The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11

Two years after the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This act aspired to replace a sprawling agency‐oriented intelligence apparatus with an integrated, networked intelligence community. The act envisioned a director of national intelligence who would accomplish sweeping structural reforms, while at the same time maintaining and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations. This vision has not materialized. The director of national intelligence does not have the power to implement structural reforms. Schisms between the legislature and the executive also hamper reforms.     

Intelligence reform: The logic of information sharing

A cornerstone of US intelligence reform is ‘information sharing’ as a means of adapting to contemporary security challenges. It was a central recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, reflected in the wide-ranging ‘Information Sharing Environment’ mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Yet the underlying logic of information sharing for intelligence reform has received little attention. Drawing on information and communications theory, this paper critiques the logic by highlighting problems of sense-making and interpretation overlooked amid the scholarly enthusiasm for an intelligence ‘culture of sharing’. With their impersonal, technical, and highly bureaucratic approach, today's reforms may favor the flow of information and its sheer volume at the expense of the context and analytic tradecraft that render it meaningful, actionable intelligence. For effective information sharing, the paper suggests reformers pay more attention to the socio-technical environment of analysis when interpreting ambiguous, uncertain information.     

National Intelligence University: a half century educating the next generation of U.S. Intelligence Community Leaders

Founded in 1962, the National Intelligence University has evolved over more than five decades into living up to its current vision as ‘The Center of Academic Life for the Intelligence Community.’ With the intelligence reforms post-9/11 and the development of the NIU concept, the mission has changed from a military-centric focus of instruction to educating a more diverse audience from throughout the IC, both military and civilian, full-time and part-time, active and Reserves, with an emphasis on taking higher education to an interagency clientele spread globally and desiring different learning outcomes. The result is a rapid growth in offsite academic centers and a resurgence of certificate programs geared to professionals who already have a degree but wish to enhance their credentials in intelligence specialty fields. There is also an effort to revive concentrations and programs of study. This article outlines the steps NIU is taking to make itself more flexible and marketable to a growing and demanding academic audience that is much more than the uniformed DoD students who matriculated in the past with full-time resident study as their only option.     

Intelligence reform commissions and the producer–consumer relationship

Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.     

Reforming Egyptian Intelligence: Precedents and Prospects

Abstract

In 2011 intelligence reform became a timely and pertinent topic in Egypt with the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak by mass demonstrations. Yet two outstanding questions persist: can Egyptian intelligence be reformed? What would intelligence reform entail in the Egyptian context? An examination of historical Egyptian intelligence reforms suggests that ‘reform’ in the Egyptian context usually means greater efficiency and centralization at the expense of public oversight and accountability. Prospects for fundamental intelligence reform are further hampered by Egypt's authoritarian traditions, its relatively weak legislature and judiciary, lack of an empowered civil society, censorship and an apparent official addiction to secrecy.     

Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters

This paper focuses on how pre-existing policy priorities and goals among policy elites in the US, UK, and Australia encouraged the blurring of strategic and tactical intelligence assessment as a mechanism for legitimising the Iraq invasion. Through the selective use and interpretation of sometimes vague or unsubstantiated tactical and technical intelligence and the many uncertainties it contained, proponents of the war were able to undermine existing strategic assessments on Iraq by introducing a range of possible, but largely unsubstantiated, threat scenarios as justification for military action. The paper argues that in so far as intelligence reforms are needed, they should be focused primarily on the interface between analysis and policy making, and the issue of how policy makers interpret and understand the uncertainties that intelligence assessments necessarily contain.     

Credible Commitment in Covert Affairs

A recurring challenge in politics is to convince actors to take cooperative actions against their self‐interest. This is especially challenging for executives conducting covert activities, as infractions are unobservable and institutional reforms often require the executive's consent. We develop a model based in the auditing literature to investigate when executives agree to reforms that credibly constrain their behaviors. If the revelation cost falls in a high range, the risk of whistleblowing convinces executives to restrain themselves. Executives cannot credibly commit to this when the costs are low, resulting in inefficient investigations from watchdog groups that tax executive resources. We show that executives are sometimes better off in the first case than the second, which results in executives endogenously reforming institutions to achieve this outcome. We illustrate the mechanism with a case study of Gerald Ford's executive reforms to the intelligence community in the 1970s.     

Competitive intelligence and national intelligence estimates

National Intelligence Estimates are consensus-driven intelligence products. Yet there is considerable evidence supporting the use of competitive intelligence at every level of activity, including the presentation of finished products to consumers. We examine NIEs from two important periods in US foreign policy: the buildup in Vietnam and Gorbachev's reforms. We find in both cases alternate viewpoints were not presented in the US IC's premier intelligence product when such views could have made a difference. Consistent with contemporary findings in cognitive psychology, we argue the manner in which NIEs are structured and presented should be reformed to offer better decision support.     

