On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide

On the face of it the 1948 Convention on Genocide appears tobe a treaty that on the one hand obliges contracting statesto criminalize and punish genocide in their domestic legal systemsand, on the other, arranges for interstate judicial cooperationfor the repression of genocide. The International Court of Justice(ICJ), in the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, has instead held thatthe Convention, in addition to providing for the criminal liabilityof individuals, also imposes on contracting states as internationalsubjects a set of obligations (to refrain from engaging in genocide,to prevent and punish the crime, and also to refrain for allthose categories of conduct enumerated in Article III: conspiracy,incitement, attempt, complicity). This approach raises two questions:(i) is it warranted so to broaden states' responsibility? (ii)when applying such Article III categories to state responsibility,should an international court such as the ICJ that pronounceson interstate disputes rely upon criminal law categories toestablish whether a state incurs responsibility for conspiracy,complicity, and so on? Or should it instead forge autonomouslegal categories better suited to state responsibility? Theauthor sets forth doubts about whether it is appropriate totranspose criminal law categories to the corpus of internationallaw of state responsibility. In particular, his misgivings relateto the category of ‘state complicity in genocide’as set out by the Court: once the Court decided to transplantthis criminal law category to state responsibility, arguablyit should have relied upon the rigorous concept of complicity,as derived by international criminal courts from case law andthe relevant practice of states, rather than apply a notionthat finds no basis in international criminal law, in comparativecriminal law or in state practice.     

The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) represents a sui generisinternational tribunal on various levels. It is the first timea treaty-based Tribunal has been established through a resolutionof the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII. A furtherunique feature is its sole dependence on domestic substantivecrimes. The attempt to include crimes against humanity in theStatute did not succeed, despite the fact that the elementsof a crime against humanity seem to be discernable in the conductthat falls within the jurisdiction of the STL. References tointernational and regional terrorism instruments, such as theArab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, were alsoabandoned. The Tribunal will rely on Lebanese criminal provisionsregarding terrorism, illicit associations, crimes and offencesagainst life and personal integrity. Lebanese law provides anold but concrete definition of terrorism. This raises the questionof whether the Lebanese definition, with its strengths and weaknesses,could assist in the evolution of a well-structured definitionof international terrorism. The possibility of ‘internationalizing’the Lebanese definition will depend on two factors: the judges’approach in adopting the Tribunal's rules of evidence and procedure,and then more importantly their creativity in developing thejurisprudence of the Tribunal.     

Violence and Massacres -- Towards a Criminal Law of Inhumanity?

The law's responses to massacres seem to vacillate between twomodels: (i) the model of the ‘criminal law of the enemy’inspired by the national criminal law and rendered topical againby the attacks of September 11; (ii) the model of the ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ symbolized by the paradigm of crimesagainst humanity. The latter model is better suited to takeaccount of the qualitative dimension of massacres, i.e. thefact that they, besides being mass offences (quantitative criterion),also offend against humanity. To establish a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ as a model with a universal, or universalizable,dimension, three conditions are necessary, which concern (i)the definition of the crimes, (ii) the assignment of responsibilityand (iii) the nature of the punishment. As for the definitionof the crime, one could implicitly deduce from the list of actsconstituting crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the InternationalCriminal Court Statute) that humanity so protected has two inseparablecomponents: the individuality of each human being, not reducibleto membership in a group, and the equal membership of each inthe human community as a whole. With regard to the second condition,it is not sufficient to hold responsible the de jure or de factoleaders; intermediaries and perpetrators, at all levels of hierarchy,must also be held accountable. As for the third condition, itis not sufficient to content oneself with the watchword of thefight against impunity without bringing up the nature and functionsof the punishment; hence the necessity not only to rethink therole ‘criminal’ law can play in a policy of punishment,but also to focus on prevention, reparation and reconciliation.Finally, the author suggests that the proposed model of a ‘criminallaw of inhumanity’ must be built through the interplaybetween municipal law and international law. On the one hand,the wealth of national legal systems — also with regardto penalties and responsibility — should be better integratedinto international criminal justice; on the other, nationalcriminal systems should be better adapted to conditions of internationallaw, through the introduction into domestic law of the definitionsof the crimes and also the rules for assigning criminal responsibility.     

