Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective

George J. Stigler (Ed.), Chicago studies in political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pages xviii + 641.     

The political economy of accountability in Timor‐Leste: Implications for public policy

With a view to establishing the likelihood of the occurrence of state capture and different forms of corruption and the feasibility of their management and prevention, important aspects of the historical, social, economic, political and governance context of Timor‐Leste are examined. This context is found to be conducive to various forms of state capture and systemic grand and petty corruption, and to be resistant to conventional short‐term technocratic anticorruption remedies. While the latter are likely to have public relations benefits that may be helpful to the maintenance of political stability in the short run, it is argued that significant anticorruption progress is a long‐term endeavour, achievable principally through: sustained impartial service delivery that undermines beliefs in patronage; hastening—through general education and the creation of a conducive legal environment for business—the emergence of leaders of integrity and the growth of a middle class; and the establishment of the rule of law. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The political economy of voluntary public service

We characterize the voluntary public service policy that minimizes the expected cost of delivering a public service (e.g., jury or military service). We then examine whether a majority rule voting procedure will implement the voluntary public service policy (VPS) whenever it entails lower expected cost than mandatory public service (MPS). We find that majority rule often favors MPS in the sense that majority rule implements MPS when VPS would secure the requisite public service at lower expected cost.

     

Demographic structure and the political economy of public education

This article examines the relationship between demographic structure and the level of government spending on K-12 education. Panel data for the states of the United States over the 1960-1990 period suggests that an increase in the fraction of elderly residents in a jurisdiction is associated with a significant reduction in per-child educational spending. This reduction is particularly large when the elderly residents and the school-age population are from different racial groups. Variation in the size of the school-age population does not result in proportionate changes in education spending, thus, students in states with larger school-age populations receive lower per-student spending than those in states with smaller numbers of potential students. These results provide support for models of generational competition in the allocation of public sector resources. They also suggest that the effect of cohort size on government-mediated transfers must be considered in analyzing how cohort size affects economic well-being.     

The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities

This paper applies a public choice approach to the problem of unfunded pension liabilities and adopts the methodology of Congleton and Shughart (1990) to model underfunding of state-level public pension plans using the median voter theorem, along with the theory of “capture” by special interest groups, and a combined model of the two. With panel data from 2001 to 2009, the paper finds that the combined model provides the strongest explanation for the current levels of unfunded liabilities; hence, both median voter preferences and special interest group influence are affecting political outcomes. The special interest group model slightly outperforms the median voter model in direct comparisons.     

Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: a political economy perspective on the responsibilities and limitations of government

Public Choice - I assume that voters mark ballots exclusively to express their true preferences among parties, leaving aside any considerations about an election’s possible outcome. The paper...     

Policy makers,policy choices,and policy outcomes: The political economy of reform in developing countries

This article presents an analytic model for understanding the role of decision makers in bringing about significant policy and institutional changes and in understanding how processes of agenda setting, decision making, and implementation shape the content, timing, and sustainability of reform initiatives. Central to the model is the assertion that policy elites and the policy making process are important determinants of reform. The framework indicates that circumstances surrounding issue formation, the criteria that decision makers use to select among options, and the characteristics of specific policies are analytic categories that explain a considerable amount about reform outcomes. The model is based on cases developed by participants in twelve initiatives to bring about policy and institutional change in a variety of developing countries.     

公共政策执行中的政治资源开发与配置

目前 ,我国公共政策执行中政治资源的流失严重 ,主要存在“经济人”理性、路径依赖、素质低劣、制度短缺等原因。这就要求通过整合、参与、引导、创新的形式以加强公共政策执行中政治资源的开发与利用 ,并加强公共政策执行中的财物、人力、信息、文化等政治资源的优化配置。     

The political economy of local government financialization and the role of policy diffusion

By analyzing why English local governments have made extensive use of long-term market loans with embedded derivatives, this paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on local government financialization. Using an original, large-N panel dataset for the period from 1998 to 2014, we show that the configuration of the local political economy is an important driver of financialization processes: a Labour Party majority as well as fiscal and economic stress make it more likely that councils adopt risky financial instruments. As the use of financial innovations has also diffused geographically, policy diffusion impacts local governments as well. Highlighting the conditional effect of finance sector power, which only increases the use of financial innovations in very large councils, as well as the temporal dimension of fiscal and economic stress, we create ample avenues for further research.     

Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy

Most analyses of US congressional votes on trade policy identify political and economic factors, and general economic conditions as significant factors. In this paper we examine whether simulated state-level impacts of trade policy changes obtained from an applied general equilibrium model explain recent US Senate votes on trade bills. We find that simulated gross state product effects are good predictors of recent trade-policy votes. Our model-based measures of trade sensitivity perform slightly better in statistical terms than the more traditional economic measures. For the Senate as a whole, import considerations have a larger impact on senate voting than export considerations.     

Agenda responsiveness in the European Council: public priorities,policy problems and political attention

The existence of political responsiveness in multi-level systems like the EU remains an open question despite significant recent research on the topic. This article studies whether the European Council responds to the shifting policy priorities of European citizens. More specifically, it explores the synchronic and diachronic associations between what people consider to be the most important problems and the political attention devoted to these issues from 2003 to 2014. The economic crisis after 2008 appears to have made the ranking of public concerns and the European Council agenda more alike. However, a detailed examination of the shifts in prioritisation of single issues over time reveals little evidence for dynamic issue responsiveness. Recently the European Council has paid more attention to the issues that the public considered the most pressing problems but the convergence could possibly be driven by the intensity of the underlying policy problems.     

Missing pieces in each other's puzzles: Integrating the new public management and the new political economy

Although New Political Economy ideas have sometimes accompanied New Public Management ideas in programs of bureaucratic reform (especially outside the United States), the two schools of thought have remained separate. I argue that the problems of bureaucracy are largely political problems. Therefore, bureaucratic reform must be viewed in tandem with political reform. New Public Management can learn from New Political Economy's emphasis on the incentives of self-interested politicians, and New Political Economy can learn from New Public Management's normative approach and focus on citizens. I use an “exit and voice” framework to discuss and evaluate alternative approaches to reform.     

Economists' policy views and voting

In Spring 2003, a survey of 1000 economists was conducted using a randomly generated membership list from the American Economics Association. The survey contained questions about 18 policy issues, voting behavior, and several background variables. The response was 264 (nonblank) surveys. The responses show that most economists are supporters of safety regulations, gun control, redistribution, public schooling, and anti-discrimination laws. They are evenly mixed on personal choice issues, military action, and the minimum wage. Most economists oppose tighter immigration controls, government ownership of enterprise and tariffs. In voting, the Democratic:Republican ratio is 2.5:1. These results are compared to those of previous surveys of economists. We itemize a series of important questions raised by these results.