NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.     

Agencification and Corporatization in Norway 1947–2011

We explore agencification and corporatization in the Norwegian central government. While these types of organizational change have often been linked to the NPM and post-NPM doctrines of recent decades, we will extend our analysis back to the post-World War II period. The empirical data are drawn from the Norwegian State Administration Database. The main focus will be on changes along the vertical dimension, i.e., conversions of ministerial units into state agencies and from state agencies to state-owned companies, or in the other direction. A main question is the organizational dynamics of agencification and corporatization. Why have the structure and organization of government changed, how and to what degree do the pattern of change reflect global trends in NPM and post-NPM reforms, and is the central government subject to the politics of structural choice. Moreover, what is the importance of national administrative doctrines, party constellations in government, and deliberate actions of administrative policy-makers?     

Administrative Autonomy Among American State Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of Fragmentation and Functionalism

Abstract

Administrative (or bureaucratic) autonomy has been an issue discussed in many different political and policymaking settings. Since administrative agencies are actively involved in the formation and implementation of public policy the issue of administrative autonomy is an important contemporary issue. We measure the concept of administrative autonomy empirically and systematically among state administrative agencies along two general features or components: (1) fragmentation and (2) functionalism. Each of two features of autonomy is subdivided into institutional and perceptual dimensions. The former is based on organizational and position characteristics. The latter derives from attitudes of individual administrators. Data are derived from responses by over 1000 state agency heads from the 1998 American State Administrators Project (ASAP). Among the prominent findings are: (a) there are positive relationships between the institutional and perceptual dimensions for both fragmentation and functionalism, and (b) variations in institutional and perceptual dimension of administrative autonomy among different types of agencies and different selection methods of the agency heads.     

NEW FORMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AGE OF THIRD‐PARTY GOVERNMENT

This article explores the democratic values underlying public services when they are outsourced. Building on Rosenbloom and Piotrowski's (2005a, 2005b) framework, we examine whether and how administrative law norms – that serve as central democratic governance and accountability mechanisms in the administrative state – are extended to the new (private) frontline service providers. Through a study of the regulation of the privatized welfare‐to‐work programme in Wisconsin, we find that new forms of administrative law are evolving in third‐party government. These forms differ from administrative law as it usually applies to public agencies in several important aspects. The findings highlight the active role of legislative and administrative mechanisms in the promotion of these new forms of administrative law; and they shed light on the transformations that administrative law norms undergo in the age of third‐party government.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

Executing priority national development in indonesia: Program innovation of the junior minister

In the process of Indonesia's administrative reform and conduct of its planned development efforts, several innovative measures evolved in its executive structure. One of these was the use of temporary organizational entities to expedite the achievement of development goals where sectors/programs of the national development plan encompass two or more executive agencies and/or levels of governments. In organizational design, the executive problem is the reconciliation between responsibility and authority with the purpose of achieving maximum technical efficiency in the execution of priority development programs. As an organizational device to deal with this problem, the offices of six junior ministers were established. By employing the technique of executive authority in rank, these ministers, heading temporary agencies organized in terms of program responsibility as specified in the development plan and as approved by the cabinet, have become the organizational means by which to integrate all of the disparate project activities vested in the executive line agencies in productive organizational cores. Should this organizational innovation prove successful, it will be one of the more important organizational contributions in recent years to the execution of centrally planned development programs in a developing society.     

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EU AGENCIES: AGENCIES AS ‘MINI COMMISSIONS’

A stream of reviews that take stock of EU governance trends shows that the EU's governance agenda produces mixed results. EU agencies are part of the EU's search for new governance mechanisms. They have not proven to be a break with EU policy‐making processes – underpinning administrative stability rather than reform. This article explores the institutionalization of EU agencies. Using the case of the EU's human resources (HR) policy, it concludes that administrative details are important in order to understand the development of EU agencies turning into institutions. The influence of the EU's institutional environment on their operations is so strong that they must operate as ‘mini Commissions'. This tight control hinders their institutionalization.     

