Climate change and the credibility of international commitments: What is necessary for the U.S. to deliver on such commitments?

The engagement of the United States is critical to the success of any international effort against global climate change. Although international climate efforts require long-lasting, credible commitments by participating countries, risk of failure to deliver on such commitments rises with the degree of gap that the domestic institutions permit between the executive and the legislature. The U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol indicated that the Clinton administration’s effort to bring international solutions into the domestic arena before domestic consensus was obtained was counterproductive. The congressional politics over budgetary allocation regarding the Bush administration’s technology policies showed that general preference to a technology-oriented approach to climate change alone did not ensure the credibility of international commitments. These cases revealed that the U.S. climate diplomacy was lacking in domestic institutional mechanisms that bring the executive branch’s deal at international negotiations, and the legislators’ preferences at home, closer together. For the U.S. to take leadership in international climate cooperation, domestic institutional frameworks which reconcile the interests of the two branches are necessary. This paper suggests that such domestic institutional frameworks feature two components: regular channels of communication between the two political branches; and, incentive mechanisms for the two branches to swiftly come to terms with each other.

Australian climate policy and the Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate (APP). From Howard to Rudd: continuity or change?

This article explains, first, why Australia’s government under John Howard, together with the United States Bush administration initiated the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and, second, why the succeeding Rudd government continued to support this initiative. Climate policy under the conservative Howard government (1995–2007) in Australia was largely dictated by fossil fuel and mineral sector interests, and reflected a close alliance with the Bush administration. The Howard government shunned the Kyoto Protocol, refused to set national binding greenhouse gas reduction targets and preferred voluntary cooperative measures with industry. The APP was part of the Howard government’s strategy to demonstrate some policy movement on climate change while postponing serious action. Climate change was a key issue in the election of the Rudd Labor government in Australia in December 2007. The Rudd government quickly ratified Kyoto, adopted emission reduction targets, and moved to introduce emissions trading. The Rudd government’s decision to continue involvement with the APP, albeit with diminished funding, was a pragmatic one. The APP was supported by industry and provided bridges to China and India—both key countries in the post-2012 UNFCCC negotiations. Finally, in order to assess the long-term outlook of the APP, the article provides a preliminary assessment as to whether the APP advances technology transfer.

Compared to what? Instructing the jury on product defect under the Products Liability Act and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability

This Article is based on a presentation given at Seton Hall University School of Law's Seventh Annual Health Law Symposium on February 12, 1999.     

Blurring the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Legitimacy? A Methodological Commentary on ‘Police Legitimacy and Citizen Cooperation in China’

Asian Journal of Criminology - In a fascinating study into the nature of police legitimacy in Southern China, Sun et al. (2018) present evidence that what researchers have previously been treated...     

Pressured into a Preference to Leave? A Study on the “Specific” Deterrent Effects and Perceived Legitimacy of Immigration Detention

Immigration detention is formally not a punishment, but governments do use it to deter illegal residence. This study examines whether and how immigration detention affects detainees’ decision‐making processes regarding departure, thereby possibly resulting in de facto “specific deterrence.” Semistructured face‐to‐face interviews were conducted in the Netherlands with 81 immigration detainees, and their case files were examined. Evidence is found for a limited, selective deterrence effect at the level of detainee's attitudes: most respondents considered immigration detention a painful and distressing experience, but only a minority—mostly labor migrants without family ties in the Netherlands—developed a preference to return to their country of citizenship in hopes of ending their exposure, including repeated exposure, to the detention. In line with defiance theory, we find that eventual deterrent effects mostly occurred among detainees who also attributed some measure of legitimacy to their detention. Among some detainees, the detention experience resulted in a preference to migrate to a neighboring European country.     

Who is Qualified to Provide Expert Testimony on the Psychological Fitness for Duty of a Police Officer? A Guide for Agencies,Lawyers and Hearing Officers

The Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts and most State Courts are lenient in qualifying witnesses as experts. This article looks at the most common standard for determining who is qualified to testify as an expert regarding the psychological fitness for duty of a serving police officer. The article then discusses key areas that agencies, attorneys and hearing officers should focus on in determining the credibility of an expert’s testimony. Finally, this paper suggests trial preparation techniques for counsel, should a disputed fitness evaluation become involved in litigation.     

A New Alliance of De-legalisation and Legal Formalism? Reflections on Responses to the Social Deficit of the European Integration Project<Superscript>⋆</Superscript>

This paper will cover a wide range of issues. It will start with a reconstruction of the European Community’s ‘social deficit’, arguing that a credible response to this deficit would be a pre-condition for the democratic legitimacy of the deepened integration project. Such a response can be developed in a re-conceptualisation of European law as a new type of supranational/trans-statal conflict of laws – this is the thesis defended in the second section. This vision is contrasted in the third section, first with the steps towards Social Europe envisaged in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, and then with the messages of the recent judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Viking and Laval. It goes without saying that the theoretical premises of the argument, let alone its many interdisciplinary dimensions and empirical background, can often only be signalled, but not developed systematically.

More Sanctions – Less Prison? A Research Note on the Severity of Sanctions Proposed by Survey Participants and how it is Affected by the Option to Combine a Prison Term with Other Sanctions

Public opinion has come to be given an increasingly important role in the crime policy debate of western countries. The task of problematising different pictures that emerges from different studies of public opinion on appropriate sentences thus becomes an important task. In this article the question is whether survey respondents, in their choice of reactions to crime, tend to propose shorter prison sentences when they combine the prison term with other measures? If so, different response instructions can lead to different conclusions as to what survey participants consider to be appropriate sentences. Earlier research points at such tendencies to some extent. In order to examine this question, two comparisons will be made. In the first, survey respondents who chose to combine a prison sentence with other measures is compared with those who chose to propose a prison sentence as the only sanction. In the second, participant who were instructed to only propose a single sanction will be compared with those who were given the opportunity to combine two sanctions. Both comparisons are made with regard to the lengths of the proposed prison sentences. No systematic differences emerge. The correlation between the length of prison term proposed and the choice, or opportunity given, to combine the prison term with other measures varies, for example, across the different offences examined. The choice of appropriate reactions to crime is based on a more advanced deliberation than whether different sanctions may be combined.