Truman's revenge: Social control and corporate crime

Many criminologists have found that corporate crime does more harm than street crime, whether measured by property lost, money stolen, or lives taken. Yet, public concern about crime is almost exclusively focused on street crime and “just deserts” for the offender. The authors argue that corporate criminality is more likely than individual criminality to be planned and subjected to cost/benefit analysis than street crime and therefore more likely to be deterred by raising the costs of corporate criminality. The Model Penal Code is used to demonstrate that both individual and corporate crime produce a comparable array of avoidable harms. Public policies that demand just deserts for individual offenders (natural persons) are revealed as highly inconsistent with policies that protect corporations (juristic persons) from accountability for the harms they create. A philosophical and legal foundation for corporate crime control strategies is provided. The authors propose a sanctions regime for corporate criminals comparable to the sanctions regime imposed on natural persons for street crimes. Strategies to avoid risk shifting by corporations are suggested. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Cultural explanation and organizational crime

Both the number and influence of organizations increased dramatically during the 20^th century, which helps explain why the problem of organizational crime has received attention from investigators. Growing interest in organizational and corporate crime has been matched by interest in organizational culture. Variation in organizational culture is employed to explain many aspects of organizational performance, from effectivenessin goal attainment to criminal conduct. There are reasons, however, to be critical of theoretical constructions and empirical investigations of organizational culture. There is both considerable ambiguity about its meaning and an implicit assumption of intra-organizational cultural uniformity. Cultural explanations were developed principally in case studies, empirical analyses are flawed, and supportive post hoc interpretations ofinteresting or enigmatic findings are commonplace. The influence of hierarchy and agency as constraints on organizational culture has received insufficient attention. We interpret the appeal of organizational culture despite the absence of demonstrated predictive value, and we call for additional research on sources of variation in organizational crime.     

意大利企业合规制度的全面解读及其启示

意大利是较早建立企业合规体系,法治经验相对成熟的国家。第231号法令跨越意大利《宪法》第27条的障碍,规定了判断企业责任的主客观标准,将企业责任建立在组织性罪过基础之上。企业免责的唯一途径是构建有效合规计划。如果企业能够证明在犯罪发生之前已采用并有效地实施了组织、管理和控制模式,则可以免除责任。该法令实施20年来,通过持续性革新,将反腐败合规计划由公共机构扩展至私营企业,规定合规计划中辩诉交易的适用条件,引入配额制的经济制裁手段,实现了自我完善。我国的企业合规改革刚刚起步,应当重视企业刑事合规的法治化,明确单位犯罪的归责基础,单位犯罪治理应当由事后惩治模式向事先预防的企业合规模式转变,立法上应当增设配额罚金制和褫夺资格处罚,以建立相对完善的、符合我国国情的企业合规制度。     

Re-imagining crime prevention: controlling corporate crime?

While the discourses and practices of crime prevention are of increasing salience, few criminologists have sought the inclusion of corporate illegalities on such agendas. Relatedly, within criminology, there has been a diminished tendency to think in idealistic, utopian and emancipatory terms. This paper is one small attempt to think in precisely such terms.¹ But it is not an exercise in pure imagination. In particular, the paper makes extended reference to Finland, where recent experience suggests that corporate crime prevention may be feasible, under certain conditions, albeit subject to certain limitations. Thus we consider both the desirability and the feasibility of corporate crime prevention intruding upon the generally narrowly constructed terrain of ‘crime prevention’. We begin with a critique of some of the key aspects of crime prevention discourses – at both theoretical and practical levels – with a particular emphasis upon the extent to which these are both more appropriately and usefully applied to corporate crime prevention, before going on to discuss corporate crime prevention ‘in action’, through a focus upon recent developments in Finland. In a concluding section, we consider various aspects of both the desirability and feasibility of corporate crime prevention.     

On the dark side of the code: organizational challenges to an effective anti-corruption strategy

Corporations have been fighting for decades to eliminate corruption. However, despite the proliferation of compliance programs and a recurrent surge of interest in business ethics, commercial bribery prevails as a “rational choice strategy” for economic success and thus is widely regarded as the result of immoral choices of greedy individuals. This article reports on a modus operandi study concerning corruption within a large industrial corporation (Siemens AG). Results highlight the fact that neither consistent anti-corruption norms nor severe formal sanctions were able to deter certain employees from deviant behavior in this landmark case of structural corruption. Sociologists and business economists have both pointed to the organizational culture that provides an explanation for this paradox. The author compares three diverging hypotheses: (1) private gain, (2) cognitive normalization, and (3) organizational cultures, and concludes that the structural causes of corrupt practices fit the definition of ‘useful illegality’ (Luhmann). To a large extent, this old sociological concept resembles the criminological idea of corporate crime, but it emphasizes the cultural factors that undermine management’s preventive strategies, and thus holds the promise of theoretical progress. Implications that emerge from the case analysis for the social control of corporate bribe payers are discussed. The discussion reveals why challenges to successful anti-corruption efforts persist at the organizational level.     

