Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet War Scare: The Untold Story

Abstract

During the Soviet war scare of the 1980s, British intelligence shared vital information from KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky with its American partners. The US intelligence community, however, was suspicious of the message and the messenger, dismissing Soviet ‘war talk’ as disinformation. Some officials even believed that the British had tweaked their reports to influence US policy. President Ronald Reagan, however, on the advice of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, listened to Gordievsky rather than his intelligence advisors. The war scare had a profound influence on Reagan's thinking about nuclear war, Kremlin fears, and Soviet–American relations that led him to seek a new détente with Moscow and the end of the Cold War through diplomacy rather than confrontation.?Subsequent events and post-Cold War revelations vindicated Gordievsky. Reagan sought his advice on the eve of his first summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and later expressed his gratitude during a private meeting in the Oval Office.     

Corona over Cuba: The Missile Crisis and the Early Limitations of Satellite Imagery Intelligence

In the autumn of 1962, two weeks before U-2 aerial photographs confirmed Soviet deployments of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the US intelligence community attempted to image the island with the spy satellite Corona. Insufficient image resolution and extensive cloud cover, however, prevented this photography from providing solid evidence confirming or denying the presence of offensive missiles. This event – previously unaddressed either by Missile Crisis or Corona scholars – illustrates both the promise and the limits of early satellite imagery intelligence. It further provides insight into the early imagery tasking and coordination process and demonstrates needs that drove further development of national satellite reconnaissance in the years that followed.     

Operation ‘Schooner/Nylon’: RAF flying in the Berlin control zone

Shortly after the end of the Second World War six Allied and Soviet Military Liaison Missions were established on the territory of the former Third Reich. The British contribution to this was known as BRIXMIS, the British Commanders ‘‐in‐Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in Germany. However, after a short time liaison was not the only activity, espionage inevitably became the most important function of BRIXMIS. One of the more important and dangerous operations was the acquisition of aerial intelligence of Soviet installations in East Germany and East Berlin taking photography with hand‐held cameras from a single‐engined Chipmunk aircraft which was ostensibly used by the RAF for training purposes.     

Soviet intelligence and the 1957 Syrian crisis

This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.     

Space Situational Awareness in Europe: The Fractures and the Federative Aspects of European Space Efforts

ABSTRACT

One part of the massive US intelligence effort to learn about Soviet missile and space programs during the Cold War was acquiring and analyzing Soviet space debris that had returned to Earth. Equally important was retrieving US fragments that had landed in foreign nations to prevent the Soviets from recovering and exploiting them. At times bitter jurisdictional battles among the interested government agencies plagued the undertaking. Additionally the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 limited the ability to obtain foreign debris in some circumstances. Despite these problems, however, the available record shows that in many cases the United States acquired and tested important Soviet fragments and also was able to retrieve its own.     

From Malin Head to ‘Okean 75’: shadowing and intelligence collection operations by Royal Navy surface ships 1975–1985*

This article analyses a hitherto neglected aspect of the Cold War at Sea: the shadowing of Soviet warships by the Royal Navy surface vessels. Making use of previously untapped government sources, this article assesses the significance of these intelligence gathering operations, as well as their role in deterring the Soviet Navy through non-nuclear means. The article reviews three types of intelligence gathering operation by British warships: the regular and routine shadowing operations off Malin Head, the short-notice shadowing of Soviet warships transiting the sea areas near the United Kingdom, and finally the co-ordinated shadowing of the enormous ‘Okean 75’ Soviet naval exercise in 1975.     

New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era

The US Department of Defense (DOD) has made available to scholars a significant collection of documents captured from the files of the Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence services. DOD is also studying ways in which further such documents can be released. These documents paint a picture in many ways reminiscent of the intelligence services of the totalitarian Soviet Union. These and forthcoming documents may enable important research on Iraq and on the role of intelligence services in totalitarian states. One newly available document gives the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate's assessment of Iran on the eve of the Iran–Iraq War.     

Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957–61

Between 1957 and 1961, American National Intelligence Estimates overestimated the Soviets’ capabilities to produce and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, creating the ‘missile gap’ controversy. This article examines the contemporaneous estimates of British intelligence on the Soviet ballistic missile program, which were based upon very similar, if not the same, raw intelligence. It demonstrates that British estimates of the Soviet ICBM program were more accurate. However, this success did not continue in the analysis of the medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (M/IRBM) threat, which was relatively poor for most of the period. It concludes that the reasons for this lie in the different assumptions held by intelligence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, and a degree of conservatism in both intelligence establishments.     

