New ways of thinking: The intelligence function and strategic calculations in the admiralty, 1882–1889

Intelligence analysis is often viewed as a distant relative of the policy deliberations within military and naval organisations. This is especially apparent in contemporary settings, where policymaking is rigid and highly compartmentalised by the firewalls that exist between intelligence producers and consumers. The purpose of this article is to examine an overlooked case from intelligence history, when the creation of an intelligence function within the Admiralty had a profound impact upon the formulation and conduct of British naval policy in the 1880s. This inevitably encouraged new ways of thinking about how the Admiralty organised and prepared for war.     

Myanmar’s intelligence apparatus and the fall of General Khin Nyunt

As Myanmar’s Chief of Intelligence from 1983 until 2004, General Khin Nyunt presided over the development of a large and powerful security apparatus that underpinned military rule and played a major role in the country’s international relations. So influential did the key military intelligence organisation become, however, that it was seen as a threat by other parts of the armed forces, including the ruling State Peace and Development Council. In 2004, Khin Nyunt was arrested and his intelligence empire largely dismantled. The purge seriously weakened the regime’s capabilities, but was considered necessary to maintain its position as the supreme arbiter of power in Myanmar.     

The UK–US intelligence alliance in 1975: Economies,evaluations and explanations

Intelligence and defence are often cited as central to the fabric of Anglo-American relations after 1945. However, we still know relatively little about how the Anglo-American intelligence relationship changed during the latter part of the twentieth century. During the 1960s and 1970s the UK continued its long retreat from its world role, driven by recurrent economic crises at home and anti-colonial nationalism abroad. This essay examines UK intelligence in the mid-1970s in the light of recent archival releases pertaining to the Roy Mason Defence Review. This material sheds interesting light on tensions between the military and diplomats in Whitehall over defence intelligence. More importantly, it appears to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance.     

The German intelligence estimates in the west, 1885–1914

Little has been known of German intelligence estimates prior to the First World War. The recent discovery of several German intelligence documents, including a classified history of German pre-war intelligence operations which was written during the inter-war period, in addition to some important German pre-war intelligence analysis, now gives considerable insight into the German intelligence estimates as well as their relationship to German war planning from 1885 to 1914.     

Domestic intelligence and German military leaders, 1914–18

The top of the German domestic intelligence system was taken over by the military during World War I. The rest of the system for collecting and reporting remained in local and regional political police hands. The military leaders did not make good use of the information they received, especially about labour and Social Democracy. The essay presents the ways that the system of gathering and reporting information functioned, including its wartime changes under the state of siege. Three specific issues are followed up with the reporting system for 1917–18. Then the essay shows how the military leaders responded to raw and filtered information before exploring why they made such inadequate use of the very thorough reports which they received.     

‘The importance of being honest’: Switzerland,neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison

This paper seeks to contribute to a number of debates that have attracted scholarly attention over the last few years. Firstly, by examining the experiences of the Swiss foreign intelligence service, the paper takes issue with what one scholar has dubbed ‘intelligence history snobbery’; a process that has privileged the study of the major powers and overlooked the contribution made to the secret world by the intelligence agencies of small states. Secondly, the paper explores the extent to which a state's engagement in the secret world is affected by its preconceived ideas over its place and standing in the international community. It asks whether the behaviour of a neutral foreign intelligence service is likely to differ from that of any other ‘small’ state, and whether neutrals can be both honest brokers in international affairs, and earnest players in the field of secret intelligence. The final section of the paper looks at the impact of the end of the Cold War and the emerging ‘global war on terror’ on the shape of the Swiss intelligence community.     

The rise of the ‘new agenda’ and the decline of partisanship

Has the rise of so‐called new social movements contributed to an undermining of parties in Western nations? This study reviews the arguments alleging this to be the case, and then summarises the results of 229 public opinion surveys from 17 nations. The surveys indicate that those who hold ‘post‐materialist’ values are stronger partisans than those with ‘materialist’ values. The analysis concludes that much of the literature has overstated the contrasts between movements and parties, that the mass public does not differentiate itself into ‘party’ and ‘movement’ categories, and that parties have been resourceful in protecting themselves against the depradations that movements might cause.