The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute

By affirming criminal responsibility of the individual, theICC Statute recognizes a distinction from the internationalresponsibility of states, which is the basis of modern internationalcriminal law. The importance of the principle is evident notonly in the breadth and analytical nature of the provision dealingwith it, i.e. Article 25 of the Statute, but by its being placedin the part of the Statute devoted to the ‘General Principlesof Criminal Law’. After an introductory considerationof the context of the Article and of its general implications,this article analyses the contents of the regulation and thetype of responsibility outlined in it. The principle that emergescould be called the ‘personal nature’ of internationalcriminal responsibility. Although the general principles setout in the ICC Statute are rather rudimentary in comparisonwith what is to be found in the ‘General Part’ ofmost national criminal laws, the principle of personal responsibilityemerging from the Statute is nevertheless in the best traditionsof criminal law. It serves both as the foundation and as thelimitation of international criminal responsibility, so helpingto ensure that modern international criminal law is not a toolfor oppression but rather an instrument of justice.     

On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility

Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question.     

Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility

The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and moreas the ‘magic weapon’ in the prosecution of internationalcrimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptualconfusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of(international) criminal law but also invades the traditionalambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obviousif both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases againstaccused with some kind of superior position. After a short introductionon both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the articlegives some examples of their simultaneous application and triesto develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case lawand a ‘dogmatic’ analysis of both the doctrines.A reference to the theory of ‘Organisationsherrschaft’shows that there is yet another option to impute internationalcrimes to top perpetrators.     

To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

One feature of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’)differentiating it from other international criminal tribunals(except for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal) isthat its Statute allows for trials in absentia. The Statutepermits such trials when an accused failed to appear in courtor even to appoint a defence lawyer, but only on the conditionthat, where the indictment could not be served or notified tothe accused, it was duly publicized through the media or communicatedto the state of residence or nationality of the accused. Followingthe case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article22(3) of the STL Statute allows for retrial, except where anabsent defendant was represented at trial by counsel of hisor her own choosing. The author argues this right to retrialshould not be applied either where (i) the accused expresslywaived in writing his right to be present, but then failed toappoint counsel of his choosing; or (ii) a state's failure tohand the accused over to the STL does not cure the accused'srefusal to voluntarily surrender to the STL. She also arguesthat the right of retrial following trials in absentia oughtto accrue to Lebanese courts, notwithstanding Article 5(1) ofthe Statute, which seems to prohibit Lebanese courts retryingindividuals convicted by the STL. Finally, she takes into accountthe position of states that prohibit trials in absentia, butare requested to surrender a person convicted in absentia bythe STL for the purpose of executing his sentence, suggestingan ad hoc agreement between the state in question and the STLmay be required as a remedy.     

Divergent Approaches to Determining Responsibility for Genocide: The Darfur Commission of Inquiry and the ICJ's Judgment in the Genocide Case

Internationally sanctioned assessments of genocide are relativelyuncommon, and since genocide is usually assessed in the contextof an individual's criminal prosecution, assessments of stateresponsibility for genocide are even rarer. Yet two such analyseshave recently been completed: the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur's Report and the International Court of Justice'sJudgment on genocide in Bosnia. On a key issue, the methodologyfor determining whether a state is responsible for genocide,they diverged. Whereas the Darfur Commission determined whetherthe ‘central government’ of Sudan pursued a statepolicy or plan for genocide in Darfur, the ICJ stressed thata state commits genocide through the acts of its officials,holding that if a state organ or a person or group whose actsare legally attributable to the state, engages in genocide,then the international responsibility of that state is incurred.This article critically examines the different methodologicalapproaches taken by these two bodies in light of internationaljurisprudence. It argues that the Darfur Commission erred infocusing its genocide inquiry on whether high-level officialsin Sudan's government possessed genocidal intent, rather thanon the perpetrators of the underlying criminal acts. In addition,it argues that, whether the Commission's goal was to determinestate responsibility or individual criminal responsibility,its approach was at variance with international law as elucidatedin the UN ad hoc tribunals and as subsequently confirmed bythe ICJ in the Genocide Case. In that regard, the ICJ Judgmentreestablishes two sound methodological principles: the existenceof a state plan or policy, although probative of intent, isnot an implicit element of genocide; and determining state intent(however that may be defined) is not a part of determining stateresponsibility for genocide.     

Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon contains severalremarkable innovations. One major novelty is its mandate. Whileits subject matter jurisdiction includes terrorism, this isdefined solely on the basis of Lebanese law. It does not coverany international crime, but exclusively offences defined underthe Lebanese Penal Code. Unusually for a court of internationalcharacter, its activities could be limited to a single case:the attack of 14 February 2005 which killed Rafiq Hariri and22 others; the Special Tribunal will try other cases only ifthey are found to be connected to this attack. As its jurisdictionmirrors the mandate of the UN International Independent InvestigationCommission, the Statute of the Special Tribunal contains originalprovisions regulating its relationship with this body, as wellas with the Lebanese judicial authorities, which enjoy concurrentcompetence. Other important innovations concern the applicableprocedural law, which includes provisions concerning a pre-trialjudge, the role of the judges in conducting the hearings, theparticipation of victims in proceedings, and the possibilityof holding trials in absentia. These latter aspects are allcharacteristic of Romano Germanic criminal systems, and reflectthe intention of the drafters to draw up a more efficient internationalcriminal procedure.     

Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case

When adjudicating international crimes, domestic courts arefaced with a choice between the application of internationallaw or national law. In the recent van Anraat judgment, a DutchDistrict Court explicitly opted for the former alternative.This approach led to the accused's acquittal of complicity ingenocide. In the Court's opinion, there was no proof beyonda reasonable doubt that van Anraat had actual knowledge of SaddamHussein's special intent to destroy part of the Kurdish population.According to the Court, such proof is required under internationallaw. This article argues that the Court's preference for internationallaw was not prescribed, either by international law or by domesticlaw, although in principle such preference may prove advisable,whenever international rules are clear and exhaustive. Aftertracing the intricate legal discussions on mens rea requirementsfor genocide and complicity in genocide, the author concludesthat the issue has not yet been completely elucidated in internationalcase law and legal literature. In situations of ambiguity whereinternational case law offers insufficient guidance, domesticcourts would better resort to their own criminal law. As Dutchcriminal law extends the mens rea of the accomplice beyond ‘knowledge’so as to cover dolus eventualis as well, application of domesticlaw might have affected the outcome of the case.     

The Problem with Entrapment

In R v Looseley; Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of2000) the House of Lords articulated a legal framework to govern‘entrapment’ in criminal cases. Their Lordshipsregarded the need for judicial intervention to assist entrappeddefendants as uncontroversial. This article argues that thedoctrine they set out, in fact, necessitates substantial, andlargely unarticulated, departures from principles the courtsordinarily stress as fundamental to the criminal law. In particular,entrapment doctrine determines liability for criminal acts byreference to the kind of environment inhabited by their perpetrators,a perspective the law ordinarily attempts to exclude. This articlesuggests that the anomalous treatment of entrapment can be understoodas a device to prevent the police from relocating the temptationto commit crime to environments in which they are not ordinarilyconfronted and to ensure that those from backgrounds in whichserious criminality is not usually a plausible option will escapepunishment if tempted to commit crime by the police.     

The Concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise and Domestic Modes of Liability for Parties to a Crime: A Comparison of German and English Law

The concept of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) has becomea useful tool in international criminal law. It allows courtsto hold individuals criminally liable for group activities towhich they have contributed in a criminally relevant way. Theconcept allows for an attribution of criminal responsibilityof unforeseen consequences of such group activities, and itseems to enable the prosecution and the courts to extend criminalliability to high-level perpetrators that use subordinated personsfor their criminal aims. The advantages of such a tool are obvioussince the crimes under international criminal law are mostlyof a systematic, large-scale and collective character, whiledomestic criminal law mainly deals with less complex crimesthat are normally committed by individuals who can easily belinked to the crime. Due to this empirical or criminologicalfact, it seems logical that the normal modes of liability forparties to a crime used in domestic criminal law need to beadapted, and that a rather extensive assignment of criminalliability for secondary parties is justified in internationalcriminal law. This article seeks to question this assumptionby undertaking a comparative analysis of domestic modes of liability.The author aims to show, on the one hand, to what extent theconcept of JCE is in line with the general concept of partiesto a crime in domestic criminal law. On the other hand, theauthor argues that abandoning the idea of JCE as an independentmode of liability may lead to better compliance with the principlesof legality and individual criminal responsibility and therebyincrease the legitimacy of international criminal law.     

Similar Facts in Civil Cases

This essay evaluates the recent restatement in O’Brienv Chief Constable of South Wales Police of the law on similarfacts in civil proceedings. The two-stage approach propoundedin O’Brien contains a number of conceptual problems. Apparentsimplicity was achieved by avoiding fundamental issues underlyingthis area. Prior to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, judges recognizedthat the common law similar facts rule had a role to play inboth civil and criminal trials; but they gave the rule a widerexclusionary scope in criminal than in civil cases. Adoptionof a moral perspective helps to explain this state of affairs.The rule, so it will be argued, protects the legitimacy of trialdeliberation by forbidding reliance on an assumption that disrespectsthe moral autonomy of the person whose conduct is being judged.This moral objection can arise in civil cases; but it arisesmore frequently and usually with greater force in criminal proceedings.Hence, while there is a need to reserve some judicial powerto disallow proof of similar incidents in the civil context,there is usually less reason for the exercise of that powerin civil cases than at criminal trials.     

国际航空犯罪法人刑事责任及其国内立法转化研究

2010年《北京公约》和《北京议定书》首次规定了国际航空犯罪法人责任,法人责任以法人的高级管理人员代表法人实施劫持航空器等国际航空犯罪为要件,法人为此承担刑事、民事或行政责任。公约对法人犯罪及其责任的立法需要转化为国内法才能适用。世界各国国内法对法人犯罪及其责任的态度差别较大,英国、加拿大、法国等国刑法规定有航空犯罪的法人刑事责任,德国国内法规定有航空犯罪的法人行政责任,意大利刑法规定有航空犯罪的法人民事责任,我国仅在个别航空犯罪中规定有法人犯罪及其刑事责任。我国法人犯罪及其刑事责任的立法和理论具有较强的包容性,可在我国刑法中取消法人犯罪法定化限制,全面规定包括航空犯罪在内的法人犯罪及其刑事责任。     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Punishment of Children Under English Law – Public and Private Vices?

The punishment of children in the domestic sphere and in the public domain is an issue of concern for those with care of children or whose interests lie in the protection of children’s human rights. How children are treated when they are judged to have broken rules reveals fundamental approaches to the welfare of those who have yet to reach adulthood. The effect of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in respect of how children are punished, whether in the home or as transgressors of criminal law, may be examined through two distinct but linked spheres: the private and home life context of domestic or personal punishment, and the public domain of state punishment of children in terms of criminal responsibility under English Law. Both spheres reveal attitudes towards the rights of children which suggest how human rights are accorded to particular groups in applying international obligations to a state’s domestic provision. This article seeks to explore some issues of compliance with Article 19 (the physical chastisement of children), Article 37 (the imprisonment of children being a ‚last resort’) and Article 40 (the minimum age of criminal responsibility) of the United Nations Convention on the␣Rights of the Child. The application of the rights of children and the operation of the ‚best interests’ of the child in applying Articles 19, 37 and 40 suggests that there are issues in relation to non-compliance which indicate a diminution of the separate rights of children under English Law in particular and in the operation of the best interests of the child. Penny Booth is a Reader in Law at Staffordshire University Law School.     