Exorcising the ghost of the politics-administration dichotomy: an institutional theory of administration policy making

This article takes implementation theory one critical step further. It argues that administrative policy making is a separate, distinguishable process, not a stage in or component of the legislative policy-making process. In addition, it argues that the institutional setting for policy making has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics, and setting influences policy outcomes. The implications of the institutional perspective for understanding policy making, policy analysis, and the legitimacy of public organizations are examined.

The ghost of the politics-administration dichotomy haunts implementation theory. Although numerous scholars have declared the dichotomy dead,⁽¹⁾ administrative policy making is still seen as a component or step in the policy process that is dominated by elected officials. For example, Kelman recently examined the different institutional settings of policy making.⁽²⁾ Elected officials, in his view, are and should remain the primary source of policy ideas and choices while administrators remain responsible for translating these ideas and choices into practice. Other scholars underscore the lack of effective control by legislators and elected executives. But even those who acknowledge administrative initiative and autonomy see administrators as servants, however weak their masters.

This article takes implementation theory one critical step farther. It argues that administrative policy making is a separate, distinguishable process—not merely a stage in or component of legislative policy making. Policies can and do originate in administrative agencies. These innovations gather supporters and critics, are tested and refined, and can become part of the routine with little, if any, involvement by elected officials or political appointees. Legislation and executive orders commonly ratify existing administrative policies rather than initiate administrative involvement.

In addition, the institutional setting for policy making has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics. The institutional setting, it is argued, influences policy outcomes. Administrative policy making is not, however, an entirely discrete process. It intersects with legislative policy making at important and predictable points. The two policy processes, legislative and administrative, are loosely and variably coupled.⁽³⁾ The central distinction is that administrative policy making is dominated by the ideas, norms, routines, and choices of nonelected public employees, whereas legislative policy making is dominated by the perspectives of elected officials. Administrative policy making can occur in the bureaucracies of the President or of Congress.

The argument that these two processes—legislative and administrative—are distinct does not, however, deny their essential overlap. The overlap between these two fundamentally different policy settings has fostered the delusion that there is only one policy setting with legislative and administrative components. Clearly elected officials influence administrative policy making, and, just as clearly, administrators influence legislative policy making.⁽⁴⁾ Nevertheless, their interaction remains obscure without a clearer perception of the profound differences between the two settings. As stated, the importance of administrative policy making seems obvious and uncontroversial, but its implications are strongly resisted.⁽⁵⁾

Public administration and implementation theories have not adequately recognized the importance of administrative policy making in modem welfare states.⁽⁶⁾ Before more fully developing these ideas, four examples of administrative policy making are briefly reviewed.     

DEVOLVED RESPONSIBILITY AND CENTRALIZATION: EFFECTS OF EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The European Community is still a community of nation states in the sense that the obligations created by Community legislation fall on the member states who then have to implement them.
A point much commented upon is that this involves a loss of sovereignty or power for national parliaments and governments. What is less frequently noticed is that it can also centralize into a national government's hands some powers that had previously been devolved to local and other authorities. Since the Community deals largely with national governments, what had previously been local functions have to become national government functions the moment they fall within a Community policy.
This process can be seen at work as a result of the Community's environmental policy. In Britain a variety of administrative agencies have exercised considerable discretion in handling pollution matters. Some functions are handled by district councils, some by county councils, some by specialized regional authorities, eg water authorities, and some by specialized national agencies, eg the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate. As a result of the Community's environmental policy, the central government now has greater powers. If the erosion of the tradition of devolved responsibility is not to be resented, it must be justified on the grounds that some larger purpose is being served.     

STRATEGY FORMATION IN PUBLIC AGENCIES

The main contribution of this study is the identification of three modes of strategy for public agencies based on strategic thought in a corporate environment. Strategic design, internal strategic scanning, and strategic governance embody three distinct modes of strategy relevant in the public sector. Programming actions, combining capabilities, and formation of networks capture the essence of these strategic orientations. By offering an organization‐based view of public sector strategy, this study puts public agencies at the centre of strategic examination. The fundamental unit of analysis within agencies is administrative duty, which connects administrative action with the democratic decision‐making process. These three strategy modes are based on complementary and, in some respects, contradictory theoretical assumptions, but all offer opportunities for confronting the diverse environments faced by public agencies. Each strategic orientation has a distinct approach to such features as the role of management, occupational groups, the environment, and types of capital.     