Public perceptions of white-collar crime and punishment

Although financial losses from white-collar crime continue to exceed those of street crime, the criminal justice system has traditionally focused on the latter. Past research suggested that citizens are more likely to support punitive sanctions for street offenders than white-collar offenders. Recent corporate scandals have increased public awareness of white-collar crime, but whether public attitudes have been altered remains to be determined. Using a 2005 national sample of 402 telephone survey participants, the current study examined citizen perceptions of white-collar and street crime, as well as attitudes regarding apprehension and punishment. This research extended prior studies by also considering the influence of sociodemographic characteristics as well as perceptions of white-collar crime and punishment on the public's support for increasing resource allocation. Implications for future research and development of more effective white-collar crime control policy are discussed.     

Using meta-analysis under conditions of definitional ambiguity: the case of corporate crime

Given the reliance on meta-analyses to produce criminal justice policy recommendations, it is important to think critically about how this method is being applied in practice. In this study, we use data from a meta-analysis of corporate crime deterrence to demonstrate that applying meta-analytic methods to conceptually ambiguous research domains is problematic. Although meta-analysis is capable of modeling methodological variations in different research projects examining the same construct, analysts should not assume that meta-analytic methods are always appropriate; methodological differences may reflect underlying conceptual dissimilarities – this violates an assumption of meta-analysis. We also offer a critique of the corporate crime field for failing to clearly define its outcome, a critique that can be extended to other areas of criminological study.     

SEVERE SANCTIONS,EASY CHOICE? INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF SCHOOL SANCTIONS IN PREVENTING ADOLESCENT VIOLENT OFFENDING*

Although schools in the United States adopted harsher disciplinary policies in the early 1990s, to date, there is little evidence showing whether severe school sanctions against student misconduct prevent crime. Drawing on both deterrence and rational choice theories, we test the proposition that harsh school‐based policies against violence reduce students’ involvement in violent behavior. However, in contrast to prior research that explores the direct link between sanctions and student behavior, we emphasize the role of school sanctions in adolescent cognitive decision‐making processes, hypothesizing that school sanctions against violence condition the effect of thoughtfully reflective decision making (TRDM) on adolescent involvement in violent behavior. We use data from the first two waves of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to test our research hypotheses. The results from a series of multilevel models show that more severe school sanctions against violence (i.e., home suspension and expulsion) disarm the process of cognitive reflection and attenuate the effect of low TRDM on violent offending.     

Enron Et Al.: Paradigmatic White Collar Crime Cases for the New Century

The Enron et al. cases (i.e., the series of “corporate scandal” cases emerging in 2001–2002, beginning with Enron, and including such cases as WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and Tyco) are the first major American white collar crime cases of the new century. This article identifies some of the key attributes of these cases. The Enron et al. cases can only be understood by applying criminological theory on several different levels; structural, organizational, dramaturgic and individualistic dimensions are applied to the Enron case in particular. The Enron et al. cases must also be understood in the context of an emerging postmodern society. The specific role of criminologists in explaining and responding to these paradigmatic new white collar crime cases is addressed. The article ends with some conjectures on the potential outcomes of the Enron et al. cases. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Causal factors of corporate crime in Taiwan: qualitative and quantitative findings

Street crimes are a primary concern of most criminologists in Taiwan. In recent years, however, crimes committed by corporations have increased greatly in this country. Employing the empirical approach to collect data about causal factors of corporate crime, the research presented in this article is the first systematic empirical study concerning corporate crime in Taiwan. The research sample was selected from a corporation with a criminal record of pollution caused by the release of toxic chemicals into the environment and a corporation with no criminal record. Questionnaire survey and interviews of corporate employees and managers were conducted, and secondary data were collected from official agencies. This research indicated the causal factors of corporate crime as follows: the failure of government regulation, lack of corporate self-regulation, lack of public concern about corporate crime, corporate mechanistic structure, and the low self-control tendency of corporate managers.     

