Long–Range Corporate Strategic Planning in Government Organizations: The Case of the U.S. Air Force

Since 1994, the United States Air Force has undertaken two major reviews of its long–range corporate strategy. Both exercises stretched very substantially beyond the previous horizons for such reviews. Through visioning forward as far as 30 years, the Air Force leadership sought to quicken support for substantial reassessments of core programmatic commitments. The availability of two iterations of strategic visioning of this sort affords a rare opportunity to track the effects of an innovative approach to planning under different leaders, institutional approaches, and circumstances. Along the way, the analysis uncovers a number of important issues that might find applicability to other government organizations, whether in the United States or elsewhere.     

Seeing Red: U.S. Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949

In the immediate postwar period Army Air Force A-2 cultivated a unique intelligence culture that focussed on the air-atomic threat posed by the Soviet Union and the use of the most advanced technologies to monitor countries behind the 'Iron Curtain'. Although most intelligence reports presented a detailed analysis of Russian air power capabilities, consideration was also given to an assessment of intentions. Based on a literal interpretation of Marxist texts and an unambiguous reading of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, A-2 more than any other agency was convinced of the Soviet willingness to wage war. As for a reading of capabilities, the fact that the Soviets were developing a long-range air force was in itself evidence of intentions. A-2 was, however, left out of the national security decision-making loop until after the successful test of the Soviet A-bomb, which was accurately predicted by the Air Force in the summer of 1949. Until that time most officials in the Truman administration believed in the likelihood of the slow incremental expansion of Soviet power rather than the launching of an 'atomic Pearl harbor' against the Western bloc.     

Bletchley Park and the RAF Y Service: Some Recollections

The RAF Y Service and the German Air Section at Bletchley Park collaborated in producing a great deal of intelligence about GAF (German Air Force) operations in World War II. However, two errors in pre-war planning reduced this output. The first error was the decision that the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) should be responsible solely for cryptography, the interpretation of Sigint to be the task of the Intelligence recipients. The second was the general assumption that the information obtainable from intercepting the low-grade codes and plain language used in the control of Air operations would only be of intelligence interest while the operations were in progress. After-the-event study of these communications by the German Air Section produced unique information needed by the RAF Commands. The Air Ministry took an unduly long time to agree that this information should be provided to them.     

Team-based incremental acquisition of large-scale unprecedented systems

This paper addresses certain shortcomings of traditional acquisition approaches, especially for large-scale, unprecedented systems. Shortcomings in the requirements engineering processes are emphasized. We review incremental acquisition approaches and identify issues essential to successful application of incremental acquisition approaches to overcome these shortcomings.In identifying these issues, cases based on systems being developed by the Air Force Space Command are examined. They are the Granite Sentry (GS), Space Defense Operations Centers (SPADOC), and Mobile Command and Control System (MCCS) programs. Three key aspects of the lessons learned from these efforts parallel the steps suggested by a recent Air Force Studies Board report for reducing risk in developing unprecedented systems. These are team-based development, managing requirements uncertainty and change, and increased use of incremental acquisition approaches.This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.     

Viewpoint: The Next Great White Fleet: Extending the Benefits of the International System into Space

This article argues that what naval power was to the 17th century—knitting together separate trading systems and bridging new resources, wealth, mobility, and establishing an international system of trade that pulled various powers into the dominant power's orbit—space power can be for the 21st century. To this end, airmen must take a wider view of what strategic value the United States Air Force (USAF) can provide for the United States (U.S.) beyond support for warfighting.     

Fighting a War in Space: The Case for a Space Innovation Force

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is gearing up to face the challenge of a contested, degraded space environment that may degenerate into a full-on battleground. The U.S. space enterprise needs to be ready to not just respond, but dominate. AFSPC’s Space Mission Force (SMF) concept, to “present space forces capable of operating in a contested and operationally limited environment,” is a start toward this goal. Leveraging a historical case study from the air domain, I suggest that the SMF focus on operator training and tactics may be fundamentally insufficient in the event of a conflict in space with a near-peer adversary. To win a war in space, AFSPC must build rapid breakaway capabilities that can asymmetrically rearrange the Space Order of Battle. This work proposes the formation of a top-down “Space Innovation Force” (SIF) to complement the bottom-up SMF. If appropriately empowered, this autonomous flat-management cadre of SIF warriors provides revolutionary technological capabilities that an enemy will be unable to counter in the near term. Establishing such a SIF cadre also encourages retention of talented technical officers.     

Air power and intelligence in the western desert campaign, 1940–43

During the fighting in the Western Desert of North Africa, the Royal Air Force conducted a land‐based interdiction campaign against Axis motorized transport supply columns which was guided by intelligence. It was this campaign, and not the Ultra‐driven sea interdiction campaign, which was responsible for the destruction of the bulk of Axis supply. The impact of land‐based interdiction totally destroyed the morale and fighting ability of the Axis forces at El Alamein in late 1942, and set a pattern for operations which was replayed with success throughout the remainder of the war.     