Unknown Agabekov

The decision to declassify selected historical documents from the archives of the Security Service in 1997 has been a boon to academic historians of intelligence. The declassified files reveal the successes and failures of the Security Service in fulfilling its statutory function of defending the realm. Yet the activity of Soviet spies continues to be one of the most challenging topics in intelligence history. The role of Soviet defectors in transforming the Security Service's understanding of the nature and extent of Soviet intelligence operations, meanwhile, remains largely understudied. In the case of Agabekov, for example, the reaction of SIS or MI5 to his ‘disappearance’ in the spring of 1938 has long been neglected. It is possible that there was no reaction at all, because both services had long-since written off Agabekov as a source. This helps explain why Agabekov's case has been ignored in the relevant literature in both Russia and the West.     

‘Stella polaris’ and the secret code battle in postwar Europe

Much has already been written about the September 1944 evacuation of the Finnish intelligence service to Sweden, which was designated Operation ‘Stella Polaris’. Newly declassified intelligence documents found at the US National Archives provide a fresh perspective on the role of the American wartime foreign intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its successor, the Strategic Services Unit, in ‘Stella Polaris’ and its aftermath. The documents reveal that throughout World War II, the OSS secretly obtained sensitive intelligence information concerning America's wartime ally, the Soviet Union, from agents within the Finnish intelligence service. The OSS Stockholm Station purchased Soviet and other foreign government code and cipher materials from the Finns, not realizing until later that the Finns had sold the same material to other states. The Americans responded by recruiting some well-placed agents within the Finnish ‘Stella Polaris’ organization, who provided detailed information about the intelligence activities of the Finns in Sweden, and the work of Finnish intelligence officers in France after the end of the war. Among the key pieces of intelligence obtained was the fact that the French intelligence service was intercepting American radio traffic.     

Seeing Red: U.S. Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945-1949

In the immediate postwar period Army Air Force A-2 cultivated a unique intelligence culture that focussed on the air-atomic threat posed by the Soviet Union and the use of the most advanced technologies to monitor countries behind the 'Iron Curtain'. Although most intelligence reports presented a detailed analysis of Russian air power capabilities, consideration was also given to an assessment of intentions. Based on a literal interpretation of Marxist texts and an unambiguous reading of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, A-2 more than any other agency was convinced of the Soviet willingness to wage war. As for a reading of capabilities, the fact that the Soviets were developing a long-range air force was in itself evidence of intentions. A-2 was, however, left out of the national security decision-making loop until after the successful test of the Soviet A-bomb, which was accurately predicted by the Air Force in the summer of 1949. Until that time most officials in the Truman administration believed in the likelihood of the slow incremental expansion of Soviet power rather than the launching of an 'atomic Pearl harbor' against the Western bloc.     

‘No Wishful Thinking Allowed’: Secret Service Committee and Intelligence Reform in Great Britain, 1919–23

The May 2002 tranche of British Security Service files released to the Public Record Office included hitherto classified policy files containing documents on Secret Service Committee meetings held from 1919 to 1923. This body wrote an important yet relatively obscure chapter in British intelligence history: the post-First World War reorganization and retasking of British secret service machinery, the focus now being Soviet Russia. However, by encouraging the deliberate overstatement of the Bolshevik 'subversive' threat and then backing excessive measures to counter it, some British officials may have sown the seeds of government's later inability to detect a much graver peril to national security, that of Soviet espionage.     

Diplomatic Sigint and the British Official Mind during the Second World War: Soviet claims on Turkey, 1940–45

Historians of Soviet foreign policy have recently revisited the issue of Soviet claims against Turkey: a Stalinist objective during the period of the Nazi–Soviet Pact and in the immediate post-war era. Recently opened archives show that the British response to Soviet claims in 1945 was driven by comprehensive access to Turkish diplomatic correspondence. However, the British failed to recognize wartime decrypts that indicated continuity in Soviet ambitions in Turkey since 1940. This failure reflected the responsibility of the operational departments of the Foreign Office for the assessment of diplomatic Sigint, and the absence of a genuine political intelligence department with eyes for anything other than current lines of policy.     

De Witt Clinton Poole,the foreign nationalities branch and political intelligence

The Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services served as an important source of political intelligence for the Roosevelt administration during World War II. The philosophy of the Branch's most influential director, DeWitt Clinton Poole, and his organization's work among Yugoslav‐Americans, illustrates the concerns that ethnic politics generated in the United States, as well as appreciation of the role that ethnics could play in psychological warfare and postwar anti‐Soviet propaganda.     

