Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq

The concept of ‘politicization’ of the US intelligence services, and in particular the CIA, has been debated by scholars for many years. However, it has also been easily dismissed by those investigating recent US foreign policy, as in the Robb-Silberman Commission's assurance over the 2003 Iraq War that ‘the Intelligence Community needs to be pushed’. This essay seeks an extension of the critique of politicization by considering the historical context since the formation of the CIA. It seeks an application of that critique by putting forth, when evaluating the policy and operations of the George W. Bush administration, the notion of an ‘alternative network’ within the government. The argument is that politicization must be linked to a conception of ‘Executive power’, both within the American bureaucracy and in the projection and rationalization of US aims overseas.     

Geospatial intelligence and the U.S. Exploring Expedition (1838–1842): reframing the history of U.S. Naval Intelligence

This paper reframes the U.S. Exploring Expedition (USEE, 1838–1842) as a naval/geospatial intelligence collection activity. By charting the Pacific, the USEE furthered U.S. commercial interests, while also building a picture of the ‘maritime operational environment’ on which all other forms of intelligence were (and are) based. Viewing the USEE in this light broadens the opportunities open to historians of U.S. Naval Intelligence and historicizes contemporary concerns about climate change and resource scarcity. It suggests that ‘knowledge of the environment’ has long coexisted with ‘knowledge of the enemy’ as a priority for the U.S. Navy.     

A Higher Form of Intelligence: Hugh Trevor-Roper and Wartime British Secret Service

Throughout his distinguished career, the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper was known in many incarnations and guises: the ‘sleuth of Oxford’; Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford; the Spectator's Mercurius Oxoniensis; Baron Dacre of Glanton; and Master of Peterhouse College. In addition, he was to gain wider notoriety in the early 1980s as the man who helped authenticate the forged Hitler Diaries. Nevertheless, his wartime embodiment as a British intelligence officer is one facet of his personal history that has never before been addressed by scholars in any great depth. Using previously unpublished material from Trevor-Roper's memoirs and personal papers, as well as excerpts from the Guy Liddell Diaries, this article aims to highlight the fact that, contrary to the impression engendered by F.H. Hinsley's dry and depersonalized multi-volume official history, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Major H.R. Trevor-Roper, and many other intelligence officers like him, not only had a ‘good war’, but a rich and colourful one. If historians are to escape the late Sir Maurice Oldfield's indictment of that official history, namely, that it was written ‘by a committee, about committees, for a committee’, they might do worse than begin to reappraise the role of the individual in the context of Britain's intelligence effort during 1939–45. The late Lord Dacre, so this article argues, is one such individual requiring further study.     

The decontamination of German history: Jürgen Habermas and the ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany

The ‘Historikerstreit’ in West Germany was opened by the non-historian Habermas who sought to expose what he saw as a ‘scandalous’ revision of aspects of the history of German fascism on the part of leading conservative historians like Nolte, Hillgruber and Stürmer. Habermas sees this revisionism in the wider context of the perceived need to foster a new German nationalism as a means of legitimation. The attempt to decontaminate German history would seem to derive from the need to resist the demands for political realignment in West Germany and to establish a strong pedigree of German anti-communism which takes in National Socialism and its membership of the Anti-Comintern Pact as well as West Germany's membership of NATO. Habermas's critique of conservative historians and the non-rational assumptions of their philosophy of history is essentially linked to his critique of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault and his identification of a common paralyzing influence on discourse.     

Jack,Judy, Sam,Bobby, Johnny,Frank...: An investigation into the alternate history of the CIA‐Mafia collaboration to assassinate Fidel Castro, 1960–1997

The CIA‐Mafia plots to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s serve, by themselves, as comically horrifying tales, some of the many littered throughout American Cold War history. Yet these events have lived an extraordinary life outside of the textbooks and classrooms; the danger and intrigue of the organized crime underworld mixed with a national fascination with the Kennedy family have kept this story alive through all of its mutations. J. Alan Wolske analyzes the various histories of the assassination plots that have sprung from the government's own attempts to face up to its past deeds, and attempts to reconcile them with the ‘official’ history.     

Intelligence Analysis

American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is ‘strategic’ or ‘national’ intelligence and ‘tactical’ intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature.     

Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate

The two most prestigious products prepared by the US intelligence agencies for use by decision-makers in Washington, DC, are the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate. The Brief, an example of ‘current intelligence,’ adds value to what policy officials in Washington can learn about world affairs from the best newspapers, especially in the domains of foreign weaponry, activities within closed societies, and the machinations of terrorist organizations. The National Intelligence Estimate, an example of ‘research intelligence,’ has added value, too, on occasion, but has often been wrong. Each of these forms of intelligence has their critics, and the NIE in particular is frequently considered too long a document and too diluted in content. The production of NIEs has varied over the years since 1950, averaging twenty-three a year with a low of five (in 1976) and a high of fifty-six (in 1992).     