Democratic Oversight in Fragile States: The Case of Intelligence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In most transition countries the main aim of ‘democratizing intelligence’ is to weaken the authoritarian governmental structures by introducing more transparency, legality and oversight. In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, the state-building efforts driven by international parties combined formal democratization processes such as independent oversight with the strengthening and operational capacity building of previously weak-to-non-existent intelligence structures. In parallel with the descent into war when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, the State Security Service (SDB) in the Republic of Bosnia had split into three ethnically-based outfits answering to the political and military leaders of war. ‘Democratization’ of intelligence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the establishment of a unified, state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) in 2004 has followed its own unique path reflecting the fragmented nature of politics in Bosnia and the leading role of international organizations in proposing and effectuating institutional reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of habits, operational methods and values many Bosnian intelligence officers went through similar adaptations and transitions as their colleagues in countries where institutions at the time of democratic transition were too strong and authoritarian rather than, as in the case of Bosnia, being deemed too weak and ineffectual.     

Coming in from the cold: bringing the Intelligence and Security Committee into Parliament

The establishment of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in 1994 for the first time allowed British parliamentarians access to intelligence agency staff and records. However, as a committee of parliamentarians, but not a parliamentary committee, the ISC was a constitutional anomaly. In 2013, significant reforms reconstituted the ISC as a parliamentary committee, with enhanced powers and an expanded mandate. Drawing on interviews with ISC members and detailed examination of committee business, this article examines the impact of recent reforms. It argues that while reform has had a significant impact on the committee, in a number of respects it remains strongly constrained by government.     

Reading the Riot Act: The Schlesinger Report, 1971

The difficulty of satisfying competing needs of both national and sub-national officials and commanders for intelligence support capabilities that are too sensitive and expensive to duplicate for both sets of requirements emerged with the growth of industrial-scale imagery and signals intelligence assets and production during the Cold War. The literature of intelligence history and intelligence studies covers the symptoms of this problem, but says less a rigorous and well-documented nature on its causes. Thanks to recent declassifications in the United States, however, we can now read key documents in an American attempt to understand and deal with the dilemma. A study prepared for President Richard Nixon in 1971 and now dubbed the ‘Schlesinger Report’ has been published virtually intact by the US Department of State. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency has released two official histories which indirectly have added significant detail to the story. With these new releases, it is now possible to explain the genesis of the Report and chart its effects through the remainder of President Nixon's presidency. The Schlesinger Report marked a watershed for the intelligence community, helping the Nixon Administration to conceive and enact reforms that were both consequential in themselves and presaged the findings of later surveys and inquiries. A better understanding of the Report's background, text, and results can shed light not only the policymaking process in the Nixon Administration but also the trajectory of the intelligence community – and of foreign intelligence establishments that may, in some respects, be following in its path.     

Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence Governance in East Central Europe and the Balkans

This article discusses the reform of intelligence governance in two sub-regional groupings of former communist states: East Central Europe and the Balkans. These two sub-regions are delineated according to the pace and nature of transformations that they have undergone since the collapse of communist rule and their relations with respect to the European Union, the key political and economic organization in Europe. A number of lessons are drawn from comparing experiences in the two sub-regions relating to democratic reform of the security apparatus, and in particular the intelligence sector. Significant factors in the consolidation of democratic governance of intelligence include the nature of precursor communist-era regimes and the legacies they created, whether armed conflict has occurred during the transition, the extent and character of external (especially EU) assistance, and the strength of media and civil society. These factors appear to have influenced how transitional regimes have sought to introduce institutional reforms to constrain the powers of those services and their susceptibility to arbitrary use. They also have influenced measures taken to redress abuses by intelligence services under the preceding communist regime and the legitimation of the post-authoritarian state.     

Administrative reform in a changing political environment: The case of Hong Kong

Since 1989, the Hong Kong government has implemented a programme of public sector reform that is based on the principles of ‘new public management’. The reforms initially focused mainly on financial management reform, including delegating responsibilities for resource allocation; re-defining the roles of the central resource branches; setting up trading funds in departments that provide services directly to the public; and instilling a new corporate culture of service throughout the government. Some progress has been made in implementing the reforms. In 1993, the government realized that further civil service reform was necessary to support the reforms. The government proposed to delegate more authority to department heads on personnel matters; give managers more freedom to manage personnel; and simplify personnel regulations and procedures. These ‘new public management’-type reforms are usually associated with stable, relatively unchanging environments. In Hong Kong, however, the reforms have been proposed and carried out in an environment of considerable political turbulence which has both facilitated and hindered their implementation. Because of the declining legitimacy of the colonial government, British authorities may not have the political capacity to implement the reforms. Opposition from both department heads and civil service unions to aspects of the reforms has already emerged.     