Transforming Administrative Policy

Administrative policies and practices may evolve and change slowly and incrementally or they may be transformed intentionally. Intentional efforts to change administrative policy by transforming the structure, processes, or personnel of public sector organizations define an active administrative policy. Ideally, an active administrative policy takes as given that the organizational form to be used is open to choice, that administrative goals are clear, that a tight coupling exists between ends and means, that different organizational forms have different effects, and that there are criteria that may be used to assess those effects. This article focuses on the fulfilment of these preconditions in the three national contexts – Norway, Sweden and the United States of America – in order to determine the relevance of a transformative perspective for understanding the process of administrative change. We examine what impact constraints like polity features, historical-institutional traditions and external pressure, particularly through popular international administrative doctrines like New Public Management ideas and financial crises, have on the possibilities to enhance an active national administrative policy.     

With Strings Attached? Improving the Administration of Central State Financed Investment Projects in the PRC

This article takes a new look at the institutional core of China's economic planning—the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC, 1998–2003)—focusing on its role in approving and fundraising for major capital investment projects. The primary objective of this inquiry is to identify changes in the network structure and procedures of inter-agency relations and central planners’ interactions with national legislators, which have produced a diversity of ‘organizational microclimates’ that shape the coherence of the national economic bureaucracy and central–local fiscal relations. Based on interviews of high-level officials and case studies of investment projects in energy, information technology, and transport sectors, it is argued that administrative reforms aiming to improve SDPC's regulatory capacity have been predicated on a concerted effort by key agencies and ministries under the State Council to reduce the window of opportunity for local and industrial interests to politicize capital allocation decisions. This finding suggests caution in interpreting contemporary China through the comparative lenses of a developmental state, a regulatory state, or a fiscal federalist system.     

Regulating Collaboration: The Legal Framework of Collaborative Governance in Ten European Countries

ABSTRACT

Many scholars have considered when and why collaboration between government agencies and societal actors occurs. This article argues that a simple but largely overlooked answer to these questions is that a formal legal or administrative requirement to do so is in place. Therefore, the objective is to substantiate whether there are legal requirements to collaborate and in what type of source and context this obligation applies in ten European countries. The main finding is that collaboration is underpinned by an extensive range of legal requirements in Europe, although imposing these requirements is generally not the main objective.     

Dilemmas and Horizontal Logics: Subnational Industrial Policy in Spain and Brazil

Scholars of "decentralization" have recently revealed the importance of subnational industrial policy in responding to the challenges of globalization. But these treatments tend to make endemic assumptions about either the universal efficiency or inefficiency of decentralization. This article argues that subnational industrial policy performance is politically contingent and develops national patterns that are more composite than endemic. Political contingency is analyzed in terms of subnational incumbents'incentives to delegate authority and resources to industrial policy agencies and the degree of symmetry in authority and information flows across these agencies. A cross-regional/cross-national comparison of several subnational units in Spain and Brazil demonstrates that subnational industrial policy is implemented and maintained where incumbents delegate and policy-making agencies are symmetrically integrated.     

NETWORKING FOR AUTONOMY? NATIONAL AGENCIES IN EUROPEAN NETWORKS

The environment of national agencies has changed considerably in recent years as they increasingly become engaged in European Union networks. This article contributes to a growing body of literature on those networks and their effect on executive politics at the national level by asking whether and how the EU involvement of national agencies affects the agencies' autonomy in policy formulation. We develop an analytical model for explaining the effect of EU involvement on agency autonomy. Analyzing data from a comprehensive survey of federal agencies in Germany, we find that EU involvement has a positive effect on national agencies' policy autonomy. Moreover, we find a somewhat stronger effect of agency involvement in sectoral networks on autonomy than in intergovernmental networks, which is attributed to information asymmetries between ministries and agencies. Yet this effect is weaker than initially expected, which can be explained by a considerable degree of overlap between different types of EU involvement.     