The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice

The use of probability propositions is widespread in Intelligence estimation and strategic forecasts, as in everyday life. This paper attempts to give clear meaning to the use of probability statements for future strategic assessment. The first half presents possible interpretations in the philosophy of probability, while the second part applies the understandings of the first half to the Intelligence estimation process. A recommendation for a combination of ‘a priori’ interpretation of probability with a higher level of ‘relative frequency’ interpretation is the result of this paper.     

Harry Hopkins and Soviet Espionage

One of the intriguing unidentified cover names in the Venona decryptions released in the mid-1990s was ‘19’, a Soviet source senior enough to report taking part in a conversation with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Vice-President Wallace at the 1943 Trident conference. While some historians thought the evidence too ambiguous to identify the real name behind ‘19’, others built a case that it was presidential adviser Harry Hopkins. Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks, made public in 2009, resolved the issue by firmly identifying ‘19’ as State Department official Laurence Duggan. There remain, however, writers who refuse to accept the evidence that ‘19’ was Duggan and insist that Hopkins was a Soviet agent on the basis of insubstantial evidence.     

The ‘masterpieces of the twentieth century’ festival and the congress for cultural freedom: Origins and consolidation 1947–52

The Congress for Cultural Freedom was established in June 1950 in West Berlin with the intention of solidifying anti‐communist opinion among Western intellectuals. Despite much having already been written on its history and its relationship with the CIA, there remains a lack of clarity over its early years concerning the extent of the CIA role and the degree to which a coherent ‘strategy’ existed. This article concentrates on the various individuals and groups who were involved in the Congress' origins, and how its purpose and method was consolidated by means of its first major venture after Berlin, the ‘Masterpieces of the 20th Century’ festival held in Paris in May 1952.     

Ideas in Politics in International Context

This article asks how we might rethink the study of ‘ideas in politics’ in modern Britain. It suggests that historians need to set the problem in its international contexts in a more structured way. Focussing on the nineteenth century, the article reflects on conceptual angles opened up by ‘global intellectual’ and ‘entangled’ approaches to political ideas and behaviour. While stressing that these methods have their pitfalls, the article argues that a reconsideration of the seams where international and intellectual contexts meet can help to reconnect modern British political history with wider historical debates.     

Filling in the ‘unknowns’: Hypothesis-based intelligence and the Rumsfeld commission

In 2003 the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans employed a hypothesis-based methodology to deliver the now discredited intelligence that justified the Iraq war. The 1976 ‘Team B’, which was also heavily influenced by neoconservatives and used the same methodology, has been recognized as a precedent. There is, however, another precedent, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission, which challenged CIA predictions on the ballistic missile threat to the US. Lobbied for by many of the same conservatives and neoconservatives, the Commission used the same analytical style as Team B and the OSP. The now discredited intelligence on Iraq was not a ‘failure’ or ‘mistake’, but a method, tried and tested by the right, of challenging the CIA on political grounds.     

That Awkward Region: Writing and Advising on the History of Northern Ireland

The history of Northern Ireland poses two particular challenges for the political historian. First, histories of the region are inextricably bound up with contemporary political positions: historical time becomes distorted as histories are refracted through the lens of modern political controversies. Second, the importance of historical ‘memory’ to contemporary politics leaves little room for doubt, uncertainty or academic expertise. The past is assumed to be known; what place is there for academic historians when politicians and many members of the public are so invested in their own readings of the past? This article explores these challenges through two case studies in which the author was involved: the Historical Advisory Panel established by the UK government for the centenary of Northern Ireland; and subsequent debates around the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. It illustrates the difficult relationship between academic, public and politicised histories, and considers the lessons for historians whose expertise places them at the interface of those different ‘pasts’.     

Educational economies

Contemporary public discussion of and policy formation with respect to higher education pay scant attention to the history and structure of the modern university. In part this is forgivable, since educational historians deal almost exclusively with schooling to the neglect of any wider assessment of formal education within the public sphere. Nonetheless, personal ‘experience’, much less sheer prejudice, is no substitute for an understanding of ‘higher learning’. This review essay considers the outline history provided by Robert Stevens’ From University to Uni and suggests that we are now entering an era of a ‘postmodern’ university whose purposes are both incoherent and implausible.     

