Assessing the best interests of the child in cases of cross-border surrogacy: inconsistency in the Strasbourg approach?

This article examines the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to assessing the best interests of the child in three recent cases of cross-border surrogacy, namely Mennesson v France, Labassee v France and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy. It is argued that these cases reveal inconsistency in the ECtHR’s assessment of the best interests of the child. In Mennesson and Labassee, the ECtHR found that the national authorities’ refusal to legally recognise the relationships between the children and the intended parents amounted to a violation of Article 8 ECHR, whereas no violation was found in Paradiso. A notable distinguishing feature of Paradiso was that there was no genetic relationship between the child and the intended parents, and it is this point that seemingly led the Court to assess the best interests of that child differently to the others.     

Political representation in the networked society: the Americanisation of European systems of responsible party government?

The Internet provides a new technological opportunity structure for political representatives to communicate with constituents. Its potential for decentralised, interactive mass communication allows MPs to bypass intermediary organisations such as political parties and to establish a direct relationship with their constituents. Students of electronic democracy are divided over the political consequences of this technological change in telecommunications. While cyber-optimists envisage a transformation of responsible party government into a more direct, individualised type of political representation, cyber-sceptics adopt a more cautious approach and predict a reinforcement of established systems of political representation in the networked society. This article aims to develop a theoretical foundation as well as to carry out an empirical test of both positions. In the theoretical section, these two contradictory positions are modelled on the assumption that party government is a rationalistic concept. In the empirical section, both positions are tested in a statistical analysis of the use of personal websites in the German Bundestag, the Swedish Riksdag and the US House of Representatives.     

The Turn to Imagination in Legal Theory: The Re-Enchantment of the World?

Various contemporary legal theorists have turned to ‘imagination’ as a keyword in their accounts of law. This turn is fruitfully considered as a potential response to the modern condition diagnosed by Max Weber as ‘disenchantment’. While disenchantment is often seen as a symptom of a post-metaphysical age, it is best understood as the consummation of metaphysics and not its overcoming. Law’s participation in disenchantment is illustrated by way of Holmes’ parable of the dragon in ‘The Path of the Law’, which illustrates the rationalization and demystification of law. Four ideal–typical turns to ‘imagination’ are identified: the theoretical (turning to imagination as synthesis), the progressive (imagination as empathy), the transformative (imagination as invention) and the nostalgic (imagination as attunement). Most of these turns to imagination remain complicit with disenchantment. ‘Imagination’ often appears only to be harnessed in the service of more conventional keywords of legal thought: theoreticians turn to imagination as synthesis to serve as a form of super-reason; progressives turn to imagination as empathy to make law a more effective instrument; transformatives turn to imagination as invention to serve as a form of super-will. By turning to imagination as attunement, nostalgics come closest to accepting a world that is not masterable, i.e. they come closest to accepting an enchantment that is a gift and not the product of our imaginations. Indeed, modern imaginations are themselves symptoms of disenchantment. If Weber’s diagnostic calls for a human response, it cannot be one of overcoming disenchantment by imaginative re-enchantment: it belongs integrally to enchantment to exceed any and all human capacities.     

A stem-family society without the stem-family ideology? The case of eighteenth-century Poland1

This paper mobilizes historical census microdata and quantitative methods to answer a seemingly qualitative question of whether the stem-family organization, profoundly described in sociological and anthropological literature, existed in historical western Poland. The paper’s narrative takes a threefold argumentation format, each step relying on different methodologies. First, using household registers data and basic tools of historical demography we come to the point where a conjectural hypothesis of stem-family prevalence in the territories in question seems to be necessarily rejected. However, the vivid prevalence of the stem family is brought back to the fore in the second step, when empirical data are combined with more sophisticated statistical tools (computer microsimulation of kin sets). Finally, the latter observation is problematized in light of the historical contextual information, which altogether makes the incidence of stem-family organization in the region unthinkable given the existing socio-cultural and political-economic framework. We close with a contemplation of the limits of quantitative approaches to concerns over historical family systems, and with a discussion of the extent to which – given this apparent conundrum – our findings may illuminate existing models of historical family systems.     

A commentary on the principle of the child’s best interests —the weakness and improvement of marriage and family law

International documents like the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) propose that in mediating on children issues, the best interests of the child should be the primary consideration. In China, the Constitution and the Law on the Protection of Minors have already set out the terms in principle for the protection of minors, however, it has not been defined in the Marriage Law (2001). In order to enforce the commitment of respecting and safeguarding human rights, the child’s best interest principle should be established in marriage and family law, along with amending related provisions.     

The importance of ethics in the law curriculum: essential or incidental?

