Social Networks and the Affective Impact of Political Disagreement

Although few studies have explored the link between emotion and political talk, here I argue that political disagreement depolarizes emotional reactions via information exchanged in social networks. Analyzing data from the ANES 2008–2009 Panel Study, several conclusions are drawn. First, disagreement increases negative emotions and decreases positive emotions toward the in-party candidate, and also increases positive emotions and decreases negative emotions toward the out-party candidate. In other words, disagreement depolarizes emotions toward political candidates. Second, the affective impact of disagreement does not vary with political knowledge. Finally, positive emotions toward the out-party candidate and negative emotions toward the in-party candidate reduce political interest, candidate issue placement accuracy, and political participation. Overall, this study develops important theoretical connections between affect and political talk that have implications for the value of political disagreement.     

情感对决策过程的影响

情感是人对客观事物是否符合自己需要的态度的体验。情感与决策同属于人的主观范围。情感的"两重性"特点,决定了它对决策过程影响具有"两重性"。稳定、健康的积极情感对决策主体的决策过程可以起增力作用,表现在对决策目标的抉择、对决策思维能力的提升、对决策过程的沟通、对决策创新能力的影响上。消极情感对决策过程的负面效应也是比较突出的,决策主体要克服消极情感,发挥情感在决策过程中的积极影响。     

Negative Weights for Performance Measures

ABSTRACT

Quantitative performance measurement is a controversial idea in the public sector. This paper argues that management by measurement is sensible if the measurement methods have a sufficient quality. In particular, quantitative performance measures have to address problems of gaming and monitoring intensity. I look at the assignment of negative weights to poor, but informative, performance measures even if these measures have a positive correlation with the non-contractible performance objective. In a simple agency relationship, I show how a poor measure with negative weight can serve as an indicator for manipulation. However, the benefits derived from a negative weight may come at the price of increased measurement risk. Healthcare and research organizations provide examples of how negative weights can improve performance measurement.     

Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice

One of the most noted phenomena in social and political decision-making is the occurrence of a framing effect. For example, on problems involving risky choices, individuals tend to act risk-averse when the problem is framed in terms of gains (e.g., saving lives, making money) and risk-seeking when the same problem is instead framed in terms of losses (e.g., deaths, losing money). Scholars have begun to identify the processes underlying framing effects as well as the conditions under which framing effects occur. Yet, extant work focuses nearly exclusively on cognitive processes, despite growing recognition of the importance of emotion in general decision-making tasks. In this paper, we explore the impact of emotional states on risk attitudes and framing. We find that emotions significantly influence both individuals’ tendencies to take risks and the impact of a frame on risky choices (e.g., emotions amplify or depress a frame’s impact). The precise role of emotions depends on the problem domain (e.g., a life-death or a financial decision), and the specific type of emotion under study. Moreover, in contrast to much work in political science, we show that emotions need to be distinguished beyond their positive or negative valence, as different negative emotions exert opposite effects. Our results accentuate the importance of integrating emotions into research areas traditionally dominated by more cognitive perspectives.

Global warming and sustainability: Understanding the beliefs of marketing faculty

Addressing climate change and sustainability topics in university research and teaching is paramount; however, the majority of marketing studies and courses do not examine these concepts. We investigate global warming beliefs and the sustainability values, attitudes, and beliefs of marketing faculty to understand how these may impact upon the state of sustainability research and teaching within the marketing academy. Using an online survey method, marketing faculty were surveyed from around the world. We found that belief in global warming was high and that this was affected by political ideology and research area. We also found broad perceptions of sustainability (i.e., beyond the environmental domain) in marketing faculty, possibly more so than previous higher education studies have revealed. However, a greater belief in market ideology to solve sustainability issues also exists. We found significant effects or associations between gender, political ideology, religion, expertise, region of current residence, and region of conferred highest degree on sustainability beliefs (definition, conception, and attitudes). Considering that we find a high belief in global warming and a broad and holistic understanding and positive attitude towards sustainability, questions remain about why only limited research and teaching has been done on the intersection between marketing and sustainability.     