The Requirement of an 'Express Agreement' for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: A Critique of Brdanin

The mode of liability known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE)has emerged in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a means of assigning criminalliability to individuals for activities carried out by a collective.As a result, the doctrine must be carefully defined so as notto allow it to extend a defendant's liability beyond the appropriatelimits of individual criminal responsibility. In this regard,a recent ICTY Trial Chamber decision in Branin held that, wherea defendant is not alleged to have participated in the physicalperpetration of the crimes charged but to have contributed insome other way to the commission of the crimes by a group, theprosecution must demonstrate that the defendant entered intoan express agreement with the physical perpetrators to committhe crimes charged. The author argues that this ‘expressagreement requirement’ is both conceptually unsound andpractically unhelpful. Conceptually, it would be inconsistentwith core principles of JCE liability to require an expressagreement between a defendant and the physical perpetratorsof crimes, at least in circumstances in which it is allegedthat there existed a structure of two or more overlapping JCEs.Moreover, because this structure allows the accused and thephysical perpetrators to be operating in two separate JCEs,they need not even share a common criminal purpose. On a practicallevel, arguably in a ‘system-criminality’ contextsuch as the one that developed in the former Yugoslavia duringthe time period in question, the organizers of criminal activityare unlikely to enter into express criminal agreements withthose who physically carry out crimes, because existing organizedhierarchies provide much more efficient mechanisms by whichleaders are able to ensure the realization of their criminalplans.     

Great Expectations: The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy

This article first explores whether Italy is under an obligationto implement the Rome Statute that it ratified in 1999. It thenidentifies the general sets of inconsistencies between Italianlegislation and the Rome Statute and analyses whether and towhat extent the former needs to be amended or integrated inorder to implement the substantive provisions of the latter,in particular in relation to the definition of crimes, generalprinciples of criminal responsibility, defences and other barsto prosecution. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction by Italiancourts over crimes in the Rome Statute is discussed in the lightof the principle of complementarity on which the jurisdictionof the International Criminal Court is based.         Mere dreams,mere dreams!         W.B. Yeats,Meditations in Time of Civil War, I (1928)     

Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility

This article examines the role that command responsibility currentlyplays in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunals rely in principleon a broad concept of command responsibility – which canbe applied to all superiors, including political and civilianones. However, in practice, accused persons have only rarelybeen successfully charged under this form of liability. Indeed,recent case law has gradually adopted a rigorous approach withrespect to the legal requirements of command responsibility.This has made it more difficult to establish criminal liabilityof superiors who have not directly participated in the commissionof international offences. The ad hoc tribunals have expressedan explicit preference for forms of ‘direct’ liabilitywhere the accused can be convicted both under ‘direct’and command responsibility. While the ICTY and ICTR have progressivelyinterpreted other international legal concepts to deal effectivelywith collective crimes committed by leaders of organized groups,they seem to have confined command responsibility to internationalcrimes perpetrated in typical military-like contexts.     

Stateless Crimes,Legitimacy, and International Criminal Law: The Case of Organ Trafficking

Organ trafficking and trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ transplantation are recognized as significant international problems. Yet these forms of trafficking are largely left out of international criminal law regimes and to some extent of domestic criminal law regimes as well. Trafficking of organs or persons for their organs does not come within the jurisdiction of the ICC, except in very special cases such as when conducted in a manner that conforms to the definitions of genocide or crimes against humanity. Although the United States Code characterizes trafficking as “a transnational crime with national implications,” (22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2010)), trafficking is rarely prosecuted in domestic courts. It has thus functioned in practice largely as what might be judged a “stateless” offense, out of the purview of both international and national courts. Yet these forms of organ trafficking remain widespread—and devastating to those who are its victims. In this article, we begin by describing what is known about the extent of organ trafficking and trafficking in persons for the purpose of removal of organs. We then critically evaluate how and why such trafficking has remained largely unaddressed by both international and domestic criminal law regimes. This state of affairs, we argue, presents a missed chance for developing the legitimacy of international criminal law and an illustration of how far current international legal institutions remain from ideal justice.