王羲之开Party

日前参加朋友的一个生日Party,席间有朋友问我:古人是如何开Party的?我说:中国古人的Party,虽受当时条件的限制显得原始古朴,但大多比现代人的Party更有文化内涵,尤其是古代文人的Party,相当于现在作家、书画家的各类"笔会".其中最风光的一次Party,无疑是由东晋大书法家王羲之"做东",在会稽山阴兰亭举行的"曲水流觞"大Party,并为后世留下著名的<兰亭集序>.……     

From Class Party to Catchall Party?: The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party

This article seeks to apply Kirchheimer’s ‘catchall party thesis’ to the transformation of the Agrarian-Center Party in Finland. On at least two counts this might seem a hopeless endeavor. First, Kirchheimer excluded most parties in the smaller West European democracies like Finland from his analysis on the curious grounds that they either had effective majorities or regular access to power and, therefore, had no need of catchall strategies. Second, he expressly excluded certain parties, including significantly Agrarian parties, from his purview because they were too narrowly based to become catchall parties. Kirchheimer also asserts that in general only major parties could successfully achieve a ‘life-saving transformation.’ The Finnish Agrarian Party was certainly that. In the early 1960s, it was the largest single party, with a substantial classe gardée, and was also the pivotal party of governing coalitions. Accordingly, this article addresses three interrelated questions: a) Why did the Finnish Agrarians seek catchall status? b) What were the catchall strategies they pursued? c) Has an archetypal mass-class party, contrary to Kirchheimer’s submission, been able to extend the basis of its support to become a catchall party? It is argued that although the Center Party today exhibits the electoral attributes of the catchall party – and is the only Finnish party really to do so – it lacks the organizational characteristics of the genre as enumerated by Kirchheimer.     

Are Party Activists the Party Extremists? The Structure of Opinion in Political Parties

In re-examining May's law of curvilinear disparity, this article analyzes the structure of opinion of political parties. May suggests that voters, party leaders and party activists have different incentives to participate in politics, and therefore voters and leaders have more moderate positions on issues than party activists. This article is based on the extensions of May's law made by Kitschelt, who argues that curvilinear disparities, although not general phenomena, are bound to occur in specific circumstances. We have focused on the level of cleavage conflict in the system, the variable that Kitschelt himself found to be critical for explaining party radicalism among sub-leaders. Using the Norwegian multiparty system as a test case, we propose that radicalism among party activists is conditioned by the relative saliency of different policy dimensions. The empirical analysis, which is based on surveys of MPs, party members and voters in connection with the general election of 1993, gives very little support to our proposition.     

On a Short Leash? Sub-National Party Positions between Regional Context and National Party Unity

Do sub-national parties reproduce the programmatic orientation of the party as a whole? Or are they able to adjust their programmatic orientation to their sub-national electorate? I seek to answer these questions based on the policy positions of German sub-national parties and survey data on voters' positions. Referring to these very similar parties – which all have to commit themselves to certain policy positions in the run-up to state elections – allows for a controlled analysis of sub-national parties' autonomy. The analyses reveal that the regional context does play a role; voters' preferences and the unemployment rate appear to influence the dynamics of party positions. However, the results also show that regional branches of the same party change their positions in a similar way and also seek not to distance themselves too far from the national party line. This indicates that German sub-national parties appear first and foremost to be regional party branches of national parties.     

Party Animals? Extreme Partisan Polarization and Dehumanization

Political Behavior - The affective, identity based, and often negative nature of partisan polarization in the United States has been a subject of much scholarly attention. Applying insights from...     

When do Economic Perceptions Matter for Party Approval?

Do economic perceptions influence partisan preferences or vice versa? We argue that the direction of influence between government approval and economic perceptions is conditional on the state of the economy. Under conditions of economic crisis, when economic signals are relatively unambiguous, perceptions of the economy can be expected to exogenously influence government approval but this is not found when the economy is experiencing a more typical pattern of moderate growth and economic signals are more mixed. We test these arguments using British election panel surveys covering electoral cycles of moderate economic growth (1997–2001) and dramatic and negative disruption (2005–2010). We examine the most commonly employed measures of retrospective economic perceptions and estimate a range of models using structural equations modelling. We demonstrate that when the economy is performing extremely badly economic perceptions have an exogenous effect on government approval and provide a means of electoral accountability, but this is not the case in under more normal circumstances.     