“Scholarly influence” and white-collar crime scholarship

This article explores many of the factors that play a role in the relative lack of scholarly influence of criminology and criminal justice professionals who focus on studying white-collar and corporate crime. The latest studies of “scholarly influence” in criminology and criminal justice journals and textbooks based on citation analyses confirm the absence of scholars who study white-collar and corporate crime. The sparse inclusion of white-collar and corporate crime topics in criminology and criminal justice curriculum in academic programs also indicate that the area is considered by many as a subfield rather than a mainstream component of academic criminology. Whether or not this status will change remains to be seen, but, on a positive note, there are a few encouraging signs that scholarly influence in the field will include more white-collar criminologists in the future.     

Deciding to prosecute white-collar crime: A national survey of state attorneys general

In the past decade, academic research on white-collar crime has reemerged. Most of this inquiry has focused on three general issues: (1) public attitudes toward the seriousness of white-collar crime; (2) the use of government sanctions to control white-collar crime; (3) the differential and often beneficial treatment afforded white-collar criminals in comparison to traditional offenders. Little of this research has examined the prosecutorial link between occurrences of white-collar crime and the imposition of sanctions on white-collar offenders. In this study, an attempt to focus on the link that exists at the level of state attorneys general, a survey of the 50 state attorneys general was conducted. The results suggest the following: (1) state attorneys general prefer to use criminal sanctions, but use them most in cases involving individuals; (2) when organizations are involved in white-collar criminality, civil intervention is preferred; (3) the most crucial factor in the decision to prosecute and investigate white-collar crime is the seriousness of the offense; (4) the least important factors in the decision to investigate and prosecute white-collar violations are publicity aspects and political considerations; (5) state attorneys general may play an important part in the prosecution of white-collar crime because of the limited resources available in most local prosecutors' offices.     

A contextual analysis of crime rates: The Korean case<Superscript>⋆</Superscript>

During recent attempts to understand crime in relation to its environments, studies have focused on a single aspect of either economic or organizational context. Furthermore, scant attention has been given to the independent role of the political influence on response to criminal activity. This study examines the relative roles of economic conditions, organizational constraints of police, and political climate in explaining changes in crime rates by incorporating these three contexts into a single study. By using a variety of official statistics, we conducted time-series analyses to examine the social context of crime over the past three decades in South Korea. Findings indicate, first, that the unemployment rate is the best predictor of changes in crime rates; it consistently increased the level of both property and violent crimes. Second, organizational capacity, as indicated by police per capita, is found not to have any consistent effect on crime rates. Third, the impact of political repression, measured by the presence of extraordinary laws and the number of political prisoners, also shows inconsistent effects on crime. However, crime rates were somewhat lower during the past three military regimes, which support the argument that authoritarian governments exercised more punitive sanctions to deter crimes. Implications are discussed and suggestions are offered for future research on this topic.This work was supported by Korean Research Foundation Grant (KRF-2004-003-BO0142). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 mettings of the American Society of Criminology. We would like to thank Ivan Sun for his insightful comments and helpful suggestions.     

Introduction: White-Collar and Corporate Crime in Asia

In this introduction to this special issue of the Journal we broadly consider the problem of white-collar and corporate crime in Asia. Official reports from China show the pervasiveness of current problems and the inherent dangers underlying continued economic growth and reforms. We also consider evidence bearing on the idea that Japan’s remarkably low rate of common crime is likely eclipsed by the level of white-collar and corporate crime, and briefly discuss the institutionalization of economic crime in South Korea. Issues related to the lack of study of white-collar and corporate lawbreaking in Asia are also addressed. Finally, we introduce the papers and topics of this special issue, which include comparative research on cybercrime, the enforcement of intellectual property violations, accounting fraud, financial crime, and offenses in the mutual fund industry.     

Criminalizing white-collar misconduct

In this article we examine three explanations for the differential treatment of white-collar offenders by the legal system: (1) an organizational advantage argument in which offenders in “organizationally shielded” positions receive more lenient treatment, (2) an alternative sanctions argument in which civil sanctions replace criminal sanctions in the response to white-collar crime, and (3) a system capacity argument in which the legal response to white-collar crime is driven primarily by resources and caseload pressures. These three theoretical arguments are tested through an analysis of data on individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes against savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. We seek to determine the factors that influenced prosecutors to file criminal charges against some of these suspects and not others. We conclude that all three models may be limited in their ability to explain low rates of prosecution in cases involving white-collar crimes of the sort examined here, and suggest that these limitations may have to do with the circumscribed levels of analysis at which these explanations have been pitched.     

