A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.     

All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism

This article discusses the important role that Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has played, and continues to play, in the war against international terrorism. It sets out what is known or can be authoritatively established about the role that Sigint played in the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, especially the performance of America's Sigint organization, the National Security Agency (NSA). The article also analyzes what the potential future role of Sigint may be in the war on terrorism given the ever changing nature of terrorist operations, the growing number of technological impediments to effective Sigint collection against terrorist targets, and shifting geostrategic considerations on the part of the nations engaged in the fight against the international terrorists.     

Reorganizing for National Security and Homeland Security

This article considers the post–September 11 challenges faced by the U.S. national security machinery and analyzes the relationship between the new threat environment, the United States's role in the world, and decision–making structure. Homeland security is defined as a subset of national security. The threat of foreign terrorist organizations acting on U.S. soil should be seen in the political context of the pursuit of U.S. national interests in an often anarchic world. Two models for homeland security organizational structures are considered: a departmental model and an interagency model. The interagency model, embodied in the Homeland Security Council, is a better fit given the nature of the threat, the crucial need for coordination, and the realities of governmental decision making. The organizational challenges that may complicate the government's preparations, decisions, and implementation of a major homeland defense mission stem from three rivalries: executive–legislative, cabinet–staff, and Homeland Security Council–National Security Council.     

The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Abstract

The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy. This assumption about the influence of analysis on decision deserves a much closer examination. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide a good case to study for greater understanding of the influence, or lack of influence, that intelligence analysis has on decision-making. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped enable decision-makers to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In other words, a failure of strategic intelligence analysis lay at the foundation of the failure to prevent 9/11. But was this really the case? This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing National Intelligence Estimate by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical National Intelligence Estimate described by the 9/11 Commission would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy for the better. It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis.     

Organizational turnaround: moving beyond one-size-fits-all solutions

Abstract

Literature on organizational turnaround has frequently suggested, but rarely investigated, the possibility that turnaround strategies for failing organizations must be matched to the specific needs of the organization. Building on work related to causes of decline in private sector literature, this study offers a framework for matching strategic interventions to the current state of an organization’s functioning in terms of resources (material and human), coordination (horizontal and vertical), and the environment. Using a panel dataset of New York City schools, we find that two understandings of turnaround that often appear mutually exclusive—that an organization can improve performance by shoring up weaknesses and that an organization should play to its current strengths—can complement each other and may both appropriately describe different types of organizational challenges.     

Is the Department of Homeland Security an Intelligence Agency?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle – the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies – to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.     

An empirical analysis of alternative ways that terrorist groups end

This paper implements discrete-time survival models to ascertain the determinants behind specific endings for terrorist groups during 1970–2007. Based on multinomial logit regressions, we estimate the hazard probabilities associated with three endings for terrorist groups: splintering from internal factors, being defeated by force, and joining the political process or achieving victory. We find that different covariates differentially impact each of these endings. In a second exercise, we split our sample of 586 terrorist groups into those that started before and after the beginning of 1990. In so doing, we find that survival factors differ between the two cohorts of groups. For both exercises, the determinants of survival comprise terrorist groups’ goals, their tactics and size, and base-country characteristics. Robustness tests conclude the paper.     

Ten Years of EU's Fight against Terrorist Financing: A Critical Assessment

This article offers a critical assessment of the post-9/11 efforts of the European Union (EU) in the fight against terrorist finances. Using the EU's own goals from its action plans and counterterrorism strategies as the baseline criteria, it examines how successful the EU has been in implementing the relevant aspects of various United Nations Security Council counterterrorism resolutions, the special recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, and its own measures spanning across all of its three pre-Lisbon pillars. In particular, the article seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What and how much of its own counter-terrorism plans has the EU managed to achieve since 9/11? and (2) What lessons can be learned from the hitherto successes and failures for future EU efforts to counter terrorist financing? Special attention is paid to the thus far neglected role of the private sector in the fight against terrorist financing.     

