Cold War counter-terrorism: the evolution of international counter-terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 1972–1984

This piece provides a detailed case study of the evolution of counter-terrorism within a specific domestic security agency of a liberal-democratic state in the context of the Cold War. It does so by examining the creation of a counter-terrorism unit within Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and how it responded to international terrorism. This occurred in between major terrorist attacks in Canada in 1970 and 1985 and included a growing focus on counter-terrorism even as counter-subversion remained a top priority within a still dominant Cold War domestic security framework. Ultimately, the article, based on thousands of pages of previously secret documents, argues that the Security Service could conceive of in a broader strategic sense the threat of terrorism but found it more challenging, for a variety of reasons, including the dominance of the Cold War and the difficulties around infiltrating ethnic communities, to collect intelligence.     

Counter-Terrorism,Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection,Exchange and Analysis

In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.     

Combatting terror in Europe: Euro-Israeli counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the Club de Berne (1971–1972)

How do intelligence agencies cooperate to counter terrorism and to what extent can it be (ab)used for political purposes? This article focuses on the Club de Berne, an intelligence liaison forum that was founded in 1969 by nine Western European countries and which was also linked to the United States and Israel. This article explores the mechanisms of counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in the early 1970s and examines the motives for cooperation within this framework. On the basis of large-scale recently declassified intelligence records, the article uncovers new aspects in the history of European security cooperation with Israel and the United States, and hopes to lay the groundwork for broader theoretical reflections about counterterrorism intelligence cooperation.     

Consistency and change in American perceptions of China

The cold war dominated American perceptions of the People's Republic of China during the 1950s and 1960s, and opinions of China were correspondingly negative. Improved Sino-American relations, accompanied by domestic reforms in China, led to a gradual improvement in American attitudes toward China during the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1980s, Americans held positive perceptions of China and its relations with the United States, but continued to view the People's Republic as communist and undemocratic. This sort of inconsistency is characteristic of periods of cognitive transition: some established perceptions are slower to change than others, and this results in structural imbalance. The Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989 interrupted this transitional process and sent perceptions of China shooting back toward balanced, cold war stereotypes. The massacre set the Chinese government in a clear symbolic struggle against freedom and democracy. This rekindled latent cold war images of China and elicited disapproving rhetoric from American leaders. The result was a quick reversion to negative perceptions of China, structured by a lingering cold war schema. These processes are demonstrated through the presentation of a study that explores the cognitive structure of perceptions of China both before and after the massacre.     

Deputy sheriff or independent ally? Evolving Australian–American ties in an ambiguous world order

The policies of Australia’s current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian ‘deputy sheriff’ executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate’s future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances.     

‘A poor thing but our own’: The Joint Intelligence Committee and Ireland, 1965–72

This article explores the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in assessing the development of the Northern Ireland crisis from the mid-1960s until the imposition of direct rule in 1972. It argues that the JIC's very limited engagement with Northern Ireland prior to 1969 contributed significantly to Whitehall's failure to grasp the drift of affairs from the autumn of 1968 onwards. This was due to the JIC's preoccupation with Cold War issues, compounded by reluctance to interfere in the security affairs of the Northern Ireland government. When Northern Ireland became a stock item of JIC business in 1970, the JIC secretariat became heavily involved in efforts to improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. The article also raises the question of the JIC's role in establishing the parameters for intelligence and security operations concerning Northern Ireland, including the controversial `Five Techniques' of interrogation, the introduction of internment in 1971, and covert activities in the Republic of Ireland. The article draws mainly on JIC, Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Office records in the National Archives.     

Spies and Scientologists: ASIO and a controversial minority religion in Cold War Australia, 1956–83

Among all the controversial New Religious Movements to emerge since the Second World War, the Church of Scientology has arguably been subject to more scrutiny by domestic and international intelligence agencies than any other non-Islamic alternative religious group. While owing to the nature of intelligence gathering scholarly accounts of this have often been one-dimensional and brief, the situation in Australia resulting from the Archives Act 1983 has meant that historians of both intelligence agencies and new religions now have access to a significant amount of documentation illustrating the interactions between the Church of Scientology and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) for the period from 1956 to 1983. This period witnessed vacillating fortunes for the Church of Scientology which saw it become the subject of legislative bans in three Australian state jurisdictions during the late 1960s, as well as it launching a high profile, but ultimately unsuccessful, legal case against ASIO in 1979. While never considered a serious security risk by ASIO, the Church of Scientology played a minor role in a number of important events in the history of ASIO particularly during the 1970s, including participating in a wider activist campaign which sought to curtail ASIO’s operations during this period and making submissions to the first Royal Commission into the Australian Intelligence Services under Justice Robert Marsden Hope.     