Environmental crime prosecutions in Ireland, 2004–2014

Despite increased interest in environmental crime and green criminology, few studies address the use of criminal penalties in response to environmental crimes. A handful of published examples employ data from the United States or the Flanders court system, and little is known about how other nations punish environmental violations. Addressing this issue, the current study examined the use of criminal environmental penalties in Ireland from 2004 to 2014. Few criminal environmental cases (N = 147) and few environmental offenders (N = 154) were represented in these data over time. Consistent with the expectations of green/environmental crime researchers, mean penalties for environmental violations, which in Ireland only include fines and investigative cost recovery penalties, were rather small. Unlike in the US or Flanders, the majority of offenders were corporate offenders as opposed to individuals. Contextual factors related to Ireland’s economy, history and use of criminal sanctions should be used to interpret these factors, and prevent generalising from these data.     

Sanctioning corporate crime: How do business executives and the public compare?

Previous literature on attitudes toward the punishment or seriousness of criminal behavior has largely neglected to focus systematically upon five issues: (1) public perceptions of corporate illegality rather than perceptions of street crime or other forms of white-collar lawlessness; (2) how evaluations are conditioned by the degree of culpability and harm an offense involves; (3) the circumstances under which citizens will support the use of legal sanctions against an individual executive as opposed to a corporate entity; (4) the public's willingness to support criminal as opposed to civil intervention into various kinds of illegal corporate activities; and (5) how business executives' attitudes toward corporate legal sanctioning compare to those held by the general public. Through a survey of residents and business executives in a midwestern metropolitan area, an attempt was made to shed light on these issues. The analysis revealed a pervasive willingness among the sample to embrace the use of civil sanctions against corporations regardless of the circumstances surrounding the conduct being rated. By contrast, advocacy of civil remedies against executives and criminal penalties against either the corporation or its executives was found to vary considerably according to the culpability and harm manifested by a given illegal act. Also, public support for sanctioning corporate behavior was consistently higher than the support evidenced by executives, especially where the sanctions were directed at individual corporate managers.     

Anticipated shaming and criminal offending

Criminological research suggests that informal sanctions like shaming may have a stronger influence on crime than do formal sanctions, but research has yet to examine whether anticipated shaming may mediate the relationship between crime and variables derived from dominant micro-level theories. The present paper argues that variables derived from learning, control, strain, and deterrence theories influence criminal offending via their effect on anticipated shaming. Using data collected from a sample of young adults, results from both tobit and path analyses suggest that the prospect of shaming among friends and family bears a stronger direct relation to criminal intent than do more commonly examined variables and that the effect of such variables on criminal intent is largely indirect, mediated by anticipated shaming. We therefore suggest that crime control efforts might benefit from incorporating a greater role for Braithwaite's conception of reintegrative shaming.     

Desert,retribution, and corporate criminality

The role of commensurate deserts in the punishment of corporations and their agents has received little attention to date. Those who have written on desert and corporate crime dismiss it on the grounds that retributive rationales, which incorporate notions of desert, are not applicable to corporate offenses and because desert, with its focus on the moral opprobrium attached to criminal conduct, is not fitting for offenses which are regulatory and thus “morally neutral.” This essay argues that although retribution is a viable justification for corporate punishments, it need not be the only or even the primary justification for punishment for desert to be applicable in the distribution of corporate sanctions. It also questions the position of moral neutrality, citing empirical evidence of the public's perceptions of the seriousness of corporate criminal activity.     

Deterrence and tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation costs

The tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures varies across legal jurisdictions and time. The effects of these different tax regimes – particularly, on crime deterrence – have not been fully explored. Instead, legal intuitions in court decisions and legislative reforms are found. This paper explores the effects of these tax regimes. It shows that our common intuitions are sometimes misguided, since we tend to ignore cross-effects between crime and litigation. For example, contrary to commonly held views, it is shown that non-deductibility of monetary sanctions may increase the level of crime, if litigation expenses are deductible. In addition, if deductibility of legal expenses depends only on a successful trial outcome, this may also increase amounts spent on litigation and time allocated to crime. As this paper shows, however, a complete deductibility regime, under which both monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures are deductible, maintains the pre-tax levels of crime and litigation expenditures for risk-neutral offenders. The paper further explores the effects of different tax reforms.