The county perspective on intergovernmental relations and government capacity

This analysis examines the issues of state and federal responsiveness and state and local government capacity from the perspective of county officials. Using data from a national survey of county administrators, elected executives, and commission chairpersons, the study finds that county officials are: (1) very confident of their own capacities to respond to local problems, but not as confident of local fiscal capacities; (2) very concerned about the responsiveness of state governments, particularly state legislatures, to local needs; and (3) not confident of the responsiveness of federal government to local needs either, but desirous of federal fiscal support. The assessments of state responsiveness appear related to state efforts to expand the policy making, taxing, and borrowing authority of their county governments.     

Exorcising the ghost of the politics-administration dichotomy: an institutional theory of administration policy making

This article takes implementation theory one critical step further. It argues that administrative policy making is a separate, distinguishable process, not a stage in or component of the legislative policy-making process. In addition, it argues that the institutional setting for policy making has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics, and setting influences policy outcomes. The implications of the institutional perspective for understanding policy making, policy analysis, and the legitimacy of public organizations are examined.

The ghost of the politics-administration dichotomy haunts implementation theory. Although numerous scholars have declared the dichotomy dead,⁽¹⁾ administrative policy making is still seen as a component or step in the policy process that is dominated by elected officials. For example, Kelman recently examined the different institutional settings of policy making.⁽²⁾ Elected officials, in his view, are and should remain the primary source of policy ideas and choices while administrators remain responsible for translating these ideas and choices into practice. Other scholars underscore the lack of effective control by legislators and elected executives. But even those who acknowledge administrative initiative and autonomy see administrators as servants, however weak their masters.

This article takes implementation theory one critical step farther. It argues that administrative policy making is a separate, distinguishable process—not merely a stage in or component of legislative policy making. Policies can and do originate in administrative agencies. These innovations gather supporters and critics, are tested and refined, and can become part of the routine with little, if any, involvement by elected officials or political appointees. Legislation and executive orders commonly ratify existing administrative policies rather than initiate administrative involvement.

In addition, the institutional setting for policy making has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics. The institutional setting, it is argued, influences policy outcomes. Administrative policy making is not, however, an entirely discrete process. It intersects with legislative policy making at important and predictable points. The two policy processes, legislative and administrative, are loosely and variably coupled.⁽³⁾ The central distinction is that administrative policy making is dominated by the ideas, norms, routines, and choices of nonelected public employees, whereas legislative policy making is dominated by the perspectives of elected officials. Administrative policy making can occur in the bureaucracies of the President or of Congress.

The argument that these two processes—legislative and administrative—are distinct does not, however, deny their essential overlap. The overlap between these two fundamentally different policy settings has fostered the delusion that there is only one policy setting with legislative and administrative components. Clearly elected officials influence administrative policy making, and, just as clearly, administrators influence legislative policy making.⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless, their interaction remains obscure without a clearer perception of the profound differences between the two settings. As stated, the importance of administrative policy making seems obvious and uncontroversial, but its implications are strongly resisted.⁽⁵⁾

Public administration and implementation theories have not adequately recognized the importance of administrative policy making in modem welfare states.⁽⁶⁾ Before more fully developing these ideas, four examples of administrative policy making are briefly reviewed.     

COUNCILLORS’ RECEIPT AND USE OF CITIZEN INPUT: EXPERIENCE FROM NORWEGIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The article expands citizen participation research by tackling participation from the viewpoint of elected officials – the recipients of citizen input. The article studies the role citizen input plays in elected officials’ decision making. Citizen input is defined as information elected officials obtain through direct contact with citizens and representatives of local associations. Using survey data from Norwegian local government, the article assesses how much citizen input councillors receive, and to what extent they use it to set local agendas. It is demonstrated that Norwegian councillors have a high degree of exposure to citizen input and that citizen input constitutes most councillors’ primary source of agenda‐setting inspiration. The article also examines differences in the extent to which councillors use citizen input, and draws on existing theoretical and empirical research to discuss how these differences can be explained. For example, findings that local government frontbenchers and highly educated councillors consider citizen input less useful than others do are explained by an analytical perspective emphasizing councillors’ varied needs for such information.     

Preventive veto and obstructive veto: the imposition of public policy by organizations on the margins of government

This article argues that powerful organizations at the margins of government (i. e,, contractors, franchisers, quangos, state-owned corporations, etc.) which provide vital public services are able to impose public policy on the electorate and elected officials in democratic countries. These organizations' enormous resources, including not only their tangible assets, but also freedom from accountability and dependent clientele, constitute both a source of power and vital vested interests. Illustrating with the example of the Kupat Holim Sick Fund of Israel, it shows how when these interests are significantly jeopardized, the organizations impose veto power: a preventive veto at the policy making stage or an obstructive veto at the policy implementation stage. Both types of veto enable them to appropriate the major instruments of policy making - allocation, regulation, and restructuring - from elected government. This ability undermines the traditional relationship between the electorate and elected and raises questions about the risks to democracy inherent in the proliferation of such bodies on the margins of government.     

