论沈家本的人格平等观

191 3年 6月 9日 ,沈家本在北京的寓所里撒手人寰。今年 ,正值沈家本逝世 90周年。为此 ,他的家乡浙江省湖州市准备举行沈家本学术研讨会 ,以推动对这位曾主持清末修律的法学家的研究。我们也撰写这篇文章 ,对这位中西法学的“冰人” ,表示纪念。一　平等 :一个让沈家本回避的问题《寄文存》收录的文章 ,最后一篇为“书劳提学新刑律草案说贴后”(以下简称“书后”)。此文成于1 91 0年 ,用意在于回应劳乃宣的“修正刑律草案说贴” ,是“礼法之争”中 ,沈家本用自己的名义回复“礼派”的惟一一篇文章 ,也是沈家本晚年最后一篇论说文章 ,其地…     

Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.     

国家权力与人的尊严

国家权力也有尊严,但不能高于人的尊严,更不能建立在侵犯人的尊严基础之上。侵犯人的尊严有私人间的个体侵犯、当权者的侵犯、"上位者"的侵犯、多数人的侵犯等等。国家权力直接侵犯或参与侵犯人格尊严往往危害更大,而最严重的侵犯人格尊严多发生在国家权力与民间联手之时。宪法保障人格尊严意味着国家权力不仅不能侵犯人的尊严,还有保障人的尊严之义务。     

State Powers and Human Dignity

国家权力也有尊严,但不能高于人的尊严,更不能建立在侵犯人的尊严基础之上.侵犯人的尊严有私人间的个体侵犯、当权者的侵犯、“上位者”的侵犯、多数人的侵犯等等.国家权力直接侵犯或参与侵犯人格尊严往往危害更大,而最严重的侵犯人格尊严多发生在国家权力与民间联手之时.宪法保障人格尊严意味着国家权力不仅不能侵犯人的尊严,还有保障人的尊严之义务.     

Dignity Takings and Dispossession in Israel

This article examines the concept of dignity takings, as developed by Bernadette Atuahene, and its applicability to the Israeli situation, focusing on takings from the Arab‐Palestinian minority in Israel. Although I find dignity takings a valuable concept, as it emphasizes the interconnections between land dispossession and the denial of human dignity, I offer some qualifications and suggestions. I then examine the applicability of the concept to the dispossession of Arabs/Palestinians in Israel through two case studies: one, a close reading of the (in)famous Ikrit villagers' dispossession; the other, an examination of the dispossession of Negev (southern Israel) Bedouin citizens of Israel, which takes place, not unlike terra nullius, simultaneously with a denial of this very taking. The article concludes that with some modifications, the concept of dignity taking applies to the situation of Arab/Palestinian citizens of Israel.     

Equality

“Equality” is a notion about which disagreement arises not simply due to lack of clarity and precision (or intellectual dishonesty and bad faith). Rather, equality is an idea that implies and implicates some form of disagreement as a constitutive possibility of its horizon of discussion. This, in my view, is both a problem and an opportunity. I submit that equality is a plural notion: There are only equalities, practices aimed at removing situated circumstances of inequality and discrimination.     

Coverture and Dignity: A Comment

This short comment challenges efforts to expand the notion of a dignity taking to traditional legal structures, like those identified with “coverture.” It suggests that the inequalities of gender oppression are better understood as forms of “slow violence.” It also suggests how difficult it is to imagine and to institute remedies for wrongs rooted in long histories and in powerful structures of socialization.     

人格尊严的宪法意义

人格尊严是基本权利的价值核心。①就其本质而言,它是国家的目的,不能被当作国家及社会作用的手段,人对其基本权利的正当行使有自治和自决的权利。就其性质而言,它不是一项具体的基本权利,它与其他基本权利的关系也不完全类同于平等权与其他基本权利之间的关系。就其功能而言,与其他大多数基本权利不同,人格尊严兼有消极和积极两个方面的功能,两者相比,前者居于主导的地位。     

The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity

Abstract. We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well‐being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self‐consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives.     