Exploring the Consequences of Negative Political Advertising for Liberal Democracy

ABSTRACT

This paper explores existing thinking and research on the use of negative advertising strategies in political campaigning, and in particular examines their potential impact on liberal democracy. We ask what impacts negative forms of political communication may have on our system of government and democratic participation. Though political advertising makes up only a part of political discourse, an analysis of it is necessary given the increasing “marketisation” of political communication, coupled with concerns regarding the so called “democratic deficit.” In order to more truly evaluate its impact, the evidence pertaining to both the positive and detrimental consequences of employing negative ad strategies is examined. What emerges are some very real short-term benefits, some very real concerns over its use, and confusion over its “true” impact. Of particular note is the need for researchers and campaign managers to take a longer-term view of the potentially detrimental consequences of employing negative advertising strategies-to look beyond the short-term gains of winning elections and to consider the longer-term societal consequences of consistently employing advertising strategies characterised by the creation of doubt, fear, anxiety, violation and viciousness. We argue that the “winning” mentality of political ad campaigns needs to be balanced by a more “nurturing” orientation if the tenets of liberal democracy are to remain sustainable.     

Sowing the seeds of skepticism? Electoral-integrity beliefs among political elites

Elections in many democracies have come under attack “from within”, with political elites challenging the integrity of the electoral process and calling its outcomes into question. Such allegations may delegitimize democratic outcomes and compromise citizens' confidence in elections. Yet aside from their rhetoric, little is known about political elites' electoral-integrity beliefs. This study breaks new ground by investigating how political elites perceive the integrity of elections, and which factors may account for differences in their electoral-integrity beliefs. Using innovative data from the 2021 candidate survey of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), the empirical analysis shows that political candidates exhibit mostly positive views about the integrity of the electoral procedures and the 2021 election, while being more skeptical about the fairness of the campaign period. Moreover, the findings show that negative campaign experiences, an affiliation with a populist political party, and electoral defeat are important drivers of candidates' skepticism about the integrity of elections. These findings provide novel insights on the nature, background, and diagnostic significance of political elites’ electoral-integrity beliefs in modern democracies.     

Experimenting with a national sample: a Dutch survey of prejudice

The notion that beliefs and attitudes are flexible and often inconsistent has become a commonplace in social and political psychology. Beliefs and attitudes adapt to varying circumstances, issues and argumentative positions. This was the starting point for a Dutch survey on prejudice towards immigrants carried out in 1998. Measures of beliefs and attitudes were constructed in order to capture diverse aspects of prejudice. Some of these measures focused on negative evaluations of the characteristics of immigrant groups, others on the implications of prejudice, such as opinions on the rights and obligations of immigrants. In order to determine the flexibility and variability of prejudice, key aspects of the attitudes were experimentally manipulated, such as the (characteristics of the) target immigrant group, the arguments leading to these attitudes or the external support they received. The results show that prejudice is a variable set of attitudes for which a precise line between subjective bias and realistic concerns about immigrants cannot be easily drawn.     

Disgust,Anxiety, and Political Learning in the Face of Threat

Emotions feature prominently in political rhetoric and media frames, and they have potent effects on how people process information. Yet, existing research has largely overlooked the influence of disgust, which is a basic emotion that leads people to avoid contamination threats. We illustrate how disgust may impede learning, as compared to the more commonly studied emotion of anxiety. Disgust and anxiety are natural reactions to many kinds of political threats, but the two emotions influence political engagement in different ways. This study investigated the distinctive effects of disgust in a series of experiments that manipulated information about the outbreak of an infectious disease. People who felt disgusted by a health threat were less likely to learn crucial facts about the threat and less likely to seek additional information. Thus, disgust has the counterintuitive effect of decreasing public engagement in precisely those situations where it is most critical.     