A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014

In 2014, the largest reform since the US postwar occupation was enacted in Japanese civil service. It was designed as the final step of the two-decade-long effort to restructure the “1955 System,” that is, the politico-administrative system developed under the Liberal Democratic Party’s hegemony. Its purpose was to remold Japan’s independent-minded bureaucrats into the elected officials’ obedient servants. Unfortunately, the reform is unlikely to deliver expected results. The failure’s major reason concerns the fact that Japanese bureaucracy’s unusually large role in policymaking paradoxically discourages elected officials to use their major reining tool against it, namely, appointive power.     

Local Fiscal Stress in California: Out of Local Control and Driving Toward Growth

Abstract

Many regions of the United States have experienced rapid growth in recent decades with California being the best example of this growth. The dangers of such growth have been evident since the 1970s and yet, neither the state nor local governments have been very successful in implementing growth control policies. Why it is that government has been unable to rein in the growth has been the focus of much research in recent decades. There are essentially two schools of thought with regard to this question. One is that pro‐growth forces—essentially landowners, business elites, and elected officials—actively promote growth because it provides them personally with benefits. The other view, advocated most by Paul Peterson back in the early 1980s, is that elected officials do support and adopt pro‐growth policies, but not by choice. Cities, Peterson argued, are constrained by the economic situation around them and they must do what they can to raise revenues and reduce, or hold steady, expenditures. This research examines a region of southern California that has experienced tremendous growth despite the fact that surveys of resident attitudes within the region indicates that in general, residents favor growth control. This research contributes to an understanding of the driving forces behind the pro‐growth policies of local governments by considering how fiscal constraints placed on local governments by the state may limit the policy options of local elected officials, as Peterson predicted. This study finds that there is evidence to indicate that the revenue‐raising options available to cities may be contributing to pro‐growth policies. And this could help explain why elected officials continue to support growth within their cities despite the fact that residents express negative views toward growth.     

A National Picture of Prison Downsizing Strategies

Abstract

Many states faced fiscal pressures on their corrections budgets as the country entered a deep recession in 2008. A 2011 survey by the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA) asked corrections officials in all 50 states about changes in correctional facilities, focusing on closures, new facilities, and altering existing facilities as a response to budget pressures. States employed a combination of these strategies. Between fiscal year (FY) 2007–2008 and FY 2011–2012, 148 facilities were closed, 29 new facilities were opened, and 23 states added 22,740 beds to existing facilities, resulting in about a 19,000 net bed reduction overall. Closures did not necessarily appear to be related to fiscal pressures or always related to reductions in the prison population. Despite the Great Recession, correctional funding is still a large part of state expenses and many states’ correctional populations continue to grow.     

An Exploratory Study into the Understandings and Awareness of Leadership Ethos and Its Inherent Critical Success Factors by Public Sector Officials in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Ministry of the National Economy (ECONAT)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the understandings of public sector leaders about Leadership Ethos (LE) and its inherent Critical Success Factors(CSFs) looking at their application in the public policy implementation process. The study applied an adapted theoretical paradigm on leadership that borrows from the Western and African contexts. In the light of the aim and objective of the study, both the interview schedule and survey questionnaires were used to gather information with regard to LE and its inherent CSFs. In this view, a semi-structured interview schedule was used to guide both interviews with senior public officials - one in the DTI and one in the ECONAT. A survey questionnaire was administered to public officials at middle and lower management levels working and reporting directly to the interviewed senior public officials. The purpose of the questionnaire was to reduce personal biases inherent in the responses of the senior officials, which appear to be a challenge emerging from self-perception assessments. Research findings suggest that leaders at the DTI and the ECONAT do not sufficiently demonstrate an awareness of LE and its inherent CSFs in the practice of leadership. LE enables leaders garner followers’ trust and obtain their consent; encourage followers’ commitment to organisational goals; and introduce and encourage participatory decision making processes as key factors to successful public policy implementation.     

Size and Local Democracy: the Case of Czech Municipal Representatives

The municipal structure of the Czech Republic experienced a wave of fragmentation after the fall of the communist regime. As a result, most Czech municipalities today have populations of only a few hundred inhabitants. This situation creates specific conditions for the democratic functioning of local representative bodies. In this paper we focus on two features of Czech local government. First, we deal with electoral competitiveness in Czech municipalities; second, we analyse councillors' accountability to voters, their readiness to stand for re-election and their electoral success in successive elections. Based on an analysis of data on individual candidates and elected councillors in four successive terms, we demonstrate that the willingness to stand for election and re-election does not decrease over time; however, the choice among different candidates is limited in the smallest municipalities. Thus, the data show a reduced willingness to stand for re-election and an extraordinarily high chance of re-election in smaller municipalities. This finding weakens the general assumption about higher accountability of elected officials in small municipalities. On a more general level, we conclude that Czech local government has some features of small political systems with infrequent occurrence of major election conflicts.     

Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico

Collective remittances are the money flows sent by hometown associations (HTAs) of migrants from the USA to their communities of origin. In Mexico, the 3?×?1 Program for Migrants matches by three the amounts that HTAs send back to their localities to invest in public projects. In previous research, we found that municipalities ruled by the party of the federal government were more likely to participate in the Program. The political bias in participation and fund allocation may stem from two possible mechanisms: HTAs?? decisions to invest in some municipalities but not in others may reflect migrants?? political preferences (a demand-driven bias). Alternatively, government officials may use the Program to finance their own political objectives (a supply-driven bias). To determine which of these two mechanisms is at work, we studied a 2?×?2 matrix of statistically selected cases of high-migration municipalities in the Mexican state of Guanajuato. We carried out over 60 semistructured interviews with state and municipal Program administrators, local politicians, and migrant leaders from these municipalities. Our qualitative study indicates that migrant leaders are clearly pragmatic and that the political bias found is driven by elected officials strategically using the Program. The bias in favor of political strongholds is reinforced by the Program??s requirements for cooperation among different levels of government. This study casts doubt about the effectiveness of public?Cprivate partnerships as valid formulas to reduce political manipulation. It also questions the ability of matching grant programs to reach the areas where public resources are most needed.     

The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment

Political and economic outcomes depend, in part, on the quality of the officials making policy. Some argue that free elections are the best method for selecting competent officials. Others argue that elections lead to the selection of amateurs and demagogues. We use original data on the biographies of Russian regional governors to examine the backgrounds of elected and appointed governors. Elected governors are more likely to be locals. Appointed governors are more likely to be federal bureaucrats or hold a graduate degree. We conclude the paper by speculating on other possible explanations for variation in governor background.     

Productivity and fiscal pressure

Under the pressure of fiscal crises, elected officials and their constituents are demanding that productivity improvement be institutionalized in government. Pressured public administration is responding with innovations ranging across measurement and auditing, joint labor-management cooperation, incentives tied to performance, training, information resources, microcomputer applications, and new means of financing productivity investments. Potential progress is limited, however, by bureaupathologies, private sector assumptions, capital underfunding, statutory or procedural obstacles, and labor-management differences. Nevertheless, public sector productivity programs promise to benefit all interested parties.     

Municipal forecasting practice: “demand” and “supply” side perspectives

Findings from a nationwide survey of Government Finance Officers Association members confirm previous research that indicates an over reliance on judgmental as opposed to quantitative forecast methods, for both revenue and expenditures. While incumbents in larger cities, and with advanced degrees, evidence greater forecast training than their small-city, baccalaureate-only counterparts, this differentiation fails to materialize in forecast practice. MPA's are at a disadvantage relative to MBA's In regression and econometrics. Content analysis of leading public administration texts suggests why utilization may be retarded in practice: forecasting, like many other “nuts and bolts” areas in public financial management, is displaced by continued treatment of budget format, budget theory, and public finance. This lends credence to recent reports of increasing practitioner dissatisfaction with academic-based consulting and training in the field, and raises questions about the need for NASPAA to exercise greater control with regard to the public financial management curriculum.     

ELECTED MAYORS: LESSON DRAWING FROM FOUR COUNTRIES

Countries can and sometimes do copy the institutions and practices of other countries in order to address problems and issues that they have in common with them. The office of directly elected mayor has become an increasingly common feature of local government throughout the developed democracies, spreading from its largely American origins to a range of European states. This paper develops a matrix for the analysis of elected mayors in different countries using as its horizontal axis the formal, informal and individual attributes of elected mayors and, on the vertical axis, their governmental, governance and allegiance roles. The matrix is then applied to analyse studies of elected mayors in four countries: the United States, England, Germany and Greece, in an attempt to derive comparative lessons applicable to the countries included in the analysis, as well as to countries considering or in the process of developing directly elected executive mayors. The issues examined include improving the internal co‐ordination of local authorities’ departments, the need for network management in increasingly fragmented or ‘hollowed out’ local government systems and the ways in which mayors attempt to secure their political survival and that of the offices they hold, by securing and retaining the allegiance of voters and stakeholders. It also explores the benefits and dangers of concentrating much formal power and informal influence in a single pair of hands. Its conclusions are offered both to demonstrate ways in which comparative studies of political institutions can be developed and in the hope that they may be of use to mayors and those concerned with the development and reform of local government and governance.     