Conserving the Constitution? The Conservative Party and Democratic Renewal

In 2008 David Cameron declared that the Conservative party was 'ready for government' and suggested that 'the change we need is not just from Labour's old policies to our new policies… It's about a change from old politics to new politics'. This 'new politics' narrative is something of a cliché: British constitutional history reveals a regular pattern whereby opposition parties renege upon implementing far-reaching constitutional and democratic reforms once they win power. It is in this context that this article draws upon documentary analysis and a number of interviews to examine the Conservative party's position on constitutional reform and democratic renewal. It concludes that although the Conservative party has spent the last decade decrying the 'destruction' of the constitution it has undertaken little detailed preparatory work in relation to how it might seek to alter the governance of Britain. As a result the research presented in this article provides a number of insights into elite politics, strategic game-playing and executive veto capacities within a context of growing political disengagement from politics and falling levels of trust in politics.     

Ambassadors in the community? Labour Party members in society

A political party's members are its ambassadors in the wider community. Based on a survey of Labour party members in Nuneaton, this article investigates the extent to which party members qua party members are visible amongst their friends and colleagues. It finds that there are few closet Labour party members. Most are known to friends and (slightly less commonly) colleagues. Party members also articulate a political message, discussing politics with friends and work colleagues. Around half of party members believe that they influence others as a result of their discussions; of those who are asked their opinions by friends, almost three-quarters believe that they influence others. Labour party members in Nuneaton are thus a visible and articulate manifestation of the party. The article ends by considering whether this is likely to be true in other constituencies, for other parties, and at other times.     

The Quiet Revolution? The Labour Party and Welfare Conditionality

Labour's 2017 general election manifesto contained a pledge to ‘end the punitive sanctions regime’ in the British welfare state. Whilst the specific implications of this pledge were not elaborated, such a policy would nevertheless constitute a profound break with a welfare consensus spanning over twenty years. The depth of the suggested changes on welfare are also evident in the scale of reform proposed to disability benefits, as well as plans—confirmed in August 2018 by the Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell—to pilot universal basic income. Collectively, these policies would seemingly be deeply at odds with public opinion on the benefits system, which over the course of the last two decades has significantly hardened. Yet despite the seemingly radical and controversial nature of the policy, it received very little media or public attention during the election campaign. This article explores Labour's ‘quiet revolution’ on welfare, examining whether Labour's new welfare approach is indeed a bold attempt to reshape public opinion on welfare or, alternatively, a mostly pragmatic reaction to changing social attitudes. The argument presented is that whilst there are persuasive explanations that Labour is responding to a change in the public mood, there is also evidence of a more ambitious goal at stake: the aim of reshaping, not simply responding to, public opinion on the welfare state.     

Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland?

The rise of the radical or extreme right parties in Europe – parties usually noted for strong, sometimes racist anti-immigrant ideologies – has attracted a great deal of attention in political science. Ireland, despite having some conditions favourable to the growth of such a party has no radical right party. This paper argues that that this is because the ‘space’ usually occupied by such parties – for young, poor people disaffected by economic change – is taken up by Sinn Féin, which though it has similarities to radical right parties, differs markedly in its attitudes to immigrants. It goes on to explain the special circumstances that prevent nationalist parties in Ireland from presenting overtly anti-immigrant platforms. The focus on anti-immigration and liberal economic policies for such parties may mean that other parties with strong resemblances are excluded from studies they might usefully be included.     

Patronage and Power: Russia’s Dominant Party Regime

Following the election cycle of 2007–2008, Russia prepares to enter a phase marked by a change of presidents but continuity in the model of legislative-executive relations that was established under Vladimir Putin. During Putin’s presidency, Russia created an authoritarian dominant party regime. In such a system, patronage and coercion are used to ensure the dominant party’s control of elective offices. In Russia, United Russia’s commanding majority in parliament ensures that the president and government can enact their legislative agenda without opposition. The arrangement allows parliamentarians to enjoy substantial material benefits and patronage opportunities as champions of powerful commercial interests in return for conceding authoritarian powers to the president.      