Fear and Anger in Great Britain: Blame Assignment and Emotional Reactions to the Financial Crisis

While we know that emotional reactions are important influences on political behavior, we know far less about the sources of these emotions. This paper studies the causes of fear and anger in reaction to a negative stimulus: the financial crisis. Anger should have been experienced among individuals who believed a specific actor was to blame for the crisis. Moreover, individuals should have been particularly angry if they blamed an actor who should be accountable to them, for example the national government. I test these expectations using a panel survey run in Britain between 2005 and 2010. This data shows that British citizens experienced anger if they held an actor responsible for the crisis. Moreover, they felt particularly angry if they held the Labour government (and to a lesser extent the European Union) responsible. These findings underline the importance of studying the causes of emotional reactions and show how these may be linked to common institutional distinctions between political systems.     

培养学生积极的课堂情绪探析

人总会受到情绪的干扰或激励.在实际教学过程中,学生是整个教学思维活动的主体.课堂教学中学生不是受到积极情绪的激励,就是因为存在消极情绪而影响学习的质量.将学生的课堂思维过程由被动接受改变为主动积极思考,需要从学生的课堂情绪开始做起.     

Civil religious orientations and children's perceptions of political authority

Previous studies concerning the influence of religious variables in the political socialization process have been inadequate because they employed crude operational measures of religious beliefs. This study utilizes the presence of civil religious orientations as an alternative conceptualization of religious beliefs and finds that civil religious orientations among children are highly related to early perceptions of political authority. Moreover, the data suggest that the presence of these civil religious orientations are far more important than the nature of early perceptions of the president in the development of support for the political system.An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1980 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.     

Predicting and Interpolating State‐Level Polls Using Twitter Textual Data

Spatially or temporally dense polling remains both difficult and expensive using existing survey methods. In response, there have been increasing efforts to approximate various survey measures using social media, but most of these approaches remain methodologically flawed. To remedy these flaws, this article combines 1,200 state‐level polls during the 2012 presidential campaign with over 100 million state‐located political tweets; models the polls as a function of the Twitter text using a new linear regularization feature‐selection method; and shows via out‐of‐sample testing that when properly modeled, the Twitter‐based measures track and to some degree predict opinion polls, and can be extended to unpolled states and potentially substate regions and subday timescales. An examination of the most predictive textual features reveals the topics and events associated with opinion shifts, sheds light on more general theories of partisan difference in attention and information processing, and may be of use for real‐time campaign strategy.     

Televised Exposure to Politics: New Measures for a Fragmented Media Environment

For many research purposes, scholars need reliable and valid survey measures of the extent to which people have been exposed to various kinds of political content in mass media. Nonetheless, good measures of media exposure, and of exposure to political television in particular, have proven elusive. Increasingly fragmented audiences for political television have only made this problem more severe. To address these concerns, we propose a new way of measuring exposure to political television and evaluate its reliability and predictive validity using three waves of nationally representative panel data collected during the 2008 presidential campaign. We find that people can reliably report the specific television programs they watch regularly, and that these measures predict change over time in knowledge of candidate issue positions, a much higher standard of predictive validity than any other measure has met to date.     

Beliefs About Corporate America and the Structure of Opinions Toward Privatization

This research analyzes the individual-level factors associated with public support for the private provision of public goods and services. Given that privatization requires the transfer of authority from public to private entities, we argue that beliefs about private companies are an important and overlooked source of heterogeneity in explaining public policy preferences toward privatization. We test this expectation using survey data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We find that support for privatization is associated with positive beliefs about the motivation of private companies and with favorable views about corporate accountability relative to the accountability of government. Opposition to privatization is associated with beliefs about corporate influence in politics. Preferences for limited government are also associated with support for privatization. These results highlight the potential for beliefs about private companies to serve as a group heuristic in political reasoning and the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices on complex public policy issues.     