Order and commerce in turbulent areas: 19th century lessons, 21st century practice

The recent collapse of some states, the proliferation of internal wars and of localized political authorities, so‐called ‘warlords’, challenges the homogeneity of the international system of states at its margins. These new fragmented authorities often rely upon commercial deals with outsiders to consolidate their power. This threatens officials in strong states who depend upon organized states everywhere to control their realms and control their citizens' transactions, including with terrorists and criminals. Widespread direct rule by western powers, as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, is too expensive and politically risky to apply to all disorderly parts of the globe. Instead, officials in powerful states use techniques of indirect control that utilize commercial networks to pacify disorderly areas. This strategy resembles techniques developed in 19th century European relations with stateless areas. Similar problems develop as well. This led in the 19th century to direct rule, while contemporary officials are forced to experiment with more intensive use of commercial relations to pacify unruly areas.     

Public administration reform and the “new managerialism”: a comparative assessment of a fundamental challenge confronting canadian public administration

The “new managerialism” is becoming the new ortodoxy in public administration. It has challenged the classic assumptions about the nature of bureaucracy in democratic countries. However, it has not implied a great deal of serious debate. In Canada, it is challenging the model of constitutional bureaucracy around which public administration has been organized. Such a model involves two main principles: the ministerial Department and a neutral career public service. The former has meant that power flow in downward and responsibility and accountability upward (to the elected state authorities). The latter that, among other things, officials enjoy security of tenure in exchange for their willingness to serve governments of all partisan affiliations with equal loyalty and effectiveness. The new managerialism challenges both principles since it proposes to diffuse authority both horizontally and vertically, make accountabi1;ty run downward to “clients” and be more capable to substitute personell according to the needs of the moment. Since the new managerialism involves serious risks, the author ends up asking whether these two contending paradigms can or should be reconcilied, and warning not to overlook the past histories of Canadian and Western administrative and political institutions.     

Parties,ideology and elections: the politics of federal revenues and expenditures forecasting

Some scholars view problems in the accuracy of federal fiscal forecasts as being largely technical in nature .Others intimate that there may be a political component as well. This paper exlpores the relative merits of these two perspectives finding some support for each. Executive forecasts were found to be random with respect to direction of errors , error magnitudes increased in absolute terms over time , and revenues estimate error s tended to cluster in short bursts. Executive forecasting errors were also linked to presidential party , ideology and year in the election cycle.     

Evolving countystate relations: From servant to partner?

The relationship between counties and states is central to county wellbeing. This article examines contemporary countystate relations within a framework of institutions and processes where the most critical interactions occur: state associations of counties, state legislatures, governors, state agencies and state high courts. Countystate relations are further described through perceptual data gathered in interviews with county association directors during the Summer of 1991.

County officials favorably view their relations with state legislatures but perceive their treatment to be more like that of special interest group rather than valued partner. Even so, the vast majority of state legislatures is granting new powers to counties, expanding old ones, or extending some kind of relief in fiscal matters. Gubernatorial relations are also viewed favorably, but perceptions of state agency relations vary according to type of agency and personnel. A majority of counties also indicates that state high courts have handed down rulings with significant impact on counties, mostly in funding matters. Courts seem to have broadened their traditionally restrictive view of local powers, partly because county officials have been more willing to challenge burdensome rulings aggressively.

Though states retain ultimate authority over county governments, counties have been whittling away at state supremacy and asserting themselves through a variety of strategies and institutional arrangements. The old subserviency model of countystate relations appears outdated. Actual legislative outcomes indicate that the relationship is moving toward that of valued partner, and both the fiscal crises of states and the growing trend of counties to deliver services regionally have created an opportunity for counties to propel such a shift. However, this positive development is tempered by the trend in states to mandate without funds, making illusory any real gains in powers.     

SEARCHING FOR AUTHENTICITY? UNDERSTANDING REPRESENTATION IN NETWORK GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF FAITH ENGAGEMENT

With the growth of network governance, non‐electoral forms of representation are of increasing significance. The claims of non‐elected representatives are potentially more specific, explicit, and flexible than those of their elected counterparts. The quality of such claims can be assessed in relation to ‘authenticity’, rather than traditional criteria of authorization or accountability. These propositions are explored through first‐hand accounts of ‘faith representatives’ involved in a variety of English urban governance partnerships. Representatives' claims expressed an aspiration to authenticity (which was not necessarily realized) in the sense of seeking ongoing and substantive consent from constituents, rather than assuming consent via a formalized and symbolic moment of election. Network governance may be best served by a mix of elected and non‐elected representation, based upon an understanding of their complementary characteristics and of representation itself as a relational and emergent property.