Recently, the debate as to whether ethics should be a compulsory requirement of a law degree was refuelled when the English and Welsh Legal Education Training Review (LETR) recommended that professional ethics should be primarily addressed in vocational Legal Services and Education Training programmes and that learning outcomes in the academic curriculum should include reference to morality and the law, the values supporting the legal system and their connection to the role of lawyers. This debate is also occurring in other jurisdictions. In Australia the debate is focused on the proposal that ethics be removed as a compulsory subject in the law degree. This proposal has raised a concern that law students will be denied the opportunity to develop as ethically competent lawyers. This paper argues for the continuation of ethics as a core component of a law degree and evidences the model used for the teaching of ethics in the law degree at the University of Technology Sydney in support of our argument. The background to the model is examined to highlight the significance of student feedback and ongoing curriculum review, including the alignment of parallel pedagogical factors. This model serves as an example of not only why ethics should be core to a law degree but, in order to provide graduates who are ethical and reflective practitioners, why ethics should be pervasively taught throughout the degree and supported by an introductory and capstone presence.     

Patient narrative: an ‘on-switch’ for evaluating best interests

This article examines how the wishes, feelings, values and beliefs of adults lacking capacity can be evaluated and the extent to which they are given effect in best interests decision-making. One way of fulfilling the clinician’s legal responsibilities to take a patient’s preferences into account is to explicitly link these to the notion of narrative. Narratives provide a compelling grounding and give weight to views and values that may have been informally and consistently expressed in the past. An evaluation of recent case law suggests that the trajectory of a person’s life, their character and personality, and the perspectives of those with whom the patient has valued relationships are given increasing judicial recognition. Attending to the narrative of the patient could lead to a more sophisticated judgement of best interests than an objective ‘balance sheet’ approach would allow and enable greater alignment with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.     

The bones in the Abbey: are they the murdered princes? A review of the evidence

In 1674, the skeletons of two children were found in the Tower of London. They were believed to represent the remains of the "Princes in the Tower" (who had disappeared in 1483), and were reinterred as such in Westminster Abbey. Popular belief and conventional historical tradition held that the princes had been murdered by their uncle, King Richard III, to clear his path to the throne. In 1933, the bones in the Abbey were disinterred and examined, with the conclusion that they were indeed those of the princes. One skull was also thought to show evidence of death by suffocation, supporting another feature of popular legend. Later reviews of the investigation, however, revealed significant errors and omissions. This report summarizes the inconsistencies present in the scientific record and suggests that reexamination of the remains with improved techniques in both carbon dating and forensic science would provide a much more accurate analysis, thus helping to clarify the historical record.     

Beyond the Law?: The Justice of Deconstruction

This paper offers a close reading of Derridas essay Force of Law that emphasises the twin strengths of a deconstructive approach to questions of law and justice -- textual analysis and political context. Derridas interest is in limit or test cases, and so he engages with the fraying edges of the law, its borders, the frontiers that are most heavily policed because they are most fragile, for example capital punishment, genocide, general strikes and terrorism. Derrida undertakes an exploration of violence through a reinterpretation of Walter Benjamins Critique of Violence. At the heart of Derridas difficult argument is a demand for justice that goes beyond the cataloguing of specific injustices, and beyond the terms of Benjamins critique. The utopian impulse that underpins Force of Law is carried over into Specters of Marx, Derridas recent explicit grappling with the legacy of Marxism. The links between these two texts by Derrida implies a sustained politics of radical commitment on the part of deconstruction, a commitment to future forms of legality and egalitarianism, a theory of justice posited upon prescience rather than precedent.     

Claiming the Right to Health in Brazilian Courts: The Exclusion of the Already Excluded?

The aim of this article is to test a widespread belief among Brazilian legal scholars in the area of social rights, namely, the claim that courts are an alternative institutional voice for the poor, who are usually marginalized from the political process. According to this belief, social rights litigation would be a means (supposedly “a better means”) of realizing rights such as the right to health care, since supposedly both the wealthy and the poor have equal access to the courts. To probe the consistency of this belief, we analyzed the socioeconomic profiles of plaintiffs in the city of Sao Paulo (Brazil) who were granted access to specific medications or medical treatments by judicial decisions. In this study, the justiciability of social rights has not proven to be a means of rendering certain public services more democratic and accessible.     

The problems and possibilities in regulating technological frontiers: the politics of the new anxiety?

The revolution in science, biotechnology and medicine of the past 30 years demands a revisitation of old institutional forms and responses, including those of law itself. Scientific citizenship requires that law develop a moral vision and vocabulary so that we shape the moral dimensions of the emergent bioeconomy. Chief among those in the field of biotechnology are technologies of human reproductive cloning, therapeutic cloning and stem cell research using human embryos. Where there are deep pluralist divisions is in relation to therapeutic cloning and embryonic stem cell research. Regulatory flexibility may be opportune in delimiting the extent to which government need stray into this realm of "moral politics". As Brownsword has written, an important developmental vector is what has become known in administrative and public law literature as the concept of "smart regulation". This concept is examined and an attempt to apply it to these fields is made. The enlarged nature of human action -- enlarged in magnitude, reach and novelty -- raises moral issues beyond interpersonal ethics and requires reflection; responsibility is centre stage and calls for lengthened foresight -- what has been called a "scientific futurology". This is also examined.