The Politics of Race and the Future of British Political History

This article addresses the field of British political history's blind spot when it comes to race. Where modern British political historians are comfortable approaching politics in ‘high’ and ‘popular’ forms as well as in terms of ideas, institutions and policy, they often struggle even to see a politics of race in operation. Using examples drawn from research on the post-1945 history of the white supremacist movement in Britain, this article maintains that the means to render race visible in the political history of modern Britain lies in the incorporation of previously overlooked perspectives. In search of these perspectives, it looks to black British history and critical studies of race. In particular, it highlights analyses and critiques of British racism by black political activists, from those who organised in response to the 1959 murder of Kelso Cochrane, to the Black Power groups of the 1970s.     

Towards the Vernacular,Away from Politics? Political History after the ‘New Political History’

This article considers how modern British political history has changed since the ‘new political history’ of the 1990s. It focusses on the ‘vernacular’ histories which have emerged in the last decade or so. The vernacular ‘turn’ is frequently framed by its proponents in opposition to the new political history, with its focus on the rhetoric of politicians and subsequent tendency to reproduce the perspectives of political elites. This article, however, identifies continuities between these approaches, noting their shared interest in advancing a more complex understanding of the relationship between politics and people in the past. It argues that the real challenge posed by the vernacular lies in the necessary reckoning with the ‘apartness’ of politics from the perspective of ordinary people. Yet here too, this piece suggests, the vernacular turn can be seen as the latest stage in a continual rethinking of the relationship between political, social and cultural history.     

Meaning nothing but good: ethics,history and asylum-seeker phobia in Britain

The current hostility of the media, politicians, state and public against asylum-seekers in Britain is unprecedented in its intensity. Rarely in modern British history have those campaigning for refugee rights been so isolated, marginalized and silenced. Kushner explores how it has been possible to couch the campaign against asylum-seekers in a discourse of morality: the need to protect ‘our’ people and culture against the diseased and dangerous alien, as well as the distinction drawn between helping the genuine refugee and exposing the bogus asylum-seeker. History has been instrumentalized to prove, through alleged generosity in the past, the moral righteousness of Britain's treatment of refugees. He attempts to expose the dangers of misplaced ethics and distorted history. To begin the process of change, he argues, historians and moral philosophers, because of the abuse of their areas of expertise, must confront the issue of refugees as being central rather than peripheral to their concerns.     

Youth organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War

In the late 1960s it was revealed that ever since 1952 the CIA had financed and was still financing, by way of a whole series of ‘screen’ foundations, the overwhelming majority of youth and student organizations, not only in the United States, but throughout the free world. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as respectable as the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), Pax Romana and the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) had benefited, at various times in their history, from the generosity and ‘liberalism’ of the CIA. The key to understanding this paradoxical American involvement in leftist organizations lies in the Soviet Union's policy of systematically infiltrating Western civil society and international organizations. Its constant aim, relentlessly pursued and never openly avowed, was to control Western opinion and further the goals of Soviet foreign policy. By 1950 the communists had succeeded in effectively controlling all the international mass organizations. This study deals with the crucial Berlin Youth Festival of 1951 and the East-West struggle for dominance in the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS).     

Early warning versus concept: the case of the Yom Kippur War 1973

This article begins with a definition of the terms ‘early warning’ and ‘surprise’, and examines whether the failure of Israeli Intelligence to warn Israeli decision-makers in 1973 conforms to these definitions. After examining the conventions of Israeli military intelligence regarding anticipating a surprise, and the conceptions on which these were based, the article demonstrates how events in late 1973 indicated a possible Arab attack on Israel, but also the manner in which the Concept used to measure these warnings proved more resilient than the warnings. Discussions in the few days preceding war, when information was accumulating, are subjected to particular attention. The development of a sub-conception, with the original framework allowed and changed the forecast from ‘no war’ to ‘low probability' of war. The persistence of the Concept is attributed to both strategic intelligence and also to the doctrine of deterrence. Like deterrence, intelligence success is hard to measure. One can never be sure that a surprise attack has been prevented as a result of early warning.     

‘It takes a Russian to beat a Russian’: the National Union of Labor Solidarists,nationalism, and human intelligence operations in the Cold War

This article reconstructs the CIA’s exploitation of the Natsional’no Trudovoi Soyuz, a right-wing Russian nationalist organization, as a part of ‘rollback’ and ‘stay-behind’ covert operations against the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Operations such as these relied on the notion that far-right nationalism presented a potent counter to international communism. The article explores postwar ties between American intelligence and the NTS in a shared effort to ‘roll back’ the borders of communism. It likewise discusses the ability of Soviet counterintelligence to intercept, penetrate, and sabotage nationalist networks and their operations backed by Western governments.