Double-Edged Swords: Expert-Stakeholders as (Slightly) Unreliable Instruments for Control and Autonomy of Executive Agencies

Establishing executive agencies at arms's length of parent departments has caused widespread concern regarding their autonomy. In the Netherlands, ministries have established different types of boards to monitor agencies. Also, agencies have established an independent review commission. The different boards and the review commission can be looked at as expert stakeholders. This article poses the question whether and how expert stakeholders contribute to either the ministries' control on agencies or the autonomy of agencies. The article is based on qualitative research on six of the largest executive agencies. The article concludes that expert stakeholders act as double-edged swords: they contribute to control on agencies but also to their autonomy. Expert stakeholders improve the monitoring capacity of ministries and thus contribute to control. Conversely, they also strengthen agencies, as they provide political multiplicity and boost reputational uniqueness. The question of which of these prevails is mainly influenced by time, capture, and policy crises.     

Tax Evasion and the Role of the State Actor(s) in Bangladesh

Little attention has been paid to tax evasion in developing countries due to a lack of data. This article addresses this lacuna by investigating the tax evasion practices and finds significant increases in tax evasion in Bangladesh. The study makes a major contribution to the literature in tax evasion, and indicates that the norms of state actor(s) (i.e. the National Board of Revenue–the sole tax authority in Bangladesh) lie in the interests of politicians and the continuation of corruption. The legitimacy of the state actors in this case means that they act as facilitators for increasing tax evasion practices. Therefore, the current system has endured remarkably robustly to date, and coercive isomorphism is indeed needed in the institutionalization process.     

Public Administration Reform in a Challenging Environment: A Review of the Establishment of the Health Economics and Financing Directorate (HEFD) within the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health

The purpose of this article is to provide an example of recent public administration reform in Afghanistan. In 2003, the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) established the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and other health services. To date, service delivery has been conducted largely by NGOs, funded by the main international donors, and managed by the Grant and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU) of the MoPH. Despite these advancements, Afghanistan continues to face significant challenges in health service provision and policy. In 2009, the GCMU was restructured into the Health Economics and Financing Directorate (HEFD), which broadened the scope of the Unit to conduct important economic analyses. This article examines the MoPH's role in health financing as a developing institution engaged in applied health economics and policy analysis. This development will allow the MoPH to build evidence for policy-making and further establish its stewardship role in the health sector.