Market meets nationalism: making entrepreneurial state subjects in post-Soviet Russia

This paper argues that nationalism and neoliberalism should not be considered as conflicting ideologies, but can enter into a productive association. This association creates an entrepreneurial nationalism that people can actively embrace as self-governing subjects in pursuit of a good life and successful career, rather than as subjects governed through state-mandated projects from above. The paper illustrates this argument with material from nine months of fieldwork at a Russian elite university. While students at that university strive to develop their potential and increase their market value to be successful in the competition for the best jobs, they also emphasize that developing themselves is not antithetical to serving Russia and being true to one's country. On the contrary, advancing Russia and advancing one's own career are articulated as two sides of the same coin. At the same time, the Russian nationalist project is reframed in entrepreneurial terms: making the Russian nation strong is about developing its potential and raising its competitiveness in the global marketplace.     

I'd like to be ethical,but they won't let me

To be ethical, the member of a modern organization must know what. the work requires of him (or her), what the organization requires of him, and what others require of him. But modern organizations put doing one's job before doing one's work and before one's duty to one's fellow man. Because they do so structurally, the individual usually cannot know what the effect of doing one's duty is on doing a good piece of work or on other human beings. This article attempts to make a beginning to show how far removed the structure of knowledge in modern organization is from constituting the basis for ethical behavior. The means chosen is a phenomeno-logical reconstruction of the ethical field that links the individual to objects, others, and self.     

National Sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe

In a world of presumed nation-states nation has been, and still is, an intrinsic part of political legitimization. The claim of nationality has played an important role in such legitimization for the last two centuries. More than this, it has also constituted a fundamental collective entity for an individual's understanding of who they are in relation to those who are perceived as not sharing the nationality. This is nothing new, but in an era of globalization we are witnessing the rebirth of nationalism and nationality (Castells, 1997), where the power struggle over the political agenda will increasingly be about the struggle for the right to identity and the risks of exclusion from the national community. Even if this is the case it stands clear that everyday nationalism and nationalist struggles take different forms in different parts of the world. It has often been claimed that there are two types of nationalism prevalent in different parts of Europe, one in the so-called West and one in the so-called East. Kohn (1945) claimed that the rise of nationalism in the West was a political occurrence based on the democratic creation of the modern nation-state whereas the rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe was of a more backward type drawing its power from the struggle for cultural hegemony. The legacy of Kohn is taken up by Smith (1986; 1991) in his classical division of civic and ethnic national identities and nationalism, claiming that the former is a Western product and the latter mainly an Eastern one (see also Ignatieff, 1993). More recently, White (2000) claims that national identities in Eastern Europe have been strongly influenced by romanticism. The emphasis on ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe not only is related to historical nation formation, but also has been claimed to be of great importance in the postcommunist era (Lovell, 1999). It is widely realized that national identities and nationalism differ within the West as well as within the East, but it is still assumed that there are fundamental differences between Western and Eastern European nation formation and that these have influenced the types of national identity and nationalism prevalent in the different geographical areas. For example, Sugar (1969) claims that there are differences between the Eastern European states; nonetheless, there are also commonalties that make them differ from Western European states.     

The Globalization of Nationalism and the Future of the Nation?CState

The state is a specific form of government, distinguished from others by its impersonal character and the recognition on the part of the office holders that they represent the will of the people. This form of government is an implication of nationalism. Thus, every state is a nation?Cstate. Since nationalism is the cultural framework of modernity in all its expressions, every state is also a modern state. The future of the nation?Cstate depends on the future of nationalism. The recent globalization of nationalism into the formidable civilizations of South-East Asia has opened a new era for the latter. Therefore, the future of the nation?Cstate at present looks brighter than ever.     