A Creative and Aggressive FBI: The Victor Kravchenko Case

Surveying the FBI's investigation in 1944–46 of Victor Kravchenko, a Soviet employee of the wartime Soviet Government Purchasing Commission who defected in 1944, this article challenges the core assumptions underpinning post-9/11 recommendations intended to preclude future terrorist threats.     

Reforming policy roles in the Jordanian policy‐making process

The aim of this diagnostic analysis is to identify the weaknesses in the process of reforming policy in Jordan. This study will first present a diagnostic analysis of the characteristics of administrative reform in Jordan. Following this, weaknesses will be identified with a focus on policy roles in the policy‐making process. Administrative reform has long been an area of interest and development in Jordan since the early 1980s. Conferences were held, political and technical committees formed, and expertise and resources invested. The outcomes of these programs have been below expectations, with inadequate impact. This investigation paid attention on how Jordan can best invest its resources to maximize efficiency in the public sector, specifically the process of reforming policy. This study concludes that the primary factor impacting efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness is the degree of authority at both national and organizational level. Recent efforts in Jordan to tackle these issues could create more conflicts that threaten the Jordanian government's stability. Other resources have been dedicated to reviewing the rules and values that govern the relationship between state and society.     

France in Mali: rapid reaction

On 11 January 2013 France initiated military operations against Islamist rebels in Mali in order ‘to stop the terrorist aggression … make Bamako safe … and enable Mali to recover its territorial integrity’. It hopes that the current ground and air offensive will be limited in duration. But this will depend on several factors, including the effectiveness of its planning and intelligence, and the tactics of the opposition. If Bamako is to reassert its authority over the country's ungoverned north, the capacity of Mali's military will need to be dramatically enhanced.     

Terrorist networks, support, and delegation

The paper presents a game-theoretic representation of a general terrorist organization (GTO) that delegates responsibility to local terrorist representatives in n countries. The GTO achieves a strategic advantage by deploying a more radical representative when the government is perceived to be weak and terrorist supporters are committed. When the government or terrorist supporters alter their posture, the GTO may regret its local representative. Outside assistance can change a besieged government’s posture, thereby removing the GTO’s delegation advantage. When both the GTO and the government delegate to surrogates, the delegators are worse off if the government appears to be weak.     

COVID-19 in Nigeria and South Africa

COVID-19 is likely to affect Nigeria’s and South Africa’s economies adversely, amplifying preexisting macroeconomic weaknesses. Support for necessary public health measures remains flimsy in light of their harsh socio-economic impact, and will likely erode further should reported case numbers remain relatively low.     

Re-examining the evidence on the electoral impact of terrorist attacks: The Spanish election of 2004

This paper re-examines the electoral effect of the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid. Previous research has focused on post-electoral surveys to construct counterfactuals for the evaluation of the electoral impact of the attack. Bali (Electoral Studies, 2007) claims that the terrorists attacks had an important electoral impact while Lago and Montero (2005) claim the opposite. In this paper I propose to re-examine the evidence using a methodological approach based on actual votes instead of opinions revealed by surveys, and the difference-in-differences estimator. The calculations under the counterfactual of “no terrorist attack” support the forecasts of the polls taken prior to the terrorist attack and the results of Bali (2007). The incumbent (conservative) party would have won the election with between 42% and the 45% of the votes, while the socialist party would have obtained 37% of the votes.     

APEC adrift: implications for economic regionalism in Asia and the Pacific

APEC’s lack of success in securing tangible benefits in its first decade has particularly disappointed its ‘Western’ members. Its failures stem primarily from three weaknesses: a lack of consensus over its objectives and how these might best be realized; the absence of an institutionalized driving force for the grouping; and a failure to engage with civil society. APEC’s shortcomings have put at risk what is arguably its most significant achievement: the annual meetings that bring together leaders from around the Pacific Rim. Modest changes to organizational procedures might enhance APEC’s prospects – especially if its efforts are concentrated in trade facilitation and economic and technical cooperation rather than on trade liberalization. Such a change in direction would not only return APEC to its roots but also be in accord with the priorities of East Asian governments.     