Saving Children from a Life of Crime: Toward a National Strategy for Early Prevention

A great deal has been learned about childhood risk factors for offending and about effective interventions targeting these risk factors that reduce later delinquency and criminal offending. The time is right to implement a risk-focused, evidence-based national strategy for early prevention in the United States. A National Council on Early Prevention could provide technical assistance, skills, and knowledge to state and local agencies in implementing prevention programs; could provide funding, continuity, coordination, and monitoring of local programs; could provide training in prevention science for local people; could commission systematic reviews of the effectiveness of interventions; and could maintain high standards for evaluation research. The main aim of this article is to outline a national strategy for the prevention of delinquency and later offending. It identifies and discusses critical lessons learned from Western countries, such as Canada and Sweden, about the development of national crime prevention agencies.     

Size and growth in federal executive agencies

Concepts of size and growth have presented a number of problems to organization theorists in a variety of disciplines. Of primary concern is the method by which such concepts are operationalized. Utilizing personnel and budgetary data from a sample of seventy-three federal executive agencies, the effect of size on administrative hierarchy is examined. It is hypothesized that -- as agencies increase in size -- a larger proportion of this increase will be middle-grade and upper-grade Personnel. Coversely, the amount of personnel in lower-level positions will exhibit a decreasing rate of growth.

As a means of specifying the phenomenon of growth, the pattern of agency growth over a twenty-nine year span of time (1948-1976) is examined. The effect of appropriations growth on personnel growth is posited to operate in a positive manner.

Methods of analysis utilized include scatterplot analysis to provide a profile of federal executive agencies. Correlation and simple regression analysis serve as tests of the primary hypotheses.     

Recent state initiatives: The governor as policy leader; the governor as chief administrator

Innovative accomplishments of governors are a vehicle for analyzing state governors' performance as policy leaders and as chief executives. Analysis of survey data describing state innovations reveals governors fostering an almost even mix of programs (initiatives directly serving clienteles) and administrative innovations (changes in internal procedures), with innovations tending to be reported from agencies where the governor is involved in selection of the agency head. The implications are that governors interested in instituting and institutionalizing innovation can do so through their appointments and that the appointive power can be a vehicle for change as well as control. Program initiatives tended to concentrate in various functional policy areas, such as economic development or education. Management innovations, on the other hand, tended to be system wide in that they were reported in agencies that serve the entire state bureaucracy or they emanated from the governor's office.1     

EUROPEANIZATION IN MANAGING EU AFFAIRS: BETWEEN DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE,A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ESTONIA,HUNGARY AND SLOVENIA

Scholarly research into Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia has shown that the idiosyncrasies of the new EU countries (especially with respect to institutionalizing and centralizing the co‐ordination of core executives in managing EU affairs at home) persist. They are complemented by trends toward convergence (such as growing co‐ordination efforts and a common tendency: that of the prime minister to be the centre of co‐ordination). In this article external Europeanization pressures, national administrative traditions (the legacies of both pre‐communist and communist systems), and the patterns of party competition that cause variations in politico‐administrative relations, are tested as possible explanatory variables of differences seen in the three countries when managing EU affairs. While national administrative traditions play similar roles to those seen in old(er) member states by filtering the EU‘s impacts, the effect of patterns of party competition on politico‐administrative relations when managing EU affairs has been filtered by the accession states’ national priorities of integrating with the EU.     

The “Imperial Minority”: An Interpretative Framework of the Russians in Kazakhstan in the 1990s

This article is the fifth and final in a Nationalities Papers series providing an overview of the development of Romani political group representation and administration, from the arrival of Roma to Europe up to 1971, the landmark year of modern transnational Romani politics. The article concentrates on the period between the Second World War and 1970 and the emergence of the following phenomena which distinguish this period from those covered in the previous articles: some limited Romani participation in non-Romani mainstream political or administrative structures, an international Romani evangelical movement, reconciliation between Romani political representation and the Catholic Church, national institutions created by various governments to aid the administration of policies on Roma and rapid growth of non-governmental organizations addressing Romani issues.