the evolution of a well-structured definitionof international terrorism. The possibility of ‘internationalizing’the Lebanese definition will depend on two factors: the judges’approach in adopting the Tribunal's rules of evidence and procedure,and then more importantly their creativity in developing thejurisprudence of the Tribunal.     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case

When adjudicating international crimes, domestic courts arefaced with a choice between the application of internationallaw or national law. In the recent van Anraat judgment, a DutchDistrict Court explicitly opted for the former alternative.This approach led to the accused's acquittal of complicity ingenocide. In the Court's opinion, there was no proof beyonda reasonable doubt that van Anraat had actual knowledge of SaddamHussein's special intent to destroy part of the Kurdish population.According to the Court, such proof is required under internationallaw. This article argues that the Court's preference for internationallaw was not prescribed, either by international law or by domesticlaw, although in principle such preference may prove advisable,whenever international rules are clear and exhaustive. Aftertracing the intricate legal discussions on mens rea requirementsfor genocide and complicity in genocide, the author concludesthat the issue has not yet been completely elucidated in internationalcase law and legal literature. In situations of ambiguity whereinternational case law offers insufficient guidance, domesticcourts would better resort to their own criminal law. As Dutchcriminal law extends the mens rea of the accomplice beyond ‘knowledge’so as to cover dolus eventualis as well, application of domesticlaw might have affected the outcome of the case.     

Investigating and Prosecuting Large-scale Corruption: The Italian Experience

The author, who has been one of the leading prosecutors investigatingorganized crime (and in particular corruption crimes) in northernItaly, discusses the Italian experience concerning the use ofsuspects cooperating with prosecutors, the relevance for thefight against organized crimes of such criminal notions as ‘criminalassociation’, as well as the various investigating strategiesmore suited to combating organized crime. He concludes thatin Italy the cooperation of suspects based on the offer of lightpenalties or other quid pro quo measures has never been theonly means of collecting evidence, as prosecution must alsoavail itself of other evidence.     

Who is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors?: On the Double-Track Approach to International Criminal Justice

Since 1947, no alleged crime of aggression has ever been prosecuted,in spite of the many instances in which states have committedacts of aggression with the Security Council sometimes deemingan act to be such. A dual system of international criminal justicehas taken shape slowly. Crimes consisting of serious violationsof jus in bello, that is, war crimes, usually considered lessegregious than the crime of aggression, have been severely prosecutedand punished, in particular by the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Yet, the ‘supreme internationalcrime’ — aggressive war — mostly committedby political and military authorities of major powers, has beenignored and its perpetrators still occupy the summit of internationalpower undisturbed.     

海洋发展战略背景下我国海洋刑事立法若干理论问题探讨

区分陆上犯罪与海上犯罪是应对日益增长的海上犯罪、彰显海上犯罪的基本特征和适应海上司法实践发展的需要。由于特殊罪名的适用效果不佳、适用范围有限,一般罪名未能反映海上犯罪的特点,因而它们均不能适应海洋发展战略的需要。现行刑法只适用于我国领域内发生的海上犯罪,而不能适用于领海外国家管辖海域内发生的犯罪。涉海国际公约只规定了海上犯罪的罪名和罪状而没有规定法定刑,对国际法的海上犯罪适用现有一般罪名违反禁止类推原则,也没有体现海上犯罪的特点;不仅适用程序繁琐,而且使结果处于不确定状态,因此,国际法的海上犯罪应转化为国内法的海上犯罪。     

The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany

The impact of the Nuremberg trial on Germany has changed overtime. It is not only a question of evolving legal debate, butalso a correlation of historical, political and moral developments.The author considers the reception of the International MilitaryTribunal (IMT) trial during the Cold War. West Germany rejectedNuremberg's historic precedent, principally on the grounds thatthe Allies had enforced victors’ justice, and that theTribunal had applied ex post facto law by violating the nullumcrimen principle. Meanwhile, East Germany seemingly took upthe cause of Nuremberg by prosecuting minor Nazi perpetrators.However, this affirmation was politically motivated, and itled to inhumane abuses of power, exemplified by the Waldheimtrials. The reunification of Germany marked the beginning ofa positive approach to the Nuremberg legacy: the new generationof judges, politicians and academics was increasingly sympatheticto international criminal justice, and adopted the Nurembergprecedent by dealing judicially with crimes committed in theEast during the Cold War. The study goes on to deal with therelevance of West German legal critique for modern internationalcriminal law. The author suggests that a distinction shouldbe made between true victims of international crimes and thosewho wish to revise history by portraying themselves as such,as many West Germans did after World War II. Moreover, the ‘victors’justice’ argument must not be used to conceal the factthat justice has indeed been administered. However, the criticismof the IMT's violation of the nullum crimen principle is firmlygrounded in the German, as opposed to Anglo-American, legaltradition.     