“Neither angels,nor demons,but humans”: anti-essentialism and its ideological moments among the Russian Zionist intelligentsia

This article shows that anti-essentialism was a pivotal ideological feature of Russian Zionism – the idiom of Zionism that lay behind Russian Zionist periodicals such as Rassvet in Late Imperial Russia. For Russian Zionists, the Jewish nation was the social field that existed as a social fact. While Russian Zionists' concept of the Jewish nation was inevitably influenced by their political context, nonetheless, it was primarily a result of the convergence of the following two ideological movements. First, there emerged a sense that a socioeconomic foundation was crucial in forming a nation. The transformation of Jewish socioeconomic positions in Eastern Europe and Russia was the background of this consciousness. The second is the ideological claim that any collective entity or social field should be respected regardless of its merit and utility vis-à-vis others. More specifically, for Russian Zionists, the Jewish raison d'être was the simple existence of their own social field; they believed that no further definition was required. The emergence of this viewpoint can be understood as a reaction to the Zionists' perception of Jewish history where Jews pursued the recognition and validation of their place among non-Jews by virtue of their merit or utility vis-à-vis non-Jews.     

Rock 'n' roll nation: counterculture and dissent in Romania, 1965–1975

A vibrant countercultural and dissident movement developed in Romania between 1965 and 1975. Young Romanians combined elements of the global youth movement with local cultural and political practices. Thus, Romanian counterculture and dissent shared the era's hippie aesthetic and anti-authoritarianism, but was highly isolationist, vehemently antisocialist and heavily couched in the language of the nation and nationalism. Furthermore, during this early Ceau?escu period, the socialist regime attracted some level of nonconformist support through a program of reform, opposition to Soviet interference, and nationalist rhetoric. These conclusions demonstrate that the rubric of 1960s counterculture needs to be extended to include a variety of ideological and cultural positions beyond the New Left that scholars generally emphasize. Furthermore, scholarly avoidance of Ceau?escu's early period has obscured the existence of an alternative culture, and has led to an un-nuanced interpretation of Romania's postwar history.     

In the service of democracy

The notion of service can encompass much more than the basic duties of obedience, loyalty, trust, and courage directed solely to some higher secular authority. It can also encompass a duty to a “common good,” a “good society,” a “public,” or a people. If public service is to be viewed as an integral component of our democratic political system, the ethical-moral values of faith, hope, and love must be recognized as the critical impulses which energize a life dedicated to the service of democracy. But such an approach is very different from the current focus of democratic ethics. In particular the love ethic inevitably moves on a collision course with many of our basic canons of public sector management such as the concept of formal, institutionalized, bureaucratic authority, the notion of detached, dispassionate, objective neutrality, and the almost absolute emphasis placed on rational, routinized, programmed behavior.

To labor in the service of democracy is to recognize that all of us are called, in one way or another, to be watchmen, sentinels, or prophets of others. It is a recognition of the fact that a life in service of democracy is a life of constant instruction, giving and receiving knowledge about right conduct in the formation of one person's character by another, and in the acceptance of another's guidance in one's own growth. In a word, society is dependent on the career professionals in governments at all levels to lead it to a new value vision of the common good. As a first step in this direction, public administrators must be willing to confront the suppressive and debilitating constraints which currently are being imposed on bureaucracy from all directions, and to reaffirm the values and virtues inherent in the notion of service which have unified the ethical forces of democracy so well in the past.     

Orthodoxy and nation-building: Nichifor Crainic and religious nationalism in 1920s Romania

This article uses the early career of Nichifor Crainic (1889–1972) to show why Orthodox Christianity became a central element of Romanian ultra-nationalism during the 1920s. Most Romanian nationalists were atheists prior to the First World War, but state-sponsored nation-building efforts catalyzed by territorial expansion and the incorporation of ethnic and religious minorities allowed individuals such as Crainic to introduce religious nationalism into the public sphere. Examining Crainic's work during the 1920s shows how his nationalism was shaped by mainstream political and ideological currents, including state institutions such as the Royal Foundations of Prince Carol and the Ministry of Cults and of Art. Despite championing “tradition,” Crainic was committed to changing Romanian society so long as that change followed autochthonous Romanian models. State sponsorship allowed Crainic to promote religious nationalism through his periodical Gândirea. Crainic's literary achievements earned him a chair in theology, from which he pioneered new ways of thinking about mysticism as an expression of Romanian culture and as crucial to understanding the Romanian nation.     