Party over Policy? Scottish Nationalism and the Politics of Independence

The Scottish National Party (SNP) won control of Scotland's devolved government in the 2007 election yet opinion polls show no majority for its objective of independence in Europe. While the party is adept at exploiting short‐term political opportunity structures in the wider British context, as well as appealing to the ‘opinion electorate’, it appears less successful at persuading a majority of Scottish voters to agree with its core ideology. Helpful parallels can be drawn between 2007 and the last time the party polled over 30 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland at the 1974 (October) British General Election—then, as now, the Scottish voter appears to be willing to distinguish between party and policy.     

Europeanization or Party Politics? Explaining Government Choice for Corporatist Concertation

This article assesses whether changes in government choice for policy concertation with trade unions and employers are better explained by international or domestic factors. We compare patterns of corporatist governance in a strongly Europeanized policy domain (labor migration policy) and in a weakly Europeanized policy domain (welfare state reforms) over the last 20 years in Austria and Switzerland. We show that there is no systematic difference in patterns of concertation between the two policy sectors and that factors linked to party politics play a bigger role in the choice of governments for concertation. If the base of party support for policies is divided, governments are more prone to resort to corporatist concertation as a way to build compromises for potentially controversial or unpopular policies. By contrast, ideologically cohesive majority coalitions are less prone to resort to concertation because they do not need to build compromises outside their base of party support.     

Neglected and Unloved: Does the Hinge Party Deserve That?

This article focuses on the hinge party both as a concept and a strategy. It seeks to ‘liberate’ the hinge party from the clutches of such close conceptual relatives as the ‘pivot party’, the ‘genuine pivot party’, the ‘pivotal centre party’, the ‘pivotal middle party’ and the ‘pivotal median party’. This is a taxonomical jungle and while some use the terms ‘hinge party’ and ‘pivot party’ interchangeably, this study urges a ‘velvet divorce’. The main theoretical question is in two parts: (1) What are the distinguishing features of the hinge party and how does it differ from the pivot party?; and (2) What set of legislative party system circumstances would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy of keeping options open to both left and right? Self‐styled centrist parties would seem most likely to favour a hinge party strategy and the empirical question is: To what extent have the Nordic Centre‐label [former agrarian] parties sought and been able to do so?     

What Motivates the Gatekeepers? Explaining Governing Party Preferences on Immigration

Most scholarship on immigration politics is made up of isolated case studies or cross‐disciplinary work that does not build on existing political science theory. This study attempts to remedy this shortcoming in three ways: (1) we derive theories from the growing body of immigration literature, to hypothesize about why political parties would be more or less open to immigration; (2) we link these theories to the broader political science literature on parties and institutions; and (3) we construct a data set on the determinants of immigration politics, covering 18 developed countries from 1987 to 1999. Our primary hypothesis is that political institutions shape immigration politics by facilitating or constraining majoritarian sentiment (which is generally opposed to liberalizing immigration). Our analysis finds that in political systems where majoritarianism is constrained by institutional “checks,” governing parties support immigration more strongly, even when controlling for a broad range of alternative explanations.     

Marching to the Left? Programmatic Competition and the 2017 Party Manifestos

This article analyses the content of the 2017 general election manifestos, and introduces the latest estimates from the Manifesto Project to explore recent ideological movements in the British party system. It reports the changing policy emphases in Conservative and Labour manifestos and the ideological positions of the major political parties in 2017. It finds that Theresa May's party produced its most left‐wing manifesto since 1964, and that Jeremy Corbyn's party produced its most left‐wing manifesto since 1992 and the election before the advent of New Labour. The article also finds that the ideological space between the Conservatives and Labour opened up in 2017, and that Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionists published the most right‐wing manifesto.     

Rejecting representation? Party systems and popular support for referendums in Europe

Under what conditions do citizens favor deciding political issues by popular vote? Models of support for popular vote processes usually consider the influence of individual attitudes such as political trust and interest in politics. But much less is known about the effect of institutional variables on support for popular vote processes. This article builds on research showing that disaffection with elected officials shapes support for referendums by considering the influence of the party system. First, an analysis of multilevel data from twenty-four European democracies indicates that individuals are more supportive of referendums in countries with fewer effective political parties. Second, a mediation analysis provides evidence that the number of parties influences referendum support through individual-level political trust and external efficacy. Where there are fewer viable parties, feelings that elected officials are unresponsive tend to increase popular support for referendums. These findings suggest a trade-off between available representation by political parties and support for direct influence over public policy.