Democracy,bureaucracy, and state capacity in Taiwan

Taiwan has long had a reputation for effective policy-making based on a highly skilled and educated bureaucracy. In addition, this capacity for technocratic leadership has not resulted in a huge, inefficient bureaucracy since the size of government remains comparatively small. This paper explores the implications of Taiwan's recent democratization for the effectiveness of the country's public administration. On the one hand, democratization reduced the power of regime conservatives, thereby expanding the role of technocrats in the government; on the other burgeoning corruption and policy gridlock have clearly undercut effective policy-making. Thus, the most fundamental challenge for public administration in Taiwan appears to be re-establishing the bureaucratic integrity of technocratic government.     

Representative bureaucracy and impartial policing

Representative bureaucracy theory expects minority bureaucrats to advance the interests of minority citizens. Yet, little attention has been given to the variation in the acceptability, incentives and risks of representation across bureaucratic domains. Analysis of over two million police vehicle stops from four different US departments reveals that African American police officers do not treat African Americans preferentially, yet they mitigate existing racial disparities in policing. Compared with White officers, African Americans seem less disposed to use their discretion. They are disinclined to search drivers, yet inclined to cite them, displaying comparatively low disparities across social groups. These findings extend to pure traffic violations, and are robust to entropy balancing reweighting. We provisionally attribute African American police officers' impartial policing style to their compelling need to display their performance, and avoid blame, amidst intra‐organizational pressures and risks ensuing from the political salience of the police's clash with minority communities.     

State,bureaucracy and change in India

The article discusses the nature of the Indian state and of the Indian bureaucracy. During the 1980s, it was widely believed that the Indian bureaucracy constituted a dominant class and that this dominance is the root cause of economic stagnation. When confronted with empirical evidence, this assertion seems less convincing. The complex picture that emerges of the Indian state does not totally contradict the dominant view. This complexity points to a need for a more elaborated theoretical understanding of the role of the state and of the public bureaucracy. The article concludes by sketching the outlines of such a possible revised theoretical framework.     

Representative bureaucracy,international organizations and public service bargains

Academic interest in the administrative aspects of international organizations is on the rise. Yet, an issue that has received little attention is bureaucratic representation—the extent to which international bureaucracies are representative of the polity that they serve. The article theorizes the rationales for and forms of representative bureaucracy in international organizations by combining insights from the representative bureaucracy literature with the ‘public service bargains’ framework. It argues that bureaucratic representation is highly relevant in international organizations, given the diverse polity these organizations serve and their precarious legitimacy. It distinguishes three types of representational ‘bargains’ between international organizations and those they serve, centred on power, equal opportunities and diversity, and discusses under which conditions each type of bargain is likely to be struck. The argument contributes to discussions about representative bureaucracy in international organizations and to broader theoretical debates about international public administration.     

Democracy and Empowerment

The article argues that institutions of parliamentary democracy are currently being undermined and calls for the development of new means of democratic empowerment. The meaning of 'democratic empowerment' differs sharply depending on whether one refers to a predominantly aggregative, or a predominantly integrative strategy of empowerment. The article seeks to clarify the phrase. For a predominantly aggregative strategy of empowerment, as proposed by Paul Hirst, the primary means of empowerment is exist. For a predominantly integrative strategy of empowerment, proposed by David Burns, Robin Hambleton and Paul Hoggett the primary means of empowerment is voice. The article concludes that a democratic strategy of empowerment must aim to balance exit and voice options. An example of how balance could be institutionalized is found in Denmark.     

Corruption and Democracy

Most models and empirical tests of the relationship between corruption and democracy assume corruption falls as democracy matures. Yet recent theoretical developments and case evidence suggest an inverted U relationship between the two, although so far no one has tested for this relationship. By drawing on a panel data set covering a large number of countries between 1982–1997, substantial empirical support is found for an inverted U relationship between the durability (age) of democracy and corruption. Fortunately, the turning point in corruption occurs rather early in the life of new democracies – between 10–12 years.     

