人工智能时代的政务智慧转型

当前人工智能技术的不断发展和广泛应用使得人类逐渐进入到人工智能时代.人工智能技术对以自然人为主体构成的整个人类社会产生了深远的影响.对行政体系而言,包括对传统政府的主体、行为模式、组织运作等都产生了深刻的影响.从知识管理的角度出发,政府可视为一种公共管理的智慧集合,在人工智能不断渗入的情况下,传统政府正在从单一的自然人的政务智慧集合逐渐演化为人机高度融合的泛政务智慧体系.人工智能是人类文明的一次巨大飞跃,最终会形成人与人工智能密切融合的新的社会文明形态,而传统的行政体制也将形成新的人机高度融合的新形态.     

Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations

Intelligence liaison increased exponentially during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. Today it continues as the most significant dimension of intelligence, including impacting on accountability and oversight considerations. Nevertheless, the intelligence liaison phenomenon remains largely under-studied and substantially under-theorized. In this article, preliminary suggestions are offered concerning how this dearth of theory can be addressed. Firstly, the relevance of international relations theory and other bodies of theory, together with significant approaches concerning how international relations – extending to how intelligence and intelligence-related phenomena (such as, in this article, intelligence co-operation) – can be studied, are explored. These theories, and equally, approaches, are arguably most appropriate when deployed in an arrangement of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ across the different interrelated levels of experience and analysis, and they offer more effective explanations when intelligence liaison is disaggregated into at least eight systemic attributes or variables. More broadly, the suggestion that international relations theory, and indeed theory generally, is ‘irrelevant’ to intelligence studies is simultaneously challenged.     

Comparing the Democratization of Intelligence

This introductory article discusses some of the main themes that are contained within this collection originally delivered as papers to two conferences. There is brief consideration of some issues of method and major themes relating to the legacy of authoritarian regimes, the process of change and the current state of ‘democracy’ are identified. Continuing controversies and uncertainties around intelligence have important implications for democratic governance in many countries which must encourage more comparative work in this key area of intelligence studies.     

Glimpses into the Gems of American Intelligence: The President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate

The two most prestigious products prepared by the US intelligence agencies for use by decision-makers in Washington, DC, are the President's Daily Brief and the National Intelligence Estimate. The Brief, an example of ‘current intelligence,’ adds value to what policy officials in Washington can learn about world affairs from the best newspapers, especially in the domains of foreign weaponry, activities within closed societies, and the machinations of terrorist organizations. The National Intelligence Estimate, an example of ‘research intelligence,’ has added value, too, on occasion, but has often been wrong. Each of these forms of intelligence has their critics, and the NIE in particular is frequently considered too long a document and too diluted in content. The production of NIEs has varied over the years since 1950, averaging twenty-three a year with a low of five (in 1976) and a high of fifty-six (in 1992).     

多元智力理论与人才培养

多元智力理论认为,每一个体的智力都是多元的,都具有自己的特点和独特的组合方式。同时,智力的本质是实践能力和创造能力,个体智力的发展方向和程度受到特定社会文化的影响和制约。这一理论对当前我国人才培养有以下几点启示:促进人的全面发展;尊重人的个性发展;注重培养人的实践能力和创造能力;重视社会文化与人的发展相结合。     

Intelligence fact and fiction

Nigel West, GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 1900–1986 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), pp.294; £12.95. Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and Whore (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), pp.436; £14.95.     

Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century

The transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no less profound than that of the weapons, platforms, warfighting systems and governments they are designed to support and inform. Moreover, the cumulative weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the way in which intelligence is used and conceived. The old demarcation lines between strategic and operational intelligence and between operations and intelligence, once starkly differentiated will blur. Decision-makers will have better access to intelligence as a result of advances in ‘pull’ technology which have made possible intelligence on demand while open source intelligence will enrich and add value to national intelligence databases.

Although information will become more plentiful and less of a privileged source in the global information environment of the twenty-first century, paradoxically the demand for timely, high quality strategic and operational intelligence will intensify rather than diminish. What will distinguish the successful practitioners of twenty-first century intelligence is the ability to fuse and integrate all elements of the process to provide seamless support for policy-makers and operational commanders. However, despite impressive advances in integration, technical collection and communications no intelligence system, no matter how efficacious, will ever be able to completely dispel the fog of war.     

论集体侦查智能的特性与类型

集体侦查智能是两个或多个个体为完成共同的侦查任务形成的智能的集合,具有正负双重可能效应、依赖个体间通信、受规则约束下协调机制制约的特性;包括调查人员与技术人员的集体侦查智能,领导与个人的集体侦查智能,同资质侦查个人之间的集体侦查智能,侦查个体与群众之间的集体侦查智能。     

Intelligence Studies on the Continent

The study of intelligence is often inward-looking. Scholars focus upon the means of gathering, evaluating, and distributing information with subsequent evaluation of its impact on decision making. Institution-based analysis ignores the role that the intelligence craft plays in the broader social and political context. This is apparent in the case of intelligence failures which reach beyond government to influence public opinion and ultimately the ability of authorities to mobilise support and govern. In the wake of failure, competing elites contest for power with conspiratorial interpretations of events that provide psychological comfort by offering explanations for events, targeting culprits, and fixing blame. This essay considers the intelligence failure of September 11, 2001, and outlines the conspiracy theories of left and right raised in its wake. Among those charged were the usual suspects - Zionists, the anti-Christ, advocates of a New World Order, and members of the military-industrial complex. In response, American government authorities validated their opponents' plot-making by defending themselves with their own cries of conspiracy. Heightened government secrecy, efforts to intensify surveillance, and the rhetoric of fear deepened the intrigue. In such a culture of conspiracy, charges of subversion bring only short-run gain. Public faith in institutions is eroded and paranoia becomes the conventional wisdom.     

Intelligence Analysis

American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is ‘strategic’ or ‘national’ intelligence and ‘tactical’ intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature.