Latin America’s think tanks: The roots of nonprofit privatization

Conventional development models refer to two sectors, public and for-profit private. Massive growth of nonprofit private activity undermines that picture. Latin American tyink tanks exemplify a nonprofit privatization that has an enormous impact on development and remolds inter-sectoral relationships overall. Four major dynamics account for the spectacular growth of the region’s nonprofit think tanks. Three push factors are state repression, state weakness, and public university problems, and, as epitomized by financial supply, a pull factor is also crucial to attract nonprofit growth. To conceptualize its findings, this article considers public failure theory. Unhelpful regarding the pull factor, the theory otherwise works reasonably well, especially where there is visible movement from the public to the nonprofit sector. Beyond that, the evidence suggests ways to broaden the theory. Even a broadened formulation cannot fully capture the remarkable diversity and vitality of the growth in Latin America’s think tanks. But we are able to identify and analyze the key growth factors that blend together to produce particular institutional and national configurations. Daniel C. Levy is a professor at SUNY-Albany. After earning his Ph.D. in political science at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, he was research associate for five years at Yale University. He has published five books and roughly seventy articles on politics and higher education, especially on Latin America, and on Mexican politics. Levy has done field research in most Latin American countries and has presented lectures and been published on five continents.     

Historical constraints to privatization: The case of the nationalized chilean copper industry

The military regime that came to power in 1973 made no attempt to hide its intentions to drastically restructure the state. Because of Chile’s historical economic dependence on its copper industry, which had been nationalized at high political and economic cost, many feared that the nationalization process would be reverted and that the gains won against dependency would be lost. The article examines why the efforts to privatize the Chilean National Copper Corporation (CODELCO) were not successful. This failure must be attributed to the country’s long experience with external economic dependence, which produced a deep-seated national awareness of the drawbacks of foreign control, and to the benefits that the industry brings to powerful groups in the regime, above all the Chilean Army.     

The Polish economic transition: outcome and lessons

This article provides an overview of, and draws conclusions about, Poland's economic transition during the 1990s. Special attention is paid to macroeconomic and external developments, privatization, and the lessons of the Polish experience for other transition economies.     

privatization in latin America: the other side of the story

In line with the current global trends, most Latin American countries have adopted promarket reforms, including privatization, deregulation, and liberalization, under the auspices of various market-friendly regimes and international financial agencies. They carried out privatization exercises based on the rationales that privatization would enhance competitiveness and efficiency, overcome economic stagnation and fiscal crisis, eradicate poverty and unemployment, reduce external debt, and increase foreign investment. In opposition to these rationales, however, the actual socioeconomic conditions in most Latin American countries have hardly improved, and in many cases, the situation has worsened. This article attempts to offer a more critical account of the outcomes of privatization by evaluating the trends of economic realities in Latin American countries before and after privatization programs were adopted. It is found that except for a few cases, most Latin American economies have not performed well during the privatization period in terms of various economic criteria. The article then explores why privatization remains a favorite policy option in Latin America despite its dismal outcomes during the policy period.     

Coalitions and corporate choices in Argentina, 1976–1994: The recent private sector support of privatization

After sabotaging almost every privatization since the 1970s, the Argentine private sector suddenly began to support privatizations in 1991. While public choice approaches that stress the cost impact of policy can explain the anti-privatization behavior of the private sector prior to 1991, they are less successful at explaining this recent shift in behavior. This article explains this shift by focusing on political coalitions. By expanding (or reducing) the set of attainable outcomes, political coalitions shape the political choices of firms. Prior to 1991, the rent-seeking private sector led a huge multi-sectoral anti-privatization coalition that repeatedly preempted the Executive from privatizing. In 1991, this coalition disintegrated as a result of a reordering of economic institutions. Devoid of its traditional allies, the private sector chose to acquiesce to privatizations. Thus, political coalitions can be more important in shaping firm behavior than economic considerations such as the cost-impact of public policy or the size of rent markets. This article also explains why, in many countries confronting comparable anti-privatization coalitions, privatizations are likely to emerge with an unexpected mixture of competition-enhancing and competition-restricting policies. Javier Corrales is assistant professor of political science at Amherst College, specializing in comparative and international politics of Latin America. He is currently writing a book on the effects of executive-ruling party relations on the implementation of market-oriented reforms in Latin America. Newspapers and magazines (from Buenos Aires)ámbito Financiero Clarín El Cronista Comercial La Nación Noticias The Review of the River Plate     