The origins of bureaucracy: an anthropological perspective

Many decades have passed since the first appearance of Max Weber's seminal study, in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , of the origins and characteristics of bureaucracy. His analysis was, naturally, dependent on the existing knowledge of his day; but the growth and maturity of archaeology and anthropology as academic disciplines have shed much new light on the historical and social contexts in which bureaucratic organizations emerged. This article, using Sumerian civilization as a case in point, summarizes much of what we now know about the conditions under which bureaucracy first originated and flourished. In so doing, it identifies several major human developmental and social transformations—the hominid revolution, the agrarian revolution, and the urban revolution—which played vital roles in the evolution and expansion of the bureaucratic form of organization.     

Democracy and economic development

This discussion explains why democracy as is generally understood may not be suitable to meet the challenges of a developing economy and how democratic institutions generally fail to respond to the immediate demands of a population impatient to raise its level of living. It defines the terms economic development and democracy, reviews some theoretical models of democracy which have been proposed in economic theory, proposes an approach to the process of economic development, and considers problems of development. Economic development is a process which calls for huge investments in personnel and material. Such investment programs imply cuts in current consumption that would be painful at the low levels of living that exist in almost all developing societies. Governments need to resort to strong measures, and they must enforce them vigorously in order to marshal the surpluses required for investment. If such measures were put to a popular vote, they would certainly be defeated. Mainstream economic theory assumes the virtues of a market system and the decisions arrived at by the interaction of market forces. This is the economic equivalent of democracy. Yet, mainstream economic theory devotes little attention to the conditions under which a market system generates a just solution. The democratic developing countries have all inherited a class society, with a highly skewed distribution of income. The wealthy minority often seeks to preserve its privileged position and to enjoy the benefits of development. It even seeks the help of the judiciary to preserve the sanctity of private property and to assure that its patterns of conspicuous consumption can continue. This is done in the name of democratic rights. Many developing societies are burdened with outmoded traditions and value systems that are incompatible with the production relations of the new society they hope to achieve. The international exchange of resources is believed by some to be an attempt to control the pace and character of development so that the economic colonization will survive. To end such unfavorable conditions for development, 3rd world governments must demand greater sacrifices from their citizens, and this cannot be achieved by normal democratic means. Recent events in several developing nations illustrate this point.     

Democracy and Gender Equality

This article examines the relationship between democracy and gender equality. In particular, it contrasts the impact of long-term stocks of democracy with the contemporary level of democracy and the participation of women in democracy. It contends that democracy should be thought of as a historical phenomenon with consequences that develop over many years and decades and that women’s participation should be included as an important component of democracy. The main argument is that long-term democracy together with women’s suffrage should provide new opportunities for women to promote their interests through mobilization and elections. A cross-national time-series statistical analysis finds that countries with greater stocks of democracy and longer experience of women’s suffrage have a higher proportion of the population that is female, a greater ratio of female life expectancy to male life expectancy, lower fertility rates, and higher rates of female labor force participation.

Vital Democracy: A Theory of Democracy in Action

Scottish citizens benefit from 19 per cent more public spending per head than English citizens. The ‘Barnett formula’ is slowly reducing the gap, but very little is known about the countries' relative needs and hence about how far the present gap is defensible: the aim of this paper is to throw some light on the countries' relative needs. We begin with the complex formulae that the Westminster government uses to assess the spending needs of English local authorities, and we use these English formulae to assess the needs of Scottish local authorities for three major blocks of local services. These formulae suggest that Scotland needs 6.4 per cent more per head than England for environmental, protective and cultural services, 8.1 per cent more for highway maintenance, and between 24.3 per cent and 35.3 per cent more for fire services. We also combine these results with those of two other papers concerned with local education and social services to show that these English formulae put Scotland's per capita needs for local government services as a whole at about 6 per cent above England's. However, we then compare the relative needs of Scottish local authorities as assessed by the English formulae with their relative needs as assessed by the Scottish needs formulae that are currently used by Holyrood, and we find major differences. This suggests either that at least one country uses seriously flawed formulae to assess needs, or that the two countries have different conceptions of need.