Responsibility Budgeting at the Air Force Materiel Command

The case study reported here challenges conventional wisdom about the feasibility of implementing responsibility budgeting and accounting practices in U.S. government. A variant of this practice took root and operated effectively in a large federal agency—the Air Force Materiel Command—during the period of study. Contrary to conventional wisdom, implementing a meaningful form of responsibility budgeting and accounting does not require changes in public management policies or systemic institutional reform. However, the evidence shows that instituting practices of responsibility budgeting and accounting may require considerable administrative ingenuity in adapting the generic practice to the situation at hand.     

Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis: An Expertise and Responsibility Centered Approach

Looking at trends of professionalization of intelligence analysis within the United States Air Force as a subset of the broader US Intelligence Community, this paper calls for a re-evaluation of the professionalization of intelligence analysis away from a bureaucratic ‘corporateness’ approach examining the traits of a profession. Instead, reform of intelligence analysis should focus on the unique expertise and responsibility that define the profession. It identifies the analyst's unique expertise as managing adversary information to reduce a decision maker's uncertainty, and the responsibility in striving to improve capabilities within the profession while ensuring both the strengths and limitations of intelligence analysis are understood by intelligence customers. By focusing on corporateness, the community jeopardizes reform efforts by moving professionalization toward ‘getting the right answer’ and away from a broader understanding of the strengths and limitations inherent in the field of intelligence, where getting the right answer isn't often attainable.     

Habermas and the pragmatics of communication: a Deleuze–Guattarian critique

The intention in this article is to explore, explicate, and, ultimately, critique Jurgen Habermas' communication theory. Drawing on the pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari we will propose that Habermas' defence of the importance and priority of communicative action is problematic to the extent that it implicitly involves the issuing of an imperative order that cannot be accounted for within the normative framework that he envisages. In other words, we will be suggesting—with the help of Deleuze and Guattari—that Habermas, undoubtedly against his best intentions, precipitates, what we will call, a strategic levelling of communicative action.     

The RAF and the utility of airpower

This year marks the centenary of the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force (RAF), the first independent air force, and the end of a ‘100-year experiment’. During that period, it has become clear that airpower has limitations, and the RAF and other air forces continue to face many of the same fundamental challenges.     

The Curious Incident of Mr Cameron and the United Kingdom Defence Budget: A New Legacy?

During 2015 Prime Minister Cameron found himself under intense domestic and international pressure over his apparent reluctance to maintain United Kingdom defence spending at the NATO target level of 2 per cent of GDP. Most commentators attributed this reluctance to the inevitability of defence cuts if the government wished to meet its deficit reduction targets. However, the aftermath of the general election saw a sudden decision to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target level. This u‐turn is one of the more curious episodes in recent British defence policy. In this article we explore the reasons why, at a time of continuing cuts and austerity measures and against all the political signals, a decision was made to meet the 2 per cent target, and what this means for the UK's defence policy. In doing so, we analyse why most commentators assumed that defence cuts were inevitable, the domestic and international factors that explain the government's apparent u‐turn and what this revised defence budget settlement meant for the new 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.     

Fear,greed, or garage sale? The analysis of military expenditure in East Asia

This paper examines the determinants of military expenditures in eight East Asian countries from 1983 to 1993. In a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis, it finds that the security threats (either external or internal) have not been a factor in determining the governments' defence burdens. Instead, economic and bureaucratic budgetary factors are better predictors of their defence decision-making. Military corruption and subsidized defence industries are the main domestic elements driving up the budgets; but this bureaucratic 'irrationality' is checked and balanced by economic rationality, for the defence burdens generally correlate with the availability of economic resources.     

Rethinking the Europe‐Taiwan relationship

This article attempts to construct an overview of Japan's defence problematique in the post‐cold war era. Its approach is to survey the historical legacies that have shaped Japan's defence policies and perceptions, and to assess how these fit, or do not fit, with the new security environment within which Japan now finds itself. The purpose is to argue that a policy of non‐offensive defence (NOD) could solve many of the difficult defence questions that Japan now faces. As a consequence, the discussion will concentrate mainly on military and political issues, mostly leaving aside questions of economic, societal and environmental security on the grounds that these issues interact less strongly with NOD. Section 1 considers the geopolitics of Japan's security that arise from its being an island country. Section 2 analyses some crucial historical considerations, particularly Japan's status as a great power, and the particular circumstances of its historical relationship with its neighbours. Section 3 looks at Japan's position during the cold war, examining how the legacies of its defeat in the Second World War blended into the demands placed upon it as a front‐line ally of the United States against Chinese and Soviet power. Section 4 surveys the actual and possible changes in Japan's security environment consequent upon the ending of the cold war. It focuses on Japan's relationships with the United States, the East Asian region, the international system as a whole, and finally on Japan's relationship with itself. Section 5 considers the requirements for a Japanese defence and security policy in the post‐cold war era.     