The decline and fall of the roman empire lessons on management

The Roman Empire experienced decline and renewal on many occasions. While certainly political in nature, the solution to these imperial crises also entailed the successful application of management. In examining the history of these imperial crises, four major managerial themes can be seen: (1) organizational legitimacy, (2) anti-corruption, (3) organizational stability, and (4) effective leadership. The combination of these led to an assured imperial renewal.

First renewal entailed the identification of the regime with what could be termed as an “organizational culture” -- the moral ideal of the Empire. Second, renewal entailed reform of the abuses and corruption that had, in many instances, contributed to the decline. Third, renewal necessitated the institutionalization of these reforms thought the establishment of an effective administrative structure. Fourth, the strength of character of visionary leadership was required.

The Roman Empire endured through its ability to integrate these four elements - legitimacy, anti-corruption, stability and leadership. Its success at this enabled Rome to govern the vast Mediterranean world. To a great extent this success represents the triumph of management.     

Cananea consolidated copper company from nationalization to privatization: 1972-1991

Copper, a base metal, became important in the late nineteenth century with the development of electricity and other industrial uses. La Cananea, a Mexican copper mine, was acquired and worked by an American, Colonel Greene, between 1896 and 1907. From 1907 until the mine was nationalized in 1972, the mine was successfully worked by Anaconda, an American multinational copper company. Poor performance under nationalization and a change of policy by the Mexican government led to the reprivatization of the mine in 1990. The process of re-privatization was complicated by two factors: the value of the mine and employee redundance. This paper considers the problems of ownership and management from nationalization to privatization from 1972 to 1991.     

The growth of Indian nitrogen fertilizer manufacture: Some lessons for industrial planning

Large‐scale manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers in India originated during the Second World War as a result of the interruption of the import of rice from Burma. The growth of production has been at the prodigious rate of 22 per cent per annum in the 17‐year period 1949/50–1965/6. Demand has never acted as a constraint; this suggests that agro‐industry can play an important part in an industrializing strategy for development. In spite of this success two negative features have characterized the economic history of fertilizer production: gestation lags and under‐utilized capacity. Had the establishments worked at design capacity and had the average gestation lag not exceeded three years, less than 60 per cent of the 2.1 million tons of nutrient imported into India during these 17 years would have been required. This highlights the need to include in planning models of output expansion both of these variables, getstation lag and low capacity utilization. Some of their causes have been exogenous to the industry. But a number are internal and recurrent. Unjustified technical risks, plant dis‐integration, faulty process selection and inadequate project appraisal in investment decision‐making. Attempts to reduce the balance of payments deficit have had a negative feedback on the foreign exchange flow by reducing the industry's average annual output. Such negative effects should be included in formulating import control, import substitution and export promotion policies. Finally the ubiquity of excess capacity and the invariance of labour force size with the degree of capacity utilization in this sector is shown to lead to large over‐estimates of the future required‐labour force when certain forecasting techniques are used, even in the absence of trends to increasing labour productivity.     

Keeping the aspidistra flying: thatcherite privatization and the creation of the enterprise culture

This article examines the role of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's pnvatization policy in the present Conservative government's effort to establish an “enterprise culture.” The Thatcher government has maintained that the policy would make substantial contributions to altering the anti-business values and behaviors of the English, often characterized as the “British disease” by: (1) permanently altering the boundaries of the public and private in favor of the latter; (2) widening the number I of shareholders in the society; and (3) promoting competition. A look at the results of privatization to date, as well as projections for the future, reveals that the policy has thus far been most successful with respect to the first of these aims and more successful with respect to the second than third goal. The article maintains that privatization appears to be making a significant contribution to achieving a free enterprise society, but that the policy is not in and of itself enough to bring about the transformation that the Thatcher government desires.