Reconsidering “Piłsudskiite nationalism”

This paper examines the intellectual underpinnings of the nationalism articulated by the followers of Marshal Józef Pi?sudski (Pi?sudskiites), who ruled Poland between 1926 and 1939. Scholarly consensus holds that modern Polish nationalism was solely the domain of the National Democratic movement. Conversely, the Pi?sudskiites' conception of the nation is generally seen as anachronistic, poorly articulated, self-contradictory, and lacking a deeper intellectual foundation. Focusing on the formative years of the Second Polish Republic (1918–1922), this paper draws a link between Pi?sudskiite political thought and the philosophy of the heterodox Marxist theorist Stanis?aw Brzozowski. Re-examining the early writings of Pi?sudski's followers in light of Brzozowski's philosophy, the paper presents the argument that “Pi?sudskiite nationalism” was in fact deeply constructivist, surprisingly sophisticated, and no less “modern” than the nationalist discourse articulated by the National Democrats. In the process, the article interrogates and problematizes the classic “ethnic” vs. “civic” typology of nationalist movements.     

Isaiah Berlin: Russo-Jewish Roots,Liberal Commitments,and the Ethos of Pluralism

Isaiah Berlin contributed significantly to the study of the history of nationalist ideas in modern Europe, to the revival among political theorists (and others) of interest in nationalism as a theory, and to the articulation of theories of “liberal nationalism” in the 1990s. Berlin was also a life-long Zionist, whose reflections on the impulses behind nationalism owed much to his reflection on the condition of Jews in the diaspora. While Berlin’s views on nationalism have long claimed attention, and while there has more recently been excellent work done on his Jewish identity and commitment to Zionism, the connection between both his liberalism and his views on nationalism, and his personal background and experiences, remains to be more fully explored. Deploying biographical reconstruction and textual analysis, I here undertake to draw such connections, emphasizing how Berlin’s personal condition and the response to nationalism that it influenced in turn shaped his liberalism. I conclude that Berlin’s experiences coming from a specifically Russian-Jewish background, as well as his position in British society, his wartime service in the British government, and his intellectual formation, significantly shaped his views on nationalism. I also suggest that both his response to nationalism and his advocacy of a distinctive liberalism reflect Berlin’s commitment (never made fully explicit) to a pluralistic ethos, which itself may be seen as a response to the condition of Jews (and other minorities and migrants) in the modern world.     

Russian Economic Nationalism during the First World War: Moscow Merchants and Commercial Diasporas

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, “opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian.” In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often “subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire.” Recently, two authors have challenged the predominantly pessimistic portrayals of the extent of Russian national identity in late imperial Russia, focusing on peasant responses to the First World War. Scott Seregny makes a strong case that while peasants may not have been full “Russians” by 1914, the spread of politics and literacy to the countryside through the zemstvos was rapidly integrating peasants into a broader civic identity. Josh Sanborn argues that even though responses were varied and in fact protest against the war quite frequent, the important thing is that both positive and negative responses were expressed within a single national political framework and discourse. In response, S. A. Smith grants that the war strengthened rather than weakened national identity, but thinks Sanborn and Seregny underestimate the degree to which nation, empire, and class pulled in different directions from 1916, concluding that “by the summer of 1917, politics had become polarized between an imperial language of nation, used mainly by the privileged and educated strata, an anti-imperial language, used mainly by the elites of the non-Russian nationalities, and a language of class, used mainly by the subaltern classes.”     

The Importance of Voluntary Associations for Guerrilla Movements

The question I examine in this article is why is it that under certain circumstances a guerrilla movement succeeds while under others it fails? The hypotheses that I shall present below are the greater the number and variety of voluntary associations supporting the guerrilla movement, compared with the number of associations supporting the regime, the greater is the guerillas’ level of success. Voluntary associations can fulfill the guerrilla's basic needs: resources, organizational ability, and obligation. Achieving these needs assist the guerrilla in realizing: population support; inter-class allies; military force; governmental function, which in turn allows the realization of the political objectives.     

Another Baltic Postcolonialism: Young Latvians,Baltic Germans,and the emergence of Latvian National Movement

This article looks at the emergence of Latvian nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century from the intercultural perspective of postcolonial theory. The writings of early Young Latvians, and the reaction to them from the dominant Baltic German elite, show that the emergence of a modern Latvian nationalism is to a large extent due to postcolonial mimicry, as described by Homi Bhabha. Attempts to imitate German cultural models and to develop a Latvian high culture lead to hostile reactions from the German side, which, in their turn, lead to increasing consolidation of Latvian nationalism. Since the Baltic German elite increasingly legitimized its rule in terms of cultural superiority, the Young Latvians' alliance with the Russian Slavophiles led it to treat the Latvian nationalists as culturally inferior and partly Asiatic, like the Russians.     

From Marxism to nationalism: The Chinese Communist Party's discursive shift in the post-Mao era

The Chinese Communist Party's dramatic shift from Mao Zedong's Chinese Revolution to Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream remains under-examined and even misunderstood or mispresented despite its enormous impact on every aspect of national life in the People's Republic of China. There is a clear need for in-depth analysis of the extent to which the CCP has departed from the philosophical foundation of Marxism and Maoism, abandoned socialism and communism, inverted its long tradition of iconoclasm, transformed its own identity and altered its subject position. Part of the CCP's philosophical departure from Marxism and Maoism is its increasing conversion to nationalism. The new nationalism underpinning the Chinese Dream, in particular, operates against the grain of Marxism and Maoism, and vice versa, and is logically irreconcilable with the latter – so much so that the CCP cannot be nationalists and Marxists, Maoists or communists at the same time. The contradictory logics between nationalism and Marxism can be best seen from their respective conceptions of permanence and change, the unity and conflict of opposites, and conceptions of, and approaches to, tradition and the past, which have had major ramifications in political-cultural change in post-Mao China, especially in Xi's New Era.     

Becoming patriots in Russia: biopolitics,fashion, and nostalgia

The article seeks to explore the common ground between biopolitics, fashion, patriotism and nostalgia. Taking off from the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics as a control apparatus exerted over a population, I provide an insight into the modern construction of the Russian nation, where personal and collective sacrifice, traditional femininity and masculinity, orthodox religion, and the Great Patriotic War become the basis for patriotism. On carefully chosen case studies, I will show how the state directly and indirectly regulates people’s lives by producing narratives, which are translated (in some cases designers act as mouthpieces for the state demographic or military politics) into fashionable discourses and, with a core of time, create specific gender norms – women are seen as fertile mothers giving birth to new soldiers, while men are shown as fighters and defenders of their nation. In the constructed discourses, conservative ideals become a ground for the creation of an idea of a nation as one biological body, where brothers and sisters are united together. In these fashionable narratives, people’s bodies become a battlefield of domestic politics. Fashion produces a narrative of a healthy nation to ensure the healthy work- and military force.     

From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990 – 2005

This article examines how military veterans and political veterans of Zimbabwe's nationalist movements competed for power and access to state resources, using their distinctive contributions to legitimate their claims and de-legitimate others' claims. Drawing on parliamentary debates over state assistance for war veterans and state pensions for heroes, the article seeks to highlight previously unexplored continuities between the political discourses within the ruling party in the 1990s and the ruling party's brand of nationalism after 2000. More generally, the essay suggests a much longer pattern of nationalists using struggle credentials to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate others in competition for power and resources.     