US Intelligence Performance and US Policy during the Polish Crisis of 1980–81: Revelations from the Kukliński Files

Drawing on intelligence documents that were recently declassified, this article assesses the quality of US intelligence analysis during the 1980–81 Polish crisis and the impact of the intelligence analysis on US policy toward Poland and the Soviet Union. After discussing the value and limitations of the declassified materials, the article raises questions about US policy during the crisis and discusses how intelligence inputs helped to shape policy. The newly available documents confirm that the US intelligence community's analytical products were often deficient and that these shortcomings put a crimp on US policymakers' choices.     

Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973–1991

In June 1967, the Soviet Union abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Israel and withdrew its embassy staff from Tel-Aviv, including its large KGB Rezidentura. To develop new sources of intelligence in Israel, the KGB recruited under duress hundreds of Russian Jews to spy in Israel in return for allowing their families to leave the Soviet Union. Most of these ‘recruits’ abandoned their task once they reached Israel, leaving Soviet intelligence with only a small number of agents in Israel who were handled by KGB illegal case officers working out of Russian churches. These agents were able to make careers in Israel and obtain some access to confidential military information, but generally failed to reach Israel's inner circle of political and military decision makers. This inner circle was only breached in 1983 by the treachery of a highly placed former Mossad officer who offered his services to the Soviets and became the KGB's best source for secret information deep inside the Israeli government.     

Preparing for Armageddon: Jic 1 (Final) and the Soviet Attack on Canada

From 1945 to 1947 Canada shifted from a dependency on Great Britain for wartime operational intelligence to a junior partnership with the United States in the production of strategic threat assessments of the Soviet Union. Working through the Military Cooperation Committee the primary objective of Canadian and American officials was to update the wartime Defence Plan (ABC-22), with a Basic Security Plan for the post-war defence of North America. Each country was to produce a detailed 'Implementation' based on an intelligence 'Appreciation' of the threats facing North America in the 'air-atomic age'. Towards this end, the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee prepared JIC 1 (Final), a report on when, where, and in what capacity the Soviet Union would strike Canada in the event of the next major war. The basic problem facing the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee was to incorporate American sources in the assessment of Soviet capabilities without simply producing a carbon copy version of the assessment of their continental ally. Moreover, the Canadians were particularly concerned that they produce a 'made in Canada' assessment of Soviet intentions. The report was completed and approved by Canadian and American defence officials in 1947 and updated versions became the basis for continental defence planning until the signing of the 1957 Norad agreement.     

Is it a Pearl or a Kidney Stone? Intelligence Reform and Embassy Reporting,from Moscow to Baghdad

A July 1990 cable from the US Embassy in Moscow that anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union is a case study for an analysis in this article that seeks to make three points: 1) major failures in intelligence analysis are more likely to result when all elements of the intelligence community speak with one voice than when they disagree; 2) embassy reporting can play an essential role independent of that of the intelligence community in shaping Washington thinking about international events, but a variety of developments have made this increasingly difficult; 3) probability analysis plays too great a role in intelligence products and risk management too little.     

‘Because I Don't Trust Him,We are Friends’: Signals Intelligence and the Reluctant Anglo-Soviet Embrace, 1917–24

Signals intelligence was crucial in helping British policymakers come to grips with Communist subversion – real or imagined – in this country. Still, though released by GCHQ in the late 1990s, Soviet diplomatic intercepts have yet to feature prominently in any study of early Anglo-Russian relations. While they ought not to be regarded on their own as the definitive source on Soviet foreign policy, GCCS intercepts tell us a great deal not only about how Moscow used the threat of subversion as a bargaining chip but also about personalities and bureaucratic rivalries on the Soviet side.     

Cold War Reconnaissance Flights along the Berlin Corridors and in the Berlin Control Zone 1960–90: Risk,Coordination and Sharing

During the Cold War, Soviet and East German military units, equipment and activities around Berlin were high priority targets for Western military intelligence agencies. This article examines the imagery gathering undertaken by British, French and US reconnaissance flights along the Berlin Air Corridors and inside the Berlin Control Zone. The quantity of information was effectively multiplied because of the close cooperation between the Western allies and coordination with Allied Military Liaison Mission ‘ground tours’. This cooperation generally went further than has been publicly acknowledged by individual governments. This paper contends that the collaboration provided the most comprehensive and regular collection of imagery on Soviet and East German military units for the duration of the Cold War. It contributed to a multi-dimensional picture of Soviet and German Democratic Republic capabilities and intentions. Soviet motives for generally not interfering with those missions on a regular basis are considered.