Shield of collaboration: The Wang Jingwei regime's security service, 1939–1945

This article studies the role of the security service in the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime (1940–45), and argues that it not only contributed to the regime's coercive muscle but that it was also involved with the regime's broader socio-political policies. The central position within the Wang Jingwei government enjoyed by the security service enabled its head, Li Shiqun, to wield enormous influence within the regime. However the Wang Jingwei government had to share control over its security service with the Japanese intelligence agencies. This dual control made the security service a less tractable instrument of regime control than it should have been. This dual authority provided a clear example of the limits on the power of a collaborationist regime like the Wang Jingwei government, even in the crucial area of regime security.     

Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: do natural disasters incite terror?

A novel and important issue in contemporary security policy is the impact of natural disasters on terrorism. Natural disasters can strain a society and its government, creating vulnerabilities which terrorist groups might exploit. Using a structured methodology and detailed data on terrorism, disasters, and other relevant controls for 167 countries between 1970 and 2007, we find a strong positive impact of disaster-related deaths on subsequent terrorism incidence and fatalities. Furthermore, the effects differ by disaster type and GDP per capita. The results consistently are significant and robust across a multitude of disaster and terrorism measures for a diverse set of model specifications.     

Counter-Intelligence for counter-revolutionary warfare: The South African police security branch 1979–1990

In counter-revolutionary warfare strategy, political action forms the overwhelming part; however, also central as an off-shoot of the tenets of counter-revolutionary warfare is the elimination of insurgent structures – generally a euphemism for assassination. In reality, assassination is a subset of covert paramilitary action, implemented as a consequence of counter-intelligence or even counter-terrorism. South Africa's Security Branch presents one of the best recent examples of the use of counter-intelligence techniques for counter-revolutionary warfare. While politico-constitutional intelligence was gathered by the National Intelligence Service to support constitutional efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict and bring about a new political dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid government relied on the covert operational capabilities of the security forces (especially the Security Branch) to not only halt the ‘Revolutionary Onslaught’ of the liberation movements, but to eliminate them as a viable political and revolutionary force. In attempting to support an unwinnable political objective, the ultimate corruption of the intelligence process and the reliance of individuals overseeing it far and away on the covert operational intelligence capabilities of the state, the apartheid government brought about its own downfall. The Security Branch was at the heart of these efforts.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.     

German Intelligence History: A Field in Search of Scholars

German historians have so far shown little interest in the history of intelligence services and in the role the craft of intelligence played in national and international politics. The sole exception is found in the historical writings on East Germany between 1945 and 1990, where the Ministry for State Security - or Stasi - has become the subject of dozens of highly valuable studies. This neglect cannot be explained simply by pointing to the difficulties in getting access to relevant source materials. A more plausible explanation is found in the reluctance on the part of most German intellectuals to study the broader questions of war and peace in international politics. Military history has been marginalised in post-1945 German universities. The same is largely true of international security studies, defence studies, studies of insurgency, terrorism and various related subjects. Peace and conflict studies, a discipline established sometime in the 1970s, has mostly avoided both war or intelligence. The deeper reasons for this neglect lie both in Germany's psychological atmosphere and in academic politics. Spy novels and spy movies are as popular in Germany as anywhere but their heroes almost never are Germans. Even those German intelligence officers and spies who worked against Hitler and might therefore be regarded as heroes are barely known in present-day Germany. Those few scholars who are now trying to build up the field of intelligence studies get little help from their government or from private funders. While East Germany publicly revered communist spies like Richard Sorge and Klaus Fuchs, the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst did and does nothing to publicise its achievements.     

