Curbing Corruption in India: An Impossible Dream?

This article analyses the serious problem of corruption in India by examining its causes and the various anti-corruption measures employed by the government from the formation in 1941 of the first anti-corruption agency, the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which was expanded to form the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in April 1963. India's ineffective anti-corruption strategy can be attributed to the lack of political will of its leaders and its unfavourable policy context, which has hindered the enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. The lack of political will in fighting corruption is manifested in the lowest per capita expenditure and least favourable staff-population ratio of the CBI when compared to those of its counterparts in Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand. To enhance the CBI's effectiveness, it should be removed from the jurisdiction of the police and be established as an independent agency dedicated solely to curbing corruption. The Constitution of India should also be amended to empower the CBI to investigate corruption cases at the state level without obtaining the consent of the chief minister of the state. In view of the lack of political will, this article concludes that curbing corruption in India remains an impossible dream in the foreseeable future.     

Comparative political corruption: Issues of operationalization and measurement

As with other areas of comparative political inquiry, analyses of political corruption must carefully negotiate around numerous methodological issues. In this article, we focus primarily on problems of operationalization and measurement of corruption. We evaluate the major examples of cross-country measures of corruption that have recently emerged and review research that has incorporated the new measures. We end with a discussion of an alternative method for the cross-national measurement and analysis of corruption, one that might also facilitate the goal of establishing universal principles and causal claims about political corruption. Thomas D. Lancaster is associate professor of political science at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. His research and teaching interests include comparative politics, with a specialization in western and southern European politics, and the logic of comparative political inquiry. Gabriella R. Montinola is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Davis. Her current research focuses on economic development, interest representation, and the causes and consequences of political corruption. She is the author or co-author of articles in various journals, includingWorld Politics, Journal of Democracy, andBritish Journal of Political Science. The authors would like to thank Richard Doner, Robert Jackman, and the editor and referees ofSCID for their helpful comments.     

Flexibility versus Inflexibility: discursive discrepancy in US democracy promotion and anti-corruption policies

This article analyses US discourses on democracy promotion and anti-corruption strategies. The analysis shows that there is a cosmetic agreement in these discourses on notions of the good society that identify democracy as a good thing and corruption as a bad thing. However, despite this agreement, there are differences in the discourses on the measures recommended to promote democracy and fight corruption that may lead to policies and processes pulling in opposite directions. This discrepancy arises, on the one hand, from a mode of operation of democracy promotion that is flexible and adaptable to various contexts and, on the other hand, from the uncompromising and inflexible language of anti-corruption policies that threatens to ‘undo’ what US democracy promotion's rhetoric aims to achieve: ownership and sustainability of democratic reforms through re-empowering the state.     

Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China

During the transition period, the extent of corruption in China is higher than before. Meanwhile the forms and characters of Chinese corruption are also different in many important aspects from those of its past and of other countries. This paper explores the causes, consequences of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns of the Chinese government. The major conclusion of this paper is that further political reform toward democracy should be the direction of future anti-corruption efforts.     

Donors,State Building and Corruption: lessons from Afghanistan and the implications for aid policy

This article critically analyses the state-building agenda from a governance and aid policy perspective, and from an anti-corruption viewpoint in particular, highlighting potential problems with both theoretical and practical applications of state building in a development context. Inconsistencies and contradictions between the state building and anti-corruption work have not been adequately explored or reconciled. In particular, the article explores these tensions using the example of the Performance-Based Governors' Fund (pbgf) in Afghanistan, where some donors are looking to reduce corruption in local government, encouraging often ‘warlord’ governors to run their administrative offices with integrity. The article argues that the pbgf approach—with its themes of being realistic, going for indirect strategies over the long term and building integrity rather than fighting corruption, provide important lessons for the anti-corruption community as a whole, both at the level of theory and practice.     

Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends

Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively ‘hybrid’ institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.     

Reform,corruption, and growth: Why corruption is more devastating in Russia than in China

This article explains why massive political corruption appears to be incompatible with economic growth in Russia but compatible with very rapid economic growth in China. The common assumption is that corruption is bad for economic performance. So how can we explain the puzzling contrast between Russia and China? Is Russia being more severely “punished” for its corruption than China? If so, why? This article demonstrates that three intervening factors—comparative advantage, the organization of corruption, and the nature of rents—determines the impact of corruption on economic performance, and that these factors can explain the divergent outcomes. The article thereby offers an alternative to statist explanations of the Russia-China paradox.     

FUBAI: differing Chinese views of corruption since Tiananmen: does a road paved with corruption lead to socialism?

Corruption, particularly in the public official based definition which is dominant in reform China, involves the violation of administrative ethics and responsibilities for private gain. Corruption has long been a key factor in analyzing and understanding modernization in Communist and Third World countries. Corruption has the potential to undermine a regime's legitimacy and power as well as a nation's economy. Moreover, by contributing to both economic and political polarization, it also has the potential to significantly influence the social stratification and overall social structure of societies in the midst of significant political, economic and social transformation; in other words, how they ‘modernize’. While the majority of Chinese analyses of corruption recognize the threat posed by corruption, they disagree on the sources and consequences of such corruption, and thus on the means for controlling and/or eliminating it.

The success of any anti-corruption process is determined by a) the causes and consequences of corruption and the ways in which they are perceived or blocked out by the regime's analytical framework; b) regime goals, including the degree to which, by promoting the transformation of the forms of legitimate economic intercourse, it encourages changing what is defined as corruption and c) the degree to which it is capable of accomplishing its goals once set. However, inasmuch as the dominant Chinese analysis tend2 to exclude certain key factors, frequently including the regime's goals in ‘modernizing’ Chinese society, the present anti-corruption policies are not likely to be successful.     

When civil engagement is part of the problem: Flawed anti-corruptionism in Russia and Ukraine

In developing countries, the fight against corruption entails purges of political and business elites and the restructuring of electoral, financial, and social provision systems, all of which are costly for the incumbents and, therefore, unlikely without sustained pressure from civil society. In the absence of empirical analyses, scholars and practitioners have, therefore, assumes that civil society plays an unequivocally positive role in anti-corruptionism. In this article, we challenge this dominant assumption. Instead, we show that, under certain conditions, an engaged non-governmental community may, in fact, undermine the fight against corruption. Using the data from forty interviews with anti-corruption practitioners in Ukraine and Russia, as well as primary documentary sources, we present two models of anti-corruptionism whereby active civil engagement produces suboptimal outcomes. One is faux collaboration, defined as a façade of cooperation between the state and civil society, which hides the reality of one-sided reforms. The other model is that of non-collaborative co-presence, whereby the governance role is shared by the government and non-governmental activists without compromise-based solutions. In both cases, civil engagement helps perpetuate abuses of power and subvert such long-term goals of anti-corruption reforms as democratization and effective governance.     

The Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Putin’s Russia: Power,Opposition, and the All-Russia People’s Front

Abstract

The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term was characterised by the politicisation of corruption. Opposition forces focused on corruption and criticised the regime for tolerating it. This article explores how the regime reacted to opposition criticism. The regime encountered a dilemma: it could not ignore the opposition but promoting anti-corruption reforms was risky for the regime. This study focuses on the regime’s use of the All-Russia People’s Front (Obshcherossiiskii Narodnyi Front—ONF) and concludes that it functioned as a ‘parastatal’ anti-corruption movement, enabling the regime to deflect the blame without directly involving itself in the process.     

Making Plans for Liberia—a Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance?

Abstract

Since the end of the Liberian civil war in August 2003 the international community has been ‘making plans’ for Liberia. However, it rarely questioned whether these plans were in accordance with the political and economic logic of the peace agreement and the subsequent transitional government. The consequence was that corruption continued and a much more intrusive economic management plan was established. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (gemap) is supposed to combat corruption and facilitate good governance, but it also limits the range of policy options for the new democratically elected government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The irony is that the best and most legitimate government that Liberia has ever had is subject to stronger external control than any of its predecessors. The probability that this scheme will remain sustainable when donor interest shifts elsewhere is low, and what is needed is a more pragmatic approach that draws a wider segment of Liberian society into anti-corruption management and creates checks and balances between them.     

Unintended Consequences of Vigilance Activities in Two Project Settings in India

Anti-corruption agencies that are independent and vested with the authority to enforce laws can be a potent force in combating corruption. However, overzealous anti-corruption agencies acting in the absence of an effective institutional environment could paralyse the public sector's decision-making apparatus by instilling a sense of hesitancy into the officials’ minds. Through ethnographic studies of two infrastructure projects in India, I investigate how anti-corruption agencies contributed to project delays. This research supplements the existing discourse on factors contributing to the efficiency of anti-corruption agencies, given the constraints of project settings, and provides insights towards policy making in this domain.     

Corruption and identity politics in divided societies

Corruption is a major problem for populations in various parts of the world. This article argues that to understand the problems and dynamics of corruption, we need to understand how discourses and practices of corruption (and anti-corruption efforts) are intertwined with the construction and contestations of identity. Identity politics is a salient feature in peaceful political struggles, as well as in contemporary armed conflicts, which are often characterised by the politicisation of collective identity (ethnic, national, religious) for the violent pursuit of power. The article outlines and discusses four ways in which identity politics and corruption intersect. First, it points to the often blurred lines between private and collective benefit from corruption, revealing the implications of group identity for how corruption is conceptualised. Second, it shows how corruption may exacerbate grievances along identity lines. Third, it highlights how corruption can be used strategically in identity-based conflicts. Finally, it explores how corruption may encourage cross-ethnic solidarity and mobilisation that defy conflict divides.     

Comparative grand corruption and protection pacts among elites: the cases of Ao Man Long in Macao and Hui Si-Yan in Hong Kong

Although Transparency International has consistently ranked the governments of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), both under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much higher on the clean governance scale than the PRC itself, the reality is that the two special administrative regions witnessed two prominent cases of political corruption comparable to the mainland corruption. These were the Ao Man Long case in Macao and the Rafael Hui Si-yan scandal in Hong Kong. This paper examines the two cases of political corruption in both Macao and Hong Kong and makes comparisons and contrasts between them. It argues that individual greed contributed to the two cases of high-level bureaucratic (grand) corruption in Macao and Hong Kong, implying that institutional safeguards against corruption, such as the establishment of anti-corruption commissions, and the scrutiny of the mass media, are by no means adequate. In other words, institutional mechanisms against corruption in the HKSAR and MSAR do have loopholes that need to be plugged. Moreover, protection pacts between a minority of government officials and the business elites can be formed because of their close personal connections, strengthening the possibility of grand corruption.     

