Civil service quality after the crisis: A view of five Asian cases

Asian civil services were once reputed to be among the best in the world, especially due to the economic miracle in East Asia. But when financial collapse and political upheaval hit the region in the late 1990s, government bureaucracies received much of the blame. This article argues that both positions were overstated. Asian civil services were not outstandingly competent in the miracle era. Neither have they been exceptionally deficient in the aftermath of the crisis. Rather, the overview of past and present civil service experience suggests that contextual factors need to be understood in assessing civil service performance and capacity. Global pressures, political openings, and technological advances have pushed civil service performance to a higher standard, but with significant variations among countries. In this regard, the article examines five Asian cases, including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.     

Federal service 2000: Staff training and labor-management cooperation

Despite general agreement about what it takes to move workforces into the 21st Century, the Federal Government is not well-advanced in utilizing labor-management collaboration to facilitate human captital development. A content analysis of a representative sample of Federal collective bargaining agreements covering more than 1 million workers and other data are used as indicators that the national government and its unions are in the very earliest stages of advancement concerning joint determination in training program design, implementation, and evaluation. Legal constraints are identified as one possible obstacle to greater cooperation. It is concluded that the parties have strong mutual interests in greater collaboration and that programs such as Total Quality Management (TQM) may serve to establish the necessary foundation for such interactions in the future.     

Inside chinese bureaucracy: Civil service reform in the ministry of light industry

Since 1987, mainland Chinese ministries have been experimenting with a western style civil service system. The provisional guidelines published in that year called for the creation of a professional administrative class to be hired by open recruitment at the central and provisional levels of leading state ministries. The article is a micro-analysis of civil service reform in the Ministry of Light Industry and evaluates the first two years of reform in this ministry, which is responsible for supervising roughly twenty percent of China's production of durable consumer goods. The reform process has been gradual and incremental. The reforms were stimulated by the need to modernize China's state-run ministries in order to make them economically competitive with the mainland's growing private market sector. However, the article concludes that the reforms are too limited to make a substantial contribution to this goal.     

Civil service reforms in British India and united Pakistan

Nearly 200 years of British rule of the Indian sub-continent clearly and significantly affected the society and people in the region. One of the continuing legacies of the British rule has been in the area of civil administration. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) characterized by centralization of authority and elite nature symbolized the British domination of the Indian people. From time to time attempts were made to reform the ICS. These reforms included introduction of competitive examination as a mode of entry, provision for systematic training and Indianization of the service. Pakistan inherited and continued with the British administrative system. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was modelled after the ICS. A number of attempts were made to reform the CSP but all failed due to lack of political will and bureaucratic resistance to major administrative reforms.     

The Civil Service Under Stress: The Fall in Civil Service Power and Authority

The failures of governments of both parties in the 1970s had prepared for radical changes in the nature of government under Margaret Thatcher. Among them were that ministers resumed greater power over their civil servants. While various aspects of the relationship between ministers and officials changed and despite the introduction of special advisers, close partnership — the Haldane relationship — was largely retained between them until the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s ministers began to operate less closely with the civil service, largely because they found they had less time for departmental work under the Major and the first Blair administrations. Many of the skills for which civil servants had been trained became less in demand because of the ending of the Cabinet style of government, the reduced importance of ministers appearing before parliament and the greater involvement of spin doctors and media handlers in preparing public documents. However, new skills were required: more rapid accessing of information and more skill in implementation and responsibility for it. The Wilson reforms of 1999 were in large part aimed to remedy these shortcomings. There remains a question whether enough of the Haldane relationship survives for government not to be driven towards greater definition of the rules in which civil servants operate.     

The spaces of economic crisis: Asia and the reconfiguration of neo-Marxist crisis theory

Neo-Weberian and Marxist theories of crisis have typically been built around analysis of crisis tendencies in a single industrially developed national economy. While neo-Marxist theories of development have noted various implications of analyses that take seriously the specificities of capitalism in developing countries, there is somewhat less work from neo-Marxist perspectives on theories of crisis. The economic crisis that hit Asia in 1997 has important transnational and subnational dimensions that invite further elaboration of such a neo-Marxist perspective. This article engages such elaboration through critical reconfiguration of Samir Amin’s core-periphery spatial ontology and deployment of this reconfigured ontology to explain specific features of the uneven development of the Asian crisis. Jim Glassman is assistant professor in the Department of Geography at the University of British Columbia. His interests are in state theory and the political economy of development in newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia. He has conducted previous research on industrial development in Thailand, as well as on the economic crisis and structural adjustment in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia. His current research focuses on populist and nationalist political reactions to the Asian economic crisis. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Global Economic Geography Conference in Singapore, December 1999. The author would like to thank participants in that conference, along with Ruth Berins Collier, Eric Sheppard, and two anonymous SCID reviewers for valuable comments and criticisms. Some of the research for the article was undertaken with the assistance of an Izaak Walton Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Department of Geography at the University of British Columbia.     

The mexican financial crisis

In the period 1990-93 Mexico's economy experienced expansion and structural change. This was associated with economic opening, market deregulation, and large inflows of foreign capital. Mexico had dealt with the external debt problem through a Brady debt restructuring. This restructuring lowered the financial requirements of the public sector, improved market expectations, and set the stage for a decline in domestic interest rates.

In the early 1990s Mexico attracted fully one-fifth of all capital flows directed into developing countries. These inflows more than financed the current account deficit, and permitted Mexico to expand its official reserve holdings. The portfolio capital inflow bolstered the stock market, which appreciated in value. Mexico's entry into NAFTA provided another reason to be optimistic concerning economic and business prospects.

However, Mexico's external payments position was falling deeper into deficit. By mid-1994 it was possible to observe that the current account in Mexico's balance of payments had shifted further into deficit, and that the high unsustainable level of capital inflow was diminishing. Political violence and assassinations in 1994 caused foreign investors to look more carefully at investment prospects, and steadily rising interest rates in the United States created incentives favoring dollar rather than peso financial instruments. As peso interest rates began to rise, the Mexican government and commercial banks turned to dollar-indexed or outright dollar borrowing. By December 1994 this increased dollar liability position together with a runoff in foreign exchange reserves left Mexico in a difficult liquidity position. The December 20, 1994 devaluation failed to renew confidence in the viability of Mexico's payments position, and two days later the peso was floated. In the early weeks of 1995 a massive Mexican financial assistance package was provided by the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and others.

An analysis of the components of Mexico's GDP and balance of payments suggests that the financial disequilibrium was clearly evident by mid- 1994. Over the period 1993-94 domestic absorption had increased beyond the ability of the economy to sustain it. Parallel to this, the current account deficit had increased beyond the ability of foreign exchange resources to support this deficit. Failure by the government and central bank to take action in the third quarter of 1994 resulted in a runoff of foreign exchange reserves, speculative trading in the financial markets, growing skepticism concerning the viability of existing arrangements. Fiscal and monetary tightening early in 1995 produced an improved financial equilibrium, suggesting that similar action at mid-1994 might have avoided the near debt crisis that manifested itself in December 1994 jand the following weeks.     

The agricultural crisis in Egypt

The paper probes the historical origins of and current responses to the agricultural problems of Egypt. Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that the class structure, the distribution of resources, and the social bases of both Nasser's and Sadat's regime have blocked either the mobilization of the peasantry on the one hand or the provision of decentralized incentives on the other. After a brief assessment of Nasser's land reforms, price policies, and investment strategy, the current responses of changing crop patterns and mechanization are assessed. Such a strategy seems unlikely to succeed, but no other obvious alternative strategy is at hand.