Fighting Corruption: The Peruvian Experience

In Peru the power system put in place by the former PresidentAlberto Fujimori created a network of illegality in which manycrimes were committed (e.g. various forms of human rights violations,including torture, murders, arms and drug trafficking and corruption).These offences were brought to light simultaneously by distinctbut intertwined investigations. In order to prosecute and punishthese crimes a special Anti-corruption System was established,which consisted of both special investigative authorities aswell as specialized anti-corruption courts. In addition, a specialsystem of Benefits for Effective Collaboration with the Prosecutionhas been put in place covering organized crime, as well as customand terrorist offences. In this respect, negotiated justiceconstitutes a very important instrument in the hands of thestate to fight organized crime. However, the prioritizationof the principles of expeditiousness and effectiveness, togetherwith very broad powers conferred on the prosecutors, impliesthe risk of undermining other equally important principles,such as the legality of evidence (legalidad de la prueba), respectfor the rights of the defence and the principle of equalitybefore the law. Finally, the author emphasizes the role thatcould be played by public international law to facilitate internationalcooperation for securing evidence and the arrest of accusedpersons, as well as to enable Peruvian authorities to identifyand seize the proceeds of crimes.     

Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?

The nature of command responsibility is still open to debatein international criminal law: is a superior to be held criminallyresponsible for the crimes committed by his subordinates ‘asan accomplice’, for having participated in the commissionof the crime by omission, or as a perpetrator of a separateoffence of dereliction of duty? This article surveys the post-WW2case law and the first international instruments on this point,and then analyses the jurisprudence of the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judges appearto have recently adopted a new approach to Article 7(3) ICTYSt.in that the superior is held responsible ‘for failureto prevent or punish with regard to the crimes of the subordinate’and no longer ‘for the crimes of his subordinates’.It is a responsibility ‘sui generis’ indeed, wherethe crime of the subordinate plays a central role in the attributionof responsibility to the superior. It is, therefore, necessaryto carefully consider the relationship between the superior'sfailure to act and the subordinate's crime, both with regardto objective and subjective elements. The same question finallyarises in relation to Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the literalinterpretation of which implies that a superior shall be punishedfor the same crime committed by his subordinates. In order toavoid the risk of holding a person guilty of an offence committedby others in violation of the principle of personal and culpablecriminal responsibility, it is crucial to consider separatelythe different cases of command responsibility, which are basedon distinct objective and subjective requirements.     

What is a Crime?

This article presents a philosophical account of the natureof crime. It argues that the criminal law contains both fault-basedcrimes and strict liability offences, and that these two representdifferent paradigms of liability. It goes on to argue that thegist of fault-based crimes lies in their being public wrongs,not (as is often thought) because they wrong the public, butbecause the public is responsible for punishing them, i.e. becausethey merit state punishment. What makes wrongs deserving ofpunishment is that they are seriously blameworthy, inasmuchas they evince a disrespect for the values violated. But theyonly merit state punishment when they violate important values,not simply due to the well-known pragmatic considerations againstthe use of the criminal law, but to the intrinsic expressiveforce of criminal conviction. Finally, the analysis of fault-basedcrimes points to a role for strict liability in regulating actionsthat are not seriously blameworthy but do increase the riskof values being damaged.     

A Criticism of the International Harm Principle

According to the received view crimes like torture, rape, enslavement or enforced prostitution are domestic crimes if they are committed as isolated or sporadic events, but become crimes against humanity when they are committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population. Only in the latter case can these crimes be prosecuted by the international community. One of the most influential accounts of this idea is Larry May’s International Harm Principle, which states that crimes against humanity are those that somehow ‘harm humanity.’ I argue that this principle is unable to provide an adequate account of crimes against humanity. Moreover, I argue that the principle fails to account for the idea that crimes against humanity are necessarily group based. I conclude by suggesting that the problem with May’s account is that it relies on a harm-based conception of crime which is very popular, but ultimately mistaken. I submit that in order to develop an adequate theory of crimes against humanity we need to abandon the harm-based model and replace it with an alternative conception of crime and criminal law, one based on the notion of accountability.     