Terrorist Threat,Leadership, and the Vote: Evidence from Three Experiments

From 9/11 in the U.S. to train, subway, and airport bombings elsewhere, individuals frequently must make political decisions in the shadow of terrorist attacks. To date, few studies have examined how times of terror threat influence voters’ decision-making processes. Using data generated from three experiments we show that, in times of terrorist threat (compared to good times), individuals weight leadership more heavily in the voting booth. Our results also shed light on how much weight is given to other determinants of the vote (issues and partisanship) across these two conditions.     

Objective intelligence or plausible denial: An open source review of intelligence method and process since 9/11

Since 9/11 there have been a series of reports criticizing the American Intelligence Community for its lack of foresight and inaccurate intelligence prior to the Iraq invasion of 2003. It is argued here that this is not a new phenomenon, but a replay of other periods of self-doubt and introspection within the Intelligence Community. The criticism of organizational structures and individuals – however relevant that may be – does not address the real, and enduring, problem with US intelligence-gathering bodies. The very process of intelligence theory, definition and practice needs to be fundamentally reviewed. Eschewing the dogmatism that has hindered intelligence reform, this article suggests three methods as a starting point for a new approach.     

Terrorism and the Railroads: Redefining Security in the Wake of 9/11

This article examines the impact of the 9/11 attacks on railroad security. Railroad security has been traditionally defined as a problem of trespass and liability for deaths, injuries, and property damage sustained or caused by trespassers. It argues that the private freight railroad industry, not government, has largely directed the efforts to prevent terrorism and share information on suspected terrorist threats, through the prompt formation of a loosely coupled network of organizations coordinated by the industry trade association, the American Association of Railroads. The freight railroad network approach is contrasted with the efforts of Amtrak to gain public funds for its security efforts by connecting its survival with homeland security. Kingdon's model of the policy process is used to explain how 9/11 has presented an opportunity for railroads to use policy windows to gain benefits for the industry while at the same time resisting possible reregulation. It contrasts the network approach with the traditional hierarchical-bureaucratic form of organization used in the design of the Department of Homeland Security, and suggests it poses a valuable case study to see how information can be shared between widely divergent types of organizations, and test how best to prevent future terrorist events.     

Bioterrorism, Fear, and Public Health Reform: Matching a Policy Solution to the Wrong Window

During the 1990s, terrorist actions using biological weapons and the fear that rogue states possessed such weapons placed bioterrorism on the political agenda, a policy window widened by the September 11 attacks. Advocates for improving the U.S. public health infrastructure attempted to use this window to obtain the resources necessary for modernization. This article examines those efforts and identifies significant problems arising from a mismatch between the goals of public health policy entrepreneurs and the policy window used to address them. By defining bioterrorism as a security rather than a public health issue, policy entrepreneurs squander the opportunity to institute broad-based reforms that would improve not only the ability to manage a terrorist incident, but also meet other public health needs. The bioterrorism program proves a useful case study in how the goals of policy entrepreneurs can be displaced by attaching policy preferences to the wrong policy stream.     

Missing the Wake-up Call: Why Intelligence Failures Rarely Inspire Improved Performance

After major intelligence failures it is often asked why intelligence and security officials failed to heed the many ‘wake-up calls’ that had been provided by earlier failures and surprises. This article addresses this question by examining intelligence failures as ‘focusing events’, which is a concept used in the literature on government policy making to explain how disasters and crises can stimulate policy change and help organizations and decision-makers learn. It argues that in order for an intelligence failure such as a major terrorist attack to inspire improved intelligence performance – to be a true wake-up call – that failure must not only act as a focusing event to bring more attention to the threat, but it must also lead to increased intelligence collection and greater receptivity toward intelligence on the part of decision-makers.