Dignity, Harm, and Hate Speech

This paper examines two recent contributions to the hate speech literature – by Steven Heyman and Jeremy Waldron – which seek a justification for the legal restriction of hate speech in an account of the way that hate speech infringes against people’s dignity. These analyses look beyond the first-order hurts and disadvantages suffered by the immediate targets of hate speech, and consider the prospect of hate speech sustaining complex social structures whose wide-scale operations lower the social status of members of targeted groups. In Heyman’s and Waldron’s accounts we find plausible insights into the nature of identity-based social hierarchies, and the harms that redound to subordinated people under the operations of such hierarchies. I argue, however, that both analyses are unsuccessful as justifications for the restriction of hate speech, because they do not ultimately provide reason to think that hate speech is responsible for creating or sustaining identity-based social hierarchies.     

不失尊严的死亡：选择与挑战

虽然绝症患者可以拒绝医治的权利已被确立,但在医生的辅助下实施“自杀”仍然是人们长期争议的一个热点话题。在美国,人们认为他们有权利按照自己选择的生活方式自由自在生活的同时,大多数人却没有意识到,当选择以安乐死来解脱被无法治愈疾病折磨的痛不欲生的生命时,这种自由权     

Resisting Dignity Takings in China

In the course of urbanization in the People's Republic of China, tens of millions of citizens have experienced expropriations of collectively owned land, expropriations of privately owned buildings, and evictions from urban land in state ownership. Summarily characterizing these measures as takings, I argue, first, that some takings observed have denied evictees dignity, understood as respect for their intrinsic moral worth and moral autonomy, in addition to dispossessing them of their land and homes. Second, in dignity takings, monetary compensation and resettlement schemes may fail to reflect the harm done to evictees by framing disputes over takings as (forced) economic bargains. Third, some victims unable to seek redress through judicial avenues have been driven into extrajudicial protest and resistance. In some cases, resistance can be restorative of dignity, but where repressive state responses to resistance prevent this potential from being realized, the injustice of dignity takings can be further aggravated.     

Dignity, Democracy, Civilisation

This paper contributes to international discussion about the difficulty of defining human dignity as a legal concept by locating it at the heart of (European) democracy and human rights. Focusing on emerging dignity case law in the United Kingdom, the paper explores the connections among dignity, human rights and democracy, and the uses of dignity to enhance and refine democracy. While judges are key actors in the construction of dignity, they operate within the boundaries of a particular democratic ‘civilisation’ anchored in the core prohibitions of art 2, 3 and 4 European Convention on Human Rights, combined with those of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). This normative core, the paper argues, is to be understood in the wider time frame of democracy and dignity, which is equally important for refining and thickening human dignity’s conceptual and normative definition, as well as for reflecting on the legitimacy of its (judicial) uses.     

平等权原则与宽容——以平等和自由的关系为向度

平等和自由之间是存在张力的,且经常表现为一种矛盾关系。国家强制平等往往通过一定的制度来实现,而这种制度如果不能在自由与平等之间保持某种适度平衡,就会导致来自国家或社会的歧视与缺乏宽容。就平等权原则在世界各国宪法上的规定及其实践而言,虽然不同国家的宪政制度和法治文化传统不同,但都体现了宽容的内在性要求,一如美国的"平等保护原则"和德国的"法律上的平等与禁止恣意原则"。鉴于我国人民代表大会制度下的"立法归类"可能造成的歧视和不宽容,将"法律面前人人平等"单纯理解为平等权或法律适用上的平等原则,都是不甚妥当的,它仍然有进一步诠释的余地。在更为根本的宪法原则层面,宽容理念要求确立社会法治国原则,以对传统法治国原则进行修正,以进一步调和自由与平等之间的内在紧张关系。     

Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required

In We Want What's Ours: Learning from South Africa's Land Restitution Program, I introduced the concept of “dignity takings,” which I defined as property confiscation that involves the dehumanization or infantilization of the dispossessed. I argued that the appropriate remedy for a dignity taking is “dignity restoration”: material compensation to dispossessed populations through processes that affirm their humanity and reinforce their agency. For this symposium, contributors were invited to examine these paired concepts through case studies beyond the South African context. This introductory essay summarizes the central arguments of We Want What's Ours and considers how the symposium contributions confirm, extend, or revise the concepts of dignity takings and dignity restoration.