国际犯罪的类型研究:回顾、反思与探寻

在理论研究的层面,国际犯罪的范围包括战争罪、侵略罪、危害人类罪等31种犯罪。在对这些国际犯罪进行类分时,根本立足点是国际犯罪,即以国际犯罪的自身特性为视角。由于国际犯罪是一定的主体所实施的严重危害国际社会共同利益,依据国际刑法应当承担刑事责任的行为,因此,在划分国际犯罪的基本类型时,可以采取如下几项标准:一是国际刑法的"两重性";二是国际犯罪的主体;三是国际犯罪的行为特征;四是国际犯罪侵害的法益。     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

A Developmental Approach for Measuring the Severity of Crimes

There is widespread agreement in criminology that some crimes are more severe than others, but precise definitions of crime severity and straightforward methods for measuring it have been elusive. Public perceptions of crime severity and economic estimates of crime costs to society or willingness to pay offer a variety of metrics for the public’s perceptions of severity, but they may not accurately describe severity as reflected in offender preferences. The behavior of offenders is critical for understanding developmental progressions in criminal careers, as one may assume that typically more severe offenses are not undertaken until less severe crimes have been committed. In the present paper we propose an alternative metric of crime severity, drawing on findings from developmental criminology that indicate that more severe crimes occur after less severe crimes in the criminal life course, and a method for estimating crime severity that uses the generalized Bradley–Terry model of multiple paired comparisons. We demonstrate this approach on two samples of youthful offenders: the National Youth Survey and the RAND Adolescent Outcomes Project. The results suggest that sample-specific estimates of crime severity can be derived, that these estimates provide insight into the developmental progression of crime, and that they correspond well to crime severity rankings produced by the public.

Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy

This article first explores whether Italy is under an obligationto implement the Rome Statute that it ratified in 1999. It thenidentifies the general sets of inconsistencies between Italianlegislation and the Rome Statute and analyses whether and towhat extent the former needs to be amended or integrated inorder to implement the substantive provisions of the latter,in particular in relation to the definition of crimes, generalprinciples of criminal responsibility, defences and other barsto prosecution. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction by Italiancourts over crimes in the Rome Statute is discussed in the lightof the principle of complementarity on which the jurisdictionof the International Criminal Court is based.         Mere dreams,mere dreams!         W.B. Yeats,Meditations in Time of Civil War, I (1928)     

The Legacy of Nuremberg

The Nuremberg trial, later followed by the Tokyo trial, is amilestone in the development of international law. For the firsttime in modern history, the leaders of a defeated country wereindicted for committing serious crimes jeopardizing the basesof peaceful coexistence among individual human beings and peoples:crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.German objections criticizing crimes against peace as havingno legal basis and, therefore, contradicting the principle nullumcrimen sine lege, were justified. To date, the legal positionhas not changed, since the international community has consistentlyrefrained from including aggression in the lists of offencesprosecutable under the statutes of the currently existing internationalcriminal courts. However, no well-founded objections could beraised against the indictment for war crimes and crimes againsthumanity. Concerning offences of such abhorrent nature, no offendercan invoke nullum crimen that protects only legitimate confidence.To hold to account political leaders, directly under internationallaw, for criminal actions organized and ordered by them is anecessity in a world where the basic axioms of the internationalsystem have changed: state sovereignty has lost its absolutecharacter and is counterbalanced by the requirements of humanrights protection. The emergence of international criminal justiceembodies the concept of international community in the mostpalpable manner. Fortunately, some of the defects of the Nurembergtrial have been remedied today: no arbitrary picking and choosingof the accused by the prosecution is possible before the InternationalCriminal Court; prosecutors as well as the judges of all existingjudicial bodies are carefully selected by the internationalcommunity with a view to avoiding any illegitimate bias.     

The Hamdan Case and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New Beginning for International Law in the US

In the Hamdan decision, Judge Stevens, writing for the majority,addressed the boundaries of the law of war and specificallywhether the conspiracy charge lodged against Hamdan constituteda violation of this body of customary international law. TheSupreme Court persuasively held that conspiracy does not constitutea war crime.