Quality of Political Management and the Role of Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis

Using the Bertelsmann Transformation Political Management Index (PMI, 2008), which measures the role and quality of political leaders, this study empirically investigates the relationship among corruption, economic freedom, and political management, controlling for the underlying socio-economic and cultural factors that shape the success of a country's political leadership. The results suggest that corruption significantly affects the quality of political management and that the effect is dependent on the level of economic freedom.     

The neoliberal discourse on corruption as a means of consent building: reflections from post-crisis Turkey

This article draws attention to the ideological role that the neoliberal discourse on corruption has fulfilled in the promotion of the second generation reforms in Southern countries since the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. This discourse is ahistoric insofar as it fails to recognise corruption as a problem of modernity; biased insofar as it associates corruption with Southern countries' historical and cultural specificities only; contradictory in terms of its counter-productive anti-corruption strategies; and politicised as it has redefined ‘corruption’ as ‘rent-seeking’. In the absence of alternative radical conceptualisations, this essentially competition-induced neoliberal orthodoxy on corruption has been easily articulated within morality-based popular concerns in domestic politics and hence acquired a hegemonic capability. The article substantiates these arguments by examining the trajectory of the neoliberal anti-corruption agenda in Turkey with a particular focus on the developments of the post-2001 financial crisis period.     

Prosecuting high-level corruption in Eastern Europe

Do Eastern European courts effectively constrain politicians and uphold the rule of law? Criminal prosecution of grand (high-level) corruption can further the central principle of equal responsibility under the law by demonstrating that even powerful political actors have to submit to the laws of the land. This article introduces the Eastern European Corruption Prosecution Database, which contains entries for all cabinet ministers (927 in total) who served in a government that held office in one of seven post-Communist Eastern European countries since the late 1990s. The systematic data collection reveals that Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia consistently indict more ministers than Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Poland; Slovakia has barely indicted anyone. We aim to start a research agenda by formulating hypotheses about which countries will see more corruption prosecutions and which ministers' characteristics would make them more likely to face the court. We use the database to begin testing these hypotheses and find some evidence for several associations. We find no strong evidence that EU conditionality or membership raises the profile of the grand corruption issue or leads to more indictments. Party politics seems to affect the frequency of corruption indictments more than the structure and behavior of legal institutions. Indictment rates are lower when a former Communist party controls the government and individual ministers from junior coalition partners are more vulnerable to indictment than other ministers. The existence of a specialized anti-corruption prosecution or a more independent judiciary do not seem to lead to the indictment of more ministers on corruption charges. Finally, we discuss avenues of future research that our database opens, both for the analysis of country-level and individual-level variation.     

International patron-client relationships: A conceptual framework

Dependency theory has cast new light on the workings of the international political economy, and on the relations between more and less developed countries. Insofar as dependency theory aims at specifying generalsystemic constraints on the behavior of Third World states, its ability to explain/predict how particular Third World states respond to these constraints is limited. Our concern is with the foreign policy responses of the LDCs. The comparative foreign policy approach to this question has attempted to account for cross-national variation in foreign policy responses of LDCs with variation in theirdomestic features, i.e., attributes, capabilities, and regime types. Here we suggest that an understanding of the foreign policies of the LDCs can be enhanced by adding an explicitly dyadic perspective to dependency and comparative foreign policy approaches, conceptualized as a form of patron-cliency.     

Measuring Corruption in Infrastructure: Evidence from Transition and Developing Countries

This paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in infrastructure using existing evidence. There is evidence that most perceptions measures appear to be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector, largely (but inaccurately) measuring petty rather than grand corruption. Survey evidence is more reliable, but limited as a tool for differentiating countries in terms of access to infrastructure finance or appropriate policy models. The paper suggests that a focus on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may be misplaced.     

The visual politics of corruption

Despite the fact that corruption is essentially invisible, communication campaigns by the global anti-corruption industry regularly feature photographic images. So far, however, we do not know much about the narratives that are encoded in these images. Through the theoretical lens of postcolonialism, this paper takes a first step towards developing an understanding of the visual representation of corruption. Specifically, the paper applies semiotic and iconographic methods to two photography competitions run by Transparency International – the major non-governmental player in the anti-corruption industry. The analysis shows, first, that the anti-corruption industry reinforces colonial stereotypes, suggesting that the ‘sinful’ and ‘irrational’ Global South is waiting to be civilised by the North. Second, through its visual imagery, the anti-corruption industry also emphasises ideas of a ‘humanitarian family’, which serves to cover up the North’s role in transnational webs of corruption. These findings are triangulated with semiotic/iconographic analyses of the Transparency International logo and the Corruption Perceptions Index map.