Public intelligence: Leaks as policy instruments–the case of the Iraq war

The study of intelligence has focused almost exclusively on ‘secret’ intelligence in its analysis of intelligence failures and the relationship of policy and intelligence. This is not surprising since intelligence analysis takes place in secret. Yet sometimes intelligence becomes public. It does so in ways that hold implications for the quality of the overall intelligence product. In order to develop a complete understanding of the relationship between intelligence and policy we need to more systematically examine the nature of public intelligence. This article provides a framework for doing so, presents historical examples from the American experience and applies the framework to the intelligence used in justifying the Iraq War.     

The EU as an International Counter-terrorism Actor: Progress and Constraints

During the first decade after the 9/11 attacks, the European Union (EU) has developed into an international counter-terrorism actor in its own right, a role increasingly accepted by third countries. This is a result of many influences, including a more favourable legal basis after the Amsterdam Treaty reforms; enhanced institutional capabilities, such as the growing importance of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator; the use of a broad range of instruments, such as intelligence sharing; and the application of geopolitical priorities, guided by meetings at the United Nations and the Council of Europe (among other fora). At the same time, the EU's counter-terrorism role has remained subsidiary, both legally and politically, to that of its member states. Furthermore, a lack of its own operational capabilities, its institutional complexity, and its problems of cross-policy coordination continue to act as powerful constraints on the EU's counter-terrorism responsibilities.     

Small state or minor power? New Zealand’s Five Eyes membership,intelligence reforms,and Wellington’s response to China’s growing Pacific role

ABSTRACT

This article uses the lens of small state theory to assess New Zealand’s role in the Five Eyes Alliance and Wellington’s implementation of intelligence reforms in the last seven years that are intended to help the country deal with a transformed security environment. In this context, New Zealand decision-makers have become increasingly concerned about growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific region and in New Zealand itself. It is clear that the New Zealand’s response to these developments resembles that of a minor power rather than a classical small state.     

Foreign aid and the politics of participation in economic policy reform

Research suggests that borrower ‘ownership’ of reforms is highly correlated with the success of reforms in developing countries. One of the most important components of ownership is the nature of public–private relations and consultation with interest groups. Yet participatory reform must overcome several political dilemmas, including problems of credibility, collective action, and distributive (in)justice. The characteristics of reforms also affect the possibilities for participation. Democratic governments interested in making policy reform more participatory and presumably more sustainable can draw on several strategies, including the selective use of incentives and compensation, public education and communications, capacity building in society, institutional mechanisms for consultation, and political sequencing of reforms. These strategies have implications for the foreign aid agencies who often fund reforms. They suggest that donors need to recognize the political rationality behind cross‐payments and spending to maintain important constituencies; that political sustainability may require reform sequences that are out of step with current orthodoxy; that policies ought to create winners before creating losers; that democratic consultation will require much more time in achieving consensus; and that outside actors need to refrain from intervening too directly in the political process by throwing their support behind particular interests. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe: An Integrative Approach

National frameworks for banking and, more generally, financial supervision in various European countries have undergone significant changes in the last decade or so. What explains these supervisory reforms? This work addresses this question by examining the recent reforms in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, engaging in a structured, focused comparison, mainly using process tracing and adopting an analytical framework articulated across three levels of analysis. It is argued that while international and EU factors acted as antecedent variables, establishing the background for the reforms, they were mediated by national factors—to be precise, by two independent variables—that account for distinctive modes and outcomes of reforms. In addition, the institutional strength of the central bank—the intervening variable—can make a difference to the process of reform by either inhibiting or catalyzing change.     

The Public/Private Cleavage in a Welfare State: Attitudes Toward Public Management Reform

This study contributes to the growing literature on differences in attitudes between public and private sector employees, particularly with respect to their receptivity or resistance to public management reforms. We begin by asking the question: to what degree does perceived self-interest play a role in accounting for attitudes toward public management reforms such as downsizing, privatization, and public spending? Using attitudinal data from Sweden, a social welfare state with a large public bureaucracy, a tension is observed both among public employees in different levels of government and between public and private sector employees. In the context of public management reforms, national government employees emerge as more right-leaning politically and more supportive of public management reforms than those working in local government. The analysis finds, particularly among national government employees, that while interest as measured here is strongly related to attitudes toward reform, status as a public employee and status as a public bureaucrat are not as significant as other components of interest in accounting for attitudes toward public management reform.     

Who has turned the project management lights on? A comparative analysis of transportation and information technology in US state governments

We provide a comparative analysis of capital project management for major transportation and information technology (IT) acquisitions in US state governments, focusing on the use of earned value management (EVM). Results indicate that most states have adopted basic reforms, such as establishing project management offices and developing guidelines based on industry standards. However, fewer have implemented reforms with more teeth to them, such as centralized oversight and EVM. We find that states with greater spending are more likely to use EVM but that it is more commonly prescribed for IT than transportation.