Measuring Exposure to Political Advertising in Surveys

Research on the influence of negative political advertising in America is characterized by fundamentally conflicting findings. In recent years, however, survey research using estimates of exposure based on a combination of self-reported television viewing habits and Campaign Media Analysis Group data (a database of all advertisements broadcast on national and cable television in the top 75 media markets) has argued that exposure to negative political advertising boosts interest in the campaign and turnout. This paper examines the measurement properties of self-reports of television viewing. I argue that the errors from common survey formats may both be nonrandom and larger than previously acknowledged. The nonrandom error is due to the tendency of politically knowledgeable individuals to be more sensitive to question format. Thus the inferences drawn about the relationship between political knowledge, exposure to negative ads, and political behavior are also sensitive to the measures used to estimate exposure. I demonstrate, however, that one commonly used measure of exposure—the log of estimated exposure—is not only more theoretically defensible but also alleviates some of the more serious problems due to measurement error.

The (Null) Effects of Happiness on Affective Polarization,Conspiracy Endorsement,and Deep Fake Recognition: Evidence from Five Survey Experiments in Three Countries

Affective polarization is a key concern in America and other democracies. Although past evidence suggests some ways to minimize it, there are no easily applicable interventions that have been found to work in the increasingly polarized climate. This project examines whether irrelevant factors, or incidental happiness more specifically, have the power to reduce affective polarization (i.e., misattribution of affect or “carryover effect”). On the flip side, happiness can minimize systematic processing, thus enhancing beliefs in conspiracy theories and impeding individual ability to recognize deep fakes. Three preregistered survey experiments in the US, Poland, and the Netherlands (total N?=?3611) induced happiness in three distinct ways. Happiness had no effects on affective polarization toward political outgroups and hostility toward various divisive social groups, and also on endorsement of conspiracy theories and beliefs that a deep fake was real. Two additional studies in the US and Poland (total N?=?2220), also induced anger and anxiety, confirming that all these incidental emotions had null effects. These findings, which emerged uniformly in three different countries, among different partisan and ideological groups, and for those for whom the inductions were differently effective, underscore the stability of outgroup attitudes in contemporary America and other countries.

     

How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world

We explore how partisan affect shapes citizens' views of party ideology and political competition. We argue that voters' affective ties to parties (both positive and negative) lead them to perceive the ideological positions of those parties as more extreme. Further, when voters are "affectively polarized," i.e., they strongly like some parties and dislike others, they are more likely to view politics as high stakes competition, where ideological polarization is rampant, participation is crucial, and electoral outcomes are highly consequential. Using cross-national survey data covering 43 elections in 34 countries, we show that partisan affect indeed impacts perceptions of party ideology and that affective polarization alters beliefs about the nature of political competition.     

Do White In-group Processes Matter,Too? White Racial Identity and Support for Black Political Candidates

Scholars find that negative evaluations of Blacks lead Whites to vote against Black political candidates. However, can an in-group psychological process have the same effect? We consider White racial identity to be a strong candidate for such a process. We argue that the mere presence of a Black candidate cues the identity, reducing support for these candidates among Whites. We test this hypothesis on vote choice in seven instances. Five of them involve simple vote choice models: the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections, and three elections in 2010: The Massachusetts Gubernatorial election, Black candidates for the US House, and Black candidates for the US Senate. The other two are tests of the notion that White racial identity reduced President Obama’s approval, thus reducing support for all Democratic Congressional candidates in the 2010 Midterm and 2012 Congressional elections. We find support for these notions in all seven cases, across these seven elections, using four different survey research datasets, and four different measures of White identity. Comparisons with other presidential elections show that White identity did not significantly affect mono-racial elections. Furthermore, we find the White identity and racial resentment results to be very similar in terms of their robustness and apparent effect sizes. This indicates in-group evaluations, and those that focus on out-groups, operate independently of one another.