The problem of Defence Intelligence

Abstract

The following article argues that defence intelligence in general, and Britain’s Defence Intelligence (DI) organization in particular, represents an area in intelligence studies that is significantly under-investigated. It makes the case that the significance of understanding defence intelligence and DI lies not only in a general lack of illumination but also because DI is subject to and prompts a range of difficulties and challenges that are either especially acute in the defence context or have ramifications for the wider intelligence community that remain to be fully appreciated. Particular attention is given to DI’s remit being divided between Ministry of Defence and national requirements, problems of fixed-sum resourcing an intelligence function with national responsibilities that is subordinate to Departmental spending structures and priorities, fraught positioning of defence intelligence in Departmental line management and, finally, a chronic lack of public or official interest or scrutiny. The article concludes that the UK’s experience has echoes elsewhere, notably in the US, and that wider international study of defence intelligence is both long overdue and may have implications for understanding of national and wider intelligence institutions and processes.     

Cold War Reconnaissance Flights along the Berlin Corridors and in the Berlin Control Zone 1960–90: Risk,Coordination and Sharing

During the Cold War, Soviet and East German military units, equipment and activities around Berlin were high priority targets for Western military intelligence agencies. This article examines the imagery gathering undertaken by British, French and US reconnaissance flights along the Berlin Air Corridors and inside the Berlin Control Zone. The quantity of information was effectively multiplied because of the close cooperation between the Western allies and coordination with Allied Military Liaison Mission ‘ground tours’. This cooperation generally went further than has been publicly acknowledged by individual governments. This paper contends that the collaboration provided the most comprehensive and regular collection of imagery on Soviet and East German military units for the duration of the Cold War. It contributed to a multi-dimensional picture of Soviet and German Democratic Republic capabilities and intentions. Soviet motives for generally not interfering with those missions on a regular basis are considered.     

Environmental Justice and Green‐Technology Adoption

This paper presents an analysis of an environmental justice (EJ) program adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) as a part of its regulation to phase out a toxic chemical used by dry cleaners. SCAQMD provided financial incentives to switch early and gave establishments in EJ neighborhoods priority in applying for grants. Despite this pro‐EJ policy, available data show that dry cleaners in low‐income, predominantly minority, and EJ‐designated areas were less likely to be an early adopter of green technologies, and this finding holds even after accounting for firm and market characteristics. Dry cleaners in disadvantaged neighborhoods were also less likely to receive a grant to switch technology despite the district's effort to set aside half of the funding for applicants from EJ areas.     

The Royal Navy,Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936–39

This article discusses the Royal Navy (RN)—Royal Air Force (RAF) feud concerning the use of air power in the round through an investigation of each service's appreciations of the lessons being learned about air power during the Spanish Civil War. It reveals that despite such bodies as the Joint Intelligence Committee existing, for the processing of operational and strategic intelligence, there was very little that was joint about the way air power lessons were being used to inform RN and RAF interwar preparations for future conflict. Not only were the RN and RAF rivals, which dragged out the process and skewed the results so that they became useless for planning, but in that non-joint age each service could use the results for its own separate purposes and avoid any synergy among the services for operational and strategic effectiveness.     

Viewpoint: It is Time to Create a United States Air Force Space Corps

The United States (U.S.) has deepening dependence on space systems for economic prosperity, civil government administration, priority science and exploration programs, and national security while at the same time there is dramatic growth in competitive space capabilities and demonstrated threats to space systems globally. Despite this, the U.S. has not invested sufficient resources to meet National policy direction for capabilities to insure freedom of action in space, especially space situational awareness capabilities—the cornerstone of deterrence from space attacks. A principle reason for this shortfall is the historical absence of an organization accountable for securing the space domain like those of land, sea, and air. Using the analogy of the Army Air Corps, the author recommends creation of an autonomous Space Corps realized out of existing organizations within the USAF. The AF Space Corps would manage a separate space budget and all space professionals in organizing, training, and equipping national security space capabilities including those necessary to secure the space domain for peaceful use.     

TLAMs in Syria

The United States' Tomahawk cruise-missile strikes on the Syrian regime's Shayrat Air Base in retaliation for the regime's sarin attack are unlikely to advance peace in Syria. The regime and its main supporters, Russia and Iran, remain defiant, and the Trump administration appears inclined to frame the strikes as a relatively narrow deterrent against chemical weapons attacks and keep counter-terrorism its main priority in Syria for now.