Book reviews

Paulin Kola, The Search for Greater Albania (London: Hurst, 2003), xiv, 416 pp. + maps. Few are the monographs available in English and written by Albanian scholars that deal with the contemporary history of the Balkans. The Search for Greater Albania is therefore a welcome contribution to the study of Albanian nationalism. The author endorses a definition of nationalism as an ideology “whose proponents advocate the indispensable congruence of the political and the national unit, i.e. the state and the nation” (p. xii) and endeavors to demonstrate that no one among Albanian leaders from King Zog to the present, including Hoxha, ever worked to achieve a “Greater Albania.” The intent of the book is then to explain why state-builders in Tirana from the very beginning disregarded their irredenta despite the fact that a substantial part of the ethnic population had remained outside the borders because of international treaties. After a summary of the historical developments in the first part of the twentieth century, Kola pays particular attention to the space for ethnopolitics among Albanian communist and post-communist elites in Albania proper, in Kosovo and marginally in Macedonia. The author is keen to question the nationalist credentials attributed to Enver Hoxha by most scholars of Albania. Kola describes the key historical events in the region after the Second World War by looking for references to Kosovo and the preservation of national independence and shows that these references were all just instrumental to elites' power politics. What the communist regime instead managed to do, observes Kola, is to impoverish its own citizens and to alienate Albanian communities from one another. Kola concludes that political leaders in Tirana have all been prone to “a comfortable parochialism vis-à-vis the national question“ (p. 233). Exceptions to the rule are considered, such as the attempt to internationalize the Kosovo crisis by the first post-communist governments. However, the 1997 descent into anarchy of Albania proper compromised the cause of nationalism in the “motherland.” The idea of “Greater Albania,” according to Kola, never existed in Albania proper but was rather rooted outside the nation-state borders. In Kosovo, where “real Albanian nationalism” instead resided, the discovery of the poverty of the “motherland” in the 1990s toned ambitions down (p. 394). The same Macedonian Albanians did not expect help from Tirana when they initiated the armed confrontation in 2000 and did not show any intention to seek national unification with Tirana. Therefore, Kola observes, foreign observers should be reassured that national unification is not the ambition of Albanian politics today and no one will press for it in the foreseeable future.     

Understanding the exclusionary politics of early Turkish nationalism: an ethnic boundary-making approach

Turkish nationalism has long presented a study in contrasts. The nationalist movement that created the Republic of Turkey sought to define the nation in explicitly civic and inclusive terms, promoting a variety of integrationist reforms. Those same nationalist politicians, however, endorsed other policies that were far more exclusionary, expelling many religious and ethnic minorities from the new nation and imposing harsh restrictions on those who remained. The seemingly contradictory nature of Turkish nationalist policies has been mirrored by much of the scholarship on Turkish nationalism, which has often viewed Turkish nationality through the lens of the “civic/ethnic divide,” with various scholars arguing that the Turkish nation is exclusively civic or ethnic. This article seeks to transcend this dichotomous way of looking at Turkish nationalism. I argue that the policies previously seen as being exclusively civic or ethnic are in fact both examples of boundary-making processes, designed to forge a cohesive nationalist community. Seen through a boundary-making perspective, the seemingly contradictory nature of Turkish nationalist policies in its early years is not paradoxical at all, but represents a multidimensional effort to construct a cohesive national community that could replace the defunct Ottoman state.     

‘LADIES A YOUR TIME NOW!’ Erotic politics,lovers' rock and resistance in the UK

‘Lovers’ rock' is a largely overlooked genre of ‘Black British’ reggae music that emerged in London during the 1970s through Caribbean nightclubs and ‘pirate radio’ stations. Lovers’ rock was an integral part of the reggae music scene of that period. However, lovers rock became gendered as genre that appealed particularly to the romantic aspirations of black teenaged girls growing up in ‘Thatcher's Britain’. Within the political context of the dancehall scene, both lovers rock and roots reggae are seen as binary opposites of each other – lovers being ‘soft’ feminised reggae concerned with romantic love, and roots as masculinised ‘serious’ reggae concerned with black oppositional politics. Using black feminist theories on love and the erotic, this paper challenges the gendering of lovers' rock by suggesting that the genre was part of a much broader and complex political expression of love and rebellion amongst Caribbean communities in Britain. Indeed, while the gendering process is highly problematic, this paper also argues that Caribbean communities had also used the erotic and political intersection of both genres to reconfigure racist and sexist representations of their identities. As such Caribbean males and females had created their own ethic of ‘loving blackness’ as a way of restoring and validating their experiences within Britain's often hostile urban centres.     

Secularizing Religion: Hindu Extremism as a Modernist Discourse

In this article, I suggest that Hindu nationalism, like many other religious extremist ideologies, is a modern discourse rooted in modern categories such as a homogenous national identity, objective science and history, hyper-masculinity, and secularism. To demonstrate the above claims, I undertake a close analysis of the writings of V.D. Savarkar, a key founder of "Hindutva" or Hindu nationalism. I show how he retools Hinduism by removing all aspects of religiosity/piety while replacing it with a primarily political-secular identity that places an exclusive Hindu nation at the center.