‘A Profoundly Disruptive Force’: The CIA,Historiography and the Perils of Globalization

This essay argues that, since 1989, the CIA has been slow to understand the transformative impact of globalization upon its own activities as an intelligence agency. While the CIA spent considerable time examining global trends as part of its work on generalized strategic analysis, its thinking about how globalization would change its own business was less prescient. This problem is explained in terms of the way in which debates over the CIA have been framed historiographically. While intelligence studies as a subject has been successfully integrated into mainstream international history, it has failed to make the same connections with international relations. As a result, those debating how intelligence might change have tended to focus quite narrowly on matters of bureaucratic organization and have taken only limited interest in global politics. This is stark contrast to those working on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism, who have engaged in wider debates about world affairs. This needs to change, since the perils of globalization remain the over-arching challenge for the CIA over the next ten years.     

Burma's intelligence apparatus

Since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma has developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. So powerful did the MIS become that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel. After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy has continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several intelligence failures in recent years, however, have raised serious questions about the ability of even this expanded apparatus to meet all the demands being placed upon it.     

International organized crime

He has served as a consultant to the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, and related agencies of the U.S. government. He has written, coauthored, or edited over sixteen books on intelligence and national security.     

Improving the democratic accountability of EU intelligence

The 9/11 attack and the ‘war on terrorism’ have been followed by a discussion on intelligence deficits. However, surprisingly little attention has been given to the issue of agencies' democratic accountability. This article argues the benefits of oversight for democracy and its significance for the improvement of services' performance. It puts EU intelligence agencies, which have hardly been the subject of any debate, at the centre. While acknowledging that the major threats to civil liberties of European citizens are posed by national intelligence agencies, it identifies the establishment of mechanisms for quality control of EU intelligence as the main challenge at the EU level.     

Partisan Improprieties: Ministerial Control and Australia's Security Agencies, 1962–72

Partisan behaviour and abuses by intelligence and security agencies have often been attributed to the fact that agencies have become ‘out of control’ or ‘rogue elephants’. But a detailed empirical study of the politicization of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) over ten years shows that the agency was not ‘out of control’ but very much under the control of its minister. The partisan use of security information arose from directives issued through the ‘democratic’ control exercised by a government. On the basis of this study, prevention of abuses by tighter governmental control is unlikely to work. A combination of government control, autonomy of the agency and independent scrutiny by an inspector-general is more likely to succeed.     

Sudan's Security Agencies: Fragmentation,Visibility and Mimicry, 1908–89

This article contends that, in the period under study, government security agencies in both colonial and post-colonial Sudan have failed to dominate society. It attributes this failure to the limited resources and limited ambitions of the state, and the fact that its security organs were thus weakly institutionalized. The fact that these failures persisted after independence, in spite of the efforts of post-colonial governments to expand their intelligence agencies, demonstrated the divisions within the state and the extent to which it could be captured by competing political and social groups.     

Administrative reform in Haiti: Problems,progress and prospects

A growing awareness among officials in Haiti of the need for public service reforms has resulted in the reorganization and revitalization of the country's Administrative Reform Commission (Commission Administrative). At present there is no uniformity in organization, procedures, regulations or remuneration between the different government agencies. The bureaucrats have little security and the bureaucracy is completely dominated by the executive branch of government. Coupled with this, owing largely to the budgeting system, the public service has developed into virtually two separate services, one dealing with development and the other with recurrent tasks. The number of public servants has doubled in the past decade. The Administrative Reform Commission has identified its priorities including the creation of a unified career service system, a restructuring of the bureaucracy and decentralization. This article comments on the Commission's proposals and the problems of implementing them.     

Signals intelligence in India

In May 1945, as France celebrated the end of the Second World War in Europe, its foremost overseas dependency, Algeria, erupted into rebellion. Revisiting the roles and responses of the colonial security forces to what came to be known as the Sétif uprising, this article suggests two things. One is that the intensity of repressive violence pursued becomes more explicable once we consider the part played by political intelligence gathering in the operation of French colonial government in Algeria. The other is that the decision to use the political intelligence amassed before, during, and after the rebellion to coerce the Algerian population at the rebellion's epicentre signified a fundamental shift in the nature of the French colonial state in Algeria. Intelligence-led security policing, much of it later adopted by police agencies in metropolitan France at the height of the Algerian War, became more repressive, less selective, and highly violent.